Indian Philosophical Quarterly

Vol. 18 1991

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Harid

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

078678

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

COMPILED

078678

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

FORMERLY 'THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY' □ NEW SERIES
ISSN 0376-415X
JOURNAL OF THE PRATAP CENTRE OF PHILOSOPHY, AMALNER
AND
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, POONA UNIVERSITY, POONA

EDITORS

S. BARLINGAY, RAJENDRA PRASAD, M. P. MARATHE
R. SUNDARA RAJAN, MRINAL MIRI, S. S. DESHPANDE

Vol. XVIII
No. 1
January, 1991

University of Poona

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
ISSN 0376-415X

Editors

S. S. Barlingay, (Professor Emeritus, Poona University), Rajendra Prasad, (Rtd. Professor, Patna), M. P. Marathe (Poona University), R. Sundara Rajan (Poona University), Mrinal Miri (NEHU, Shillong), S. S. Deshpande (Poona University)

Board of Consulting Editors :

G. N. Mathrani (Bombay), Daya Krishna (Jaipur), Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta), K. J Shah (Dharwad), R. C. Pandeya (Delhi University), D. P. Chattopadhyaya (Jadavpur University), G. N. Joshi (Poona). D. Y. Deshpande (Nagpur), J de Marneffe (Poona), Dharmendra Kumar (Delhi University), R. C Gandhi (Delhi), J. Khwaja (Aligarh Muslim University), S. A Shaida (I. I. T., Kanpur), Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow University), S. K. Saxena (Delhi University), S. V. Bokil (Poona University), R. A Sinari (Goa University), R. K. Gupta (Delhi University), R. Balasubramanian (Pondicherry University), Ranveer Singh (Imphal), V. K. Bharadwaja (Delhi University), Ashok Gangadean (Haverford College, USA).

Articles in this Journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index, U. S. A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium, and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).

Articles for publication, Books for Review, and other communications pertaining to publications, Book-reviews, subscriptions, I. P. Q. Publications, etc. may be sent to :

The Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Department of Philosophy, Poona University, Pune 411 007, India.

Subscription to be sent to :

The Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly (by Cash or by Cheque)

- Change of Address and/or non-receipt of an issue of the Journal may be intimated within a month of the date of publication

- **Life Membership :**

Individuals	:	Rs. 400/-(in India) US $ 100/-(outside India)
Institutions	:	Rs. 1500/-(in India) US $ 200/-(outside India)

- **Annual Subscriptions :**

Individuals	:	Rs. 60 (Rs. 45/- by cheque) US $ 35.00
Institutions	:	Rs. 100 (Rs. 80/- by cheque) US $ 50.00
Single copy	:	Rs. 20/- US $ 5.00

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regn. No. 24248/73

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

ASHOK GANGADEAN : Predication and Logic of Language (I) .. 1

R. SUNDARA RAJAN : Aspects of the Problem of Reference (2) .. 53

JAGAT PAL : G. E Moore on the Values of Whole and Parts : A Critique .. 73

DANIEL HOLBROOK : The Ontology of Mental Images .. 87

K SRINIVAS : Analysis as a Method in Philosophy with Special Reference to A. J. Ayer ... 111

DISCUSSION ... 125

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

- Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I. P. Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
- The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
- **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
- The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
- Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
- Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining, bold face by wavy underlining.
- The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
- Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
- The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations.

Edited and Published by S. S. Barlingay, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune 411 007.
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, Pune 411016.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regn. No. 24248/73

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

R. SUNDARA RAJAN : Aspects of the Problem of Reference ... 153

ASHOK GANGADEAN : Predication and Logic of Language (II) ... 199

MANGALA R. CHINCHORE : Kṛtapraṇāśa and Akṛtābhyāgama : An Analysis, Defance and Rationale of the Buddhist Theory of Action ... 231

PHILIPPE H. FLURI : Thomas S Kuhn and L Fleck : Two Sociologists of Science .. 271

P. R BHAT : Pragmatic Principles and Language ... 285

V. ANANDA REDDY : Sri Aurobindo and the Process of Physical Transformation .. 315

JYOTSNA BAPAT : A Candidate Paradigm for Human Ecology ... 335

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

* Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I. P. Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
* The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
* **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
* The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
* Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
* Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining, bold face by wavy underlining.
* The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than Engl sh should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
* Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
* The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes p pers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations

---

Edited and Published by S S. Barlingay, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona Pune 411 007

CC-0. In Public Domain. Panini Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regn. No. 24248/73

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

ASHOK GANGADEAN : Predication and Logic of Language (III) . 363

R. SUNDARA RAJAN : Aspects of the Problem of Reference (IV) ... 431

A. KANTHAMANI : L J Cohen's Metaphilosophical Relativism .. 461

P B. JOHNNIE : Social Constructionist and Positivist Approaches to Social Enquiry : Some Comments ...479

R. P. SINGH : Contradiction and Sublation : Hegel on Dialectic .. 503

: BOOK REVIEW ...519

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

* Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I. P. Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
* The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
* **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
* The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
* Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
* Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining, bold face by wavy underlining.
* The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
* Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months. which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
* The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations

---

Edited and Published by S. S. Barlingay, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona Pune 411 007.
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, Pune 411016

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regn No. 24248/73

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

KAI NIELSEN	:	Testing Anti-Paternalism : Some Medical Cases	.. 525
BRADLEY YORK BARTHOLOMEW	:	Inner Self Located	.. 549
JOHN W. MURPHY	:	The Genetic Code in View of Postmodern Linguistics	...567
RAGHUNATH GHOSH	:	Some Reflections on the Nyāya Theory of Action	. 581
PRABHAT MISRA	:	The Concept of Tātaparya in Indian Theory of Meaning	...595
ARVIND SHARMA	:	Should the Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion be Normative ?	.. 609
SRI CHANDRA	:	The Indian Conception of Philosophy	.. 621
N. S. DRAVID	:	*DISCUSSION* Some Observations on the so-called 'Buddhist Process-Ethics'	.. 623

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

* Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I. P. Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
* The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
* **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
* The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
* Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
* Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one. Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining, bold face by wavy underlining.
* The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
* Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
* The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations

---

Edited and Published by S. S. Barlingay, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune 411 007
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, Pune 411 016

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 1.
January 1991

PREDICATION AND LOGIC OF LANGUAGE (I)

Introduction

This essay is part of a larger project on the logic of language. In what follows we focus specifically on the nature of predication as this shapes logical form. It is clear in different traditions of logical theory and philosophy of language that the concept of predication is fundamental in understanding the nature of thought, rational form, the nature of judgment, discourse and the grammar of reality. The space of predication is the rational space in which language and discourse proceeds; in which meaning and human understanding functions; in which the grammars of experience and existence co-arise. And it is clear that the space of predication is a focal point for understanding a range of primary and mutually implicated concepts such as naming, reference, sense, predicability, categories, proposition, assertion, quantification, truth, tense, modality, existential import, and other important features in the logic of discourse. So, a proper understanding of predication is vital for gaining clarity on logical form, rationality, ontology, and the logic of language.

In the unfolding dialectics of " western " logical theory we have reached an exciting and creative horizon. With the publication of the highly original and seminal book–*The Logic of Natural Language* by Fred Sommers (Oxford, 1982) the analysis of predication and logical form has reached a critical moment. Sommers presents a general model of predication for natural

Received : 8–5-1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

language and argues that all propositions exhibit a common and generic predicative form. Sommers extends and revises and builds upon the classical Aristotelian paradigm of predication and argues that intrinsic to this paradigm is a generic model of predication for all thoughts or propositions. The prior attempts to clearly analyze and explicate the general form of predication for all propositions, and thus provide a simplified and coherent general logic for language had not been accomplished over the centuries. And it is clear that the classical subject–predicate model of thought persisted since the innovations of Aristotle and profoundly influenced the evolution of thought. Laibniz dreamt of a universal calculus in the subject-predicate logic and apparently believed that a universal grammar of thought could be developed in which all propositions would be shown to be subject–predicate in form. It is clear that the subject–predicate logic of Aristotle was the basis of Kant's analysis of the categories as they derived from his explication of the forms of judgment.

Despite its long and venerable history, the classical predicative model of thought which was the core of Aristotle's logic was virtually set aside with the dramatic innovations of Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, and others. Frege opened the way to a different paradigm of logical form which essentially rejected the Aristotelian model. He replaced the subject-predicate model of thought with a functional model of predication which was the basis for a new general analysis of thought and a powerful calculus for reasoning. These dramatic innovations in birthing of a new science of logic sparked the modern analytical revolution in philosophy, and as this movement grew in momentum a new consensus emerged in which the classical paradigm of predication and logical form was virtually regarded as mistaken or obsolete.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Sommers' discoveries are especially remarkable since he presents a simple, elegant and powerful general calculus for the logic of natural language which confirms the intuition that thought essentially exhibits a generic model of predication. If Sommers is right, then the case for classical paradigm of logical form and analysis of thought is reopened and we now have a general instrument for the analysis of thought in natural language that is a serious alternative to the Fregean and post–Fregean models of mathematical logic. Indeed, Sommers presents his discoveries in dialectical critique of contemporary post–Fregean approaches to the logic of language and argues for the superior theoretical powers of the generic model of predication and its effective calculus of terms.[1]

The present essay attempts further to open the way for a radical reconsideration of the nature of predication, logical form and the logic of language. We attempt here to move to an adequate understanding of predication and logical form by bringing the two major paradigms of logic into mutual critique. We attempt to clarify the generic model of predication introduced by Sommers. We suggest that achieving clarity concerning the generic predicative form of thought places logical theory and philosophy of language in a new light.

Most significantly, if Sommers' revival and extensions of the classical Aristotelian model of thought is valid, as I believe it is, then we are faced with the possibility that there are at last two major alternative narratives of the grammar of thought. And if both the Fregean and Aristotelian paradigms of logical form are simultaneously applicable to the logic of natural language, then this raises intriguing questions concerning the ultimate nature of logical form and the nature of thought itself. If, for example, both paradigms adequately represent logical form, and the two paradigms appear to be complementary and perhaps

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

even mutually incompatible on certain fundamental points, then we may well wonder whether there is a fundamental bi–polarization in the analysis of logical form itself. If this be so, then obviously this raises fundamental issues concerning the nature of rationality, logical form, and the nature of discourse.

This essay is presented in four parts–three sections preceded by a general introduction. The introductory section gives a summary overview and historical narrative on the issue surrounding predication and the attempt to discern the generic model of predication. Section one is on " Sense, Truth and Predication " and attempts to open the way and set the philosophical context for explicating the generic concept of predication. Section two focuses on " A Formal Analysis of Predication " and presents the generic-formal model of predication in a preliminary way. And section three, " A Predicative Analysis of General Propositions " applies the generic model in a new clarified understanding of the predicative form of general propositions.

Historical Background

The failure to uncover predication in its generic form is due to the fact that predication has been identified and confused with closely related (and not closely related) concepts such as assertion (affirmation/denial of a predicate of a subject), judgment, reference, truth (satisfaction—an expression being true or false of some object), denotation, attribution, description, subject-predicate relation, substance–attribute relation, etc. These and other notions have been superimposed upon the notion in one way or another in previous accounts. Explication and presentation of the concept of predication in its essentially intensional-generic form involves careful excavation of the concept from the layers of superimposed notions which have kept it concealed. Thus, a major portion of the first part is concerned with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

disentangling predication from these other notions. Only then does the generic-formal concept of predication emerge.

The concept of predication is equally foundational for both the classical Aristotelian logical theory and the contemporary Fregean logical framework. Both accounts failed to uncover the intensional-generic concept of predication, but for different reasons. On the one hand, the Aristotelian account was explicitly intensional (i.e, concerned with sense formation and the categorial principles governing sense) and *purported* generality in the sense that is assumed (but did not demonstrate) that all *statements* were predicative (subject-predicate) in logical form. But this account failed because predication was confused with assertibility (predicatibility with assertibility) i e, the *affirmation* or *denial* of a predicate of a subject. The Aristotelian account failed to distinguish in a clear and systematic way between a *proposition* (in the special Fregean sense in which represents the sense-content of a statement or assertion-judgment) and a statement (judgment, assertion). Predieation is concerned with the sense-content (sense–structure) of *propositions* — this constitutes its essentially intensional feature. Thus, although the Aristotelian account *aimed* at an intensional and general treatment of predication it failed to explicate predication in a purely intensional way, since it focused on judgment or assertibility of statements. At the same time it failed to *generalize* the concept of predication. That is, syllogistic logic was developed for general statements and certain other statement-forms, such as compound statements, were not successfully included in the subject-predicate logic. But it was still assumed in the Aristotelian framework that *all statements* were subject-predicate in logical form. Partly responsible *for this failure in generality* was the dominance of the subject-predicate paradigm. The concept of predication was modelled on the subject-predicate relation, and this in turn was connected

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with the substance-attribute (metaphysical) relation. This paradigm of predication was an obstacle when it came to the logical analysis of relational statements and such compound forms as hypothetical and disjunctive statements. The generic concept of predication *transcends* both the sucject-predicaie relation and the substance-attribute relation. Predication is a relation between constituents of *propositions,* or *terms,* and terms must not be confused with *linguistic* expressions. It will be shown later that the subject–predicate paradigm of predication has been largely responsible for distortion of the *generic* concept of predication. It was harmless enough in the logical analysis of general-categorial statements as well as singular statements, but it hindered, rather than helped, in the analysis of the logical form (sense–structure) of relational and compound statements. It is best to drop all talk of subject and predicate in theory of predication, and insted speak more neutrally of *terms,* or of *prior* and *posterior* positions (rather than subjects and predicates). To drop all talk of subjects and predicates is not to abandon predication. As we shall see in a moment, Frege did just this, yet predication was central to his logical theory. The generic concept of predication does not entail that all propositions are subject-predicate in form; it means simply that they are predicative. Thus, despite intentions, the Aristotelian account failed to discover the purely intensional concept of predication.

On the other hand, Frege transcended some of the limitations of the Aristotelian account of predication only to introduce distortions of his own. Frege, who was a mathematician interested in the foundations of mathematics, found the classical logic which derived from Aristotle quite unsuited to the task of mathematical analysis. He (almost single-handedly) forged a new organon in his *Begriffsschrift* (1879) which started modern logic on its present course. Frege's logical theory was a radical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

break with traditional logic. He moved *potentially* closer to the general concept of predication when he rightly abandoned the subject-predicate parcdigm for predicative structure. He replaced that paradigm with a different one–the function-argument (Fx) paradigm, which was suggested to him from mathematical discourse. On this new model predication consists of the application (juxtaposition) of a function (or predicate), which is essentially " incomplete " to an argument (individual object, or ordered sequence of objects, or individual variables, depending on whether the predicate-function was absolute or relative). This new model opened the way to a new generality in logical theory—the theory of quantification.[3] The functional model for predication provided a common paradigm with which to analyze the logical structure of singular, relational and general statements.

Besides this important theoretical advance Frege was brilliant in his distinction between propositional content and judgment/assertion. More than any other previous (and perhaps subsequent) thinker he was powerful in his critique of psychologism in logical theory. Part of his motivation for the rejection of the subject-predicate paradigm was based upon his insight that logical thory (theory of logical form) is primarily concerned with conceptual (sense) content (the proposition), whereas the subject-predicate relation (distinction) was, he thought, primarily grammatical and rhetorical in import. For Frege predication was the structure of *propositions* (in his special clarified sense). This recognition was *potentially* a major advance toward the generic concept of predication. I say " potentially " because, as I shall claim in a moment, Frege restricted predication to logically singular propositions (including relational propositions). He did not treat *all* propositions predicatively, only atomic or elementary propositions are predicative on his view.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Another related possible advantage of the Fregean account was his now classical distinction between *sense and reference.* This distinction was fundamental to his logical theory, and it parallels the distinction between proposition (conoeptual content) and judgment (assertion/statement). The proposition constitutes sense-content, and in judgment a movement is made beyond the proposition (sense) to the truth (truth-value) or reference of a declarative sentence. The *sense* of a declarative sentence is the proposition, and the reference is the truth-value (which is discerned in judgment). Again, ostensibly, predication is the structure of *propositions,* not just judgment or assertion. That is, predication is concerned with sense structure This important distinction should have opened the way to the purely intensional conception (analysis) of predication But it didn't.

Despite its (potential) advantages of abandoing the subject-predicate paradigm (and the important breakthrough to *one* form of generality connected with the functional model) and the clear-headed distinction between proposition and judgment/assertion, together with the related distinction between sense and reference, the Fregean account failed to discern the generic-intensional concept of predication. For, in the Fregean theory, predication turns out to be *neither intensional nor generic.* Not generic, since only elementary (atomic) propositions are predicative, and this means that predication is logically singular; not intensional, since Frege's analysis of propositions is dominated and shaped by an interest on truth-conditions rather than sense-conditions. And this leads to an extentionalist conception of predication.

The Fregean theory assumes that predication is logically singular. For in breaking with the classical framework for logic it proposed the radical thesis that general propositions (despite grammatical appearances) are *not* subject-predicate in *logical*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

structure, and are in fact not predicative at all. One of the major advances claimed for the Fregean theory is the "recognition" that the logical structure of singular and general propositions differ radically. The former are predicative, but the latter are complex in logical structure, involving quantification (quantifiers) applied to a compound propositional function (which are analyzed by means of propositional connectives). For example, a statement of the form:

"All Humans are Mortal"

is not, as the classical theory held, subject-predicate in structure, but rather really asserts:

"For every object in the universe, *if* a given object is human, then it is mortal".

which is rendered symbolically as :

$$(x)\ (Hx \supset Mx)$$

Thus, general statements are really (it is claimed) quantificational in logical structure, involving application of a quantifier to a compound propositional function. The latter involves propositional connectives, i.e., logical signs which connect *whole propositions* (rather than terms), while syncategorematic particles such as "is", 'isn't", "not", etc are taken to be essentially predicative (sub-atomic) functions. This means that quantificational logic (general logic) presupposes the primacy of propositional logic, and here is another radical break with the classical theory. For, in the Aristotelian theory it was assumed that syllogistic logic, the logic of terms, was primary logic (rather than the later developed propositional logic, which dealt with external relations between propositions). The classical orientation was reversed in the Fregean theory of logic.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This new orientation must be stressed here since it is responsible for the *extensionalist* (rather than the intensionalist) approach to predication. For propositional logic (primary logic for Frege) is admittedly extensional in the sense that the formative (logical) signs are taken to be essetially truth-functional. From the logical point of view the sense content (sense-functions) does not enter in the logical analysis of compound propositions, only truth values or reference makes a difference. This extensionality (pre-occupation with truth-value and reference, rather than sense) penetrates down to the sub-atomic level and pervades the concept of predication itself. Despite his clear distinction between propositional (sense-) content and judgment/assertion, Frege's theory of logical form is controlled by a concern for truth-structure, and hence assertive form, rather than sense structure and predicative form. It will be shown, particularly in section three, that the extensionality which dominates Fregean logic leads to an extensional conception of predication, and the latter is essentially connected with the dogma of singular predication. The Fregean conception of predication, which is shared in one way or another by such diverse theorists as Quine, Geach, Strawson, and Searle[8], is extensional and singular.

The extensionalist conception of predication is more clearly evident in such followers of Frege as Quine and Geach. It is the view that predication consists in a relation between a *predicate expression* (e. g. 'F–', if an absolute predicate) and the *object referred to* by the logical subject (which is a singular expression). The relation is that of *being true or false of* the object, i e., the truth-relation of satisfaction. It will be shown that the extensionalist concept of predication is problematic, as is the related assumption that predication is logically singular (the singular dogma). The extensionalist thesis is the view that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

predication consists in a relation between *an expression* (predicate) and *an object.* It is questionable because it confuses predication—which is essentially a sense relation between propositional constituents (terms)—with the notions of reference and satisfaction (true or false of). For neither expressions (predicates) nor objects (referents) are constituents of propositions (predications), which, by the way, Frege explicitly recognized. And the relation between an expression and an object (satisfaction) is not the same as the intensional (sense) relation between terms.

But the extensionalist conception of predication is mistaken on another count, namely, its attendant assumption that predication is logically singular. This latter assumption–the singular dogma–is essentially connected with the extensionalist thesis.

These distortions in the concept of predication, we shall see, are due to a failure to be thoroughly Fregean, i.e., to follow through consistently of Frege's crucial distinction between proposition and judgment/assertion. Apparently Frege did not realize how radical the sense-reference distinction really was (this is developed in section 1). It did not fully emerge that sense-functions must be distinguished from truth-functions, and that there may be a disparity in logical form between sense structure and truth-structure. Theory of sense-formation is not the same as theory of judgmental form or assertibility. The former is concerned with *intelligibility or sense-conditions,* while the latter is concerned with assertibility or truth-conditions. Thus, it is surprising that the Fregean account of predication, which initially linked predication with proposition (sense), and which, in one sense at least, moved towards generality in the theory of propositions, nevertheless ended with an account of predication that was neither generic nor intensional.[4]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Sommers' Calculus of Terms

An important advance towards the generic concept of predication comes with the publication of Sommers' paper– "The Calculus of Terms" *Mind*, 1970). Sommers breaks new ground in this highly innovative and yet classical treatment of predication. The classical Aristotelian theory of predication has been dismissed by contemporary Fregeans for now well known reasons. Sommers mentions some of these at the beginning of this paper :

1) The failure of classical logic to develop a calculus of propositions.

2) The inevitable failure of classical logic to provide schemata for inferences involving polyadic statements (i.e. relations).

3) The classical doctrine that all inference is basically syllogistic.

4) The classical doctrine that all statements—including relational and compound statements–are subject-predicate in form.

Clearly the Aristotelian logic was deficient where (1) is concerned; it failed to develop a calculus of propositions. According to the Fregean view this deficiency reflects a fundamental misunderstanding on Aristotle's part of *primary logic*. For, according to Frege, propositional logic, and not syllogistic (the logic of terms) is primary logic. General logic (quantification theory or predicate logic) which corresponds to the classical logic of terms, presupposes propositional logic. This means, on the Fregean view, that Aristotelian syllogistic is a mere fragment of general quantificational logic. Hence, neither primary logic nor general logic was developed in syllogistic theory.

The charge, then, is not that classical logic *happened* not to have developed a propositional logic (calculus), but rather that *in principle* it could not have succeeded, since it was crippled by the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

assumption that all statements (including compound statements) were of the subject-predicate form. Neither, on this view. are relational statements subject-predicate in form. Still another gross deficiency of the classical approach, according to Fregeans, was its ineviitable failure to give a satisfactory account on the logic of relations (which, of course, is especially important in mathematical discourse).

Furthermore, according to the Fregean critique, the Aristotelian logic fundamentally misunderstood the nature of its own greatest achievement—the syllogistic theory of general statements The dominance of the subject-predicate paradigm was (at least in part) responsible not only for failure to adequately understand the logical form of compound and relational statements, but (perhaps even worse) for failure to understand the logical form of general statements as well. For, as pointed out earlier, on the Fregean theory general statements are not of the subject-predicate form either. And this " discovery " of Frege was one of his greatest contributions, according to his followers. For example Russell says :

> " The first serious advance in real logic since the time of the Greeks was made independently by Peano and Frege—both mathematicians. Traditional logic regarded the two propositions ' Socrates is mortal ' and ' All men are mortal' as being of the same form. The philosophical importance of logic may be illustrated by the fact that this confusion, which is still committed by most writers, obscured not only the whole study of the form of judgment and inference, but also the relation of things to their qualities, of concrete existence to abstract concepts, and to the world of platonic ideas... Peano and Frege, who pointed out the error, did so for technical reasons .. but the philosophical advance which they made possible is impossible to exaggerate. " ("Logic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

as the Essence of Philosophy" in *Our Knowledge of the External Warld "*)

Frege and his followers have claimed repeatedly that the classical logic is inimical to clear thought and genuine logic understanding. Russell,[5] again, is a good example of this. He says in one place that the Aristotelian system is " as definitely antiquated as the Ptolemaic astronomy ". He goes on :

> " This makes it difficult to do historical justice to Aristotle. His present-day influence is so inimical to clear thinking that it is hard to remember how great an advance he made upon his predecessors (including Plato), or how admirable his logical work would still seem if it had been a stage in a continual progress, insteae of being (as in fact is was) a dead end, followed by over two thousand years of stagnation ". (Aristotle's Logic ". *History of Western Philosophy)*

The Aristotelian logic is regarded as being *inherently* inadequate (a dead end), not merely deficient in not having developed certain important aspects of logic. For, it is assumed (claimed) that even in principle the Aristotelian Framework *cannot* provide an adequate logical theory of relational and compound statements, etc.; and that it cannot in principle provide a general calculus for logical inference. Frege and Russell claimed [6] that Leibniz, who attempted to develop a universal " characteristic " (logical language) for philosophy failed to do so because he was still under the influence of the subject-predicate logic. Frege thought that he had discovered a general logical calculus (conceptual notation) of the type that Leibniz was seeking preeisely because he abandoned the subject-predicate logic.

In the light of this attitude towards the classical logic it should appear odd (even perverse) for me to suggest that Sommers'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

work on theory of predication is an important advance towards the intensional-generic concept of predication. For Sommers' research on predication is rooted in the Aristotelian framework, and his "calculus of terms" is a natural development and extension of this subject-predicate framework In his paper Sommers challenges each of the four main charges (listed above) levelled against the classical theory. He sketches the general calculus of terms which is based upon the assumption that all statements are subject-predicate in logical form. He attempts to show not only that the general statements are subject-predicate in *logical* form, but that the common model of the calculus applies to the logical analysis of relational *and* compound statement-forms as well. The result is that the calculus of terms shows that term logic is at once *primary and general.* All statement forms are analyzed logically as being subject-predicate in form, and all inference turns upon common basic syllogistic principles. Sommers argues in turn against each of the following assumptions of the Fregean logic :

> "(i) that the internal structure of general categorical statements is essentially different from that of singular statements, since general categoricals involve truth-functions and arguments under quantification;
>
> (ii) that (in consequence) truth-functional logic (neglected by traditional logicians) is prior to predicate logic or traditional term logic;
>
> (iii) that relational statements are not of subject-predicate form;
>
> (iv) that compound statements cannot even distortedly be construed as being of subject-predicate form;
>
> (v) that (in consequence) it is impossible to reduce compound statement to elementary statements and impossible to eliminate truth-functional connectives;

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(vi) that syllogistic is not a basic form of logical reckoning (that honour belonging to the inference techniques of quantificational logic)" (Calculus of Terms – pp. 38–39)

I shall not attempt to discuss Sommers' calculus of terms here. Certain features of the calculus will be discussed in later sections. Nor am I assuming that Sommers succeeds in all that he claims for the calculus. Cleary there are problems still to be faced (and certain of these are being faced). The discovery of the calculus of terms is a *beginning*, and a remarkable beginning. What Sommers has shown beyond doubt is that the classical Aristotelian framework for logic was dismissed prematurely and unjustifiably by Fregean logicians. Sommers has succeeded in showing that the Aristotelian theory of predication is neither a dead end nor Ptolemaic. On the contrary, it is now clear, with the discovery of the calculus, that the proper analysis of the logical form of statements is not at all a settled matter, but is reopened for discussion. Sommers has shown that the Aristotelian logical framework has remarkable theoretical powers which have not previously been recognized. It is *not* inherently defective and it *can* in principle be developed to overcome the defects ascribed to it. It is in *this* respect–the reopening of issues and questions–that I am claiming that Sommers' work is an advance in the understanding of predication. Sommers' insights into the generality of predication, even though suggested and supported by the power and simplicity of the term calculus, do not *depend* for its legitimacy upon the success or failure of the calculus in its present form. Of course an important test of a theory of predication (logical form) is precisely its ability to provide a logical calculus, and its effectiveness in giving an account of inference. I believe that Sommers *has* succeeded here. But what I wish to stress is the understanding and formal analysis of *predication* which forms the basis of calculus, not the other way around. It

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is a matter of priority. The understanding of inference and entailment relations (and the development and success of a logical calculus) depend upon the analysis of predication. This is why throughout this essay the focus is primarily upon the analysis of predication, and only secondarily upon the workings of the calculus. Whatever difficulties there may be with the calculus in its present form, and whatever transformations it may undergo with future research, this does not alter the fact that the concept of predication is now placed in a new light, and there is before us now a clear alternative to Frege's extensionalist-singular conception of predication.

Before I discuss the critical theoretical discoveries which led Sommers to the general conception of predication let me digress for a moment and elaborate upon the last sentence. I claim that Sommers' research has *reopened* certain fundamental issues of logical theory, and in so doing has shown that the Aristotelian logical framework is a *worthy* alternative to the Fregean framework The point is not that it is always good to have an alternative, but rather that such an alternative is *essential* given the thoroughly extensionalist orientation (shape) of the Fregean approach. Most contemporary discussion (and disagreements) in the theory of predication presuppose the Fregean framework as a common denominator, even when (perhaps especially when) certain writers disagree with Frege on certain points. The Fregean assumption that predication is logically singular, for example, is taken as axiomatic It is critical, therefore, to have a genuinely alternative framework for logical theory. At least now it is *possible* to seriously consider whether general statements are predicative, and whether compound statements (and relational statements) are predicative in logical form.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Another reason for stressing the desirability of an alternative framework for theory of predication is that the Aristotelian theory, despite real limitations and confusions, is essentially *intensional* in orientation. I have been suggesting that the *generic* concept of predication is intensional–i.e., concerned with the sense formation of propositions. Sommers' discovery of the calculus of terms, and the general conception of predication upon which it is based, came only after several years of a systematic move away from the Fregean extensionalist treatment of predication.

In his earlier research on theory of predication Sommers was especially concerned with theory of sense (predicability), and in his paper "The Ordinary Language Tree" (*Mind*, 1959) he discovered that there are formal categorial principles governing predicability or sense-formation. These principles (including the tree-rule) were grounded in the Aristotelian concept of predication. Sommers demonstrated that the Aristotelian concept of predication was *intensional* in the sense that predicability relations between terms conformed to categorial structure in a way that the Fregean theory did not. Sommers located this critical distinction between the two views of predication in the denial-negation distinction. That is, on the Aristotelian view, predication involved the affirmation or *denial* of a predicate of a subject, but denial must not be confused with negation.[7] For negation is a truth-functional connective which operates on a whole atomic or compound proposition, not on a predicate being applied to a subject (sub-atomically). The logical conditions of affirmation/denial are not the same as the logical conditions of assertion/negation. For example, certain terms are, on the Aristotelian theory, *impredicable* of one another, i.e., if they are joined in predication they form a category mistake which is a sentence that is neither true nor false. However, on the extensionalist

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(Fregean) view of predication, in which denial is assimilated to negation, there are no categorial restrictions on predicative formation, hence any two terms may be joined and every syntactically well-formed sentence would have a truth-value.[8]

In his early works, then, Sommers was principally interested in theory of sense-formation (predicability) and this was directly connected with ontological categories and type rules. The formal ontological rules developed and discussed in " Types and Ontology " and " Predicability " were grounded in theory of predication. The primary philosophical motivation centered on formal ontology and metaphysical analysis. Here there is an important contrast to be drawn between Sommers and Frege. Frege was a mathematician, interested in the foundations of mathematics. His logical theory originated and was shaped out of interests in this area (e. g. the shift to the functional paradigm for predication was influenced by his interests in mathematical analysis.[9]) However, Sommers developed theory of predication out of an interest in formal ontology and metaphysical analysis. He found the Fregean theory of predication unsuitable for the task, just as Frege found the classical theory of predication unsuited to his interests in the philosophy of mathematics. Now Aristotle was a metaphysician-ontologist and the organon shaped by him was in certain ways well suited (potentially) to metaphysical analysis. The Arstotellian logic, at least, had *potentiality !*

Let us return to the main point. The philosophical motivation for the development of the Aristotelian logic was the need for a general organon (logical instrument) which was suited to the investigation of sense-formation, ontological categories, and formal ontological analysis. Any serious alternative to the Fregean logical theory should be able to develop a general theory of propositions and provide a general logical calculus.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Unless the Aristotelian logic could be developed and extended to meet the challenges and charges levelled against it by contemporary logicians no discoveries grounded in that framework would be given serious consideration.

It was in this sense, then, that Sommers' research in theory of predication moved towards the discovery of the generic-intensional concept of predication. An important breakthrough in this direction was the discovery of the oppositional nature of formatives (or logical signs). Earlier logicians used the term "syncategorematic" for logical signs such as "every", "is", "not", "some", etc. Propositional constants (connectives) such as "if...then...", "either...or...", etc. are also included in the list of logical signs or formatives. They all play some role in the formation of propositions, simple or compound. These logical signs are contrasted with signs which are descriptive or "extra-logical". The Fregean logic treats *propositional* formatives as primary, and the syncategorematic formative are added to the primary propositional logic in the form of quantification theory. Ostensibly there are important logical differences between propositional formatives, the former being truth-functional, the latter not. (At least this is what is assumed).

Now Sommers points out (in a paper entitled: "Formatives") that no general theoretical account of formatives has been given, either by classical or contemporary logicians. The common practice is to present a list called "logical signs" with no *positive* general characterization (criteria) of such signs. Sommers says,

> "The older label is essentially negative: the syncategorematic elements of a categorical propoitsion are not its terms (predicates or names). A negative characterization has the virtue of not pretending to define a concept governing the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri
078678

list of non-descriptive expressions. Contemporary labels sound more positive but in fact there is no accepted principle for the distinction between formatives and descriptive elements. What counts as a logical sign remains arbitrary. Logicians will agree that ' is identical with ' ought to be included. But they will hesitate over ' is greater than ' or ' is between '... The question I wish to consider is : What is a formative element ? To say that an expression is formative because it is not descriptive or not extra-logical is to appeal to the distinction that wants illumination. The appeal is not more illuminating than explaining the formative character of ' not ' or ' some ' by referring to its formative powers ". (pp. 1–2)

Sommers proceeds in the " Calculus " paper to give a general characterization of formatives and argues that *formatives are signs of logical opposition.* I shall refer to this as the " Opposition Thesis " (OT) of formatives. The OT applies to both groups of formatives, to syncategorematic as well as propositional formatives. He focuses first on syncategorematic formatives, arguing step by step, that these signs are essentially signs of logical opposition. For example, each term may be positively or negatively " charged " – and this represents the *contrariety opposition* (C-opposition). Thus, the term ' un-wise ' is negatively charged, while its opposite ' wise ' is positively charged. Sommers uses a plus-sign for positive logical signs and a minus sign for negative logical signs. Every term, then, has a charge : + P or – P.

A second logical opposition is the predicate-formative (P-opposition). A predicate is distinguished from a term and every predicate has a logical charge (positive or negative). The signs " is " and " isn't " indicate the predicate charge -

" — is P " = + (+P)
" — isn't P " = – (+P)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A third opposition is the propositional opposition–and this is indicated by a logical function which indicates whether the *predicate* (now distinguished from a term) is *affirmed or denied* of the subject. The sign for affirmation is positive and the sign for denial is negative. Let us call this opposition the essertive opposition (A–opposition). (Sommers does not use this characterization. He calls it the *predicative* opposition. But I maintain that Sommers' sense of predicative, affirmation denial, is assertive. Also, I do not agree with Sommers in the notion of a predicate-formative. In section three I shall argue against this notion of a predicate, which is similar to the Fregean notion).

The three oppositional relations presented thus far : C, P, and A, are all qualitative. The critical discovery at this level was that the " quantitative " distinction between " all " and " some " are *also* logical oppositions which may be treated as qualitative opposition, represented by a plus and minus sign also. This distinction is called the Q-opposition. The discovery that the quantifier *(logical* quantity) may be treated along with the other formatives as a qualitative opposition opened the way to a " non-quantificational " (non-Fregean) analysis of general statements. For only then did it become clear that all the predicates are positive and no discriminatory use be made of contrariely to specify the different general statements. Thus, the opposition between and "some" could be brought out as :

Affirm
Deny (All (+/-S) is/isn't - (+/-P)
Some

↑	↑	↑	↑
A	Q	P	C
↓	↓	↓	↓
±	[- (± S)	±	(±P)]
	+		

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Note : It turns out that the "all" is minus and the "some" is plus.

The distinctive logical features of each formative-type is preserved by syntactic position. For example, the left-most opposition preceding the prior term (+/-S) is the Q-sign (All or Some). The sign immediately preceding a term (within parentheses) indicate C-opposition : (+/-S) and (+/-P). etc.

There is some redundancy in the four oppositions (C, P, Q, A) and various schedules of categoricals may be constructed by use of any two oppositions, holding the others constant. A simplified schedule may be used to express the traditional square of opposition as follows :



Sommers demonstrates the power of this analysis by explicating the workings of the calculus which is based upon the opposition notation. For example, a valid inference form from syllogistic is :

All M is P	=	-M + P
All S is M	=	-S + M
All S is P		-S + P

This example shows that the sum of the premises equals the conclusion, if the arguement form is valid (with certain constraints),

$$-S + P - M + M = -S + P$$

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But this is very sketchy. The reader is referred to the Calculus paper for the detailed presentation. I give these examples here to show how the opposition notation looks and how it works. The point is that the insight into the oppositional character of formatives (logical signs) makes clear the predicative structure of statements, the logical connections between the formatives themselves in the compositional structure of statements, and provides a model of logical form which provides a simple and powerful calculus. The full generality of the OT emerges when Sommers extends the analysis to propositional formatives as well. (Sommers also applies the model to the analysis of relational statements, extending the notion of a relational term and making clear the structure of the relational term).

I shall illustrate with the " if... then ..." formative Sommers argues that in compound propositions the constituent propositions may be regarded as propositional-terms : (p) represents " the state of afairs in which p " (waere 'p' is a propositional term). (Sommers calls them " state-terms ".) Sommers shows that conditional or hypothetical propositions exhibit the same logical-predicative form as general (universal) statements :

-S + P All S is P
-(p) + (q) If p then q

The latter is read in the subject-predicate manner : " Every case of p is a case of q ".

The following schema of translation shows how other compound formatives are analyzed :

if p then q = -(p) + (q) = Every (p) is (q)
p and q = +(p) + (q) = Some (p) is (q)
p or q = - (-p) + (q) (i.e., if not-p then q)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Notice the correspondence between the " every... is..." form and the " if .. then...", on the one hand, and the " some... is..." and the " both ... and...". They are isomorphic.

Ironically, I find Frege falling back upon just such an interpretation of the conditional when he attempts to explain the assertive force of hypothetical statements :

> " In the sentence–" If the sun has already risen, the sky is very cloudy "–the time is the present, that is to say definite. Here it can be said that a relation between the truth values of conditional and dependent clauses has been asserted, viz such shat *the case does not occur in which the antecedent stands for the True and the consequent for the False*". " Sense & Reference " p. 74 (my italics).

That is, the assertive content of a conditional statement is subject-predicate (or categorial) in form : " every case of the antecedent is a case of the consequent ", in other words,

" All cases of p are cases of q "
$- (p) + (q)$

Now it should not be surprising to find an intimate connection between " every... is .." and " if... then...". For, Frege translated general statements formed by " every... is. . ." into a form which used " if. . .then. . .": Every S is P becomes (x) (If Sx then Px). Sommers is merely reversing the translation showing that the " if. . .then. . ." statement form may be rendered in subject-predicate form, and with good reason.

The idea, then, is that compound propositions (statements ?) be analyzed into subject-predicate form. And the OT is generalized for all formatives.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> " The differences between the syncategorematic formatives and the propositional formatives is now clear : A syncategorematic formative is a single sign of opposition, a propositional formative is an ordered sequence of oppositional signs. This complexity of the propositional formatives accounts for the fact that we do not intuitively think of them as either positive or negative in the way we naturally do with most of the syncategorematic formative - signs. The extension of the " oppositional " thesis to propositional formatives accepts the traditional view of compound propositions having the form of such subject-predicate propositions Leibniz realized that such a uniform analysis of compound propositions must simplify logical syntax ". (" Formatives " p 19)

Note : Although Sommers uses the term 'proposition' in the above passage, he does not use it in the special Fregean sense that I have been stressing. Sommers uses the terms ' statement ' and ' proposition ' interchangeably.

In reading the logical papers of Leibniz I have discovered striking parallels to the culculus of terms. After the discovery of the OT and the calculus Sommers himself discovered such connections (independently), and he refers to two remarkable passages from Leibniz in his Formatives paper :

> " Thomas Hobbes, everywhere a profound examiner of principles, rightly stated that everything done by the mind is a *computation*, by which is understood either the addition of a sum or the sub-traction of a difference (De Corpore 1, i.2). So just as there are two primary signs of algebra and analytics, "+" and "–", in the same way there are, as it were, two copulas 'is' and 'is not'. Leibniz, *Of the Art of Combination*, Parkinson, p. 3

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> " If, as I hope, I can conceive all propositions as terms and hypotheticals as categoricals, and if I can't treat all propositions universally, this promises a wonderful case in my symbolism and analysis of concepts, and will be a discovery of the greatest importance ". Leibniz, *Logical Papers, Ibid* , p. 66.

Note : See also, Leibniz – " A Study in the Plus-Minus Calculus " Ibid p. 122 ff.

Sommers' discovery that formatives are signs of logical opposition, and that it is possible, even plausible, to construe all statement forms on the subject–predicate model exhibitting a common formative structure, was a most important advance towards the generic concept of predication. Logical theory is now brought under a unified and general characterization of formatives : there is no longer any *formal* reason to divide formatives into two types–syncategorematic and propositional. All formatives are part of the predicative form of propositions, and all propositions are predicative in *form*. For example, both types of formatives (if they really are of different type) are governed by common syllogistic rules of inference. It becomes clear that syllogistic–the logic of terms–is at once primary *and* general logic.

" All S is P " for Frege becomes: " (x) (If Sx then Px)

The point is that there are genuine and irreducible differences between categorical assertive form and hypothetical assertive form. One form cannot, without loss and distortion, translate one form into the other. [10] In terms of assertibility and truth-conditional structure, a categorical is different from a hypothetical. However, it may nevertheless be that they share a common predicative sense-structure. From the *predicative* point of view all propositions are elementary (This is developed below.)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This applies to the distinction between singular and general categoricals as well. Predicatively (propositional structure) they have a common form, but assertively there is a disparity in form. The truth-conditional structure (assertibility conditions) differ. This is why it is critical to distinguish between predicability and assertibility. In failing to make this distinction certain difficulties arise for Sommers in giving a forceful and coherent account of the generality of predication. The generality of the OT applies to the propositional (sense) form—to the sense-functions, not to the truth-functions (statement-form). But apparently Sommers is claiming that predication is the structure of statements.

Again, predication is a purely intensional concept. Although Sommers is especially interested in intensional structure (as evidenced by his earlier critique against the Fregean extensionalism) this becomes obscured by the confusion of proposition with statement (predicability with assertibility, sense-conditions with truth-conditions). Here, we have seen, Frege made the clear distinction between proposition and judgment (assertion), and between sense and reference. So Frege had the advantage here. But Frege lost the advantage since his concept of predication was thoroughly extensional. Frege, too, confused sense-conditions with truth-conditions. On the other hand, Sommers had the advantage in truly generalizing the concept of predication, whereas Frege restricted predication to singular statements. What is needed is a systematic following through of the general concept of predication (suggested by Sommers) with the distinction between proposition and judgment (sense and reference) sug(gested by Frege). When the generic concept of predication is properly and systematically united with propositional (sense) structure, the generic-intensional concept of predication comes into view.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Let us now leave historical (background) considerations and proceed to the actual explication of the generic concept of predication.

Note: It should now be clear that the criticisms levelled against the classical logic were misdirected. It is not that the logic of terms was inherently defective or Ptolemaic, nor that it was wrong-headed in assuming that all propositions had a common predicative form. Rather it was because the very concept of predication was not properly understood and generalized. But this was a defect that afflicted the Fregean logic as much as it did the classical.

SUMMARY PRESENTATION OF MAIN POINTS

Predication as the intensional structure of propositions

Predication consists in the sense-structure of propositions. A proposition is a sense-content (intelligible content) of thoughts. But (as Frege pointed out) it is not an *act*, and *it is not constructed;* it is discerned or apprehended in thought. A proposition is not a judgment, not an assertion, though it figures in these. A proposition (in this special Fregean sense) may equally figure in other linguistic (speech) acts where no assertion is made, no judgment formed, and where the question of truth (fact/existence) does not enter. The constituents of proposition must be sense-contents. Sense-contents which are constituents of propositions are *terms.* Terms configure in a sense-functional way in the *compositional structure* of propositions. Predication consists in the configurability of terms in propositions. Terms are *not* linguistic expressions, though they are *connoted* by expressions (signs), just as a proposition is not an expression (sentence), but is connoted by appropriate sentence-forms.

The rules governing the sense-formation of propositions are predicability rules, rules of intelligibility (sense). These rules

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

involve categorial relations, category structure. Predicability rules are *not* rules of truth, judgment or assertion; not rules of reference or satisfaction. A Sharp distinction must be made in logical theory between rules of sense (intelligibility) and rules of truth (judgment/assertion/reference). This is a natural outcome of Frege's distinction between proposition and judgment (sense and reference).

Predication, therefore, is not assertion, not judgment. A predication does not consist in a relation between expressions, and objecls. A predication does *not* make an existence or truth claim. But a predication does make a *sense claim* over and above its having a sense, i.e., that it *mekes sense*. A predication does not *state* facts. A predication (proposition) *specifies* a state of affairs (State), which is a possible fact, a possibility. The relaion between a proposition and a State is not like that of an expression to a sense-content (term or proposition). It is not the relation of signification or representation. Rather, in apprehending a proposition one apprehends a state.

Predication is not a relation between a subject and predicate; subject and predicate are not constituents of propositions. Predication must not be confused with the notions of reference (an act performed in the *use* of certain signs) and satisfaction (an expression being true or false of an object). Predication is not the affirmation or denial of a predicate of a subject, for affirmation/denial involve assertion and satisfaction. Nor is predication a relation between substance and attribute (not attribution), for predication consists in a sense relation between *terms*, and substance/attribute are not terms, not constituents of propositions. Only constituents of propositions *can* be elements in predication. Predication does not consist in some relation (as Strawson suggests) between particulars and universals.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The logical analysis of sense (propositions) must be distinguished from the logical analysis of statements (judgments/assertions). A distinction must be made between *sense and meaning*. Let us say that propositions have (constitute) sense, and statements (and other linguistic acts) have meaning. Thus, meaning is a broader notion and includes reference, etc. *Meaning* of statements is given by truth-conditions, but sense of propositions is specified by sense-conditions. A distinction must be made between sense-functions and truth-functions. Sentences (of appropriate form-declarative sentences) have sense-values and truth-values. If a sentence connotes (specifies) a proposition it has a sense-value (" Sense = S "), if it fails to specify a proposition then it is Senseless (= "-S"), and this means that it violates category rules–is a category mistake. By contrast, a sentence is *used* to make a statement (express a judgment), and statements are True or False. Predications are not true or false. Sense-content does not represent (or purport to represent) *what is the case* (fact/existence). Predications *categorially* have truth *Status*, but no determinate truth value; *senses* does not refer, though expreseions may be *used* to refer in virtue of sense. Predications are not *potentially* true or false, just as sense is not potentially reference. Nevertheless, propositions have *some* relation to truth (fact/existence), and sense some connection to reference.

Sense is related to truth in a peculiar way The sense of a proposition is not determined (or specified by) the conditions under which a statement is true or false. The distinction between a property-word and a category-word helps to clarify the peculiar relation between proposition and what is true (between truth-status and truth value). To be true or false is to have a *determinate* truth-value. This is one understanding of the disjunction: true or false. By contrast, a category-word consists of taking disjunction of logical contraries as *essentially* one term :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

true-or-false (= /T/). The sign /T/ stands for a category word. Category words have a different logic from ordinary words; /T/ is different from 'true' or from 'false'. Predications are /T/, but neither true nor false. Sense coincides with being /T/, not with being true or false. Thus, to be /T/, does not entail being true or false, even potentially: a predication *itself* does not *become* true or false (sense does not *become* reference). However, to be true or false *does* entail being /T/, i.e, involves sense. This is one attempt to formally explicate the elusive relation between proposition and statement (sense and reference). Strictly speaking, then, propositions (predications) are not true or false, only *sentences* which are *used* to make statements (express judgments/assertions) are. Frege, too, when he is speaking strictly, makes this point (See section I).

Note : To be intelligible is to be /T/. If a sentence represents a proposition it is /T/. This does not entail that in this sense-function it is true or false. For example, "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" is intelligible, hence, has truth status –/T/ But it need not be true or false (determinately). Contrast this with "The equator is clean" which is unintelligible (senseless) and has no truth-status, is not /T/. The truth-functional logician will have difficulty here, for the disjunction "true or false" entails determinate truth-value Often, writers claim that meaning consists in being *true or false*, and this disjunctive predicate is disjunctively stressed, intending to distinguish it from being true or being false. Strawson is a good example of this, especially when he explicates the relation of presupposition. I suggest that what is intended in stressing the disjunctive predicate "true or false" in this context is /T/. The truth-functional logician, however, would deny this, for he has no option but to interpret the 'or' in a determinate-distributive way. For example, the principle of bi-valence : *every statement is true or false* is inter-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

preted to mean that every statement has a determinate truth-value. Aristotle, as we shall see, questions this interpretation for singular predictions (statements about future contingencies). ' /T/ '–a category-word–defines the category of sense. It is essentially a sign of possibility. This must be distinguished from assertibility–i.e, the conditions under which a statement is true or false. Assertibility is connected with *being the case* (fact), predicability is not The critical connection between /T/ (sense) and being true or false (truth) is *judgment*. Frege rightly stressed that it is in judgment that a thinker-judge moves beyond sense to reference or truth. It is in judgment that sense is brought into relation with truth (fact/existence). Thus, the concept of truth is essentially related to judgment-assertion. (The concept of sense is essentially related to possibility. But not the sense of possibility which is associated with the assertive mode–*may be*.)

There is a systematic ambiguity in the concept of logical semantics. The ambiguity is due to the distinction between sense and truth. The characterization of semantics in terms of the relation between signs and what they signify slurs over this important distinction: sense and meaning. For the relation between a sign (expression) and what it *connotes* (specifies), viz *sense*, is not the same as a relation between a sign and its reference, i.e., between a sign and *what is* (fact/existence). A propositional sign (sentence) does not connote (specify) fact (what is the case). Theory of sense must be distinguished from theory of reference. The theory of sense and truth are usually included under the rubric 'semantics', and these distinct concepts are usually linked: sense is specified by truth conditions (consists in being true of false).

Pure semantics is theory of sense (intelligibility). Theory of truth (and reference) involves epistemics and pragmatics. Logic,

...3

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in the primary sense, deals with the laws of sense, not truth. Theory of truth presupposes theory of sense, not the other way around. This should have been the natural outcome of the Fregean line of thought. (See section 1.)

Syntax reflects semantics. The ambiguity found in semantics is reflected in logical syntax (theory of logical form). Sytanx is not autonomous and prior to semantics. The logical form of statements (judgments), i.e., truth-conditional structure need not (does not) coincide with logical form of propositions (predication), i.e., sense-conditional structure or configurability of terms. There is a disparity between assertive-judgmental form and propositional-predicative form.[11] Take, for example, a singular definite description : " The Present King of France is bald ". The *proposition* specified is predicative in sence-structure, and this does not involve existential import. However, if Russell was correct, the assertive structure (truth-conditional structure) is that of a general *statement,* and involves the existential quantifier. Because Russell failed to distinguish (as Frege implicitly did) between sense and meaning he was forced to deny that the *proposition* was predicative, for he assumed that if it were predicative then this would mean that there was a Present King of France, i.e., that a predication involved the existence of the logical subject. But a predication does not *assert* existence, only statements do. Russell was proposing an analysis of the assertive (statements) form in his theory of definite descriptions.

Again, some philosophers argue that " singular predictions "– e. g. "Professor Carnap will fly to the moon " are *really* general in logical form (Ryle, Pierce–" the generality of predictions thesis "). Here again there is a confusion due to ambiguity in ' logical form '. For the *proposition* is predicative and logically singular, but (if Ryle's thesis is correct) the *statement* (assertive form) is logically general. Here too there is a disparity between

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

logical form (sense-structure) of proposition and logical form (truth-conditional/assertive) of statement. A *prediction* is an assertion about some future state. *Propositions* have the same predicative form, past, present or future. (Aristotle's insight into the logic of singular predictions of future contingents trades on this point. See below.) (Thus, syntax (logical form) is the formal representation of semantic features.)

The difference between sense and truth penetrates to the concepts of inference and validity. A distinction must be made between inference and entailment. Entailment is to sense as inference is to assertion. Entailments consist in sense-relations between propositions, or better, entailment is a purely intensional relation between propositions (sense-contents); it is *not* a truth relation. *Validity* of inference is determined by entailment relations. The confusion between sense and truth emerges in this context in the characterization of validity in terms of truth-relations : if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. But actually validity depends upon sense-relations between propositions, not truth-relations. The truth-characterization works in practice because it presupposes that entailment holds, but *theoretically* it is not accurate, it is not an *essential* characterization.

This point extends also to the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments (statements). This distinction applies to *judgment* and truth-conditions (the grounds for the judgment). Usually the distinction is explicated in terms of the grounds of the judgment : if a judgment is true in virtue of meaning or sense then it is analytic, if it is true in virtue of experience then it is synthetic. This characterization *fails*. A truth-characterization of the distinction fails to get at the essential point. Predicatively (propositionally) both forms of judgment involve sense relations between terms, and this is so apart from the question of grounds

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of judgment. For the predicative content of the judgment, which has nothing to do with truth or assertibility or the grounds of judgment (evidence), inherently exhibits the distinction we are after. For example, in the two *propositions* specified by the sentences :

" The grass is green " and

" Bachelors are unmarried males "

the predicative sense-structure involves sense-relations between terms in both cases; both involve intelligible (sense) content. If there is an analytic/synthetic distinction it must be drawn at this predicative level, not in terms of judgment. as Kant, for example, does, nor in terms of truth, as is a common practice." The point is that from the predicative point of view both propositions involve sense-relations between terms–both are of a type (kind), since propositions are sense-contents. Now this might suggest that there is no analytic/synthetic distinction at all. But this does not follow. For there is an important distinction to be drawn between entailment (sense) relations and " empirical " (contingent) sense relations. There *is* an important distinction to be drawn between the two sentences above; there are two types of sense-relations, and only intensional criteria will do. It becomes clear that the division of judgments into matters of fact and relations between ideas (synthetic and analytic) misses the point, for both involve sense relations. The proper way to draw the distinction is not in terms of judgment or in terms of truth-conditions

Modality, the modal concepts relate to " may be " (possibility) " can't be " (impossibility), " must be " (necessity) are assertive concepts. They indicate modes of judgment. A systematic distinction must be made in the analysis of the assertive

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

copula in ordinary language. For example, in the *statement* (assertion) made in the *use* of the declarative sentence :

" Socrates *was* a philosopher "

the logical (formative) sign " was " is logically complex and four distinct concepts may be distinguiseed :

1) a predicative sense function (predication)
2) an assertive truth function (assertion)
3) tense (is, was, will be)
4) moadlity (may be, must be, can't be).

The propositional content may be indicated by the neutral predicative sense-function " be " : " Socrates *being* a philosopher ". The predicative " be " does not carry truth-force (assertoric force), whereas the assertive " is " does indicate assertive force. Strictly speaking, whenever we use a sentence which specifies a proposition but does not have assertive force the neutral " be " should be used instead of the *charged* " is ". For example, in the antecedent of a hypothetical :

If Socrates *be* a philosopher, then ...

Now modality (at least in one clear sense) applies to the assertive copula (formative), not to the predicative copula. Modal concepts indicate modes of assertion (judgment), not modes of predication. Modal concepts fall within theory of assertion, not theory of sense. That is, sense-formation is independent of modal considerations. Debates as to whether logic is two-valued or three (many)-valued fail to make this clear. A three-valued logic, such as that suggested by Lukasiewicz, does not apply to propositions but to truth conditions and assertibility. The modal concepts related to " may ", " can't " and " must " are modes of *judgment*. Here is another reason for

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a systematic distinction between theory of sense (propositions) and the theory of assertion/truth.

Certain problems concerning reference and existential import stem from a failure to properly distinguish between theory of sense and theory of truth Predication does not have existential import. *A person* is committed to the existence of what he *asserts*. Nor does predication involve *reference* to existent objects. Only assertions have existential import. Predication does not commit one to existence of objects or facts. Quine, who rejects all talk of sense (meanings), and who confuses predication with satisfaction (extensionalist thesis) finds himself in an extensionalist bind. He is forced back to sense (he speaks of " purports ") in order to explain how a predication can be " meaningful " even when there is no object (existent) referred to (named) by the logical subject (singular term). The failure to distinguish between sense and truth leads to perverse doctrines about existential import–for example, that general statements made by use of " some " have existential import, while statements made by use of " all " have no existential import. The difference is *not* in the logical meaning of " all " and " some ". *Predications*, whether involving " all " or " some " have no existential import, do not *assert* existence. But *assertions* (statements) whether involving *all* or *some* may (or may not) have existntial import. The claim that universal statements have no existential import and are essentially hypothetical in assertive form : (x) (If Hx then Mx) = " All Humans are mortal " goes too far. For clearly *some* (most) universal statements do have existential import. Some universal assertions do *not* have existential import and these may be interpreted in hypothetical form.

Thus, in terms of sense-formation (predicative structure) both universal and particular *propositions* have a common predicative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

structure. It becomes clear that the Fregean analysis of general *statements* captures (attempts to capture) the truth-conditiona structure, and is not an analysis of the sense-structure (which is predicative). The confusion of sense-structure and truth-structure leads to *ad hoc* devices (stipulations) concerning existential import, e.g. that "some" has existential import but "all" does not, so that the former is an "existential quantifier". Here, again, we find a difference in "form" between singular and general statements. A general statement is true if and only if each instance (individual case) is true: "All humans are mortal" is true if for each x, if it is human, then it is mortal. However, "Socrates is mortal" is true if Socrates is mortal. Frege's "insight" into the disparity in logical form between singular and general *statements* does not apply to the sense-structure of propositional content, but to the statement-meaning (truth-conditional structure). We shall see that both singular *and* general *propositions* have a common predicative structure. Frege went too far in analyzing all universal categoricals into quantified hypotheticals.

Hence, Quine's criterion of ontological commitment in terms of quantification (being the value of a bound variable) trades on the fact that the qnantificational form is assertive form "For every x, *it is the case that* (if Hx, then Mx)". However, quantification figures in predicative (propositional) content and here it has no existential import or ontological commitment. The critical distinction is not between "all" and "some".

Summary

Predication is essentially intensional consisting in the sense-structure of propositions. Predication is not an *act*, not judgment, not assertion, not affirming or denying a predicate of a subject (or what a subject refers to). It is not the relation of satisfac-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tion–a predicate applying to (being true or false of) an object. Predication is not attribution, and does not involve a relation between substance and attribute, nor (as Strawson suggests) between particulars and universals in a non-relational tie. Predication does not involve truth conditions, nor does it involve reference to fact and existence. Predication, as a purely intensional concept, involves sense relations between terms, and terms are sense-constituents of propositions.

All propositions are pradicative in sense structure. This is so whether the proposition is singular, general, relational compound, etc. These differences (which are logically important and irreducible) are due more in the types of terms involved than to the sense structure of form. The generic concept of predication in not characterized by saying that every proposition is of subject-predicate form. This terminology is crippling and misleading. It happens to apply naturally to certain types of statements (singular and general) but not to compound statements. We shall speak instead of *terms* and prior/posterior positions, and drop all talk of subject/predicate.

Every proposition consists of two terms in configuration. A proposition consists of terms and formatives (logical signs). Formatives represent sense-functions. (In statements formatives take on additional truth-functional meaning). (This reflects the distinctlon between sense-value and truth-value.) Every proposition consists of two main terms and one main formative. The two terms must be configurable, and the formative indicates the mode of sense-configuration. Propositional formatives are indicated by oppositional signs.

Terms and formatives are both constituents of propositions. Terms are " indomplete " with respect to formatives, and vice versa. Neither can function apart from the other. Each *completes*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the other in the unity of a proposition. Outside of a proposition a term (quaterm) has no function. They are *essentially* constituents of propositions.

Terms are sense-contents. They must not be confused with entities (objects) to which they correspond. Objects are constituents of the world. If one insists upon entifying terms, and treating them as objects of some sort (sense-objects), then these must be distinguished from objects which are not-constituents of propositions.

A term occupies logical space—it displaces other terms. This metaphor helps to make the distinction between terms (content) and formatives (which do not occupy logical space but structure it) The sense of a term is constituted by its configurative possibilities. Only certain terms configure with each other. The theory of sense-formation (predicability) aims at articulating the formal principles (categorial) which determine configurability. A term's sense is a function of its *exculsion* (displacement) of other terms A term *excludes* only those terms which are contiguous (configurable) with it. (This gives a hint of the theoretical basis of the opposition thesis of formatives.) The more determinate the sense of a term the more *dense* it is (the more definite). Density is a function of exclusion-specificity. The sense of a term is determined by its " location " in logical space—its configurability-range with respect to other terms. Some terms have a *wider range* than others. Thus, the sense of a term is essentially connected with *other* terms. Configurability is determined by categorial structure. Sense rules are categorial rules. (See Sommer's " Ordinary Language Tree " and " Types and Ontology ".)

The formal structure of a proposition is represented by :

A +/– B

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

We shall speak of prior and posterior terms and positions, instead of subject and predicate (positions). 'A' is prior term and 'B' is posterior term. Position is relative to the formative. For the full explication of formal structure see Section 2.

Any term-type may occupy posterior position. The *formal* concept of predication does not restrict prior position to individuals or particulars. Predication is neither logically singular nor general. Any type of term may be a " logical subject ". Predication is not essentially tied to a material ontology, either substance/attribute (Aristotle) or concept/object (Frege). Predication is not essentially connected to an ontology of *individuals*. State-terms, for example, (i.e., a term which specified a state of affairs) may figure in predication, occupying either prior or posterior position.

(" Clouds being present +/– Rain falling")
(A) (B)

Thus, from the predicative point of view, there is no *formal* distinction between a singular-term and a state-term (even though the type differences between such terms are formally rendered). A singular term (representing an individual) is constituted by the possible *states* in which it may configure (configurative possibilities). We must look elsewhere for criteria of type distinction between terms.[13] Quine's criterion of grammatical role (position) for distinguishing between singular and general terms misses the point. For terms are not expressions, not constituents of sentences. Quine's criterion works only if one presupposes the singular dogma of predication.

Type differences between terms, between singular and general terms, or between singular and state terms, for example, must be located in the sense-contents themselves i.e., in the configurative possibilities of the terms. And this takes us back to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

categorial criteria. Here Strawson is moving in the right direction in proposing a type-criterion (in a different sense of type) to distinguish between singular and general terms. The latter distinction has to do with the fact that singular and general terms have different *configurative ranges.* This does not preclude general terms from occupying prior position in predication, nor does it restrict singular terms to prior position. Formally, predication is *symmetric.* The Fregean view that predication is inherently assymetric goes back to the singular dogma and the extensionalist thesis of predication. A term with *wider* configurative range (of any two given terms) is the natural posterior term (natural predicate), while the " narrower " term is the " natural subject ". Some such thesis was subscribed to by Aristotle. (See Sommer's " Confirmation and the Natural Subject " *Philosophical Forum*, 1972; and " Do we nced Identity ? " – *J. of Philosophy*, August, 1969)

In systematically following through on the distinction between sense and truth, between sense-value and truth-value, sense functions and truth functions, sense structure and assertive structure, it becomes clear that compoud statements, too, have sense-content. The truth-functional analysis of compound formatives focuses on truth-functions. Here, again, we find the extensionality thesis at work. For, the truth-functional analysis of compound formatives (as defined by truth tables) is explicitly extensional; the sense content is not important. The reference or truth-value is important. Despite this, Frege clearly assumed that compound statements had propositional (conceptual) content : there are compound *propositions.* What is needed to supplement the truth-functional analysis of compound statements is a sense-functional (predicative) analysis of compound *propositions.*

In an " if... then. . . " hypothetical *statement,* for example, the formative (if. . .then. .). indicates both truth-function *and* sense-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

function. Since the formative is taken to be *essentially* extensional (truth-functional), as it is by Fregean logicians, it is no wonder that perplexities arise regarding the proper understanding of the sense-formation (propositional content). Sense-rules govern the relations between antecedent and consequent terms, and there can be violations of category rules (category mistakes) here as well. (The 'if...then...' like the 'is' in ordinary language is logically complex and it too must be analyzed and excavated, distinguishing sense-function, truth-funciion, modality.. And this leads to a predicative analysis of compounds).

For example, in the *conditional* proposition, which involves the two state terms " Clouds being present " and "Rain falling", the propositional connection relates the two terms sense-functionally.

" Clouds being prescnt "is sense related to " Rain falling".
If Clouds be present *then* rain falls

The truth-functional analysis focuses on the assertive form of hypothetical *statements.* Once the distinction is made between propositional content (predicative sanse structure) and judgmental conditions (assertive truth structure) we are in a position to avoid the *reductions* of both Frege and Sommers. Frege assimilated general universal *categoricals* to hypothetical (truth-functional) form under quantification: "All humans are mortal" becomes.

(x) (If Hx then Mx).

Sommers went the other way in assimilating hypothetical truth-functional " if... then..." statements to universal categorical form :

" If clonds are present then rain falls "

becomes $-(p)+(q)$ or " All cases of (clouds being present) are cases of (rain falling)"; " Every (p) is (q)"

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

From the point of view of assertive functions, it appears that hypothetical assertions are significantly different from categorical assertions, even though from the predicative (sense-functional) point of view the propositions expressed exhibit a common generic predicative form. It may be noted here that Leibniz, as seen in an earlier quote, wished to treat hypotheticals as categoricals. (I am suggesting that such attempts are ill-founded if directed at assertive form). Categorical assertive functions cannot be reduced to hypothetical assertive functions, except perhaps where the general statement does not have existential import.

Note : (1) Scarle rightly distinguishes between categorical and hypothetical reference (See *Speech Acts*, p. 73)

(2) Note also, that in Kant's table of *judgments*, hypothetical, categorical and disjunctive are placed in one category. Kant has been unfairly criticized (e g. by Ryle) for this classification (See Ryle's " Categories "). They *do* belong under one heading since they are modes of judgment (assertion).

The realization that compound statements have propositional sense-content, and that compound formatives are also *sense-functions* opens the way for a very different analysis of the " meaning " of such statements The preoccupation with truth-functionality has displaced and obscured the proper understanding of the sense-formative content of such statements. Here again the distinction between sense and meaning (truth) is critical. Once the propositional (predicative) content of compound statement is disclosed new possibilities of analysis are opened. For example, the theory of compounds now have something in common with truth-analysis of other statement-forms. From the predicative point of view *all* propositions are elementary

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(atomic). And truth of compound statements as well as categoricals may be treated under one model. A statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts. At the same time all statements involve truth-functions, even categoricals.

Truth is essentially connected with judgment and assertion. A distinction must be made between States (what is apprehended in the apprehension of a proposition) and *Facts*. Facts are stated, and this involves judgment. This does not, of course, mean that the *being of a fact* depends upon judgment, only that the *stating of a fact* does. Propositions do not represent (picture) facts, as Wittgenstein claimed, at least not propositions in the special Fregean sense in which I have been using the term. There is a space between conceptual content (sense-content) and being the case (facticity). The analysis of the concept of truth is essentially bound up in theory of judgment and assertibility. (Strawson approaches something like this in locating *meaning* (not sense) in sentences, and truth in statements.)

Predication is concerned with possibility, assertion with actuality. Aristotle finds an important asymmetry between principles of predicability and assertibility in discussing the sea-battle problem in *De Interpretatione* (Chapter 9). If every *statement* is true or false, then reality is fully determinate—past, present and future. Rightly or wrongly Aristotle inferred a logical determinism from this (a truth-necessitation) which, he believed, precluded chance and entailed fatalism. Aristotle proposed a way out which modern truth-functional logicians (some of them anyway) find perverse. Aristotle suggests that when matters are future, contingent, potential, indeterminate—an assertion (statement) is assertively vacuous, neither true nor false. Nevertheless, he insists that the statements is *true-or-false*, and the principle of excluded middle :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(S will be P or S won't be P)

is necessarily true, even when each disjunct is neither true nor false. Some interpreters suggest that Aristotle is rejecting the universal sway of the principle of bi-valence while subscribing to the universality of the principle of excluded middle. Such a maneuver, it is maintained, is a gross error (see Kneale–*The Davelopment of Logic*). Quine also calls this a "logical howler"). However, if we are generous to Aristotle and resist construing his analysis in a truth-functional way, we may find an important insight here.

I suggest that Aristotle is taking exception to the assertive principles (bi-valence *and* excluded middle) while reaffirming the predicative principles. If we interpret him in this way, he is suggesting that singular predictions of future contingents are assertively vacuous, neither true nor false, but still predicatively they are /T/.

This means that from the propositional (predicative) point of view a proposition may have truth status /T/ without having truth value, without being true or false. And this is precisely what it means to be potential : to be /T/ and yet not be determinate i.e , neither true nor false. Thus, there are two principles– one applying to what is actual, and one applying to what is potential. In the former, to be /T/ entails being determinate in truth value and being. In the latter, being /T/ does *not* entail being true or else false; it is indeterminate.

However, on the truth-functional view every statement must have a determinate truth value, whether or not we are in a position to judge what it is.

Here we find another application of the point made earlier that truth status (intelligibility) is indepeddent of truth-value

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(truth-determination). For clearly certain singular predictions (*assertions* about the future) are *intelligible* (make sense). But this does not entail that they must have determinate truth value. Sense is independent of truth. Principles of predicability are independent of principles of assertibility. From the predicative point of view past, present and future are symmetric. This *need not* be the case for assertibility. We have already illustrated this with the generality of predictions thesis of Ryle and Pierce.

ASHOK GANGADEAN

Philosophy Department,
Haverford College,
370, Lancaster Avenue
Haverford
Pennsylvania 19041-1392
(U. S. A.)

NOTES

1. For recent discussions of Sommers' work see – *The New Syllogistic*, George Englebretsen, ed. (Peter Lang,Ny, 1987).

2. Van Heijenoort says, " And when in his *Begriffsschrift* Frege introduced quantifiers, he thereby had to make the subject–Predicate form the onique form of his prime sentences. Frege is generally credited with having introduced, to get full quantification theory, the generalized subject–predicate form, that is, the one in which there is more than one subject. This is true. But it is also true that he was making more than a generalization of something already existing. He was putting the subject–predicate form squarely at the basis of logic, both in its generalized (more than one subject) *and* in its simple (just one subject) versions. "

" Subject and Predicate in Western Logic " (Presented at the East–West Philosophers' Conference on The Development of Logic : East and West, June 1973.)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It must be stressed here that this form of generality introduced by Frege is not the sort of generality I am claiming for the generic concept of predication. Frege's generality applies to the extension of predication from absolute form (one subject) to relative form (more than one subject). This extension, although an important advanee, nevertheless restricts predication to logically singular propositions. General propositions, and compound propositions, for example, are not subject-predicate in form.

3. These prominent wtiters on predication differ in their views on substantive polnts. Nevertheless, they all in one way or another subscribe to the Fregean framework for logical theory. Their disagreements, however real, presuppose certain common Fregean assumptions—such as that predication is logically singular.

4. It should be added here that the Fregean view of predication did not escape being enmeshed in material ontological doctrines. The Aristotelian theory is sometimes criticized for having confused predication with the metaphysical relation of substance / attribute. It is often overlooked that the Fregean conception is also tied with the object / concept ontology of individuals. In this respect, then, the Fregean approach cannot claim an advantage over the classical view. What is wished for is a conception of predieation that avoids material ontological doctrines and is a formal organon for ontology.

5. For example, Van Heijenoort says, " Aristotle's syllogistic was his lucky strike. He had the luck to hit upon a part of logic where quantifiers are unnecessary. Syllogistic deals with one-place predicates, and, as such, is part of monadic quantification theory..." (Op. cit-)

   See also, P. T. Geach *Logic Matters* – " History of the Corruptions of Logic. "

6. See, for example, Frege's introduction to the *Begriffsschrift*, and Russell's " Logic as the Essence of Philosophy " op. cit.
   Leibniz attempted to develop a universal logical language which presupposed the Aristotelian framework. He assumed that all statements are subject-predicate in logical form, and that it was possible to develop a general calculus of terms which was based upon a plus-minus arithmetic model. (We shall see in a moment that this is essentially the type of calculus developed by Sommers). For example, " If, as I hope I can conceive all propositions as terms, and hypotheticals as categorials and if I can treat all propositions universally, this promises a wonderful case in my symbolism and analysis of concepts, and will be a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

discovery of the greatest importance". *Logical Papers* ed Parkinson - p. 66.

See also pp. 17, and 143 - "A study in the Plus-Minus Calculus".

7. It was pointed out earlier that this characterization of predication—affirmation / denial—confuses predicability with assertibility. Nevertheless categorial rules govern the affirmation / denial of terms, for assertibility presupposes predicability. So there is still an important difference between this conception of predication and the Fregean-which assimilates denial to negation.

8. For details on these points see the following papers of Sommers :
"Types and Ontology" - *op. cit.*
"Predicability" - *Philosophy in America* (ed. Max Black, Ithaca, 1965)
"On a Fregean Dogma" - *Problems in Philosophy of Mathematics* - I. Lakatos, ed. Amsterdam, 1967, North Holland.
"Truth-Value Gaps" - *Analysis* - 25 (1965).
"Meaning Relations and the Analytic" - *J, of Philosophy*, 60 (1963)

9. F. Ramsey remarks on a characteristic feature of mathematical logic in the context of discussion whether predication is symmetric or asymmetric :

"...The reason for this lies in a fundamental characteristic of mathematical logic, its extensionalily, by which I mean its primary interest in classes and relation in extension. Now if in any proposition whatever we change any individual name into a variable, the resulting propositional function defines a class..So mathematical logic, being only interested in functions as a means to classes, sees no need to distiuguish these two sorts of functions, because the difference between them, though all important to philosophy, will not correspond to any difference betwesn the classes they define. ...Anyone who was interested not only in classes of things, but also their qualities, would want to distinguish from among the others those functions which were names..."
"Universals" - *The Foundation of Mathematics*, (pp. 131-132).

10. There are some cases where general-categorical assertions are translatable into hypothetical form (and vice verea) with no appaeent loss. (See H. B. Joseph - *An Introduction to Logic*, pp. 181 ff.)

11. Frege attempted to formally depict this difference in his signs for the content and judgment strokes : This attempt failed since it did not actually penetrate into the representation of formatives (logical signs). Frege later recognized the redundancy in this "assertion" sign, for he realized that assertion was already indicated in the "form of the declarative sentence".

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

12. Frege was essentially correct in his criticisms of Kant's method of drawing the distinction. In the *Foundations of Arithmetic* he argues convincingly that Kant's criteria fail to adequately draw the distinction. Frege preferred to use the principle of non-contradiction as the criterion, and this shifted the focus away from judgment towards the conceptual concept.

    Quaine is on the right track when he rejects the truth-characterization of analyticity. The appeal to "truth in virtue of meaning" is unsatisfactory. But his *reasons* for rejecting the distinction thus characterized are very different from the approach I am taking. For Quine's rejection of the distinction presupposed the truth-characterization, for he observes that from the point of view of judgment and truth it is a matter of degrees, not kind.

13. Given this intimate conneetion between individual terms it seems that Wittgenstein's opening statement of the *Tractatus* : the world consists of facts not things, is a specious contrast. States (states of affairs) are constituted by objects, and objects are constituted by configurability in states. It is a matter of description, rather than an ultimate ontological dichotomy.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-**

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs. 25/-**

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-**

Ramchandra Gandhi (ed) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs. 50/-**

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs. 70/-**

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs. 60/-**

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism, Rs. 50/-**

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-**

S. S. Barlingay (ed), **A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs. 50/-**

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs. 25/-**

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs. 30/-**

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Pune–411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 1.
January 1991

ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF REFERENCE (2)

Beyond the Phenomenological Theory of Reference.

In the previous part, I suggested that Husserl's theory of intentional reference, by way of the noematic meaning of the act, depends upon a certain inner duality in the noema itself: within the noematic meaning complex, we can distinguish a predicative part, which characterises the object and an indicative or purely demonstrative part which secures the identity of the object. It is this complex whole of indication and characterization that secures intentional reference. If this is so, I further suggested that we must distinguish two modes of meaning; meaning in the sense of expression and meaning in the sense of indication In the present section, I wish to bring out how Husserl himself makes precisely such a distinction between two modes of meaning but I shall also point out how this distinction between two modes of meaning at the level of language is connected with certain other dualities in Husserl; in particular, I shall concentrate on two other polar distinctions:

1. the distinction between speech and writing.
2. the distinction between intentional experience and discourse.

I shall try to suggest that these polarities are not unconnected; on the contrary, they give a specific articulation to the phenomenological project and I shall end this section by anticipating certain inner tensions or aporiae which arise from these contrasts, tensions which anticipate the movement of deconstruction.

Received : 24-2-1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl introduces what he calls the double meaning of a sign; he points out that a sign may mean either as an expression (Ausdruck) or an indication (Anzeichen).[36] The function of an expressive sign is to express a meaning or 'bedeutung'. The meaning of an expression, for Husserl, is neither a factual entity nor a mental state or event. Essentially, Husserl has two arguments for the view that meaning is not to be inentified with the factual entity. (i) A sign may have meaning in the sense of expressive meaning and yet there may be no factual entity corresponding to it. (ii) Even where there is acorresponding entity, the referent is mutable and contingent, whereas the meaning is self-identical and invariant.[37] If, on the one hand, the meaning is not to be equated with the object, nor, on the other hand, is it to be identified with the mental state or event, here also, two considerations have to be kept in mind– (i) meanings, unlike psychological states or events, are immutable and constant; (ii) mental states are variable from person to person and relative, whereas meanings are shareable.

Hence, meanings are neither physical nor mental; this, of course, was also Frege's position. But there is a certain paradox involved in Husserl's conception of expressive meanings. The connection between an expression and its ideal meaning can be established only by the meaning-intention of the user of the expression. The eidetic essence is given in intuition and hence available only to the intuiting consciousness. No one else can perceive this connection between the sign and its meaning, since this connection is given in my consciousness. To any one else, the sign that I use can only be an external indication and not the expression of an ideal meaning. The paradox, as Derrida points out, is that the expressive sign is meaningful only in interiority. The issue is not merely that Husserl's theory seems to lead to what may be called the private language hypotheses; the point is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the much more unsettling consequence that Husserl's expressive signs are not expressions. This goes against Husserl's own definition of a word as a bodily entity animated by a soul, which is its meaning. As Derrida puts it, it is a soul without body; it is a voice without sound (the voice that keeps silence). This is the phenomenological voice, the voice of the phenomenological subject, the subject that still remains after the phenomenological reduction of the real world.[38]

Two comments may be made about this critique of Husserl—

1. Derrida shows how Husserl's later notion of transcendental subjectivity is already implied in Husserl's notion of expressive signs.

2. More importantly, for our present purpose, Derrida's criticism brings out the fact that Husserl's theory of expressive signs, implies the other duality between intentional experience and linguistic or discursive expression. It is this latent duality which really leads to the aporia of an expressive sign not being an expression at all.

Since Husserl's idea of a double meaning of a sign is structured by the contrast of expression and indication, the collapse of the notion of an expressive sign would also lead to the dismantling of its correlative, namely, the indicative sign. But apart from this, Derrida also brings up certain difficulties about the notion of indicative signs on its own.[39]

According to Husserl, an indicative sign has no ideal content; it has no meaning in the strict sense. Since an indicative sign has no ideal content, its meaning is always its referent. The referent of an indicative sign is generally given through perception, just as the meaning of an expressive sign is given through the presence of an essence.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The first comment that we can make upon this characterization of an indicative sign is that, although the intention is to contrast the indication from the expression, yet the paradoxical result is that the similarity is stressed. Just as the meaning of an expressive sign is given in the *presence* of an essence before the subject, so also the meaning of an indication is given by the presence of the object in perception. In both cases, meaning, whether it be that of an expressive sign or of an indicative sign, is defined in terms of immediacy and presence. It is in this intimate bond of a sign and its meaning that the significance of language is seen. From the point of view of this immediacy and presence before consciousuess, the difference between the two sets of signs–expressive and indicative–recedes into the background. If, formerly it appeared that all expressions are indications now, in a converse paradox, it appears that all indications are expressions. Taken together, these two paradoxical outcomes collapse the distinction between expressive signs and indicative signs. We now come to see that it is not a question of reversing the relationship–of privileging the indicative over the expressive, as nominalism seeks to do in reply to the Platonism of the ideal content over the real referent. Merely to reverse the signs of this heirarchy would still leave us within the double binds of the opposition itself. Instead, what is required is to collapse the distinction itself, as it were, in a subversive move through which, if all expressive signs turn into indicatives, all indicative, in a reverse paradox, turn into expressive signs. This play of cross cutting paradoxes calls into question the terms of the opposition itself.

But Derrida makes a different point of criticism also in connection with Husserl's theory of indicative signs. He holds that the meaning of an indicative sign is, as much an ideal content as that of an expressive sign and that this ideal content

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is not given or determined by the presence of any objects.[46] The upshot of Derrida's critique of Husserl's indication is that indicative signs behave exactly in the same way as expressive signs do. So, Derrida rejects Husserl's distinction between expressive signs and indicative signs and affirms their essential unity. This, of course, would have far reaching implications for understanding the concept of ' sign ' itself.

The first polarity at the level of signs is that between expressive signs having an ideal meaning or sense and indicative signs which have only a referential function. But this polarity is imposed on a deeper dichotomy, namely, the dichotomy of spoken and written signs. The first distinction between expressive and indicative signs is a distinction which can be made at the level of spoken signs themselves; in fact, the characterization of expressive signs as calling up an ideal content or essence in the consciousness of the subject suggests that the model which is implicitly operative here is spoken language. Within this stratum there is a certain privileging of the expressive sign as in some sense, truly significative, whereas the indicative sign is a purely referential index or pointer.

But when we come to the distinction between speech and writing, the privileging of one of the terms in the pair, namely, the spoken sign, is much more clearly seen.

In our previous discussion of Husserl's account of linguistic reference, I suggested that his theory of linguistic meaning is a reflection of an antecedent structure of meaning acts. Specifically, I had said that linguistic meaning, which Husserl calls ' bedeutung ', is the noema of an intentional act lent to the act of utterance. It is this pre-linguistic act of intention which vivifies the speech act. There would, of course, be profoundly difficult problems in understanding properly the relationship between

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

intention and expression. We shall soon turn to some of these problems but what I would like to note at this juncture is that if one approaches linguistic meaning from this point of view, as a reflection of an antecedent structure of intentions, then, by the very logic of such a presupposition, it is speech which is likely to be the chosen paradigm of linguistic meaning, for in the phenomenon of speech, the closeness and intimacy of the relation between the utterance and the meaning seems to be peculiarly self evident. One hears oneself speaking, such that the expression and its meaning, the world and its sense, seem to be given together in a simultaneous experience.

This privileging of speech over writing is no modern sentiment or prejudice; on the other hand as Derrida has argued, and also Ricoeur in a different way, this goes back to the very 'origins' of Western thought, in what Derrida has called 'logocentrism' and 'phonocentrism'.[41] In this, as in other issues, the articulation and expression of attitude gets its voice most powerfully and clearly in Plato, particularly in *Phaedrus* and the *Seventh Epistle*.[42] But what is up for immediate oomment in this context is that this attitude is built into the very notion of the sign as in De Saussure's structural linguistics.

De Saussure writes : "Language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first. The linguistic object is not both the written and spoken form of words. The spoken forms alone constitute the object. But the spoken form is so intimately bound up with the written image that the latter manages to usurp the main role. People attach even more importance to the written image of a vocal sign than to the sign itself. A similar mistake would be in thinking that more can be learned about some one by looking at this photograph than by viewing him directly".[43]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

We may say that for De Saussure, the written sign is a signifier of a signifier (the spoken word) and, as such, external and merely parasitical upon speech. The same attitude which may be called 'phonocentrism' insofar as it gives primary place as signifier to the spoken form, is also to be seen at work in the two other thinkers discussed in the present study, namely, Frege and Husserl. For them also, the model of sense and reference is the use of language in speech. For Frege, the written form is useful only as a script or a notation, a sign of a sign. In Husserl, this is all the more clearly seen; for Husserl's signs are animated by meanings and since meanings are presented as eidetic essences, the most pellucid example of a sign is where an expression immediately correlates with an essential meaning or ideal content. This immediacy of union of expression and sense is given in speech. Hence, for Husserl, the paradigmatic instance of language is speech and written signs are only arbitrary markers of meaningful sounds. In Husserl, the necessary link between 'phonocentrism' and 'logocentrism', the emphasis on speech and the primacy of the presence of a meaning or an essence is particularly clear.[44] It is because meaning is primordially an affair of the presence of something before consciousness, that at the linguistic level, the spoken word is the privileged instance of language.

But as in the case of the previous dichotomy, here also, in the opposition of the spoken and the written sign, there are subversive tendencies at work in the very setting up of the opposition, tendencies which dismantle the oppositional contrast itself. This is the moment for which Deconstruction lies in wait, in watchful attention to the 'implosion' of the opposition set up by the theory itself; this is the moment of reversal or peripateia, which, when caught, leads to a dismantling aporia of the distinction itself.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In Husserl, we can see in a particularly arresting manner, this turning of tables and reversal of the order of primacy as between the spoken and the written signs. The main trend of his theory of meaning, of course, foregrounds the immediate presence of meaning in the moment of the spoken utterance; it is when one hears oneself speak that a single consciousness embraces the expression as well as the meaning. Although even this speech act is not the ultimate foundation of meaning, for Husserl, since the act of expression itself is grounded in a meaning intention, yet, speech comes closest to the silence of the phenomenological consciousness. In this sense, the indwelling principle of language, that which animates it as meaningful discourse, is the spoken word In this, of course, Husserl conforms to the major semantic presupposition of a long body of Western traditton. But what is particularly instructive about Husserl is that in the very attempt to formulate the principle of speech and relate the written form of expression as ancilia to the spoken, a counter argument is released, an opposing line of reflection is opened up which, as it were, from within the manifest claim of the primacy of speech, subverts precisely this *de jure* primacy and installs in its place, the *de facto* primacy of writing and the dependence of meaning upon writing. It is this inner dialectical reversal of roles that Derrida exposes in his close study of Husserl in his 'Introduction' to *The Origin of Geometry*.[48] Husserl's late study *The Origin of Geometry* has many layers of significance in the development of his phenomenology. At the most obvious level, this study is an addition and contribution to the basic theme of his theory of the life world, suggested in the *Crisis*. In that text, Husserl had argued that the Galilean mathematization of nature is founded on an antecedent givenness of the life-world and that the uncovering of this formation of the scientific view of the cosmos will have to show the origins of geometry. The present essay seeks to carry out precisely this project; at another level,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Husserl's study is also an addition to what he himself had termed 'genetic phenomenology' which would explicate the formation of various constituted domains of objectivity and thus serve as an essential corrective and supplement to the static phenomenological analysis of the *Ideas*. But what makes *The Origin of Geometry* an important text for us is that it makes Husserl's recognition that language, and more specifically writing, is a necessary condition for meaning [45] Husserl's investigation starts off from a phenomenological query : how does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary intra–personal origin, where it is a structure within the conscious space of the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity? Husserl first suggests that it is in the contact of reciprocal understanding that the first stabilization of meanings takes place. It is in the communicational community that thc repetition of structures by each transforms it into something common for all; in other words, meanings are stabilized in the inter–subjective communication of subjects, each having an access to the meanings by way of acts of intention. Even this goes a point beyond the earlier passivity of expression, *vis–a–vis* intention, for that view had limited itself to the position that an act of expression, a linguistic act, is a reflection of an antecedent noematic intuition and it is precisely by way of being such a receptive reflection that it constitutes itself as a linguistic meaning. But now, Husserl is recognising the active role of communication in building up a commonly accessible ideal objectivity; it is the production and reproduction of a repeated communication that the objectivity of a meaning is made available. Bnt Husserl proceeds futher and shows how actual communication is not sufficient to establish the objectivity of geometrical knowledge, for what is still lacking is 'the persisting existence of ideal objects even during periods in which the subjets are not wakefully 'related. It is at this point that the importance of writing which Husserl describes as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'communication become virtual' is apparent, for it is only through the detachment from any actual subjectivity, which writing makes possible, that the objectivity and communicability of scientific knowledge can be finally secured.[47]

But this introduces a startling and upsetting new trend of thought, for, as Derrida points out, language is no longer simply expression; on the contrary, it constitutes the object and is a concrete juridical condition of truth. Even more surprisingly, in its permanency and its independence of any actual objectivity writing must be considered as the telos of language 'the possibility of the appearance of truth, is co-extensive with the possibility of its disappearance; in its quest for foundational certitude, transcendental phenomenology reaches a point at which it begins to undermine the very project which set it in motion'[48]

What Derrida is alerting us to in Husserl is the moment of an internal subversion from within phenomenology itself. In the very attempt to ground the possibility of meaning by an analysis of speech and a relegation of writing as a mere supplement to speech, a contrary train of reflections is released and the condition of meaning and of language is seen to depend on the previously relegated supplement. But Derrida is not intent on usurpation of primacy by one of the elements in the opposition; it is not to exalt the previously repressed and to repress the previously exalted that he argues; such an argumentation would merely amount to a local non–significant coup and by the very fact of claiming for a reversal of roles within the heirarchy, it would not call the principal of logocentrism into question; as it were, it would amount to only a negative logocentrism, its shadow. But the point of Derrida's deconstructive argumentation is to call the heirarchy itself into question, to bring the principle to the point of breakdown and not to claim a new position within the principle. That is why, the total effect can be seen,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

not at the level of any one opposition, but at the level of the systems of structures of opposition, on the ensemble of all the structures and privileged relationships sponsored by a theory. We must, therefore, move on to the next, and in a sense, the most fundamental level of contrast in the Husserlian theory of language–the opposition between the level of intention and expression – the opposition of the phenomenological and the linguistic.

We now come to the most basic and founding distinction of all in Husserl, a distinction and correlation which in a sense dictates the form and significance of the other polarities that we have briefiy considered above – the contrast between expressive and indicative signs and that between the sign as spoken and the sign in its written inscriptional form. These two distinctions are laid over the more fundamental and basic contrast and correlation between meaning as intention and meaning as expression. Husserl introduces this basic distinction by way of a strange detour.

In section 124 of the *Ideas* entitled "*The Noetic–Noematic Stratum of Logos : Signifying and Signification*" Husserl introduces two senses of meaning : meaning in the sense of meaning content of an intentional act (what we have called in the previous discussion 'act meaning') and meaning in the sense of the meaning of an expression.[49] Husserl writes : "originally these words (i e. sense, meaning etc.) concerned only the linguistic sphere, that of 'expressing'. But one can scarcely avoid and, at the same time, take an important cognitive step, extending the signification of these words and suitably modifying them so that they can find application of a certain kind to the whole noetic–noematic sphere, thus the application to all acts, be they now combined with expressive acts or not".[50]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Here Husserl is suggesting that we may think of meaning at two levels; first, in the sense of meanings of pre-linguistic acts of intention and secondly, in the sense of meanings of linguistic expression. We may call them the pre-discursive and discursive levels of meaning and also in terms of a phenomenological and semantic levels of meaning.

But what is peculiar about this passage is that, on the surface, it seems to be suggesting that the sematic or expressional sense of meaning is the basic form and the meaning of an act is an extension from this discursive level.

This is curious; for apart from the fact that the rest of the argumentation in the section clearly suggests that the phenomenological level is the founding stratum and that expressive meaning is a reflection of this antecedent prediscursive meaning, the whole thrust of the phenomenological method and its guiding principle of the return to the given as given, is exactly the opposite of this suggestion In terms of the spirit and intention of the phenomenological method, it is the experiential prediscurtive meaing that is primary and discourse or language is intelligible only on the basis of that primacy of experience.

But there is another implicit suggestion also in the passage which speaks of an extension or extrapolation. Now, the metaphor of extension, of further steps, etc. imply a certain equivalence or consistency between the two levels and indeed Husserl himself articulates this presumption in two places in the same text. Firstly, he brings the idea of parallelism and of correlation between the two levels and secondly, and more importantly, he articulates a principle of universal expressibility. "Anything remembered as remembered, anything phantasied as phantasied is also explicitable and expressible. Anything 'meant as meant"

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

anything in the noematic sense, pertaining to any act, no matter which, is expressible by means of 'significations' ".

But here too, there is a counter–force moving against the principle of expressibility which leads to the very opposite of the principle, namely, that there is a certain incompleteness in the expression of an intuitively given presence and furthermore this incompleteness, this non–congruence, is essential to thought and discourse.

In passing, the intention of the above remarks is not to suggest that Husserl makes contradictory or conflicting claims; rather what I want to get at, is, seeing these conflicts as symptoms I want to inquire into the 'causes' or 'motivations' of these symptoms; in other words, I want to see the basic polarity of the intentional and the discursive as an opposition which, in the very articulation of itself, deconstructs itself, by releasing such contradictions and conflicts immanently. Borrowing a hint from Derrida, we may sensitize ourselves to these immanent aporiae in Husserl by a careful attention to the metaphors and figures in terms of which the argumentation is unfolded. Husserl himself is alive to the metaphoricity of the passage and he is also, as it were, 'unconsciously' aware that these metaphors suggest mutually conflicting ideas and meanings. Immediately after introducing the metaphors of stratum, stratification, mirroring, reflecting and picturing, Husserl remarks "To be sure, these locations... imposed upon us are to be taken with care since their metaphorical use can easily lead to error".[51]

It seems almost as if at this moment, the deconstructive forces immanent in the problem are raised to the level of preconscious awareness in Husserl. But he wishes us to look away from the metaphors and consider the phenomena themselves. But this is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

precisely what we find ourselves powerless to do, for the idea of " a consideration of the phenomena themselves " cries out to be explicated and its explication throws precisely the issue before us – the relationship between the intentional and the discursive. If the articulation of this distinction is in–extricably caught up in the web of metaphors, it looks as if the idea of " a consideration of phenomena as in themselves " is a function and outcome of these metaphoricities of the argumentation. Far from being a principle independent of the figures and ruling them, it itself is the fine spray cast by these rapidly moving figures, analogies and tropes Such being the case, the advice to look beyond the metaphors is a call for repression; instead, we must follow the play of these figures and the forces let loose by them.

From this point of view, we may begin with the basic geological metaphor of strata and stratification Husserl speaks of the sphere of expression as a stratum, as the stratum of the logical and conceptual.[9] By the figure of ' strata ', he seek to convey essentially two sets of ideas: (i) the expressive is a domain or order having its own structure organised by rules and laws specific to it; (ii) on the other hand, the stratum of linguistic or discursive meaning rests upon or is founded upon a base structure of intuitive acts. One may think of these two structures in terms of base and super structure, where the super structure, though an organised totality in itself, having principles of its own specific anatomy and physiology, its own structure and functioning, yet as a totality, is essentially referred to an earlier or antecedent organization as a condition of its own possibility. Given these connotations of the geological metaphor, *prima facie*, it seems perfectly appropriate to the particular case on hand. But yet Husserl alerts us to the points of misfit and mislocation, which throw us on to other models and other metaphors. The first point is that dislocation has to do with the principle of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

expressibility that we have already noticed. Husserl holds that insofar as every intentional meaning, every noetic act with its noematic sense can be expressed, the expressive order enters into the structure of the pre-discursive intentive acts. The superstructure is not mere outer layer, covering a stratum which does not undergo any transformation by coming into contact with it. On the contrary, expression enters into intention and co constitutes it anew. Husserl, therefore, remarks " expression is not something like a coat of varnish or a piece of clothing covering it over; it is a mental formation exercising new intentive functions on the intentive substratum ".[52]

But in the very rejection of the idea that expression is a mere covering over of the underlying intentive processes which may be presumed to keep their self–sameness untouched by this supervening stratum, Husserl evokes another figure–that of a clothing, which suggests an altogether different line of reflection. We may now think in terms of something woven (texte) by the crisscrossing of warp and woof. Meaning may now appear as a fabric into whose production both intention and expression are together involved. Husserl now speaks as per the metaphor of clothing or fabric, of " an inter–weaving" of acts of expression and other acts ". The strata are now interwoven and together constitute the order of meaning. Expression is not to be thought of as merely founded or super–imposed on an antecedent order of pre–linguistic sense; on the contrary, every intentive act enters into the order of expression such that intention and language inter–penetrate. With this inner relation between sense and expression, we have to think in terms of a coincidence or reciprocal parallelism between the two and indeed Husserl himself begins to think of the relationship between exprience and language on the register of a paralleism and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mirroring and correspondence. But these models, too, in their own way, release other forces of disruption and dislocation.

The metaphors of reflection and mirroring and of medium suggest a certain receptivity, a passive permeability of discourse by sense. For discourse or language to serve as a medium of reflection of meanings, it must allow itself to be imprinted by sense. The expression must give itself up as a vehicle for the underlying meanings; as such, the order of expression must be a receptive and unproductive. Expressivity is not a power or a work, but a receptivity or non-productivity.[64] This non-productivity or sterility of expression is demanded by the basic phenomenological predilection for the immediacy and presence of sense as the telos of language, but on the other hand, this idea of the passivity of expression hardly fits in with the insight which started this line of thought, namely, the essential involvement of discourse or language in every act. The idea of the necessity of expression for every act of meaning would require that we think in terms of a more active or formative model for language. And indeed Husserl himself points out the breakdown of the models of correspondence, parallelism and mirroring and reflections. If discourse lends itself to be imprinted by sense like a perfect transparent medium, one would expect a complete coordination between sense and expression; if discourse is a medium, the whole of the order of intentive experience would be reflected in it.

But Husserl points out the gap the incompleteness of the fit between the sense of experience and the expression of it in language The gap between experience and discourse is first presented, as if it is a more contingent failure of congruence, a *de facto* lack of fit, which, although characterizing ordinary language, may be remedied in terms of a structure and more disciplined scientific discourse Husserl's example is taken from

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

daily life. Husserl writes "an expression is incomplete (with reference to an experience), as when, with respect to a complex event such as the arrival of a carriage perhaps, bringing long-awaited guests, we shout in the house" the carriage, the guests.[55]

Husserl's point here seems to be that the fullness and richness of the experience is almost totally overlooked or passed over in the expression The utterance could hardly be said to mirror the complex intentionalities involved in the situation. But it may appear that this is purely a negligible fault or deficiency to which discourse is liable because, in such practical contexts, the pragmatic demands of action fore-shorten the expressive powers of language; for purposes of practical exigencies of action any close fidelity of language, of our utterence to the experience, is an unwanted distraction. But it is possible to restore the expressive potentialities of language which are here suspended for the sake of action. Hence, the postulate of expressibility of all senses may be still acceptable 'in principle' as it were.

But Husserl moves decisively at this point to show that the incompleteness is essential to the very possibility of language. The incompleteness he is now bringing to our notice is not a mere *de facto* lack of fit, but an essential, functional or necessary discursive incompleteness, an incompleteness which is the condition of possibility for thought, for conceptuality.

Husserl points out that the level of linguistic expression can serve as the medium of logical or rational thought, because of its conceptuality. It is given a certain dimension of generality that every linguistic expression, by the very fact of using linguistic signs, has a generality.[56] This expression of general meanings is the condition of the possibility of rational thought. In this sense, discourse is the basis of logos. But because of this

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

generality, there will always be an incompleteness, a lack of perfect congruence between the specificity of experience and the generality of language. But unlike the earlier incompleteness, this absence of fit is essential for thought. Rational thought would not be possible without the conceptuality introduced by discourse and thus, paradoxically, language could articulate the meaning of experience precisely because of this lack of correspondence.

The point can now be made that the problem of the relationship between experience and discourse, of sense and expression, appears to be structurally unstable; to bring out or emphasise a certain aspect or quality of this relationship, we are led to use certain models, certain schemas, but precisely these devices of exposition, these articulating images, throw up antithetical ideas and release opposite tendencies of thought. In these perturbations and reversals, the primary thematic idea of a duality of levels, of the level of intention and that of expression, of experience and language–this root principle itself which is a manifestation of the theme of phenomenology, is called into question. We have seen this interior subversion operating at three levels or in three contexts–the two senses of a sign, as expression and indication, the duality of the spoken and written and finally the master organising duality of intention and discourse. At each level or in each one of these sites, the two-step disconcerting process of a first inversion of the order of importance and a second dissolution of the binary opposition itself takes place. What is first thought to be supplementary and secondary reverses its positional significance and is seen to regulate the first rather than be merely regulated by it. But at the next turn of the argument, a more fundamentally disturbing possibility suggests itself namely, the dissolution of the binary schema itself.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In the particular case of language or discouse, the schema of the relationship between experience and expression itself is called into question. But if this schema is abandoned, in what new ways, according to what other possible metaphors, can we order the problem of reference ? If the phenomenological way of Husserl is to be given way, to what other form of refiection, other way of thought about language, does it give way ? How should we think of language and reality, of meaning and reference, beyond the limits of phenomenology ?

Department of Philosophy
Poona University
PUNE 411 007

R. SUNDARA RAJAN

NOTES

36. E. Husserl ; *Logical Investigations*, I. Sec. 1 (trans.) J. N. Findlay, Routledge Kegan Paul, London.

37 *Ibid.*

38. J. Derrida ; *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 70 (trans), D. Allison, Evanston, North Western University Press, 1973.

39. *Ibid*, pp. 95-96.

40. *Ibid*,

41. J. Derrida ; *On Grammatology*, Introduction (trans.) Gayatri Spivak,

42. J. Derrida ; Plato's Pharmacy in ' Desseminations ' (trans.)

43. F. De Saussure; *A Course in General Linguistics*, p. 23 (trans.) Wade Baskin, McGraw Hill, N. Y. 1966.

44. J. Derrida ; *Speech and Phenomena*, Preface by Newton Garver.

45. J. Derrida ; *Edmund Husserl's ' The Origin of Geometry ' : An Introduction*, Stony Brook, N. Y. 1978.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

46. *Ibid.*

47. *Ibid,*

48. *Ibid,*

49. E. Husserl; *Ideas Towards A Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, Chapter III (trans), F. Kersten, Martinus Nijhoff, Boston, 1983.

50. *Ibid,* Sec. 124, p. 294.

51. *Ibid,* p. 297

52. *Ibia,*

53. *Ibid,*

54. *Ibid,* p. 296.

55. *Ibid,* p. 299

56. *Ibid,* pp. 299–30)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 1.
January 1991

G. E. MOORE ON THE VALUES OF WHOLE AND PARTS : A CRITIQUE

This paper is an attempt to maintain the view that Moore's thesis " A whole may possess the property of good in a degree different from that which is obtained by summing the degrees in which the parts possess it " [1] is unsustainable within his ſame-work of ethics.

G E. Moore in his book *Principia Ethica* advocates the following thesis [2]

Thesis– 1

> " The peculiarity of Ethics is not that it investigates assertions about human conduct, but that it investigates assertions about that property of things which is denoted by the term 'good' and the converse property denoted by the term 'bad'. "

Thesis—2

> " This property, by reference to which the subject matter of Ethics must be defined, is itself simple, indefinable intrinsic and non–natural. "

Thesis—3

> " All assertions about its relation to other things are of two, and only two kinds : they either assert in what degree things themselves possess this property or else they assert causal relations between other things and those which, possess it. "

Received : 3–4-1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Thesis—4

> " In considering the different degree in which things themselves possess this property, we have to take account of the fact that a whole may possess it in a degree different from that which is obtained by summing the degrees in which its parts possess it. "

The problem that arises with regard to these theses is this : Are they mutually consistent theses ? As for Moore's stand is concerned answer is positive. But to my mind it seems that the answer should be negative. In order to show how these theses of Moore are not mutually consistent let me begin the discourse with the thesis (2).

The thesis (2) asserts that for Moore good is a simple, indefinable, intrinsic and non–natural property. Good is a simple property This account Moore maintains on the ground of unanalysability. He says that good is a simple property because it has no components and whatsoever has no components is unanalysable. Since good is an unanalysable property, we cannot reduce it further to some other properties. It is an irreducible property. From this point of view, the term 'good', on Moore's account, is a primitive term and all other terms are definable in terms of it. Besides the characteristic of simplicity Moore also maintains, as it is clear from thesis (2), that good is an indefinable property. This account he maintains again on the basis of unanalysability. For him to define is to analyse (in genuine sense). Good admits no analysis; therefore, he says, it is indefinable. Further, Moore advocates the indefinability characteristic of good; therefore, according to him, any attempt to define indefinable property of good is to commit a fallacy which he calls the naturalistic fallacy.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The characteristics of simplicity and indefinability of good are, thus, on Moore's account, grounded in the notion of unanalysability. Good is a simple and indefinable property because it is incapable of further analysis. Let us admit that Moore's characterizations of good, that is, simplicity and indefinability are correct on the basis of unanalysability. But the moment we accept Moore's view along with his theses of (3) and (4), we find they generate the following difficulties.

If the property of good is a simple property, as Moore advocates it to be, and all simple properties, by definition, have no component (on account of which they are incapable of further analysis), then the property of good, it follows, cannot have (in the logical sense) the property of degree which the theses of (3) and (4) advocate For the simple reason, that the property of degree admits analysis of good which possesses it in terms of quantity; but this is incompatible with the property of simplicity of good. This is absolutely true in the light of their definitions. We cannot say that things themselves may possess the property of good in different degree but good itself has no degree. For, to say this means to make a contradictory statement which is always false. How can things themselves possess good in different degree unless good itself varies in degree ? Good can vary in degrees only when it differs in quantity and its difference in quantity is not possible unless there is a difference in its constituents. To say this does not mean that a property which admits of constituents always differs in its degree. It merely means that if a property has no constitituent, it cannot vary in degree. But to admit this means to reject the property of simplicity which the thesis (2) advocates. For, the moment we admit that good has constituents which justifies its being different in degree from case to case, it follows that the property of good is capable of futher analysis which its property of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

simplicity denies. This shows that both the properties (i.e., the property of simplicity and the property of degree) caanot be attributed to the property of good since the attribution of one property to it implies the negation of other property This is true in the light of their definitions. If what I have said is true, it is evident that the theses of (2), (3) and (4) are not mutually consistent, since they ascribe incompatible properties to the property of good. As a result, Moore's account of good becomes unsustainable.

Further, if it is true that the notion of degree admits by its own definition analysis in terms of quantity, which I believe it does, then the property of good cannot be said to be an indefinable property as Moore claims it to be. Because, whatever is capable of analysis, according to him, is definable and good becomes capable of analysis by virtue of its degree characteristic Moore cannot hold this view that good itself has no degree characteristic because to say this means to admit that theses of (3) and (4) are false. Putting the same thing in different words, since the notion of degree is incompatible with the notion of indefinability and since the notion of indefinability is grounded in the notion of unanalysability, the notion of degree is incompatible with the notion of indefinability. And this means Moore's account of indefinability of good is untenable along with its degree characteristic. Moore's account of indefinability of good is also untenable on his this line of argument. If good is indefinable because it has no synonyms or there is nothing whatsoever which could be substituted for good, as Moore advocates it to be, it remains no longer a peculiar property of good at all by reference to which the subject matter of Ethics must be defined. Its peculiarity ceases because any notion or property which has no synonyms is indefinable, and on this count notion of good ceases to be peculiar.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It might be said that the notion of simplicity is not opposed to the notion of degree. Difference in degree is not a constituent part of the property which admits of it. A simple property can differ in degree and a complex one may not differ in degree. 'Red' is, for example, a simple property but it does differ in degree. Whereas ' triangularity ' is a complex property, it does not differ in degree. Its degree always remains the same. If this is true, it can very well be said that Moore's theses are quite consistent and sustainable because the property of good may have the property of simplicity even if it differs in degree. Its difference in degree does not negate its being simple. My humble submission against this view is that it has no strength because of the following reasons.

First of all, nowhere is it said that difference in degree is a constituent part of the property which admits of it. What is argued is that nothing can possess good in different degree unless good itself varies in degree Good can vary in degree only when there is difference in its quantity, and this is not possible unless there is a difference in the constituent of the property which admits of degree. To say this does not mean that difference in degree is one of the constituents of the property which admits of degree. Secondly, it is the notion of 'degree' that admits of analysis, not the notion of ' difference in degree '. So a property which admits of degree is open to analysis irrespective of whether its degree changes or remains constant. The degree of triangularity, no doubt, does not change but it does not mean that it admits no analysis. Its degree is perfectly analysable in terms of the degree of its angles of which it is composed. As a matter of fact, it is also done so Above all, nowhere is it said that it is the notion of ' difference in degree ' that admits of analysis. What is argued is that it is the notion of ' degree ' which admits of analysis of the property which possesses it. If

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

what I have said is true, as I strongly believe it to be so, it leads to the thesis that the property of red, the so called simple property, is not in fact a simple property at all, since it admits analysis in terms of quantity because of its degree characteristic. When I say this I do not mean that it admits analysis in terms of some other property or properties other than itself What I mean is that its analysis is possible in terms of its different quantity. So is the case with good if good admits degree like red.

Let us come to the thesis (4). The thesis (4) asserts that the value of a whole bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its parts. A whole may posses, intrinsic value in a degree different from that which is obtained by summing the degrees in which the parts possess it. To be conscious of a beautiful object, for example, possesses greater amount of intrinsic value than the sum of the values of its parts; that is, the object and being conscious. Neither the intrinsic value of object, on Moore's account, gives the value of whole nor the intrinsic value of consciousness. The sum of their intrinsic values also do not give the values of a whole either, of which they form parts. As the values of a whole bear no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its parts, Moore says that the greatest error is committed if it is assumed that wherever two things form a whole, the value of that whole is merely a sum of the values of those two things. Here, the following points are worth noticing on this view :

(i) The existence of part is a necessary condition for the existence of good constituted by the howle. In other words, the intrinsic value of a whole cannot conceivably exist unless the parts exist. Because what is asserted to have intrinsic value is the existence of the whole and the existence of the whole includes the existence of its parts.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This does not mean that the existence of part possesses the value of the whole. The value of a whole is not the value of its parts. What is true of a whole is not true of parts. Because whole is not a part of itself. The number of two stones, for example, is two but it does not mean that each of the stones is also two. So is the case with values of whole and parts. A whole formed from two bad things may have positive value. This is perfectly possible.

(ii) The part of a valuable whole always retains exactly the same value when it is, as when it is not, a part of that whole. This means the existence of the value of part is independent of the value of a whole.

Now the question at issue is, why does intrinsic value of a whole after all differ in degree from the sum of the values of its parts ? Why do two bad things may produce a whole with positive value ? Moore may say that the value of a whole differs in degree from the sum of the values of its parts, or two bad things may produce a whole with positive value because of their relationship. If this is so, the question again arises: what is the nature of that relationship ? The value of a whole cannot be said to be related to the value of part in the same sense in which whole is related to parts. The relation of whole to parts is one sort of analytic relation since the existence of whole includes in it the existence of parts. But the relation of the value of a whole to the value of tis parts is not an analytic relation on Moore's account, since the value of a whole does not include in it the value of parts. Had it been so, the value of a whole formed from two bad things would not possibly have been positive. But since, according to Moore, a whole may have reverse value of parts, the value of a whole cannot be said to include, on his account, the value of parts. Saying this does not mean that the value of a whole can conceivably exist, on Moore's account, without the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

existence of parts. The value of a whole, according to him, cannot conceivably exist without the existence of parts because what is asserted to have a value is the existence of a whole and the existence of a whole includes in it the existence of its parts. But, then, can we say that the relation of the value of a whole to the value of its parts is a causal one ? This we also cannot say, because Moore himself denies it. He clearly says that the intrinsic value of a whole is not a causal product of the values of its parts. If the relation of the value of a whole to the value of its part cannot be said to be either analytic or causal, on Moore's account, then the same question remains In what way are they then related ? We also cannot say that their relation is contingent. Because to say this means to admit that the existence of the value of a whole can conceivably exist, on Moore's account, without the existence of the value of its parts, and the parts of a valuable whole do not retain the same value when they are not parts of that whole, which Moore himself denies. If the value of a whole cannot conceivably exist without the existence of its part and if part possesses an intrinsic value, the value of a whole connot be separated from the value of its parts which form the whole, even if the value of the whole is different and distinct from the sum of the values of its parts or they possess just reverse values. This shows that the value of a whole is necessarily connected, in some sense, according to Moore, with the values of its parts although its converse is not true. The existence of the value of parts is possible without the existence of a whole. But unfortunately Moore nowhere makes this point clear that they are synthetically and necessarily related, which he should have done.

Besides, comparison between the values of a whole and the value of parts in terms of degree does arise only when it is accepted that value has degrees or else its possibility is completely ruled out. But to accept this view means to admit that good is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

not a simple property. It has constituents. Because a property cannot differ in degrees unless it differs in quantity and difference in quantity is not possible unless there is a difference in the constituents of the property which admits of degree. This we have already seen earlier. Moore's analogy of a beautiful object seems to me to be defective not on logical but epistemic ground. For, any sort of comparison between the value of a whole and the value of its parts is possible only when someone is aware of their values; otherwise not only the purpose of comparison is defeated but comparison itself is ruled out. In the given example it is impossible, to my mind, for anyone to know the value of a beautiful object separately without being conscious of it, because to know the value of a beautiful object means to be conscious of it. Knowledge of any sort, for that matter, without being conscious of it is logically impossible. This is true in the light of the nature of knowledge itself. As a result, it becomes impossible to maintain this view from the epistemic point of view that ' to be conscious of a beautiful object ' has a greater intrinsic value than that of its part or parts. In other words, we cannot legitimately say, in the context of a beautiful object at least, that the whole possesses greater intrinsic value than the sum of the values of its patrs when we do not know or can never know the values of its parts separately and distinctly. It is worth noting here that when I say ' it is impossible to know the value of a beautiful object separately without our being conscious of it ', I do not mean to say that the object concerned has no valve. It may haue some value of its own. This is logically quite possible. But the knowledge of that value would never be possible without our being aware of it.

There remains one more notion which, I think, must not be omitted in a complete analysis of the problem, that is, the notion

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of intrinsic value. Moore states the definition of intrinsic value in his paper entitled " The Conception of Intrinsic Value " in the following way :

> " To say that a kind of value is ' intrinsic ' means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question. "[3]

Moore explains the above definition by saying that it involves two things:

(i) " that it is impossible for what is strictly one and the same thing to possess that kind of value at one time, or in one set of circumstances and not to possess it at another. "[4]

(ii) " It is impossible that of the two exactly similar things one should possess it and the other not. "[5]

It is quite clear from Moore's above statements that for him intrinsic value is not only necessarily connected with intrinsic properties of the thing which possesses it but also bears regular proportion to the intrinsic properties of that thing. Now, when we reflect on Moore's given account of intrinsic value, we find it generates the following problems:

If Moore's above-stated view is correct that intrinsic value depends solely on and varies in proportion to the properties of the thing which possesses it, then it follows that the value of good cannot be said to be an absolute value as he claims, since it does not exist on its own account Its value and degree depend on the intrinsic properties of the thing which possesses it If he says that good exists on its own account and its intrinsicness lies within it then it makes no sense for him to say, as he says, that it depends solely on and varies in proportion to the intrinsic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

properties of the thing which possesses it. Moore cannot hold both the views in the same breath since the acceptance of one denies the other. But since, as a matter of fact, he does this, his theses cannot be said to be consistent. However, we cannot say that there is no distinction, on Moore's account, between intrinsic values and intrinsic properties of the thing which possesses it. Because he himself clearly maintains the distinction between them. This is quite obvious from his following passage.

> " ... the kind of difference I feel there to be saying that intrinsic properties seem to describe the intrinsic nature of what possesses them in a sense in which predicates of value never do. If you could ennumerate all the intrinsic properties a given thing possesses you would have given a complete description of it, and would not need to mention any predicates of value it possesses; whereas no description of a given thing could be complete which omitted any intrinsic property. "[6]

It is quite natural and legitimate to expect that, since Moore admits that there is a distinction between the predicates of value and the intrinsic properties of the thing which possesses predicates of value, there must be some characteristic belonging to intrinsic properties which predicates of value never possess. But unfortunately Moore fails to identify such characteristic except that intrinsic properties seem to describe the intrinsic nature of what possesses them in a sense in which the predicates of value never do, and that seems to me to be least illuminating.

There is yet another difficulty. How can value of good be intrinsic unless good itself possesses intrinsic property ? It cannot be said that the value of good is intrinsic but it has no intrinsic characteristic. Because to say this means to make an inconsistent

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

statement. But if the value of good possesses intrinsic property, as Moore believes it to be, then the question arises : In what way is the intrinsic property of good related to the intrinsic property of the thing which possesses it ? One thing is clear that the intrinsic property of good is quite different from the intrinsic property of the thing which possesses it, because the intrinsic property of the thing is a part of the thing but the intrinsic property of good is not a part of the thing that possesses it, on Moore's account, even if it depends solely on and varies in proportion to the intrinsic property of the thing which possesses it. The intrisic property of good is a non-natural property. But the intrinsic property of the thing is a natural property of the thing. This is the reason why Moore says that the intrinsic properties of the thing describe the intrinsic nature of the things which possess them, but the predicates of value (i.e., the intrinsic property of good) never do so. So the greatest error will be committed if the intrinsic property of good is identified with the intrinsic property of the thing which possesses it, which he calls the naturalistic fallacy. Though the intrinsic value of good is quite different from the intrinsic property of the thing which possesses it, yet they are necessarily connected, on Moore's account. If any thing possesses intrinsic value at one time or in one set of circumstances, it always possesses it in exactly the same degree at all the times or in all sets of circumstances (whatever its degree may be). Not only the same thing possesses it under all circumstances in the same degrae, but also anything exactly like it possesses the same degree of value under all circumstances. If this view is true, that the intrinsic property of good is necessarily connected with the intrinsic property of the thing which possesses it, then the question arises : In what way are they necessarily connected ? It is quite obvious that their connection is biconditional, because a thing may have

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

intrinsic property even if it does not possess intrinsic velue of any sort But this does not mean that the necessity involved in them is analytic. The instrinsic property of good cannot be said to be analytically connected, on Moore's account, with intrinsic property of the thing which possesses it either. Because to accept this means to admit that the intrinsic property of good is a natural property of a thing, which Moore always rejects. It also cannot be said that the necessity involved in them is causal, because Moore himself denies it. No statement of causal value for him is statement of intrinsic value. Statements of causal value are not universally true statements. The whole difficulty arises because Moore nowhere makes the point clear in what sense the instrinsic property of good is necessarily connected with the instrinsic property of the thing which possesses it. It appears to me from his discourse that Moore admits a synthetic apriori relation between them, though he does not say it explicitly. But if this view is correct, then it makes no sense for Moore to say that the intrinsic value of good depends solely on the intrinsic property of the thing which possesses it, unless he admits the other way round too. But he does not do this. For him the intrinsic property of the thing can conceivably exist without intrinsic value but intrinsic value cannot conceivably exist (even if it is conceptually different) without intrinsic property of the thing which possesses it, because what is asserted to have intrinsic value is the intrinsic property of the thing. Even if it is admitted that their relation is synthetic apriori, it does not follow that good is an intrinsic value just merely on account of the intrinsic property of the thing which possesses it, without itself being intrinsic. But if good has intrinsic property of its own, then it makes no sense for Moore to say that the intrinsic value of good depends on the intrinsic property of the thing which possesses it, even if they are synthetically and necessarily related.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

We may, thus, conclude on the basis of above discussion that Moore's thesis are unsustainable, since they involve inconsistencies.

Department of Philosophy
North–Eastern Hill University
SHILLONG 793 014
(Meghalaya)

JAGAT PAL

NOTES

1. G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge University Press (1903), Chapt. I., p. 36.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
3. G. E. Moore. *Philosophical Studies*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. (1922), p. 260.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 274.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 1,
January 1991

THE ONTOLOGY OF MENTAL IMAGES

In *Critique of Pure Reason,* Immanuel Kant presents the imagination as being a special faculty of the mind.[1] The imagination plays an important role in Kant's epistemology, as it is solely through acts of imagination that the synthesis of the objects of intuition and the " categories " is obtained. Kant makes a distinction between two varieties of synthesis : figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis. Only figurative synthesis will be considered in this essay, as the topic is limited to the ontology of mental images. There is a broader issue : the ontology of imaginary objects in general. Within figurative synthesis there are again two species of imagination : the productive imagination and the reproductive imagination. When visual experience is the result of a spontaneous act of imagination—what we often call ' imagining that we see '—then this is said to be an instance of the productive imagination. To the degree that visual experience is of the more ordinary sort—where the content of the experience is " entirely subject to empirical laws "[2]—then this would be an instance of reproductive imagination. All of which is to say that there are two types of image–producing activity. In the case of reproductive imagination, the mind is more passive to the stimuli of the external world. In the case of the productive imagination, there is a greater degree of independence from the usual causal sequences that partially determine the content of visual experience. In reproductive imagination, it is assumed that there is a causal sequence that originates in the external world. In the case of productive imagination, some of the initial steps

Received : 17–2–1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the ordinary sequence are lacking. The experience is said to arise spontaneously.

Therefore, Kant's analysis of perception is a classic example of the view that both imaginary visual experience and non-imaginary visual experience are species of the category of imaginary experience in general. Although Gilbert Ryle never mentions Kant's thesis, I understand it to be the kind of thesis he intends to refute in *The Concept of Mind,* especially the chapter on imagination.[3] I am supplying this sketch of Kant's position only as an example of a developed system of thought that does assert a similarity between the experience of the objects of visual imagination and the perception of the objects of our ordinary experience. Ryle neglects to develop a plausible statement of the position he intends to oppose, so I submit the preceding outline as being one plausible alternative to Ryle's thesis. *viz*, that there is no similarity between mental images and the objects of ordinary perception. He also argues that there is no special faculty of the imagination, that instead imaginary experience is a species of usually more demonstrative activities, a genus that includes pretending and play-acting.[4]

The order of the day is then simply setting out the various activities that are relevant to our experience of mental images into their proper station, including the possibility that we have no genuine experience of these images at all Our task would be to discover that imagination is like X because of reasons a and b, and that mental images are like Y for reasons c and d, and likewise to discover and assess the relevant differences. In Ryle's terminology, this is to determine the "logical geography" of the concept in question.[5] In this essay, I will examine a few key examples and arguments offered by Ryle in his attempts at the establishment of the logical geography of the concept of imagination. In addition, I will discuss examples offered by Ryle's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

commentators, and finally will offer an example and argument of my own. I claim to have demonstrated that Ryle's absolute denial of any ontological status for mental images to be unacceptable. I do not, however, offer any elaborate positive ontological thesis to serve as a replacement.[6]

The question of the ontological status of mental images is part of two different and more general questions; the ontology of the objects of imaginary consciousness in general, and the ontology of the class of conscious states in general. Mental images fit into the first category in that they are the products of the figurative end of imaginary consciousness, as opposed to the intellectual end. Mental images fit into the second category in that they are products of the imagination and the imagination is one often-supposed faculty of the mind. A natural course to be followed in an attack upon the positive ontology of the mental is to take on each of the faculties of the mind in order, and this is done in *The Concept of Mind.* A second strategy would be to attack the often-supposed constituents of mental acts as enjoying any special ontological status, and this course is also in Ryle's book. He offers a line of reasoning that is meant to show that the mind is not a place where mental events, with their mental constituents, occur.

If one intends to argue for the non-existence of some kind of spatial object x, then one course of reasoning would be to show that :

1. everything that exists and has spatial properties of any kind exists as a constituent of a spatial system, and
2. things of kind x have spatial properties of some kind, and
3. there is a unique spatial system Y that defines the natura, world, and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. nothing of kind x is a constituent of system Y, and therefore,

5. nothing of kind x exists.

It is phenomenologically obvious that mental images do have spatial properties of some kind. If mental images do exist, then they exist in front and in back of one another and stand side-by-side; otherwise they would not be images. Ryle never does justice to the type of argumentation and evidence that would be required to fulfil some closely-reasoned scheme as numbers one through five above. It seems that he assumes the concepts of location and space to be automatically limited to our actual space in our actual world. This assessment of space could include only instances as the top of the table here in the coffee room, or the intersection of the equator of the earth and 0^0 Greenwich. This is not the type of location a mind could ever have, in the strong sense that is needed to justify minds as ontologically distinct, so Ryle concludes that minds do not exist. His programme even includes a proposal to purge sentences that include reference to the mind as a place .. "The phrase 'in the mind', can and should always be dispensed with. Its use habituates its employers to the view that minds are queer 'place', the occupants of which are special-status phantasms." (*The Concept of Mind*, p. 44). In a paper written several years after the publication of *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle reflects on his earlier work, especially the chapter on imagination He remembers that his "chief bother" was the analysis of events where we..." 'see in our mind's eyes' faces, buildings and landscapes ..", and that "It was important for me to discuss these special mental acts of imagining since we are all strongly tempted to think of the human mind as a sort of private chamber, and to think of the things that we visually and auditorially imagine as, somehow, authentic occupants of this private chamber. *Imagining* then becomes misconstrued as a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

special brand of witnessing, the objects of which happen to be internal and private to the witness." (*Collected Papers*, p. 139) Ryle's attack on the positive ontology of the mental is then two-fold; he denies the existence of the often-supposed constituents of the mind, and he denies the special ontological status of the mental.

Although to quite different ends, Jean-Paul Sartre[8] and Ryle share this denial of there being a separate theater of the mind. For Sartre, the roots of this belief lie in a misunderstanding of the nature of consciousness in that often... "We pictured consciousness as a place peopled with small likenesses and these likenesses were the images. No doubt but that this misconception arises from the habit of thinking in space and in terms of space. This I shall call: *the illusion of immanence.*" (*The Psychology of Imagination*, p. 5) The resemblance between Sartre's view and Ryle's view ends in their common affirmation of the illusion. Sartre believes that the illusion arises from our habit of "thinking in space and in terms of space", but offers no explanation of why we are so inclined.[9] For Ryle, the illusion is a result of sloppy habits in the use of language. Alastair Hannay aptly calls Ryle's version "the linguistic illusion of immanence." (*Mental Images : A Defence*, p. 27)

To fill the conceptual vacuum where we might have once thought to be the idea of the mind as an entity in its own place with its own objects, Ryle supplies the idea that the place of the mind is..." the chessboard, the platform, the scholar's desk, the judge's bench, the lorry-driver's seat, the studio and the football field... These are where people work and play stupidly or intelligently." (*The Concept of Mind*, p. 51) In each of these places, people are engaged in activities, although the football field is a place where our actions are more demonstrative than our sitting at the scholar's desk. For the special case of imagination, Ryle

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

will argue along the same lines. He attempts to show that imagination is actually a relative of the more overt actions. The attack on the positive ontology of the imagination is but one battle in the larger campaign to so categorize all forms of mental activity.

One popular manuever that is employed in attempts to deal with philosophical problems is what I call a 'comeback'. Consider the question, 'Where do the things and happenings exist which people imagine existing?'. Ryle's comeback is, "They do not exist anywhere, though they are imagined as existing," (*The Concept of Mind*, p. 245) His comeback is given because he believes there to be no proper answer to the straightforward sense of the question, and so the question is twisted to the form believed to be that of the most similar answerable questions. In this case, the similar question would be, 'Where are the things and happenings imagined to exist when people are so imagining them?', and to this the only proper reply would be the location of the imaginary scene, if it is given as part of the imaginary event...for example, 'Lilliput'. There is little satisfaction in the comeback answer because it turns our attention away from the original intent of the original questions. If I am imagining a scene as occurring in Lilliput, then the comeback is not too objectionable, although still not very helpful. The problem intensifies when I am imagining a scene in the case where it is not part of the imaginary consciousness that the scene has a particular location. In this case, there is no apparent answer to the comeback form of the question, *but* there is a very apparent similarity between it and the type of imaginary consciousness in which the location of the imaginary scene is given. I can imagine a scene where a troop of little men are tying Gulliver to the ground and include this as occurring in Lilliput; or only imagine the scene, but not including the consciousness of a specific

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

location. These two imaginary events are very much a like. For the former, the answer to the comeback form of the question of location is ' Lilliput ', but the answer for the latter would be ' nowhere ', or ' no location '. It is clear enough that the comeback form of the question captures a different concept than the original. All but the very naive understand that the reply to the question, ' Where do the things and happenings exist which people imagine as existing ?', is not to be answered by citing an ordinary street address, or some coordinates on a map. As it stands, the question is a curious one, but to answer it really involves a set of questions of which Ryle believes to be worthy of a straightforward answer The questions would include...

1 What is the relation between imaginary events and their non–imaginary counterparts ?, and

2, How are these events alike, and how do they differ ? ' and ultimately,

3. What is the ontological status of imaginary events and things ?

Ryle believes that these questions have answers, namely...

1 There is no relation, and

2. They are different in every way and

3. They have no ontological status.

If these three questions are legitimate, although deserving a false answer in Ryle's view, then qustions about the location of imaginary events would seem to deserve a similar treatment. The comeback is at best only a way of saying, ' as you have put the question, I have no answer. ' Whether or not it turns out that we will say that mental images exist in the end, Ryle's comeback seems to be evidence far short of any cause to deny the reality of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the mind, and eventually in due course, the denying of the reality of mental images.

The author of *The Concept of Mind* does not devote all of his energy to the task of elimination of the mental. Besides the destructive work, there is still the task of establishing the logical geography of whatever concepts remain relatively unscathed and intact. This is still part of the old concept of mind, but with the amendment that the mind and its objects are no longer to be considered as special-class entities. As such, the remaining mental concepts would need to be redefined in behaviouristic or meterialistic terms. Early on in the text of *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle claims this logical geography will .." reveal the logic of the propositions in which they are wielded, that is to say, to show with what other propositions they are consistent and inconsistent, what propositions follow from them and from what propositions they follow." (*The Concept of Mind*, p. 8) Instead of geography, this task would have better been described as logical taxonomy. The question that is actually more often dealt with is the less precise problem of the establishment of genus–species relationships. Ryle finds the answer to be that there is a genus, "seeming to perceive", and two species of this genus, "seeming to see" where there is a copy of the actual scene (or person, etc.) present before us, and "seeming to see" where there is no such copy before us. (*The Concept of Mind*, p. 254) The essential point is that the similarity between the two species is strictly limited to a similarity on the part of the relevant act and condition of the person who is doing the "seeing." Where we are so often mistaken, according to Ryle, is to also suppose that there is a real object that is a counterpart within the "seeing" act of the second species. If we are so tempted, then we might be led to assume that there exists a mental image that is the counterpart of the copy (a physical object, e. g., a photograph) that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

induces the " seeming to see " state. This is the first step towards a positive ontology of mental images, and to adopt this view would demand all kinds of messy amendments to an otherwise neat-and-tidy materialism. According to Ryle's thesis, whenever we " seem to see " an image of the golden mountain the similarity between this act and our looking at a picture of Pike's Peak consists solely in the similarity in our own material stetes. There can be no corresponding similarity between the picture and a mental image, after all the mental image is claimed by the materialist not to exist. It might be claimed that the mental image looks very much like the picture ..it seems to have colours and shapes. This would not be possible for Ryle as there is simply no image to have these qualities, and so there is no possibility of a similarity obtaining.

The most common variation on this theme in *The Concept of Mind* is the distinction between seeing (proper) and 'seeing'. The first sense is meant to capture the meaning of our everyday reports of the form 'I see x', where to make this report presupposes that there is an event or object external to ourselves that is x. So when I claim 'I see the chair in the coffee room', it is supposed that independent of my reporting there is a chair out there to be seen. This is to be contrasted with 'seeing', where in this second sense there is no accompanying existential claim about the object of the verb. 'Seeing' is in a way similar to seeing (proper), it feels a little like seeing, but that is the end of the resemblance... or so it is claimed.[10] What Ryle intends to do is to drive a wedge between seeing (proper) and 'seeing'. He claims that " when a person says that he 'sees' something which he is not seeing, he knows that what he is doing is something that is totally different in kind from seeing. " *The Concept of Mind*, p. 246) That which is " totally different " is not to be determined phenomenologically, even though that is what the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

quote suggests. The difference is in a grammatical function; the kinds of adjectives applicable to seeing (proper) are conceptually different from the adjectives applicable to 'seeing'. Adjectives like 'vivid', 'faithful', and 'lifelike, are argued as being suitable to 'seeing', but not suitable to seeing (proper). When we are standing together, looking into the coffee room, it would make no sense to turn and say, 'Isn't this a lifelike rendition of the coffee room ?, or to say, 'Why, look at the faithful reproduction of my coffee cup, it even has the brown stains along the inside walls and the little puddle of coffee at the bottom left over from yesterday.' Ryle certainly has a point here. Talk about images and 'seeing' them does involve a different kind of grammar. That could be granted by almost anyone, including the 'Imagist' as one who holds to the positive ontology of memtal images is sometimes named.[11] Ryle's argument travels rather quickly from the obvious grammatical fact to the dubitable implication of there being something genuine about seeing (proper) that is lacking in 'seeing', and that this lack of authenticity counts against the ontology of mental images.[12]

A grammatical fact is only philosophically significant if it cannot be equally well dealt with by either party of the disagreement. There is an explanation of the grammatical fact that adjectives of comparison like 'vivid', 'faithful', and 'lifelike' do not seem to apply to ordinary visual experience, although they do apply to imaginary visual experience, The Imagist could well grant that there is a primacy of a certain class of images over others, and to the images of the first class there would be no sense in the application of these comparative adjectives. The obvious candidate for this class would be those images that are present to consciousness whenever we are engaged in normal acts of seeing everyday events and objects as seen through these first-class images. The image family (as Sartre calls it[13]) of my coffee

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cup includes those images that occur in their most clear and distinct fashion in my ordinary experience of the coffee cup. In the image family, these sharpest and most familiar images could be considered of a first order and after images, mental images; physical images and any other image so lacking in clarity would be considered ' vivid ', ' faithful ', and ' lifelike ' to the degree that they resemble the first order images. For the Imagist, it is all a matter of images. For the images of the first order there would be no sense in applying these comparitive adjectives, if there is no ' super-image ' over and above the image family to serve as the object of comparison.

A Platonist (but not necessarily Plato himself) might have some recourse here. In some very naive form of Realism it might be claimed that in the ordinary act of observation the image I hold of the coffee cup stands in a comparitive relationship to the universal ' form ' of coffee-cup. This is not what Ryle claims his opponent to necessarily be holding as a position, I am sketching out this line of reasoning to demonstrate the variety of possible ontological alternative where one class of objects stand in some secondary relationship to the objects of some primary order. In this case, neither kind of image enjoys full ontological status, as this is reserved for the form in which both kinds of images stand in an inferior relationship. For this view, full ontological status is reserved for the form, the images are all dependent upon the form as they can only ' participate ' in the form's reality.

Ryle has uncovered a grammatical fact that suggests that there might be some ontological importance in that we consider some things to be genuine and some things as only being copies. He believes that the fact that some adjectives apply to only some types of visual experience counts against the positive ontology of

...7

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mental images. Since there are actually several metaphysical schemes that can accommodate this fact—from the simple positive assertion of the reality of mental images to forms of Platonism—the discovery of this grammatical fact really does little for his position. The grammatical fact he has uncovered certainly lacks the force that Ryle believed it to have.

The next line of argumentation in Ryle's programme against the positive ontology of mental images is his characterization of 'seeing' as a species of mimicry. This is one step further along the way to achieving the total divorce of seeing (proper) and 'seeing'. To illustrate this line of argumentation, I wish to draw attention to two types of juggling—the ordinary sort and play-juggling. The former requires a set of physical objects, but the latter has no such requirement. In play-juggling you merely move your body as if you were juggling—you raise your arms up and put them down in a circular motion—you can even move your head as if you were following the track of the balls. If you want to pretend that the balls are heavy, you can brake the force of their fall and pretend to absorb the imaginary impact. It feels like juggling. Now imagine that you are seeing the balls—four shiny red ones. Is this just another act of mimicry? The other acts might well be explained in terms of the movement of skeletons, muscles, and tendon—so are we to believe that visual imagery is to be properly sorted into the class that includes these other acts of mimicry? That would suggest to us that 'seeing' the balls involves going through a set of physical processes similar to those that we would be going through if we were reacting to (and seeing) non-imaginary balls. If this is the case, then the differences and similarities between juggling and play-juggling are all explainable through only appealing to...

1. physical objects, such as red balls, and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

2. different physical states of ourselves when in the presence of red balls, and

3. different physical states of ourselves that occur whenever we are mimicking the reaction we ordinarily have when red balls are present before us.

Conspicuously missing is the often-supposed fourth item... the mental image counterpart of the red ball.

Again, there is an apparent alternative. No one denies that there are lawful relations that hold between there being certain kinds of physical objects present before us and the character of our experience. When in the presence of flying red balls, I almost always have the experience of red, shiny objects moving in amongst one another. The Imagist would claim that the ordinary experience is an experience of redness and roundness of the colour and shape of an image, just as imaginary experience. The Imagist would claim that the similarity consists in the occurrence of images which are similar in the two cases. It is true that we cannot create physical balls by only imagining to be juggling them, but it is not automatic from that to the conclusion that we cannot create ball-images whenever we are imagining to be seeing them. The juggling example shows that we cannot conclude that an act of mimicry always does obtain a parallel existence for the counterpart objects.

Sometimes mimicry is possible without any props, as in the case of play-juggling. Sometimes you do need something to be used as a prop, as the prop-less action does not convey the intended information. It is like playing charades ...those actions that are easily signified by gestures are the easiest to imitate. Juggling is very easy, reading a book is a little more difficult, reading *The Concept of Mind* would be an almost impossible action to guess from a prop-less charade. The principle would

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be that the more complex and less adaptable an activity is to imitation, then the greater the need for the prop. The important question is, when we are imagining are we using a prop? This is what Ryle needs to focus upon; instead he is begging the questions in favour of materialism as he assumes that mental images must be exactly parallel in their logical behaviour to physical objects. The interesting possibility is that mental objects are real, but not physical. Ryle does not seem to appreciate this alternative enough to be careful in his considerations to account for it. The preceding argument is a relative of the old 'two-tables' dispute. It is certainly true that there is a straightforward answer to the question of the number of tables in the room; there is only one. The philosophically interesting question is about there being only a table in the room, or there being a table in the room *and* a table–image present to me, or even perhaps there only being the table–image present.[14] It would be very poor philosophy to automatically infer from the fact of there being only one table in the room (in the straightforward sense), to the conclusion that there are no such things as table-images. Hannay observes, " the fact that I seem to perceive one thing does not entail that I cannot be perceiving, or at least seeing, another ". (*Mental Images* : *A Defence*, p. 39) Yet Ryle moves in just this direction. Extreme caution ought to be observed when moving from a grammatical fact to a metaphysical conclusion. Sometimes grammatical observations are helpful in locating distinctions, but they are rarely final. The truth conditions about there being one or two tables before me in the straightforward sense that is uncovered by the grammatical fact has little to do with metaphysical and epistemological questions of mental images and the details of just what they are and how we come to see them. If there do exist mental images apart from the physical objects that they are intended to represent, then the fact of our seeing one table is explained by there being one

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

physical table and one image representing that table. In the case of seeing two tables, there are two physical tables and two images, etc....So if Ryle really believes that the unexamined grammatical fact is especially relevant to the question of the ontology of mental images, then he has again overestimated the force of his argument. [15]

Ryle asks us to consider the example of a sailor demonstrating the tying of a certain kind of knot...with the provision that there is no rope used...instead the sailor only goes through the appropriate motions with his hands and fingers. This is similar to my juggling example. He then compares the knot–tying example to the example of 'seeing' the golden mountain... "while he (the person 'seeing' the mountain) is enjoying, so to speak, only a hypothetical view of the mountain, (he) does not seem to be really doing anything. Perhaps his non–existent visnal sensations correspond to the sailor's non–existent piece of string, but what corresponds to the movements of his hands and fingers? The sailor does show the spectators how the knot would be tied, but the person visualizing (the golden mountain) does not not thereby show them to himeself?" (*The Concept of Mind,* pp. 266–267, with some editing) First, I would be very much interested in knowing just what it is to enjoy a "hypothetical view of the mountain", or a hypothetical view of anything for that matter. I can understand something's being hypothetical in a logical or theoretical sense, but there is absolutely no way to employ the distinction phenomenologically. This would be a category mistake. Either I am enjoying a view or I am not, and if I am then it is a *view,* whether or not there is something physical for us to take into account. There are no hypothetical views in the sense that Ryle would require. There is no seeing a would–be boat on a would–be lake, imaginary or not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It is also the case that when we imagine a scene we can show it to ourselves *at will.* Some scenes require more effort than others, it is easier to imagine a red ball than to imagine a cathedral. There are sometimes mental blocks to be overcome in the imagining af some scene that is believed to be repugnant, or unpleasant, or fear–inspiring. The sailor tying the knot with the imaginary piece of rope does suggest that it is possible for there to be an intentional act where the counterpart intentional object does not enjoy a parallel kind of existence. In an earlier essay, " Imaginary Objects ", Ryle claims that to say that x is an imaginary object is a way of saying that x does not exist [16] It is plausible that there could be no imaginary piece of rope as a direct counterpart to the physical rope, and at the same time be real mental images present to the spectators. Again, Ryle's arguments and examples fail to squarely address the crucial issue... do mental images exist ?

Ryle gives another example of how—when unsure of the spelling of a long and difficult word—he sometimes imagines that he is looking at the appropriate page and column of his dictionary and then somehow discovers the correct spelling. He reports that this... " feels rather like reading off the letters from a dictionary". *(The Concept of Mind,* p. 249) In regard to this kind of example, Reynold Lawrie cites psychological studies done by Jaensch where " eidetic " imagery had been found to occur in about 60% of the children and about 7% of the adults tested. One subject was even able to recall an image and read off the fine print on a sign in a shop window.[17] Like Ryle and his long and difficult word example, it seems that the image is in some way separate from ourselves lying there to be studied. From this sort of data, Lawrie draws the conclusion that .. " the phenomena of eidetic imagery support my contention, against Ryle, that some of us visualise something *by* contemplating a mental image of it ".

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

("The existence of Mental Images", p. 254) Lawrie even suggests that Ryle is probably not one of the lucky 7%, as if he were he would likely change his position on mental images.[18]

Again, the conclusiveness we seek is lacking. The phenomena of eidetic imagery can also be explained by each of the two opposing theses. If the Imagist is correct, then the images are simply there to be studied, but there are still avenues open to the materialist's side. Someone like Ryle can argue that it is a fact about our ability to imagine that we can produce a series of imaginary events where it *seems* that we are focussing upon some image. If we grant him the possibility of one kind of mental image being viewed without the image existing, then ther could as easily be a wide range of experiences where it is suggested that a mental image exists, but where there is no such image. It is perhaps only a curious fact that some of these experiences 'feel' like our experiences of studying some image of the physical variety. We have had exderiences where we have been looking up words in the dictionary, and have felt perplexed looking for the proper spelling. Perhaps we are only again engaged in an act of mimicry, only this time it is at a more abstract level. Rather than assuming the reality of the image, this might as well be considered as only another degree of illusion, where we imitate being surprised to find added content in the image that was before unnoticed. At least to this doint, we have a stalemate. The materialist's arguments can be disarmed by the Imagist, the Imagist's arguments can be accommodated by the materialist.

In an essay written in response to *The Concept of Mind* that addresses a similar issue as the case of eidetic imagery, G.B. Mathews[19] discusses a study by C.W Perky.[20] In Perky's experiment, the subjects were asked to imagine various familiar objects as being on the surface of a ground–glass wall. At the same time, an image of the same object named was secretly projected through

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the ground–glass wall from the adjacent room. If the subject was asked to imagine that he was seeing a tomato at a certain spot on the wall, then at the next moment a tomato slide was put into the projector in the adjacent room and the image was flashed on the ground–glass wall. Each time, the subject believed that the image on the wall was solely the product of his imagination.[21] Mathews concludes... " Perky's results suggest that imagining a tomato at a certain point in space may be phenomenologically similar to seeing a faint image of a tomato there; for one may confuse the latter for the former. " (" Mental Copies ", p. 163) Here is some fuel for the Imagist's fire. If seeing things that are also present in the external world is supposed to be so different from ' seeing ', as Ryle claims, then it should be evident to the perceiver as to whether or not there is an image on the wall. If ' seeing ' is an act in which some special effort is required—as Ryle says, *a doing*—then we would be forced to conclude that this special exertion is taking place without our being aware of it. On the other hand, if the Imagist is correct then seeing (proper) and ' seeing ' are both species of imagination, and so both kinds of images produced are on more or less equal ontological fooring. It would then be easy to understand why the subjects cannot discriminate between the faintly–coloured images and mental images. The explanation would be that mental images are the less–intense cousins of the apperances that make up our everyday experience of the world.

The next step in Ryle's strategy is to challenge the idea of mental images as being things similar to pictures. We often describe ' seeing ' as seeing pictures in our minds, so Ryle needs to explain away this supposed similarity. He argues that... " we speak of ' seeing ' as if it were a seeing of pictures, because the familiar experience of seeing snapshots of things and persons so often induces the ' seeing ' of those things and persons. This is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

what snapshots are for". (*The Concept of Mind*, pp. 253–254) At this point, Ryle's argument is at its muddiest. The common-sense view is that there are images present on the surface of the photograph. Is it that almost every one of us has been misled to believe that there is an image present on the surface of the photogroph, and that the image suggests some person, place, or thing to us because of its striking similarity to the thing or person that it portrays ? Ryle avoids speaking about the surface of the photograph as sharing properties with the scenes that they portray. The only relationship that he seems to allow is a causal one. Photographs are things that are often present when we are subject to the illusion of believing that we are ' seeing ' the scenes that they portray. This is very peculiar.

Sartre also deals with the example of the photograph. His view leans heavily on the idea of intentionality. He claims that it is only through intentionality that we come to see the subject of the photograph as being our old friend, Peter. Sartre describes the process of imagination as. . . " I wanted to produce Peter out of the void, and then something loomed up which filled my intention." (*The Psychology of Imagination*, pp. 23–24) Sartre has an idea that each member of the image, the photograph, and the caricature–are more or less equivalent in their intentional qualities, so the variance must be accounted for in the differences of their material qualities. If the mental image is to fit into this scheme, then it must also be constituted of some kind of material; but this material. . , " derives its meaning solely from the intention that animates it". (*The psychology of Imagination*, p. 23) The phenomenological fact that there can be "empty intentions" before the appearance of the image; and that this intention is the material of which the image is composed, all seems to border on the unintelligible. First, I find the concept of intentionality difficult enough to deal with in its common forms, but intentionality as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

substance is a twist that strikes me as surrealistic. Secondly, I find it phenomenologically false or at least, very obscure–that there is an experience of a void prior to the experience of the image. The image is simply present, then it is gone. Sartre is the master of making these phenomenological studies, but this time I believe that he has let loose of his imagination. If, I so desire, I can imagine a void, and then an image appearing in its place. This must be what Sartre is doing, though perhaps unbeknownst to himself. It is easy to become confused about these matters. If I were to strongly suggest to myself the idea of a void prior to the image, then it might become difficult to reflect on the act of producing the image without the accompanying suggestion. The prior void is certainly not a phenomenologically necessary condition for the image experience, and so we have no compelling reason to suppose the image to be constituted of some pre–existing intentionality playing a role counterpart to material substance.

I do agree with Sartre that there is a lesson to be learned from the photograph example. Without some theoretical ammunition, the photograph... " is but a paper rectangle of a special quality and colour, with shadows and white spots distributed in a certain fashion. " *(The Psychology of Imagination,* p. 24) From a purely materialistic standpoint, there is little similarity between the photograph of Peter and the flesh–and–blood Peter. He is a strapping young man, the photograph is next–to–nothing He is very much alive, but the photograph is only a piece of paper with a peculiar arrangement of exotic chemicals on its surface. For Sartre, it is intentionality that brings the photograph image into Peter's " family " ..." If I see Peter by means of the photo it is *because I put him there. " (The Psychology of Imagination,* p. 25) The analysis of the photograph is then a curiousity on both sides of the channel. Ryle will not admit a similarity between the photo-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

graph image and the mental image, as for him there is no mental image upon which to found the similarity. The best he can say is that the photograph is an object that causes us to imitate the state in which we would be in if we were in the proper spot to be viewing the portrayed scene. For Sartre, looking at the photograph involves an act of intentionality obtaining the substance of the image being placed on the surface of the photograph.

There are similarities between photographs and mirrors. In both cases, they present a flat surface that reflects light with a minimum distortion. In both cases, there is an experience of an image being located on their surfaces. If we consider this experience as a placing of the image throhgh an action performed by the perceiving agent, then the example of the mirror would parallel Sartre's treatent of the photograph. What we see as the mirror–image is not especially revealing as to the physical state of the mirror surface. The image depends on the character of the scene being reflected. The image is subjective in that as you move around it. the character of the image changes. If you are standing at a different vantage point than your neighbour, then the image that you see on the surface of the mirror is dramatically different than the image seen by your neighbour. It is misleading to think that there are many—or an infinity—of images that are actually on the mirror It is an illusion. The only images present are those that you imagine to be there, or there are no images present there at all. In the example of the mirror, we can be literally put face–to–face with an image, perhaps a mental image. You have been 'seeing' that image every morning when shaving—or powdering your nose—pointed towards your bathroom mirror. The first thing we notice is how lifelike these images are. This is so because mirror–images are close relatives to the objects of our ordinary visual–experience. This is the best explanation of this similarity available.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

By now, I have discussed a few key arguments and examples relevant to the ontological status of mental images. I claim to have defeated and disarmed those arguments that once comprised the core of the materialist's arsenal. I offer some evidence that supports the positive ontology of mental images, I even describe an everyday situation where you are able to carefully inspect one variety of them Can we any longer deny that they are real ?

Department of Philosophy **DANIEL HOLBROOK**
Washington State University
Pullman, Washington, 99164–5130 (U.S.A.)

NOTES

1. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. trans. by Norman Kemp Smith as *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1929), B. 150–152.
2. *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 152.
3. Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London : Barnes and Noble, 1949). pp. 245–279.
4. *Ibid*, pp. 257–258.
5. *Ibid*, p. 8.
6. For a positive account I suggest, Alastair Hannay, *Mental Images : A Defence* (New York : Humanities Press, 1971).
7. Gilbert Ryle, "Phenomenology Versus 'The Concept of Mind'", reprinted in *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, (London : Hutchinson, 1971).
8. Jean Paul Sartre, anon. trans. as The *Psychology of Imagination* (Secaucus, N. J. : The Citadel Press, no date).
9. In this respect, Kant's doctrine is superior, see his "Schematism", B 177–187.
10. *Op cit.*, p. 154.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

11. Hide Ishiguro, "Imagination", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Vol. XLI (London : Harrison and Sons, 1967).

12. *Op cit.*, pp. 246–247.

13. *The Psychology of Imagination*, pp. 22–77,

14. For Jean Paul Sartre there would be an infinity of images, see *L'etre et le neant*, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes as *Being and Nothingness* (New York : Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. 3–7.

15. *Op cit.*, pp. 210–222.

16. Gilbert Ryle, "Imaginary Obects", reprinted in *Collected Works*, Vol. II.

17. Reynold Lawrie, "The Existence of Mental Images", *Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 80, July 1970, p. 254.

18. For anotner discussion of this study, see *The Psychology of Imagination*, pp. 11–12.

19. G. B. Mathews, "Mental Copies", *Philosophical Review*, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 1, January 1969.

20. C. W. Perky, "An Experimental Study of Imagination", *American Journal of Psychology*, No. 22. 1910, pp. 422–452.

21. For another discussion of this study, see *The Psychology of Imagination*, p. 75.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

Proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, the book contains a critical appraisal of various aspects of the late **Kalidas Bhattacharyya's** philosophical thought, and includes his own final formulation of his philosophical position.

Edited by **Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastava**

The book includes contributions from **K. L. Sharma** (A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharyya), **Daya Krishna** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation); **S. K. Chattopadhyaya** (Professor Bhattacharyya's "Alternative Standpoints" of Philosophy), **K. Bagchi** (Subjective and Objective Attitudes as Alternatives : A study of Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Knowledge-Object Unity), **N. K. Sharma** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Philosophy : Alternative Absolutes), **R. S. Bhatnagar** (Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy : Study of a Fundamental Dichotomy in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Thought), **Mrs. Yogesh Gupta** (Pre-suppositions of Science and Philosophy : A Critical Study) **Mrinal Kanti Bhadra** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Freedom and Existentialist Thought), **Rajendra Prasad** (Freedom and Existential Thought), **Rajendra Prasad Pandey** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya on the Indian Concept of Man), **K. J. Shah** (Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated), **J. N. Mohanty** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician).

1/8 Demy, Pages 239. Price Rs. 60/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
Poona University, PUNE 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 1.
January 1991

ANALYSIS AS A METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO A. J. AYER

The 20th century analysts are unanimous in their claim that the subject matter of philosophy is language and its legitimate method is analysis.[1] For, they conceive that philosophy, unlike other disciplines such as Botany, Zoology, Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy etc., does not have any subject matter of its own to deal with. In order to save philosophy from this rather awkward situation analysts claim that they have assigned a special function to philosophy which is a unique feature of philosophy. The assigned function of philosophy is the logical clarification of our everyday language and science. By analysing the concepts of everyday language and science, analysts felt that the so-called philosophical puzzles can be solved. A. J. Ayer, who was a chief patron of logical positivist movement in Britain, holds the view that a philosopher neither does indulge in experimentation nor does he patiently observe the behaviour of any natural objects, yet the statements of a philosopher purport to provide us 'knowledge' which is different from the 'knowledge' of science. Then the question before Ayer was what kind of 'knowledge' does philosophical analysts provide us ? To put it simply—what then is philosophical analysis ? In an attempt to answer this question, Ayer maintains that philoshphical analysis is concerned with the use and function of language. This analysis, according to Ayer, attempts to rewrite the sentences of everyday language and science in such a way that these sentences exhibit their proper

Received : 3-4-1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

logical form; consequently their meaning becomes clear. As a result of this approach, believes Ayer, the traditional problems of philosophy are found to disappear. He opines that the problems of philosophy appear and reappear due to muddled thinking and this muddled thinking itself is largely the product of our improper use of language.

In what follow I have made a sincere attempt to show the futility of analysis as a method in the aqusition of knowledge of objective reality. In other words, Ayer's notion of philosophy deprives philosophy of its empirical content. In addition to that, Ayer's supposition that the sole function of philosophy is mere analysis of language is not at all convincing as philosophy does not confine to one particular subject matter or the other. In order to accomplish our project, let us examine the views of Ayer with regard to nature and method of philosophy.

I

Trying to vindicate his claim, namely, the sole function of philosophy is logical analysis of language, Ayer views that philosophy is not a search for ' first principles '. This is because " the foundation of these first principles to provide certain basis for our knowledge, it is clear that they are not to be found among the so-called laws of nature. For, we shall see that the ' laws of nature ', if they are not mere definitions, they are simply hypotheses which may be confuted by experience ".[2] Ayer argues that the ' first principles ' are not deduced from an intuitively preceived truth upon the basis of which a philosopher proceeds to construct a deductive system. They are, contends Ayer, no objects of speculative knowledge which lie beyond empirical investigation. If one wants to deduce all knowledge from the ' first principles ' without trespassing into ' metaphysics ', then one must take a priori truths as his premises. And from one set

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of a priori truths (tautologies) one can deduce another set of a priori truths.[3] Thus, Ayer envisages that it is not possible to deduce all our knowledge from the 'first principles.' It implies that there is some amount of knowledge that can be derived from the 'first principles' (a priori truths). Then it is none other than the knowledge of logic and mathematics.

In the first place, Ayer's attack on the view that philosophy is a search for 'first principles' can be understood as an attempt to disapprove Cartesian view–point. For, Descartes aimed at making philosophy as exact as mathematics. By virtue of his commitment to this view, Descartes had to look for the 'first and indubitable' foundations or principles of philosophy from which a consistent philosophical system can be constructed. In addition to that, Descartes relied on two important powers of human reason, namely, intuition and deduction as two main tools of his inquiry. According to Ayer, the knowledge deduced from such premises cannot have any informative content since one set of analytic truths leads us to another set of analytical truths. He also maintains that the 'first principles' cannot be found among the so-called 'laws of nature' for, the laws of nature can be confuted by experience. Consequently, it is not possible to derive the 'first principles' either from intution or from sense–experiance. What is spurious with Ayer's notion is that he could not distinguish between the 'laws of nature' and mere 'statements of tendency'. A law is something which does not fail to occur in a given set of conditions. Laws of nature are well established scientific truths. They can neither be verified nor be falsified. Ayer's main contention is to show that the activity of philosophizing does not involve in the search for 'first principles' What then does this activity of philosophizing consist of?

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Ayer asserts that the activity of philosophizing is essentially analytic. In support of his assertion Ayer holds that " those who are commonly called philosophers have actually been engaged in carrying out analyses."[4] Not only that, " it can be shown that the majority of those who are commonly supposed to have been great philosophers were primarily not mataphysicans but analysts".[5] From this it follows that to be a philosopher one needs to be an analyst. Apart from that, the greatness of any philosopher lies in his being an analyst rather than a speculator. Accordingly, Ayer considers his empiricist predecessors (Locke, Berkeley and Hume) as great. Of Locke and Berkeley, Ayer writes that Locke was not a common-sense philosopher in the sense in which G. E. More is a common-sense philosopher. Neither he (Locke) tried to prove common-sense beliefs on a priori grounds, nor he affirmed or denied the validity of any empirical matter but only analysed them in terms of sense-experience. Similarly, Berkeley was not a metaphysician as he was commonly understood to be. Like Locke, he too was indulged in analysing the reality of material things.[6]

As a matter of fact, Ayer follows the footsteps of his empiricist predecessors Berkeley and Hume in reducing the statements about material objects to statements about sense-data. The phenomenalistic analysis of material objects of Berkeley and Hume has been converted into linguistic phenomenalism. The very purpose of this reductionist analysis is to show that the existence of material objects is somehow inferred from the sense-data. With regard to Hume, Ayer says that Hume is opposed to metaphysics (transcendental kind of metaphysics). It is only a belief that Hume has put forward the views concerning the nature of philosophical propositions. In fact, what is considered to be philosophical are his works of analysis. The whole misunderstanding about Hume's philosophical position is the outcome of his treat-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ment of causation that is often misunderstood.[7] Ayer himself advocates the same Humean conception. While dealing with the nature of causation Ayer writes that " our conception of causation is the same as his (Hume's)."[8] In this way Ayer illustrates that the activity of analysis is an unique feature of British Empiricists.

According to Ayer, philosopher as an analyst is not concerned with ' facts ' or ' notions ' or ' things '. In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual but only linguistic in their nature. They express definitions or formal consequences of definitions.[9] In this way, Ayer, a professed empiricist, dispences with all empirical facts as irrelevant to philosophy. For him a philosopher is only concerned with the stipulative definitions of his own inventions. It is clear from the following passage of Ayer.

> I must say not that I see the cigarette case, if this is to carry the implication that there is a cigarette case there, but it only seems to me that I am seeing it... the next step, continuing our example, is to convert the sentence ' it now seems to me that I see a cigarette case ' into ' I am now seeing a seeming cigarette case ! And this seeming cigarette case, which lives only in my present experience, is an example of a sense-datum.[10]

Indeed, it is in a pickwickian sense, i. e., regardless of their actual or literal sense, that ' facts ' or ' notions ' or ' things ' can be analysed.

Proceeding further, Ayer tries to distinguish philosophy from other sciences With regard to philosophy Ayer holds that philosophy is distinguished from other arts and sciences not because of its methods but because of its subject matter. Philosophers utter statements which are intended to be factual but in the final analysis it is realised that they are not the statements

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

about matters of fact. The theories of philosophy are not tested by any observation.[11] What follows from the above assertions of Ayer is that the questions such as whether the material objects are real, whether objects continue to exist at times when they are not perceived, cannot be decided on the basis of scientific information. According to Ayer, these are not the qustions which could be settled by observation but can be resolved on the basis of analysis of language. To quote Ayer's remarks in this context, " What is in dispute in such cases is not whether, in a given set of circumstances, this or that event will happen, but rather how anything at all that happens is to be described. "[12] In short, the activity of philosophical analysis consists in providing definitions.

Regarding the nature of philosophical analysis, Ayer holds the view that the definitions which philosophy provides are not ' explicit definitions ' but ' definitions in use '. In an attempt to illustrate this point, Ayer writes that " a lexicographer also seeks to give information about the usage of words, but the philosophers differ from him in being concerned ... but with the use of particular expressions .. and whereas the propositions of the lexicographer are empirical, philosophical propositions, if they are true, are usually analytic. "[13] Thus a lexicographer is considered to be an empirical scientist who glosses antecedent facts, whereas the true propositions of philosophy do not express anything new but only clarify what is already expressed by the propositions. In short ' the definitions in use ' show " how the sentences in which it (a symbol) significantly occurs can be translated into equivalent sentences, which contain neither the definition itself, nor any of its synonyms ".[14] The very purpose of philosophical analysis, according to Ayer, is to translate certain sentences into their equivalents. For example, the sentence ' The round square does not exist ', is equivalent to ' No one thing can be both square and round ', and the sentence ' The author of Waverley

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

was Scotch ' is equivalent to ' One person only, wrote Waverley, and that person was Scotch '.[15] Susan Stebbing in her review article on Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* points out that the statement ' The author of Waverley was Scotch ' is translated into an equivalent statement or sentence that ' One person, and one person only wrote Waverley and that person was Scotch ' violates the rules of analysis provided by Ayer. Stebbing argues that if the word " that " is used referentially, then " that person was Scotch " is equivalent to the whole of the original; and if it is used demonstratively, the defining expression " is not a translation of the original at all ".[16] In defence of his position against Stebbing's criticism, Ayer argues that " the object of analysing ' The author of Waverley was Scotch ' is not just to obtain an accurate translation of this particular sentence, but to elucidate the use of a whole class of expressions, of which ' the author of Waverley ' serves merely a typical example ".[17] According to Ayer, the examples of this kind are only meant to show how certain class of expressions can be explained in our ordinary language. If a philosopher sticks to this kind of analysis, claims Ayer, he will avoid either interfering in the sphere of natural science or involve himself in metaphysics.

In an attempt to define an ambiguous symbol, Ayer states that " a symbol is constituted by signs which are identical with one another in their sensible form, and in their significance, and that a sign is a sense-content, or a series of sense-contents, which is used to convey literal meaning, is not to say that a symbol is a collection of system of sense-contents. "[18] From the above statement of Ayer we can deduce that he is heading for ' reductive analysis '. Every symbol is reduced to signs which are identical in their sensible form. This kind of ' reductive analysis ' as Ayer believes is equally applicable to material object statements. This is to say that the statement about material objects

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

can be translated, without residue, into the statements about sense–data. Ayer presupposes " The problem of giving an actual rule for translating sentences about material things into sentences about sense–contents, which may be called the problem of the ' reduction ' of material things to sense–contents, is main philosophical part of the traditional problem of perception. " [19] Ayer states that the reason for adopting this reductive analysis is to eliminate certain problematic entities and to replace them with relatively less problematic entities [20] It implies that the propositions that express the facts of ordinary perceptual knowledge are not simple, and so are not the ultimate constituents of reality. For example, the expressions such as ' table ', ' chair ' etc, are problematic in the sense that they are philosophically disputable entities. And when the propositions containing such expressions are analysed, then they will be expressed in terms of ultimate constituents of knowledge (sense-data). In other words, the ordinary unanalysed knowledge seems to be about such things as ' table ', ' chairs ' etc., but analysis will make clear the ultimate constituents of knowledge. In this way, Ayer identifies philosophy with analysis and claims that " the only positive contribution that philosophy can make to knowledge is in the field of analysis ". [21]

Thus Ayer who does not wish to break too finaliy the empiricist tradition could maintain that Berkeley in his analysis of ' physical objects ', Hume in his analysis of causation were doing philosophy as conceived by logical positivists. The business is still the old reductive analysis (phenomenalism) even if it is under new management.

II

As it is discussed above, the chief aim of Ayer in identifying philosophy with analysis is to dismiss the aspects related to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

objective material world. If all that a philosopher can do is the logical analysis of concepts of everyday language and science then what kind of knowledge do we acquire about the objective reality ? Thus the analysis of Ayer leads us away from the path of knowledge into the path of empty arguments about words and concepts.

Let us consider some of the main objections raised by Max Black, John Wisdom, Gilbert Ryle and Maurice Cornforth against this kind of ' analysis '. This does not mean that they are negating the analysis as a useful method in philosophy but interpret analysis in a different way altogether.

Max Black expresses the view that analysis is a method of ostentation. Accordingly, the business of aualysis is the analysis of facts but not of meaning of statements. For instance, the facts such as ' Mr. Jones sat down ', ' Mr Jones is in his study ' etc., can be pointed out to. Black tries to differentiate ' philosophieal anlysis ' from ' logical analysis '. For, he believes " that the analytical method under consideration is either considered with analysis of facts in the sense of fact in which the same fact corresponds to different sentences, or, if it is regarded as concerned with analysing the meaning of statements or sentences, analyses of those statements into conjunctions of statements entailed by, but not having the same meaning as the analysandum. It is this fact which distinguishes ostentation or philosophical analysis from logical analysis which is concerned with the expression of statements into statements of identical meaning ".[22] Thus Black asserts that philosophical analysis is identified with ostentation. In other words, in philosophical analysis facts are pointed out to, whereas logical analysis is concerned with the analysis of meaning of statements or sentences. Black makes it clear that the analysis practised by him is totally different from the analysis practised by logical posistivists.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

can be translated, without residue, into the statements about sense–data. Ayer presupposes " The problem of giving an actual rule for translating sentences about material things into sentences about sense–contents, which may be called the problem of the ' reduction ' of material things to sense–contents, is main philosophical part of the traditional problem of perception. " [19] Ayer states that the reason for adopting this reductive analysis is to eliminate certain problematic entities and to replace them with relatively less problematic entities [20] It implies that the propositions that express the facts of ordinary perceptual knowledge are not simple, and so are not the ultimate constituents of reality. For example, the expressions such as ' table ', ' chair ' etc, are problematic in the sense that they are philosophically disputable entities. And when the propositions containing such expressions are analysed, then they will be expressed in terms of ultimate constituents of knowledge (sense-data). In other words, the ordinary unanalysed knowledge seems to be about such things as ' table ', ' chairs ' etc., but analysis will make clear the ultimate constituents of knowledge. In this way, Ayer identifies philosophy with analysis and claims that " the only positive contribution that philosophy can make to knowledge is in the field of analysis ". [21]

Thus Ayer who does not wish to break too finaliy the empiricist tradition could maintain that Berkeley in his analysis of ' physical objects ', Hume in his analysis of causation were doing philosophy as conceived by logical positivists. The business is still the old reductive analysis (phenomenalism) even if it is under new management.

II

As it is discussed above, the chief aim of Ayer in identifying philosophy with analysis is to dismiss the aspects related to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

 Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

objective material world. If all that a philosopher can do is the logical analysis of concepts of everyday language and science then what kind of knowledge do we acquire about the objective reality ? Thus the analysis of Ayer leads us away from the path of knowledge into the path of empty arguments about words and concepts.

Let us consider some of the main objections raised by Max Black, John Wisdom, Gilbert Ryle and Maurice Cornforth against this kind of ' analysis '. This does not mean that they are negating the analysis as a useful method in philosophy but interpret analysis in a different way altogether.

Max Black expresses the view that analysis is a method of ostentation. Accordingly, the business of aualysis is the analysis of facts but not of meaning of statements. For instance, the facts such as ' Mr. Jones sat down ', ' Mr Jones is in his study ' etc., can be pointed out to. Black tries to differentiate ' philosophieal anlysis ' from ' logical analysis '. For, he believes " that the analytical method under consideration is either considered with analysis of facts in the sense of fact in which the same fact corresponds to different sentences, or, if it is regarded as concerned with analysing the meaning of statements or sentences, analyses of those statements into conjunctions of statements entailed by, but not having the same meaning as the analysandum. It is this fact which distinguishes ostentation or philosophical analysis from logical analysis which is concerned with the expression of statements into statements of identical meaning ".[22] Thus Black asserts that philosophical analysis is identified with ostentation. In other words, in philosophical analysis facts are pointed out to, whereas logical analysis is concerned with the analysis of meaning of statements or sentences. Black makes it clear that the analysis practised by him is totally different from the analysis practised by logical posistivists.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

 Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Like Black, Wisdom too holds the view that philosophical analysis is an old and very useful method in philosophy. But unlike Black, Wisdom distinguishes ' philosophical analysis ' from ' material analysis '. He illustrates " Whenever one analyses the fact that ' S ' is ' P ', one gives an ostensive translation of the sentence " S " is " P " ... that is because to do the one is to do the other with a certain intention. It does not follow from that to analyse the fact, the economic man always buys in a best market is to analyse the sentence ' the economic man always buys in the best market '. To suppose that it does follow is to fail to recognise the distinction between saying that analysis is translation and saying that it is a logical construction out of i.e., may be philosophically analysed, into, translation. It is non–sense to talk of analysing sentences ".[13] The only noticeable difference between Black and Wisdom is that Black identifies philosophical analysis with ostensation, while Wisdom identifies philosophical analysis with logical analysis. However, both Black and Wisdom are in favour of ostensation.

The problem with ostentation is that it is not always possible to point out to each and every fact in reality. There are several social facts which defy the norms of ostentation and still be recognised as material facts. The social aspects of reality cannot be pointed out.

On the other hand, Ryle, in line with his ordinary language school philosophy, asserts that there are a number of type of expressions which he considers to be misleading. They are quasi–ontological statements such as ' Mr Baldwin is objective ', ' Mr Pickwick is subjective ', quasi–platonic statements like ' Colour involves extension, etc. Ryle holds that the business of a philosopher as an analyst is to restate propositions which do not exhibit their real form of the fact in a way in which the form will be duly exhibited. But a new point of ' analysis ' is suggested

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

i.e., our purpose is no longer the ontological one of getting a clear view of structure of reality but to clear up puzzlement, prevent misconceptions of language and expose absurd theories. Thus 'Mr. Baldwin is a politician' exhibits the form of fact and is not in need of analysis. Whereas the statement 'Mr Baldwin is objective' does not exhibit the form of fact, hence it needs to be analysed. Without analysis it is misleading.[34] Ryle opines that the basic task of philosopher is to treat the expressions like 'Mr Baldwin is objective' which mislead to absurd theories and inferences.

Ryle's approach towards analysis is far more superior to the other analysts. As rightly pointed out by Ryle one must analyse only those statement which lead us astray. Nevertheless, Ryle, like any other analyst, believes that the sole function of philosophy is the clarification of our thought. In this manner, in spite of their subtle differences in carrying out analysis (philosophical analysis) the common claim acceptable to all these philosophers is that the subject matter of philosophy is language and its legitimate method is analysis.

It was Maurice Cornforth who castigated the analysts on the whole; as the method of analysis has reduced primary or basic entities into secondary or derivative entities. Against the method of analysis, Cornforth argues that the 'analysis' adopted by recent analytic philosophers explains that the elements of facts displayed in a new level analysis are "more ultimate than those which were displyed before the analysis took place".[35] Cornforth argues that this interpretation then seeks to show that the ultimate and basic elements to which our scientific and common-sense knowledge refers are sensations or sense-data. Thus, the whole tendency of philosophical analysis is in the direction of phenomenalism and concludes that "analytical philosophy is just as speculative as speculative philosophy".[36]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

 Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The above account of Maurice Cornforth has brought out clearly the difficulties that arise out of practising analysis as a method in philosophy. To supplement the view expressed by Maurice Cornforth, we would like to affirm that philosophy does not have any fixed subject matter as such. Philosophy deals with the most general account of the world and man's place in it. This is all the more important because analysts are far more unanimous on this point. As we have shown elsewhere, Ayer and other analysts maintain that there is no integral philosophical system and that a philosopher creates his own. They believe that philosophy has occupied an intermediatory position between science and metaphysics. Accordingly, all definite knowledge belongs to science and all dogma as to what supercedes definite knowledge belongs to metapnysics. Between science and metaphysics there is third line exposed to attack. This third line is philosophy. In his exposition of the subject matter of philosophy, Ayer makes it clear that the main purpose in introducing analysis as a method in philosophy is to prevent philosopher from trespassing either into science or into metapysics. It tantamounts to saying that philosopher is deprived of both the definite knowledge of science and the subject matter of metaphysics. Thus, Ayer's philosophy has mere functional purpose without any objective inquiry. The analytical method practised by Ayer and other analysts deprives philosophy of any coginitive import by restricting philosophy to mere subjective analysis of language.

In opposition to Ayer's interpretation, we would say that the analysis practised by Ayer and other analysts is purely in a logical light. In other words, what is stressed in the analysis of a proposition and its meaning and what is neglected is the epistemological distinction between discovery and analysis. Discovery of facts is the principal motto of science whereas the interpretation of the results of various sciences (social as well as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

natural) is the business of a philosopher. Hence, it would be irrational to create a philosophical system and draw a picture of the world or reality without having any firsthand information about the reality.

Department of Philosophy
Pondicherry Univerity
Pondicherry—605104

K. SRINIVAS

NOTES

1. There are two types of analysts; world-analysts and word-analysts. The world-analysts like Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein of *Tractatus* etc., held the view, though there are subtle differences among themselves in holding this view, that language represents reality, while the word-analysts like Wittgenstein of *Philosophical Investigations*, Ayer, Ryle. Austin etc. restricted their analysis to the concepts of ordinary language and science.
2. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, (Hormondswoth, 1975) 2nd edn, p. 62.
3. *Ibid.* p. 63.
4. *Ibid*, p. 69.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
8. *Ibid*, p. 74.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
10. A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of knowledge* (Hormondsworth, 1977). p. 96.
11. *Ibid*, p. 7.
12. *Ibid*,
13. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 34.
14. *Ibid*, p. 81.
15. To explain the nature of analysis Ayer freely used the illustrations given by Russell in connection with his " Theory of Descriptions ".
16. L. S. Stebbing, " Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic," *Mind* (London) N. S, Vol XLV, No. 45, 1936, p. 358.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

17. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 31
18. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 86.
20. A. J. Ayer, " Philosophy and Language " in his *Concept of Person and Other Essays*, (London, 1973), p. 13.
21. A. J. Ayer, " Philosophy and Science " in his *Metaphysics and Commonsense*, (London, 1973), p. 82.
22. Max Black, " Is Analysis a Useful Method In Philosophy ? " *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement* (Londod), Vol. 13, No. 13, 1934, p. 55.
23. John Wisdom, " Is Analysis a Useful Method In Philosophy ? " *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement*, 1934, p. 65.
24. Gibert Ryle, " Systematically Misleading Expressions " in his *Collected Essays*, (London, 1971), p. 61.
25. Maurice Cornforth, " Is Analysis a Useful Method In Philosophy", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement*, 1934, p. 90.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 1.
January 1991

DISCUSSION

I

A Reply to Professor Rajendra Prasad : *Some Clarificatory Observations and Comments.*

I welcome Prof. Rajendra Prasad's critical discussion of my central thesis or theses regarding the nature of facts as propounded in my *Freedom, Creativity and Value*, if only because it affords me an opportunity to further clarify my position. Here the addition of the term ' theses ' is deliberate as I believe that even the most innocent looking proposition in a philosophical work, and even in a debate with a limited scope and purpose, involves or implies, a number of subtheses or assumptions that have a tendency to escape the notice of even a careful exponent and critic of the position. This circumstance, indeed, is a major factor leading to dissatisfaction with many a doctrinal position built up by historical philosophers. What seems to happen is this : A philosopher adopts, as his starting-point, a proposition or statement that appears to him to be a truism, i.e., as a statement of the obvious, which presumably means the statement of a fact (whatever that elusive term means); he then proceeds to work out, to the best of his ability, its implications in a manner that would illuminate a large area of what he takes to be factual realities and offer a connected solution of a large number, if not all, of the problems agitating his mind and, presumably, some other minds troubled by the same or similar problems. And, considering the almost indefinite plurality of factual realities and the problems arising from their contemplation, it seems wellnigh

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

impossible for any thinker, however gifted, to devise a scheme of ideas capable of comprehending them all in a unified vision.

In order to keep the discussion within reasonable limits, I will adopt the following procedure. I shall first advert to some important, representative thinkers who have expressed views regarding facts akin to my own; that may predispose the readers to pay sympathetic attention to what I have to say in defence and elaboration of my position; secondly, I will briefly indicate the modest contribution that my position may claim to make to the 'philosophy of facts' and/or the 'philosophy of values.' Thirdly, white exposing some of the contradictions involved in Dr. Prasad's criticisms, I would like to make a few methodological remarks and observations which, however, will be interspersed here and there as and when called for during the course of the discussion.

I

Professor Prasad has criticised my view of facts from such a naively realistic position that I feel genuinely perplexed as to where to begin my reply to him. In order to cut short the discussion, I would like to get off with some reminders–in a non-Wittgensteinian sense though. I would like to remind him of some landmarks in the history of philosophic thought, e.g.: Diṅnāga's characterization of *pratyakṣa* or purely perceptual experience as free from categorial determinations (*Kalpanāpodham*): Vasubandh's definition of *pratyakṣa* as cognition produced purely by the object *(tato'rthād vijñānam);* Kant's analysis of experience as consisting in sense–manifold cast in the moulds of space–time and the categories of the understanding; A. J. Ayer's admission that in describing a situation, 'one is not merely "registering" a sensecontent; one is classifying it in some way or the other, and this means going beyond what is immediately

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

given,'[1] and his final conclusion : 'That no synthetic proposition ... can be logically indubitable may be granted without much ado," etc. Here reference may also be made to the solipsist implications of the application of the verification principle, as of the so-called observation statements in general. Each in his own way, W. V. O. Quine in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and Carl Hempel in his "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning", has drawn attention to some of these and other troublesome implications of the neo-positivistic theory of meaning and verification.

But perhaps Dr. Prasad has directed his criticisms from the perspective of the linguistic philosophy as elaborated, and practised, by J. L. Austin—and by later Wittegenstein who objected to the sort of reductive analysis that had been indulged in by the logical positivists as well as by Russell and Wittgenstein in their logical-atomistic phase. From that perspective one might claim that the statement 'I see a bird sitting on the tree' as also the statement, 'my pen writes smoothly', is perfectly in order as it stands. Now I am no advocate of reductive analysis in any of its once fashionable forms—though Dr. Prasad himself, if I am not mistaken, is a believer in what is vaguely called "conceptual analysis". My concern here is the clarification and defence consisting mainly in the laying bare of the implications of a theory of verbalised cognition or knowledge, so-called, that affirms the presence of an interpretive element in the apprehension and/or statement of facts. So far as I can see, even an advocate of the aforesaid variety of linguistic philosophy should find it difficult to deny the element of interpretation implied in the application of class-names to such entities as "tree", "bird", "pen" and The like—as also to activities characterized as "seeing", "writing", etc. But before I take up detailed examination of that issue, I would like to dispose of Professor

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Prasad's truly serious objection implied in the judgment that 'Devaraja is not a reasoning or arguing type of thinker' but 'a synoptic or holistic thinker.' While not insensitive to the generous concession made in the qualifying statement, I would like to add that Prasad's objection stems from a misapprehension or an incomplete understanding of the nature of "argument" in general and "philosophical argument" in particular. For, while a conclusive argument in any form depends on one or other implicit assumption—a presupposition or a postulate—a philosophical position justifies itself by offering a comprehensive and self-consistent account of the data regarded by it as relevant and so worthy of attention. If one chooses to call this procedure synoptic, one should understand that this is the only way open to a philosopher seeking to justify or validate the central postulates–more or less comprable to the scientist's hypotheses-of his system. This view of philosophical reasoning and argumentation will be found, on examination, to be applicable as much to the conceptual framework of Spinoza's *Ethics* as to that of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Neither of these thinkers, so far as I can see, starts with (shall I say ?) a logical justification of their central postulates, viz., the definition of substance in one case and the conception or characterization of the world as 'everything that is the case', i.e., as a collection of facts, not of things, in the other case. Incidentally, thesis proposed by the present writer is exactly the opposite of the one upheld and elaborated in the *Tractatus*. It will be seen that the following statement of Carl Hempel, in his paper referred to above, suggests some such view of philosophical reasoning:

> ...the empiricist criterion of meaning... represents a linguistic proposal which itself is neither true nor false, but for which adequacy is claimed in two respects: First, in the sense that the explication provides a reasonably close

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> *analysis* of the commonly accepted meaning of the explicandum—and this claim implies an empirical assertion; and secondly, the sense that the explication achieves a " *rational reconstruction* " of the explicandum, i. e., that it provides... a general *conceptual framework which permits a consistent and precise restatement and theoretical systematization of the contexts in which the explicandum is used. . . .*][3] (last emphasis added).

The explicandum in the above context, of course, is "meaning' or "significance". It is well known, as Hempel points out, that one major objection to the " criterion " as formulated by some of its leading advocates, was that it could not do justice, by inclusion in the realm of cognitive significance, to ' various types of sentences which might occur in advanced scientific theories, or which have to be admitted simply for the sake of systematic simplicity and uniformity '.[4]

We are not interested here in enumerating many other troubles beleaguering the criterion indicated, among others, by Quine in the article alluded to above. For our purposes, it would suffice to observe that the criterion provided no room for judgments of value in any form whatever, e.g. the sorts of judgments that' fortunately for me, find expression in some of the statements, offered as examples of a certain class of assertions, by Prof. Prasad, e.g. : Hamlet is a great work of art; Russell is a mathematical logician whose contributions deserve being " extolled ", and the like. The positivist criterion, if it ever aspired for universal acceptance, would have to accomodate value–judgments alongside of the statements making up scientific theories. And if Dr. Prasad ever aspired to frame an adequate conception of ' facts ' he would have to find ways to accord factual status to

...9

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

our perceptions of preferability (and its opposite) such as the following: Shakespeare is a greater playwright than say, Victor Hugo; Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta* is a greater literary work than, say, the *Bhāminī Vilāsa* of Panditarāja Jagannātha; and with comparable financial assets, the person who clears the debt owed by a neighbour in distress is morally superior to one who, as a dependable person, pays up the debt incurred by himself. Analogously, the judgment that one scheme of ideas is more comprehensive, or more adequate to the data under review than another, must be shown to have some basis in facts–facts which may not be visible to the physical eye or to persons lacking in requisite training. This disposes of the claim that all genuine facts must be facts for all and sundy, and that there can be no degrees or gradations in the objectivity of facts

So far in my discussion of the problem, I have made no reference to some post-Kantian and recent thinkers in the German tradition in philosophy and other disciplines, e g. the powerful movements of thought known as "hermeneutics" and "sociology of knowledge". Nietzsche's emphatic assertion that there are no facts but only interpretations is well known. In contradistinction from Kant, who stressed the universal and necessary character of the categories responsible for the emergence of the phenomenal order of things, Hans Georg Gadamer–to mention one of the more prominent names in German thought representing a new trend in hermeneutics or the theory of interpretation–underscores the historical dimension of the interpretive activity as practised by the subject of cognition, stationed in and moulded by a particular cultural–historical milieu. The trend marks a continuation of and a new, near–sceptical historicist–relativist phase in the development of a line of thought that gathered momentum in the thought and writings of Vilhelm Dilthey and others. According to this illustrious thinker and, among others,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the great sociologist Max Weber, understanding in the human studies, embracing both the human or social sciences and humanities, is interpretive. Summing up Gadamer's position as expounded by him in his celebrated *Truth and Method,* Georgia Varenke states : ' The claim is that we are always involved in interpretation and that we can have no access to anything like " the truth " about justice, the self, reality or the " moral law ". Our notions of these " truths " are rather conditioned by the cultures to which we belong and the historical circumstance in which we find ourselves. According to Gadamer, we are further informed, natural science is no less hermeneutic than the human sciences, the implication being that *all understanding is hermeneutic.* [7] This view, as we know, has striking affinity with the analysis and interpretation of the historical development of physical science presented by Thomas S. Kuhn in his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and in later, clarificatory essays.

A near–desperate view of the situation with reference particularly to the context of the social sciences is taken by Werner Pelz in his *The Scope of Understanding in Sociology.* The following passages occur in the opening two pages of the book :

> We dare no longer ask with jesting Pilate, ' What is truth ?' since we are not sure whether there is truth, whether truth is a thing, whether truth is ... At one time the final truth and its guarantor was God, at another, it was facts... Today God does not function as guarantor, and in ever widening areas we are beginning to wonder whether we are altogether sure as to what constitutes a fact. In sociology in particular and in the social and humanistic disciplines in general ' facts ' are becoming increasingly problematical constructs. Not only is there little agreement on how to establish facts, there is as little on the nature of facts. [8]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The subject-matter of the social sciences, one and all, has a historical dimension; they, therefore, suffer from the limitations of the discipline called history.[9] The following extracts from the work of an eminent historian-thinker may shed light on the status of historical *facts*, so-called, that lend themselves to muitiplicity of formulations or interpretations. This is what Prof. E. H. Carr has to say about historical facts in his notable work, *What is History ?*

> It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls upon them : it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context ... The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one it is very hard to eradicate.[10]

How interpretation infects and alters or shapes the facts is brought out by Prof. Carr in another passage :

> We know a lot about what fifth-century Greece looked like to an Athenian citizen; but hardly anything about what it looked like to a Spartan, a Corinthian, not to mention a Persian, or a slave or other noncitizen residents in Athens. Our picture has been preselected and predetermined for us...[11]

Passages from quite a few eminent modern historians could be cited in support of Prof Carr's views. Carr himself quotes from Professor Baraclough who says : 'The history we read, though based on facts, is, strictly speaking, not factual at all, but a series of accepted judgements '[11]

The judgements, of course, arise out of interpretations put on facts or (supposedly) factual relations, so called These state-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ments by eminent historions seem to lend support to Gadamer's thesis of the historicist character of our knowledge of the past. The recent trends in the interpretation of physics are also supportive of his judgment of natural science. Let me quote from a few representative scientist–thinkers who have reflected on the investigative experimental procedures in physics. Having stated that 'every law of physics is provisional and relative because it is approximate',[13] Pierre Duhem proceeds to explain why the law should be approximate. Says he :

> the degree of approximation is not something fixed; it increases gradually as instruments are perfected... The astronomers of the next century will have telescopes with greater optic power, more perfectly divided circles, more minute and precise methods of observation... This provisional character of the laws of physics is made plain every time we read the history of the science.
>
> When Regnault had improved the apparatus and experimental method, this law (i.e. Mariotte's or Boyle's law of the compressibility of gases) had to be rejected.
>
> The laws of physics are, therefore, provisional in that the symbols they relate are too simple to represent reality completely.[14]

Needless to say the use of symbols in question involves the processes of selective attention and interpretation with respect to the entities (things or relations) symbolised. Having stated that in experimental recording of derceived relationships 'a single reading is not accepted unless it is impossible to take more', Prof C. F. Presley goes on to say that the readings have meaning within a system of measurement or with reference to a theory.... To quote Mr. Mackie, "Observation includes thinking and relies on background knowledge"[15] Further on Mr. Presley observes :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'One of the consequences of saying that an empirical law is true if it is supported by all the available evidence, is that we might have to say of a law that it *was* true, but that it *is* false.' [11] The same, I submit, not withstanding Prof. Prasad's contrary opinion, may have to be truly asserted of a fact (that it *was* a fact but it *is* no more a fact.) All statements of facts, so-called, relate to facts as they appear to us to-day; it scarcely makes sense to say, particularly in an account of a scientific study, that something is a fact once for all

As noted by Duhem and other critical positivists measurements leading to the establishment of quantitative relationships among variables are themselves dependent on optical theories on whose basis the readings from instruments are interpreted. In this connection I my be permitted to cite a passage from my forthcoming work, *The Limits of Disagreement* :

> Another noteworthy fact (whatever that elusive word means) about physical theories is that there ever remains some disagreement or difference between readings recorded by instruments and the deductions made from the theory. This being so, the investigators are satisfied if there exists what is called " reasonable agreement " between tables drawn on the basis of experimental observations on the one side and those embodying deductions from the theoty on the other side. However, the notion of " rearonable agreement " undergoes alternations depending on, as noted by Duhem and others, the level of refinement reached by the instruments available at a particular point in time.

In this connection T, S. Kuhn takes note of another relevant factor. " Reasonable agreement ", hs observes, ' varies from one part of science to another ', and, of course ' within any part of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

science it varies with time."[17] As usual, Kuhn illustrates these remarks with instances drawn from seversal fields of science.

II

I have, I think, said enough to bring home to the reader the enormous complexity of the problem concerning the being and nature of facts both in socio-cultural and in the natural sciences. When Caesar crossed the Rubicon with his troops a series of physical movements occurred; but these movements *per se* did not constitute historical facts They qualified for that description by producing ripples and eddies in the stream of meaningful phenomena called Roman history-and probably the history of the ancient world having relations of friendship, hostility etc. with the kingdom of Rome It must have affected the personal histories of many individuals including not only the military and political rivals and friends of Caesar but also ordinary citizens and soldiers who counted for little; however, the factual records of the latter have been by and large lost to posterity—irrevocably, as it seems

If facts did not involve or depend on interpretation there would be no differences of approach and opinion in the human sciences and no revolutions in physics and other natural sciences. The well-known phenomenon of even the eye-witnesses giving different accounts of an occurrence proves the same point. It is only when relatively grosser purposes are involved that people seem to achieve unanimity of reports about what has been or is being seen or witnessed-quite unaware of the fact that the use of language as such implies interpretation. In any case, there are degrees of accuracy in the attempted reportings even of the obvious.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It is against the background of the aforementioned problems and perceptions that the present writer has had to formulate his views regarding the nature and kinds of facts, being motivated, on the one hand, to combat the more extreme forms of relativism bordering on scepticism; and on the other, to explore the ground for agreement regarding moral and other sorts of value perceptions and judgments. For these purposes it has been found to be both necessary and appropriate to conceive facts and their understanding as involving the element of interpretation. However, the more perniciously extreme forms of relativism, historical and cultural, could on our view, be avoided by drawing out the implications of human creativity. [18]

Coming to Prasad's criticisms, I would first draw the reader's attention to a central fallacy infecting several of his observations and objections in regard to my position : his uncritical belief that a word like " contemplate " or " reconstruct " means, and should mean, the same thing in all contexts He forgets that a word may convey one or other sense or shade of meaning according to the context in which it is used—as pointed out, among others, by the upholders of the thesis of *anvitābhidhāna*. Thus, in the light of the definition or description of ' fact ' given by me, the reconstruction or recovery of a fact would amount to disclosing the meaningful, purpose–governed relationships that possibly obtained between actions and happenings and their consequences, partly intended and partly unintended, the disclosure depending on or involving weighing of diversity of reports and interpretations made available by contemporary researches into the surviving documents. Where no such documents exist, it is meaningless to make one or other assertion about, say, the circumstances of the death of an unknown soldier, elephant or horse or on the countless citizens of one or other kigdom or empire in the ancient world.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I may now pass on to some other, more important critical points sought to be made by Dr. Prasad. For one thing, he puts a very rigid interpretation on the thesis that, in the last analysis, our interests may be taken to be rooted in our human constitution. The view does not entail the denial either of the patent fact of the plurality of human interests or the multiplicity of ways in which a particular interest may express or realize itself. To these may be added the perception that some interests, such as that in sex, vary in intensity at different periods in life; and such derivative interests as those in wealth, power and influence may become strong in some persons to the point when they deliberately seek to suppress even relatively more natural impulses—e.g. that to counter-insult the boss or an otherwise influential person. These are, as pointed out in the book, some of the ways in which man realizes his creative freedom. That freedom is one of the more important postulates of creative Humanism as conceived and expounded in the work under scrutiny. Nor need it be supposed that the postulate of creativity which latter phenomenon is made possible by the malleability of human nature on one side and the capacity for the exercise of conscious choice, growing and developing with awareness of options for the selection of ends and objectives as well as of means available for their attainment on the other side, is inconsistent with belief in a universal human nature. For, in the case of man that nature, consisting in plurality of impulses, is, partly for that very reason, seen to be, along with its malleability, ever in a sort of mobile equilibrium. Furthermore, the unequal distribution, cultivation and expressive development of diverse interests makes for varied responses to similar situations and conditions of existence by different persons as individuals and as members of various communities and cultures. This accounts for the phenomenon that, while in principle everybody may be taken to have the capacity to understand, and appreciate, poetry

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and other forms of art and literature, logic and philosophy, and the like–which means that the rudiments of the capabilities or powers of aesthetic, moral and logical perception appear in man as innate endowments *at certain stages in his evolutionary development*, the interests stemming from them show unequal strength in different persons and even societies, depending on various factors, physical–geographical and, in later stages, cultural Denial of this would entail, among other things, uncertain authority of canons of logical reasoning and of ratiocination in general.

An object for man is anything that has relatively enduring existence or being for him, with *the power to engage one or other of his interests*. Besides physical objects there are what may be called symbolic or conceptual objects constituted exclusively of meanings, e.g. works of art and thought, arguments, theories etc. Thus the works of Kālidās and Vālmīki, Hegel and Marx have being with the power to evoke strong feelings, for persons with requisite knowledge or training. All sorts of objects–in–relation give rise to facts. This explains how there arise grades of objectivity. Even the world of physical objects *as known* through Kantian categories has objective being and existence only for man. For aught we know the world of the colour-blind frog, for one, is very different from that of man. And there is a sense in which every individual lives in a world of his own—a World within World, as the title of Stephen Spender's autobiography suggests. The degree of commonality of one or other class of objects for men is correlated with that of shareability of their corresponding interests. My perception that the *Meghadūta* of Kālidāsa is superior poetry than the *Bhāminīvilāsa* has no meaning for a person ignorant of Sanskrit or lacking or deficient in the ability to appreciate and judge literature. *The being of this perceived fact of difference, a type*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

or sort of relation, owes its incidence in man's world to being percieved. It is likely, nay certain, to disappear with the extinction of Sanskrit–knowing humanity or even with the destruction all the copies, including the printed as well as the remembered reproductions, of the two texts. And this would happen to everything that belongs, or has meaning, exclusively to and for man, if that particular creature were to disappear from the face of the planet called the earth. *A fact has a being only, and exclusively, in a particular meaning-space,* as repeatedly explained and illustrated in my book. " Once a fact, always a fact " may be logically true, but it is factually meaningless–to use those terms in their ordinary sense. And, pray, nothing can have existence or being in the purely analytical atmosphere of logic. The expression " always " in the above sentence has no temporal connotation–and here is another fact or factor of capital importance–but only logical force of a sort. Not only the verb–term " is " may express such diverse meanings as existence, predication, or class–inclusion, but even terms like knowing, understanding, conditioning, determining are thoroughly ambiguous. Each of these terms, e. g., may convey one meaning in the context of a natural science, and another in that of a humanistic discipline. Did not the Italian savant Giambattista Vico say: man can understand only what he has made or created and that we have true understanding only of the world of history (and not the world of nature); and another thinker, Johann Gustav Droysen, stated that 'understanding is the most perfect knowledge that is attainable for us humans.'[20] This means, in the context of the present writer's thought, *understanding for us is possible only of what has been invested with meaning relevant in terms of one or other of our interests* (shareably fundamental or derived there from). Such meanings alone *(and this is one important argument advanced in support of the thesis about facts)* can be *comprehended* and *communicated* by language. The illusion that we

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

know objects in the familiar day-to-day world is due to our intimate association or relationship with utility-centred or pragmatic meanings, involved in the identifying recognition and use of objects in that world. And what natural science *actually* succeeds in ascertaining are connections among symbolized pointer-readings, as explained by Sir Arthur Eddington.[21] The so-called facts unearthed and attended to by the scientist all owe their special character and being as expressive revealers of (supposedly) actual connections among things and forces (hypostatized through conceptualization) to the various systems of co-ordinates or reference-points, devised and used by the scientist. The raw material of sensations, as the Kantian analysis implied, could be neither expressed or shaped into connected units of experience without resort to meaning-bearing or meaning-indicating symbols.

Professor Prasad might not have felt quite as perplexed or puzzled, about the emergence and/or disappearance of facts had he attended to the following perception or argument recorded in my book : '... an entire set of facts about the table disappears the moment it is moved by a few inches to one or other side, or lifted up to a height of a few thousand feet on a mountain' (p. 25). The set will include literally trillions of facts : think of the spatial distance of the table or any point in it from any of the thousands or millions or trillions of points on the ceiling of the room, the surface of the earth or the sun, or a star in one or other galaxy, which may be indicated or asserted by a proposition. Substitute my finger-tip for the table and you will have to attribute to me the power to give rise to literally trillions of facts about distance between it and the points in qusstion-as also the power to make them disappear-by just moving it up or down or sideways by a fraction of an inch ! If the bird seen by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Dr. Prasad as sitting on a tree disappears into space, no device will be available to him to resurrect (is the expression that obscure ?) the fact of having seen it for public verification. This is all that is ment by the Berkeleyan assertion that its being is consisted in its being perceived. Possibly I cannot make my finger occupy the same spatial point twice to resurrect the earlier set of trillions of facts–if only because, in the meanwhile, the earth itself has changed its position relative to the sun and the star(s) in another galaxy. It follows, inescapably, on my view, that a fact has being in a particular meaning–space and not in *rerum natura*, which may be preserved for some purpose by the all too fallible human memory in one or other form. While stemming from interests the purposes we entertain are relatively more transient and variable, compared to our constitutional demands giving rise to more enduring interests. Even some of these latter demands and interests–like those bound up with the sex instinct–differ in their intensity and functioning at different stages in our life.

In conclusion, I would like to put a couple of questions to Dr. Prasad, or ask for the clarification of some of his statements. What exactly does he mean by the assertion that facts are sorts of things that *make* factual *propositions* (are there any non–factual *propositions* as well ?) true or false ? Do facts in any way effect, generate, shape, constitute, enact propositions ? What sort of activity, if any, can be attributed to facts ? In the second place, how can a fact authorise one, or furnish reasons to somebody, to use certain words and expressions in one lingustic or grammatical idiom or other ? What is there in a fact, so-called, that would guarantee *sameness* of meaning to sentences spoken in different languages and in different contexts ? What *facts* would justify attributing one or other motive to Brutus or Godse who

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

assassinated (or killed?) Caesar or Gandhi? On reflection, Professor Prasad will find that there is hardly a way out of the mixing or involvement of the interpretive element in the assertion of facts.

52, Badshah Nagar, N. K. DEVARAJA
Lucknow–226 007. (U. P.)

NOTES

* *Indian Philosophical Quaterly*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, pp. 479-91.

1. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (London : Victor Gallancz Ltd., 1948), p. 91.

2. *Loc. Cit.*

3. (Ed.) Robert R. Ammerman, *Classics in Analytical Philosophy* (Bombay, New Delhi : Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Ltd., 1965), Carl Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning", p. 229.

4. *Loc. Cit.*

5. The comparative judgments given or mentioned here constitute sorts of perceptions (or inspections) relating to the critical and moral spheres. They are *prior* to any theoretical formulations of evaluative criteria applicable to works of poetry (or literature) and actions claiming moral merit. In a related context in the author's forthcoming work, *The Limits of Disagreement*, the perceptions of the above kind have been described as constituting the pre-theoretic (but not pre-linguistic) consciousness. For all theoretical purposes they have to be looked upon as facts in the spheres in question. Comparable instances of such facts are given by G. J. Warnock in his *Contemporary Moral Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1969), Thus, he avers : 'That it is a bad thing to be tortured or starved, humiliated or hurt is not an opinion : it is a fact.' (p. 60.) Of course, the expressions "tortured", "starved" etc., involve interpretation—but that sort of interpretation precedes theoretical explanation in a humanistic discipline.

6. Ceorgia Varenke, *Gadamer Hermeneutics : Tradition and Reason* (Cambridge. U. K. : Polity Press, 1987), p. 1.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

7. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

8. *The Scope of Understanding in Sociology* (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974)

9. Cf. Anthony Giddens : ' There simply are no logical or even methodological distinctions between social seiences and history–appropriately conceived. ' Quoted by Alex Callinicos in *Making History* (Polity Press and Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 1

10. E. H. Carr, *What is History ?* (Penguin, reprinted, 1974), pp. 11–12.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 13

12. *Ibid*, p. 14

13. (Eds) Arthor Danto and Sidney Morgenbesser (New York : Meridian Books, 1962), Pierre Duhem's article " Physical Law ", p. 180

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 190, 191, 194.

15. *Ibid.*, C. F. Presley's article " Laws and Theories in the Physical Sciences ", p. 207.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 209

17. *The Essential Tension* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1977), " The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science ", p. 185.

18. See, *Freedom, Creativity and Value*, pp. 211 ff.

19. See, (ed.) Kurt Mueller–Vollmer, *The Hermeneutic Reader* (Oxford : Basis Blackwell, 1986), p. 19. Also see, *Studies in Eighteenth–Century Culture*, volume 9, (ed) Roseann Runte (Wisconsin : The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), article by Sandra Rudnick Luft, " Creative Activity in Vico and the Secularization of Providence ", p. 337.

20. *The Hermeneutic Reader*, p. 17.

21. Arthur Eddington, *The Philosophy of Physical Science* (Cambridge : The University Press, 1949), pp. 99–101.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE LATE MRS. GERTRUDE SACHS MEMORIAL ESSAY COMPETITION

Essays are invited for the Late Mrs. Gertrude Sachs Memorial Essay Competition **in English** from students below the age of 25 years studying in any Indian educational institution on the theme "**Cultural Integration of India : Prospects and Obstacles**" for the First and Second prizes to be awarded respectively of Rs. 300/- and 200/- to the essays adjudicted to be so by a panel of referees appointed for the purpose. The prize-winning essays would be published, in course of time, in the Students' Supplement of the **Indian Philosophical Quarterly,** a quarterly journal of the Department. The conditions governing submission of essays for the competition are as follows:

1. The essay typed in double space on one side of the paper must be submitted in duplicate.
2. The essay must not be longer than 2500 words.
3. The essay must be accompanied by a certificate signed by the Head of the Institution/Department where the student is studying to the effect that
   (a) the student is studying in that institution and is below the age of 25 years, and
   (b) the essay is written by him/her.
4. The essays should reach Dr. Mangala R. Chinchore, Philosophy Department, Poona University, Ganeshkhind, Pune 411 007 not later than 31-5-1991.
5. The decision of the panel of referees shall be binding on all the competitors and no correspondence of any kind would be entertained on that count.

The Head,
Philosophy Department
University of Poona, Ganeshkhind,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 2
April, 1991

ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF REFERENCE (III)

Intention and Reference in Ricoeur's Hermeneutics

Towards the end of the discussion of phenomenology, in part 3, we encountered the problem of speech and writing; we saw that Husserl, along with Frege and De Saussure, privileges speech over writing. But in Ricoeur's hermeuentic theory, there is a recognition of the specific functionalities of writing; he recognises not only the wide range of social and cultural effects of writing but also shows how the functions of discourse are qualitatively transformed by writing.[57] It is particularly with regard to the function of reference that Ricoeur goes beyond the usual limits of thinking, when he argues for a non–descriptive and non–ostensive reference at the level of a text, which is irreducible to the reference of speech.[58] This idea of a textual reference is perhaps the most significant contribution of Ricoeur's hermeneutic theory and hence I shall focus most of the time on the idea of extended reference. Connected with this, is another significant aspect of Ricoeur's theory, namely, his claim that we must recognise not only a metaphoric sense but also a metaphoric reference. Since Ricoeur himself connects his theory of textual reference with his theory of metaphoric reference, I shall also follow this aspect of his theory.[59]

But while recognising the irreducible functionality of writing, Ricoeur positions himself differently from the Deconstructionists. Firstly, unlike some of the literary deconstructionists, Ricoeur does not argue for the elimination or severance of the idea of

Received : 24–2–1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

reference. Ricoeur writes : "Discourse cannot fail to be about something. In saying this, I am denying the ideology of absolute texts. Only a few sophisticated texts along the line of Mallarme's poetry, satisfy this ideal of a text without reference. But this modern kind of literature stands as a limiting case and an exception. It cannot give the key to all other texts, including poetic texts. In one manner or other, poetic texts speak about the world, but not in a descriptive way. The reference here is not abolished but divided or split".[60] Connected with this, Ricoeur, unlike Derrida, sees the relationship between speech and writing in what may be called, a Hegelian, dialectical manner. In a sense, writing cancels the features or attributes of speech but this is not mere external negation or elimination. On the contrary, writing also actualizes certain potencies which were implicit at the level of speech; the idea of extended reference is a case in point. Ricoeur writes : "what happens in writing is the full manifestation of something that is in a virtual state, something nascent and inchoate, in living speech, namely, the detachment of meaning from the event. But this detachment is not such as to cancel the fundamental structure of discourse. Writing is the full manifestation of discourse. To hold, as Jacques Derrida does, that writing has a root distinct from speech and that this foundation has been misunderstood due to our having paid excessive attention to speech, its voice and its logos, is to overlook the grounding of both modes of actualization of discourse in the dialectical constitution of the discourse".[61]

In the light of the above remarks, it can be imagined that Ricoeur's fundamental reply to the critique of writing also would be very different from that of Derrida. It is interesting to note that Ricoeur also deals with the Platonic critique of in the *Phaedrus*, as Derrida does.[62] But Derrida's critique is an

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

immenent critique in the sense that he shows how in the very moment of marginalizing writing, Plato falls back upon it. Ricoeur does not attend to these subtle forces of agon between the thought and the textuality of Plato's dialogue. Rather than following such a 'rhetorical' critique, Ricoeur counterposes the idea of a productivity of the icon. Plato had used the notion of an icon or image to express the sterility and unproductiveness of writing. As against this, Ricoeur shows how there is a surplus, an augmentation, precisely by means of iconic techniques; icons, therefore, are not mere re–presentations, but prerentations of a new aspect of reality.[63] This enables Ricoeur to rejoin the idea of a new mode of reference at the level of texts.

It may, therefore, be seen that Ricoeur's total strategy is based on the idea of a new level of referentiality. Hence, it is this central principle that we must keep as the focal point in the exposition of this theory of meaning and interpretation.

Language as Structure and Event

Ricoeur's theory of meaning and interpretation is based on a fundamental contrast, namely, language as system or structure and discourse as event or performance.[64] The study of the first of these aspects, the systemic and structural aspects of language, Ricoeur calls semiotics and the study of meaning as event, he calls semantics. Accordingly, the parameters of his entire philosophy of lauguage are set by the proper understanding of relationship between semiotics and semantics. Ricoeur further believes that although in its classical beginnings in Plato and Aristotle, the semantic and communicative functions of language were kept in the centre of reflections, in the contemporary period, as a result of the enormous impact of linguistic structuralism, this aspect of language as expression of sense and reference has been somewhat overshadowed. Accordingly, Ricoeur sets himself the task of recovering the hermeneutic moment,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

while accepting the major claims of the structuralist understanding.[65] This dialectical motive of recovering a sharper hermeneutic understanding, by first exposing it to its structuralist opposition, is particularly marked in his treatment of reference, for it is precisely this idea of reference as involving language in its relationship to world that structuralism seeks to eclipse.

But Ricoeur's response to structuralism is not an empty or external negation; on the contrary, the does justice to he structuralist position as a necessary point of departure for any adequate understanding of language. Particularly in his critique of romantic of psychologistic hermeneutics, structuralism serves as the basis of his attack. Hence, we may begin with a brief consideration of the appreciation of the structuralist conception of language by Ricoeur. For Ricoeur, the structuralist attitude in the study of language may be summed up in the form of four postulates or maxims. First is what may be called the synchronic approach, according to which systems are more intelligible than changes. Therefore, the history of change must come after the theory that discribes the synchronic states of the system. The second guiding idea is the postulate of *finitism*. A system conceived of as finite sets of discrete entities with combinatory possibilities among themselves, becomes the object of a structuralist science. These combinatory capacities and possibilities add to the intelligibility of the system.

In such a system, no entity beloging to the structure of the system has a meaning of its own; the meaning of a word, for example, results from its opposition to the other lexical units of the system. As Saussure said, in a system of signs, there are only differences, but no substantial existence. And lastly in such systems, all the relations are immanent to system. In this sense, semiotic systems are 'closed' i.e., without relations to external, non–semiotic reality. A sign, for example, is defined

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

by De Saussure by an opposition between two aspects. These two aspects are the signifier – for example, a sound, a written pattern, a gesture – and the signified – the differential value in the lexical system. From this point of view, language no longer appears as a mediation between minds and things. It constitutes a world of its own, within which each item only refers to other items.[66]

If we look at the conception of language as a system or structure, from the point of view of discourse or communication, the structuralist conception of language may be described in terms of certain contrasts. Ricoeur particularly marks three elements in this contrast :

1. Language is subjectless
2. Language has no addressee
3. Language lacks reference.

Ricoeur suggests that the structuralist understanding of language is uni-dimensional in the sense that signs are the basic entities of such a conception. As against such a conception, Ricoeur holds that in addition to language as system or structure, we also need to think of language as discourse. At the level of discourse, the basic unit is a sentence and Ricoeur claims that the unity of a sentence is of a different type than that of signs. "The sentence is not a larger or more complex word; it is a new entity. It may be decomposed into words, but the words are something other than short sentences. A sentence is a whole irreducible to the sum of its parts. It is made up of words, but it is not a derivative function of its words. A sentence is made up of signs, but is not itself a sign".[67]

Semiotics, the science of signs, is formal to the extent that it relies on the dissociation of language into constitutive parts. Semantics, the science of the sentence, is immediately concerned

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with the concept of sense, to the extent that semantics is fundamentally defined by the integrative procedures of language.

Ricoeur holds that a sentence is not a compositional but a synthetic unity, an integration of two functions, of the subject and the predicate. The subject is the instrument of identification, while the predicate is the instrument of characterization; subject and predicate do not do the same job in the proposition. The subject picks out something singular; the predicate, in contrast, designates a kind of quality, a class of things, a type of relation or a type of action. The sentence is a functional unity of identification and predication. It is a saying of something about something.[68]

The study of discourse, therefore, takes shape as the study of three aspects of the act of utterance. Ricoeur here follows the theory of speech-acts and following Austin, he distinguishes the locutionary, illocutionary and the perlocutionary aspects of utterances. The locutionary aspect is the saying of something The illocutionary is the doing of something in saying and the perlocutionary is the effecting of something in the hearer by saying.

But besides these three aspects, Ricoeur also mentions a fourth aspect, which he calls the *interlocutionary act*. All discourse is addressed to some one. The presence of the pair, speaker-hearer, constitutes communication. The study of communication from the point of view of its function of addressing some one may be called the study of its interlocutionary aspect.[69]

An important issue in Ricoeur's analysis is the question of how these three aspects, the locutionary, the illocutionary and perlocutionary – are preserved in writing. As we shall see, Ricoeur claims that these three functions are preserved in a diminishing order of ease and clarity in writing. Thus, textual

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

discourse preserves most easily the locutionary aspect, whereas the illocutionary force and the perlocutionary effects are preserved with much greater difficulty and far less clearly and effectively. This is an aspect of the loss that we have to recognise when we go from speech to writing. For the study of discourse as event, Ricoeur holds that communication is the key and in pursuing this idea, he follows Roman Jakobson's model. But before we take up that aspect of the matter, we may note Ricoeur's transition from structure to event. Looked at from a structuralist persuation, it may appear that there is an epistemological weakness of parole, the use of language, for utterance is a vanishidg event, which disappears as soon as it is produced. This evanascence of the event of communication is strongly contrasted with the stability and permanence of language as system. It therefore appears that the demands of scientificity cannot be met at the level of an appearing – disappearing event. Science demands a system, a set of stable relationships, and this can be provided only by considering language as a structured totality in abstraction from the episodes of its use. But this privileging of structure over discourse conceals the fact that it is the use or the performance which is an actual datum; we encounter language in the form of its communicational interactions, as lived speech and performance and the postulation of a structure is a device to explain in discursive aspect of language. As Ricoeur puts it, structure and system are virtual, while performance is real.[70]

Ricoeur uses the Jakobson model in his study of meaning. It is also to be noted that it is in terms of this model of six functions of discourse that he explicates the transformations of writing.

Jacobson starts from the three-fold relation between hearer, speaker and message, to which he adds three other factors –

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

code, contact and context. To these six factors, he assignss pecific functions as below :



The speaker sends a message to the hearer, the message uses a code (usually a language familiar to both speaker and hearer); the message has a context and is transmitted through a contact (a medium). In terms of this model, we can assign functions to these factors :

1. Speaker – emotive function
2. Hearer – conative function
3. Message – poetic function
4. Code – meta–linguistic function
5. Contact – phatic function
6. Context – the referential function.

We may briefly explicate these functions with some details from the context of an oral communication. The emotive function of the speaker may be taken as the expression of his intention and the conative function, the recognition by the hearer of the intention. The poetic function would be the texture of the message itself, the meta–linguistic function of the code being the self–reference to the speaker and to itself. The phatic function would be the perceived sensuousness of the medium and the referential function, the objects and the situation, the message is about.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Ricoeur, in particular, elaborates the aspects of speaker, addressee and reference of the speech situation. Discourse, as speech event, has a subject in the sense of a specific individual with a communicative intent, an addressee, in the sense of a thou, to whom the communication is addressed and a reference in the sense of that about which the communication is made. What is distinctive about this characterization of discourse is the extension of the Fregean notion of reference from the level of sentences to the discourse of speech. Ricoeur connects Frege's distinction between sense and reference to Husserl's distinction between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment, for, in both cases "what we are dealing with is a meaning-intention which breaks the closed circle of the sign, which opens up the sign towards something; in short, which constitutes language as the saying of something about something. The moment there is a turn from the ideality of the sign to the reality of the thing is the moment of transcendence of the sign".[71]

This transcendence from sense to the world is mediated by a sentence, for, in a sentence, there is the unity of predication in the sense that something is said about something and this predicative complex is referred to the world and asserted as holding of it. As Ricoeur points out, the question of reference arises only at the level of sentence (in strictness, only in the context of the *use* of sentence) and not at the level of signs. Sense is immanent in discourse but reference moves language beyond itself to the things of the world. As Frege pointed out, we are not satisfied with sense alone, but we presuppose a reference. But what is the ground of this postulation? Ricoeur argues that there is a more originary movement from being to expression in language. The referential nisus of our language, Ricoeur suggests, is the counter-point to this ontological movement from existence to discourse. In this sense, the experience of being is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the ground of the referential capacity of language, Ricoeur, in this, is connecting the Fregean thrust towards reference with Heidegger's idea that being comes to expression in language.

But Ricoeur's ultimate purpose is to follow the career of reference as writing displaces speech. In order to have a clear perspective on the transformations of the function of discourse, when it transcends the situationality and contextuality of dialogue and becomes written discourse, Ricoeur first emphasises the effects of writing, for too often, writing is looked upon merely as a parasitic inscriptional device for recording speech. As against this, Ricoeur makes a double movement; first, he shows the fundamental transformations of our social existence brought about by writing; when one has a clear view of the dimensions along which writing transforms our existence, one would no longer think of it as a mere inscriptional or notational device. Secondly, on a very different register, Ricoeur shows how there is a possibility of short circuiting speech, as it were, when meanings are directly embodied in writing, without the detour of a spoken dialogue. This is the moment of origin of literature, according to Ricoeur, and this new level is unthinkable except on the basis of writing.

Regarding the first aspect of the transforming impact of writing, Ricoeur points out the following: (i) the formation of large scale political rule made possible by transferring orders and regulations over long distances, (ii) birth of market relationships made possible by fixation of rules of reckoning and calculation, (iii) formation of a sense of history by archives, and (iv) institution of law and other forms of judicial administration.[12] All these transformations which go so deeply into the quality of living are consequent upon the institution of writing. Ricoeur, therefore, holds that the phenomenon of writing must be seen as bringing about a fundamental transformation of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

individual and collective existence and not merely as a narrow notational device.

A second line of reflection on writing which Ricoeur opens up is the possibility of a direct embodiment of meanings in writing. He writes " Writing raises a specific problem as soon as it is not merely the fixation of a previous oral discourse, the inscription of spoken language but is human thought directly brought to writing without the intermediary stage of spoken language. Then writing takes the place of speaking. A kind of short-cut occurs between the meaning of discourse and the material medium. Then we have to do with literature in the original sense of the word ".[73]

But Ricoeur, while recognising the new threshold of possibilities opened up by writing, yet does not wish to oppose the written to the spoken; he does not suggest an oppositional or antagonistic relation between the two forms of discourse. Rather, he wants to look upon the transformations brought about by writing as actualizations of certain tendencies and possibilities already implicit at the level of speech. This continuity between the two levels is suggested by the procedure Ricoeur adopts in his study of the transformation of discourse at the level of writing; he uses the schema of Jakobson's six functions to contrast the spoken and the written. The use of the same schema is itself symptomatic of the continuity between dialogue and textual discourse.

As Ricoeur points out, the most obvious and palpable change that writing brings about is the fixation of the message in some relatively permanent medium; the spoken word is evanascent; it disappears as soon as it appears; but in writing, the message is encoded in a material medium, stone, papyrus or paper. But what we must notice here is that this inscription is a fixation

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the message; it is concerned with discourse rather than the structural system of language. What writing does is to preserve what is said – the propositional content of the communicative event. But the other two dimensions, namely the illocutionary and the perlocutionary, also are to some extent preserved in writing.[74]

But this inscriptional effect is, in a sense, the most external and superficial of the effects of writing; beyond this inscriptional effect, Ricoeur notices more subtle levels of transformation produced by writing. The relation between the message and the speaker as well as the relation between the message and the addressee are transformed with the access to writing. To consider the relation between the message and the speaker first : speech has a subject in the sense of a concrete individual speaker, communicating his intention by way of his speech. Here, the personal intention is dominant such that, at the level of oral communication, the two questions, "What do you mean ?" and "what does it mean ?" become the same. We may also say that oral communication is constituted by the motivational intention of the speaker. That is why an understanding of he who speaks is determinative of the understanding of what is spoken. We may say that the speaker constitutes the speech. But with textual communication, what the text says is never reducible to authorial intentions; relative to the personal intentions of the author, the text has a certain autonomy of its own, to ignore which is to commit what literary critics call "the intentionalist fallacy". But Ricoeur points out here that while avoiding the intentionalist fallacy, we should not fall into the opposite fallacy, which may be called the fallacy of the absolute text – the fallacy of hypostasizing the text as an authorless entity. The text, ofcourse, is the production of a certain biography; this sense of authorship we may call biographic authorship to be distinguished from

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

what I should like to call hermeneutic authorship. Hermeneutic authorship is a construction in the sense that it is an understanding of the author as revealed in the textual discourse itself. The text discloses a structure of meanings and what I call the hermeneutic author is the idea of an abstract personage as the centre of those meanings. The notion of the hermeneutic author is the notion of an assumed centre of the meanings as disclosed in the text itself. It is this shift from biographical to hermeneutic authorship that is the first transformation that we observe when we go from oral to written discourse. This moment may be called "anonymization". The text 'anonymizes' the subject in the sense that the idiosyncracies of a concrete psycho–physical biography are transcended, as it were, and the author is re-constituted at the level of the textual discourse. It is, in one sense, a loss of subjectivity, but in another sense, it is a purification of it; we may say that the text is one of the means of achieving selfhood.

Ricoeur points out that this semantic autonomy of the text, namely, that what it means is more than what the author meant by when he wrote it, restores the proper object to hermeneutics and at the same time de–psychologises it. Interpretation now can no longer be taken as the attempt to coincide with authorial meanings; nor can it aim at the placement of the interpreter with the original addresses. Interpretation now has the task of unfolding the meaning in the text and although this is not a simple process of reception, it does not involve the idea of empathy with intentions of the author or the original hearer.

Just as writing fundamentally transforms the relationship between message and speaker, liberating the meaning from the intentions of the author, so also does it fundamentally transform the relation to the addresses. Oral discourse, in the form of dialogue, has a contextual orientation to fellow participants in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the dialogue situation. This contextuality of dialogue is transcended at the level of textual discourse such that it is addressed to all those who can enter the discourse unfolded by the text itself. Corresponding to the anonymization of the subject, we may speak of the generalization of the addressee. Unlike a living oral communication, the text has a certain 'impersonality' of address. It is no longer oriented to a concrete 'thou' but it addresses itself to all those who have a certain competence to receive it. In this sense, its orientation is to a generalized other. Here again the apparent negativity of the process of generalization of addressee should not, however, occlude the element of a certain qualitative richness in the appeal of the text. It is not merely that in this generalization the range of audience of the communication is widened. The text transcends the spatio-temporal restrictions of dialogue, but this is made possible precisely because now the meaning possibilities of the discourse get a dimension of universality. The text speaks to subjects in their essential humanity; it addresses them in the name of and with the authority of essential needs, power and demands of human nature.

With regard to this enlargement of address, we must note that this universality is only potential and is grounded in the semantic autonomy of the text. Because the meaning of the text is freed from authorial intentions, it can enlarge its circle of communication and in a sense, create its own public. But it is in the reception of the meaning by the extended audience that this potentiality is realised. Hence, we must see the interaction between the semantic autonomy and extended communication as a dialectical process mutually constituting each other. Hence, Ricoeur writes : " Discourse is revealed as discourse by the dialectic of address which is both universal and contingent. On the one hand, it is the semantic autonomy of the text which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

opens up the range of potential readers and, so to speak, creates the audience of the text. On the other hand, it is the response of the audience which makes the text important and significant... It is part of the meaning of a text to be open to an indefinite number of readers and therefore of interpretations. This opportunity for multiple readings is the dialectical counterpart of the semantic autonomy of the text ".[75]

The third aspect of transformation effected by textual discourse has to do with the meta-linguistic function in the context of the relationship of the meassage to the code. Under this aspect, Ricoeur studies the formation of literary genres such as the essay, the poem, the novel etc. These may be called discursive codes, which operate on levels beyond that of the sentence where phonological, lexical, and syntactic codes function. In a sense, Ricoeur admits that these discursive formations could be studied without reference to writing. " The function of these generative devices is to produce new entities of language longer than the sentence, organic wholes irreducible to a mere addition of sentences. A poem, narrative or essay relies on laws of composition which, in principle, are indifferent to the opposition between speakling and writing.... Language is submitted to the rules of a kind of craftsmanship, which allows us to speak of production and of works of art and by extension of works of discourse.... The generative devices, which we call literary generes, are the technical rules presiding over their production ".[76] But inspite of this, writing plays a decisive role in the formation of such discursive entities. A text is not only an inscription but also stands for the 'textura' of discourse; it means discourse both as inscribed and as wrought. But perhaps the most significant and transformative effect of textuality is to be seen in connection with reference. Since this is Ricoeur's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

most original and exciting theme, namely, the idea of extended reference, we shall follow his arguments more closely in the following discussion.

The idea of the referential function of discourse is a strategically important aspect of Ricoeur's theory, for it is on the basis of reference of discourse that he tries to work out a theory of the truth of interpretations, for if there is a conflict of interpretations then without a concept of truth of interpretations, we would be stuck in an irremediable relativism of interpretations. But there is a complication here, for as we shall see, plurality of interpretations arises in the context of symbols. Now, in Ricoeur's theory, symbols are not mere expressions having significance, but are essentially plurivocal. Hence, the truth of symbols is a more complex notion than the truth of univocal expressions. As an example of such plurivocal signs, we may take metaphors. Now, the interesting point about Ricoeur's theory is that he suggests a notion of metaphorical truth and not merely metaphorical sense.

A second context in which the idea of reference in Ricoeur becomes significant is the confrontation of hermeneutics with structuralism. Ricoeur argues that given the systemic presuppositions of structuralism, a sign must not be defined in terms of some object for which it stands, but rather in terms of its relation to other signs within the system of which it is a part. By constituting itself as the study of language as a system in this sense, Ricoeur argues that structuralism violates the fundamental intention of language i.e., to say something of something. Not only has language both sense and reference, but Ricoeur, like Frege, claims that we cannot be satisfied with sense alone, for sense itself is intelligible only on the basis of the referential nisus of language. For Ricoeur, this silence about reference is not merely a criticism of the structuralist conception of language,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

but he regards it as the basic or foundational weakness of the structuralist point of view in general. For example, this is also the basis of his critique of Levi Strauss' account of myth. Here his basic point is that myths cannot be considered purely as an inter-locking self-sufficient system of rationally positioned signs. It is precisely because myths do say something about the world that they become objects of a structural investigation. The 'mythemes' are expressive; they talk of human phenomena such as birth, death, marriage and incest.[77] Here again, it is the idea of reference that is being emphasised by a peculiarly problematic notion of reference of pluri-vocal symbolic expressions that Ricoeur is advancing.

If the idea of reference is deployed against structuralist and hermeneutic theories, on the one hand, Ricoeur specifies his notion of reference against the logical analytical conceptions of reference, on the other. In this context, we may first of all observe that, while Ricoeur borrows the distinction between sense and reference from Frege, yet he extends it beyond the boundaries of the Fregean application, to discourse as a totality. This idea of discursive reference as something irreducible to propositional reference is a specific feature of Ricoeur's theory. The second aspect of differentiation is from the theory of Strawson. With Strawson, Ricoeur recognises that reference is to be located in the use of a sentence and not merely in the propositional content of the sentence. But in connection with the idea of the referential use of expressions, Ricoeur differs from Strawson and Searle on another point of theory. For both Strawson and Searle, for a person to refer to an object by means of the referring use of an expression, he must be intending that object and no other; in other words, for them, intention is a necessary condition of reference. Ricoeur accepts this inten-

...2

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tionalist account of reference as far as oral speech is concerned, but in writing or textual discourse. he holds that reference need not be tied up with intention.

This idea he develops on the basis of a three–fold typology of reference – ostensive and descriptive reference and non ostensive and non-descriptive reference. Thy last type is a peculiarly Ricoeurian notion which he develops in his hermeneutics of textual discourse.[78]

Another feature of Ricoeur's theory of reference may also be mentioned here. To understand the reference of a symbol is to interpret it and all interpretations of being are also interpretations of the subject or self. Hence, in every reference, there is also a moment of self–reference. In other words, an expression, for Ricoeur, is sustained by a bi-polar tension – a tension towards the world and a tension towards the self. What is characteristic of Ricoeur's hermeneutical philosophy and which distantiates such a hermeneutics from phenomenology of Husserl and the fundamental ontology of Heidegger at once, is that both the understanding of Being as well as of the subject are possible only by way of an understanding of expressions For Ricoeur, there is no immediate access to either the world or to the self. In his own way, which is, of course, very different from that of Derrida, Ricoeur too rejects philosophy of immediacy. As against Heidegger, Ricoeur would claim that while necessarily hermeneutics must be linked up with existence, yet this linkage or connection cannot take the form of an immediate ontology. Only a detour by way of interpretation of symbols and by way of the conflict of such interpretations can we hope to approach being. As against Husserl, Ricoeur would similarly urge that consciousness too is self–interpreting and cannot deliver itself to a wholly unmediated vision or seeing. On the contrary, here too there

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is a plurality of understandings and to be a self and to have an understanding of being a self requires a detour through these pluri-vocal symbols of consciousness. Self–knowledge too is through and through hermeneutic and because it is hermeneutic, it too is contestable and open-ended.

For Ricoeur, the referential function of language emerges at the level of a sentence. In this idea, he rejoins the classical notion found in Plato as well as in Aristotle. In the *Cratylus*, Plato shows that the problem of truth arises only at the level of the synthetic unity of a name and a verb effected by a sentence, and not at the level of isolated 'names', or words.[79]. This was also the view of Aristotle, namely, that truth and error are 'affections' of discourse and discourse requires two basic signs, a noun and a verb connected in a synthesis of a sentence. Hence, a sentence refers to an object and characterizes it by way of predication. It is this unity of referring and characterizing that is the distinctive function of a sentence studied by Aristotle in *On Interpretation.*[80] As Ricoeur remarks, for Aristotle to refer to an object and predicate something of it is to interpret reality. It is in this manner that the classical conception of interpretation or hermeneutics gets closely associated with reference. It is one of the fundamental aims of Ricoeur's hermeneutic theory to preserve this link between reference and interpretation.[81]

For Ricoeur, the distinctive function of sentence is, therefore, predication and it is in this sense that he accepts Benveniste's claim that predication is the indispensable factor of the sentence.[82] Now, predication as a semantic function, is an integration or synthetic unity of two component functions, referring and characterizing. The first, the function of singular identification, is performed by the logical subject which picks out something singular – Peter, London, this table, Mt. Everest etc. This

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

logical function of identification may be carried out by several grammatical devices, such as proper names, pronouns, demonstrations (this and that, now and then, here and there etc.) and definite descriptions (the so and so). They all serve to identify one and only one item. The predicate characrerizes this identified element in terms of quality, class, relation or action.[83]

The fundamental polarity expressed in the sentence is between singular identification and universal predication.[84]

Before we proceed further with Ricoeur's extension of the notion of reference, we may have a brief backward glance at Husserl's theory we discussed in the previous section. As we saw, Husserl develops his semantic theory of sense and reference on the foundation of a more primordial stratum of intentional or act-meaning. But although this is a more ultimate level, yet even at this level, a distinction functionally similar to logical subject and predicate can be made. As we saw, in the noematic meaning of an act, Husserl distinguishes an X component and a predicative part. The X-component secures the object being intended and the predicative component serves to characterize the object further. In the unity of the intentional act, referring and characterizing are connected with each other. It is this structure of an intentional act, which is expressed at the linguistic level, by means of the logical subject and predicate. As we further noted, the fundamental question which may be raised in connection with Husserl's analysis is whether he is imposing the structure derived from the semantics of reference onto the pre-linguistic level of intentions or conversely, whether the linguistic distinction follows the phenomenological one.

Ricoeur does not base his semantic and hermeneutic theory so univocally on a phenomenological foundation like Husserl; indeed, he could not do so for, one of the deeper motivations

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of his entire philosophical thinking runs counter to the philosophy of immediacy, which he holds to be characteristic of Husserlian phenomenology. But this does not mean that there is a simple or 'external' repudiation of phenomenology by Ricoeur's hermeneutics. On the contrary, we must, Ricoeur tells us, see the relationship between phenomenology and hermeneutics as an inner reciprocal need. While phenomenology requires to be grafted on to hermeneutics, it is equally true that hermeneutics requires a phenomenological complement, although not a foundation.[85] After completing the examination of Ricoeur's theory of reference, I hope to come back to this issue of the reciprocity of phenomenology and hermeaneutics in Ricoeur's philosophy.

The most elementary and basic form of reference recognised by Ricoeur is simple ostensive and descriptive reference. The specific claim that he advances at this level is that such ostensive reference is based on what he calls 'monstration'.[86]

Speech achieves its referential scope because there is the ultimate possibility of showing the thing spoken about. This showing is made possible by the common context or speech situation shared by the speaker and the hearer. Because of this environing contextuality of dialogue, the things spoken of can be even gesturally pointed out. But even in purely discursive terms, the object can be designated by devices of ostension, such as demonstratives, the adverbs of time and place and the tenses of the verbs. On even higher levels, they could be uniquely described in su h terms as to secure singularity of reference by the very force of such descriptions; such are what Russell has called 'definite descriptions' which have the force of singling out one and only object to which they apply. It is of course true that singular identification in the above sense can be carried out by purely discursive devices we have mentioned; it is also

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

true that such ostensive and descriptive references are as such possible in writing as in oral speech. For example at this level and for this type of reference, the definite description, 'the so and so' achieves the same effect, whether it is spoken or written. Hence, such ostensive and descriptive reference can be purely a linguistic functionality. But Ricoeur claims that all such ostensive references rest upon a gestural pointing to as a condition of their possibility. It is because the participants in a speech situation occupy a common context and share the same nexus of spatio-temporal determination, that they have things in common which they can point out. It is in this sense that Ricoeur claims that all references of oral language rely on monstration, which depends on the situation perceived as common by the members of the dialogue. Monstration is the existential availability of a thing or event to subjects embedded in the same context and it is this availability of things in the bodily sense that is the foundation of ostensive reference. This primordial type of reference, Ricoeur calls ostensive and descriptive reference, which is primarily an oral phenomenon, although as we saw, there could be a simple inscriptional form of such reference. What is characteristic of oral reference is, Ricoeur claims, the close connection between identification and monstration. Monstration is perceptual while identification is properly linguistic, but in speech, because of its contextuality, the two are so closely connected with each other that, as it were, one passes over into the other. But writing is context-transcending. With the inscription of what is said in the form of marks in a medium, the message achieves a relative permanency and independence from the occasion of its origin. Because of this fixation of the content of the message, it is available to others outside the context of the speaker/author. This is what we previously studied under the aspect of the enlargement of the circle of communication. With expansion of the range of its address,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

there appears a gap between identification and monstration. When the addresses are outside the context of the author, reference can no longer presuppose a locatability in any shared context. Writing, therefore, introduces a first complication, a first rupture in referring. This type of referring, which emerges distinctively at the level of writing, Ricoeur calls non–ostensive but descriptive reference.

But this spatio–temporal gap could be overcome in certain forms of writing which provide what Ricoeur calls 'the equivalents of ostensive reference'. Letters, travel reports, geographical and historical descriptions etc. create a kind of quasi–situational sharing. The indications within such narative forms could ultimately be connected with the here and now of the readers and through such connections, the characterizations of such forms of discourse could be tied to the identifications of the contexts of the readers [87] Although this extension may appear to be a small step, yet Ricoeur emphasises of even this first extension brought about by writing, for thanks to this, man and only man has a world and not merely a situation.[88] Although in its inscriptional form writing appears to be merely a material innovation, yet, its function, as Ricoeur remarks, is truly spiritual for it frees meaning from the constraints of a mental intention at the same time at it frees reference from the limitations of a narrowly circumscribed situation.[89] For readers share a world and not merely a context in which they are embedded. The text in its situational transcendence no longer evokes any concrete setting; in relation to oral discourse, textual discourse is de–contextualized. But precisely by means of this freedom from a specific setting or situation, the text represents a world. We may call this representation of a world in abstraction from all situational contingencies, the essentialization of reference. It is in this sence that we sometimes speak of the world of Shakespeare

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

or of Plato. Ricoeur points out that this second extension of reference is, in a sense, less due to writing as such than to certain forms of literature. Further more, there is a negative moment in such reference; as we say, in representing a world, the concrete situation is lost. The reference here is neither ostensive nor descriptive in the original sense, but rather all such first order references seem to be eclipsed. This phenomenon of an abolition of primary reference is particularly marked in work of fiction. But does this mean that all reference, as such, is abolished ? Does it mean that a literary work is not *about* anything at all, but purely by way of its literary devices, it draws our attention to itself? Ricoeur's contention is that discourse cannot fail to be about something and hence he would deny the ideology of 'absolute texts'. In one manner or the other, even 'poetic' texts speak about the world, only not in a descriptive manner, Ricoeur writes that the effacement of the ostensive and descriptive reference liberates a power of reference to aspects of our being in the world that cannot be said in a direct descriptive way, but only alluded to, thanks to the referential values of the metaphoric and in general symbolic expressions.

Ricoeur is now suggesting the most novel theme of the reference of metaphor and symbol. This extension of the notion of reference to include metaphors is perhaps the most challenging and at the same time provocative idea in Ricoeur's extensive reflection on reference, for the idea of metaphoric reference allows him to introduce the notion of poetic truth. But a proper understanding of this development of the theory of reference would first require that we keep in mind the specific signification he gives to symbol. In *Freud and Pnilosophy* Ricoeur remarks that his specific understanding of the symbol may be situated between two extremes, as it were – the one too broad and the other too narrow.[90] The overtly broad definition makes the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

symbol almost equivalent to thought, as for example, in Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*. In Cassirer, the symbolic function reduces to the function of objectivization.[91] But Ricoeur's objection to this broad conception of the symbolic function is that it obliterates the distinction between univocal and pluri–vocal expressions. Hence, Ricoeur, in his determination of the symbol, lays special emphasis on this aspect of double meanings. For Ricoeur, symbols are essentially pluri–vocal, where an expression is said to be pluri–vocal if (i) it has a direct or primary meaning (ii) an indirect or secondary meaning such that (iii) the direct meaning designates the secondary and indirect meaning and (iv) the indirect meaning can be apprehended only through the the direct meansng.[92]

This brief characterization of the symbol may make clear the nature of metaphor, for metaphors clearly have this two–level semantic structure in the sense that in metaphor there is a secondary meaning which is available only by way of the inappropriateness of the primary meaning of the expression. But Ricoeur, while recognising the similarity between symbol and metaphor, also points out to us their difference — unlike in a metaphor, Ricoeur says, in a symbol there is a non–semantic structure.[93] But nevertheless, the theory of metaphor is a proper preparatory ground for the theory of the symbol. With regard to the theory of metaphor, the fundamental claim of Ricoeur is that here too the distinction between sense and reference continues to be helpful, so much so that we can speak not only about metaphoric sense but also of metaphoric reference. This idea of the reference of metaphor Ricoeur himself regards the crowning phase of his closed study of metaphor in *The Rule of Metaphor*.[94]

Sense and Reference in Metaphor

Ricoeur's study of metaphor in *The Rule of Metaphor* has a highly complex structure organised, however, by a fundamental

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

movement, from Rhetorics to Semantics and from Semantics to Hermeneutics. [95] At each one of these levels, metaphor is considered at its appropriate sphere of analysis; thus the rhetorical level of analysis takes metaphor as focussed on words and changes of meaning at the level of words. Thus, Aristotle's definition of metaphor focusses on the word or the name. 'Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else, the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species or on the grounds of analogy'.[96]

As Ricoeur points out, this conception of metophor as the epiphora of the name, which is characteristic of rhetorics, marks metaphor as a figure of speech. Ricoeur further argues that although in Aristotle's *Rhetorics* and *Poetics*, there is implicitly a much larger and more philosophically significant conception of metaphor, in the later period, under the influence of classical rhetoricians and stylists, metaphor was reduced to a figure of speech and was classified along with the other tropes, as an ornament of speech. It is this narrow conception of metaphor, which Ricoeur names the substitution theory, since it looks upon metaphor as an expression substituted in the place of another. He argues that this narrow conception of metaphor is based on a number of presuppositions, each one of which is highly questionable. The net result of these presuppositions, as Ricoeur shows, is to reduce the epistemological value of metaphor almost to a vanishing point. Under these presuppositions, metaphor becomes merely an ornamental or stylistic device, whose only value is psychological or heuristic. Its sense is emotive and the question of its reference or truth hardly arises. These presuppositions of the narrow conception of metaphor, as identified by Ricoeur, are :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

1. Metaphor is a trope, a figure of discourse that concerns denomination.

2. It represents the extension of the meaning of a name through deviation from the literal meaning of words.

3. The reason for this deviation is resemblance.

4. The function of resemblance is to ground the substitution of the figurative meaning of the word in the place of the literal meaning, which could have been used in the same place.

5. Hence, the substituted signification does not represent any semantic innovation. We can translate a metaphor i.e. replace the literal meaning for which the figurative word is a substitute.

6. Since it does not represent a semantic innovation, a metaphor does not furnish any new information about reality. This is why it can be counted as one of the emotive functions of discourse.[97]

Ricoeur's basic case against the substitution theory is that it misconceives the process of the formation of the metaphorical meaning; it looks upon this process as if only names or words are involved, but the emergence of the metaphoric sense, what Ricoeur calls semantic innovation, arises only on the basis of the collapse of the literal or ordinary sense. It is only when the customary or literal sense is seen to be absurd, that the situation is saved by interpreting the expression according to a metaphoric sense. Metaphoric meaning is, therefore, constituted not at the lexical level, but at the level of a sentence subjected to interpretation.[98] Hence, it is at the level of sentence or statement that we can understatd the formation of metaphor. The transition, therefore, is from a rhetorical to a sementic theory which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

takes the statement as the site of the constitution of metaphoric meaning. But once we recognise that it is at the level of a statement that we can grasp the process of epiphora, we can also take the next consequential step towards a hermeneutic theory of metaphor. It is when the sentence is interpreted according to its customary sense that the absurdity of the first interpretation prepares the ground for the second interpretation. Thus, the metaphoric sense is the function of a certain conflict of interpretations; it is because the first interpretation of the statement leads to absurdity that a second interpretation taking recourse to a metaphorical sense becomes necessary. Thus, the constitution of a metaphor is bound up with the hermeneutics of statements.[99] With this, our study of metaphor moves from a semantical to a hermeneutical context.

But there is another important gain in seeing metaphor at the statement level. It may be remembered that Ricoeur had suggested that it is at the level of use of sentences that the issue of reference arises. Accordingly, a statement theory of metaphor, such as the one Ricoeur is developing, would raise the question of, not only the sense of metaphor, but of its reference as well. But the issue of the reference of metaphor has a certain complexity about it. Since sense and reference are so closely bound up, we may expect the specific structures of metaphorical sense to also influence the reference of metaphor. More specifically, we may ask: what is the relation of the two level structure of sense (literal and metaphorical) of metaphors to their reference? Since metaphorical sense arises only on the basis of the destruction of the ordinary sense. does this process affect the reference also, and if so how? These questious are of basic importance to Ricoeur; in fact, his theory of reference is shaped to a large extent by the pressure of such questions. In effect, what Ricoeur is suggesting is that just as the metaphorical sense

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

arises only on the basis of the suppression of the ordinary sense, so also metaphorical reference is possible only after a cancellation of ordinary reference. Because the customary reference is superseded, it is possible to think of metaphoric expressions (poetic discourse in general) as lacking all reference. In fact, Ricoeur himself confronts these non–referential theories of poetic discourse, but his final thesis is that the suppression of customary reference is only a moment in the service of the emergence of secondary reference.

Ricoeur begins his discussion of metaphor and reference by pointing out that the question of reference can be posed at two different levels of semantics and hermeneutics.[100] At the first level, it deals only with entities belonging to the order of the sentence. At the second level, it addresses to entities that are larger than the sentence. The problems of reference at the second level of texts raise particularly complex questions, for certain kinds of texts, i e. the poetic ones, seems to dispense with reference altogether. But this non–referential autonomy of texts goes counter to what Ricoeur calls the postulate of reference. Frege, who distinguished between sense and reference, gives expression to this postulate in a particularly striking manner. Frege writes "we are not satisfied with the sense alone. We presuppose besides a reference. It is precisely this presupposition that causes us to err, but if we are wrong, it is demanded by our intention in speaking or thinking. This intention is striving for truth which drives us always to advance from the sense to the reference."[101] It is this striving for reference that seems to be checked by certain kinds of texts. The text, as Ricoeur understands it, is a complex entity of discourse whose characteristics do not reduce to those of sentences. Texts are specific or singular discursive formations which can be arranged according to certain literary types or genres. It is the reference of these discursive

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

formations that is the point at issue. Initially, it may appear no profound transformation of the Fregean distinction between sense and reference is necessary, for it may be thought that the sense of the text, in our example, is the structure of the work and its reference is the world of the work. If so, hermeneutics is the theory of the transition from the structure of the work to its world. This conception of hermeneutical task, as displaying the world before the text rather than giving us a privileged access to the intentions and other mental formations of the author, has of course an important role to play in overcoming the psychological and romantic presuppositions of the hermeneutics of Schleirmacher and Dilthey. But such a critical hermeneutics would be available to us only if we could justify the necessity as well as possibility of moving from senes to reference. And it is this passage which is being questioned by the no–reference theorists of literature.

This justificatory movement from the sense to reference in the case of literary texts is called into question by several counter arguments, coming from such widely differing contexts as philosophical semantics, theory of literature, criticism, structural stylistics and certain persuasions in analytic epistemology. The case against reference, as we have to measure upto today, is therefore a highly sophisticated and articulated position and no longer merely rests upon the prejudice of classical rhetorics that metaphor is merely a dispensable ornamental device. Ricoeur, therefore, in the central portions of his study of metaphor and reference, carefully picks his way through these complex levels of argument. Before we follow him into the thick folds of this debate, we may keep certain broad presuppositions of his argumentation in mind :

1. The issue of reference at the level of texts arises in the context of hermeneutics, since it is in the context of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

interpretations that the double structure of sense-literal and metaphorical–could be identified, so also we need interpretation to fix the reference of texts.

2. The paralellism with sense holds at another point also; the metaphorical significance of the expression is revealed only on the ruins of the customary meaning. So also the suspension of customary reference is the necessary condition of the emergence of secondary reference. Hence, the movement from sense to reference must be seen in terms of a certain dialectic of suspended referece and displayed reference.

3. The theory of metaphor becomes a particolarly apt site for understanding the dialectic of reference; as such, metaphor, as it were, holds the mirror unto poetic truth.

4. The reference of poetic texts ultimately raises ontological qustions of reality and our mode of access to it.

With these guidelines in view, we may now follow the movement of Ricoeur's treatment of the problem of reference.

In a way, it is ironical to note that although Frege is, in a sense, the stimulus for Ricoeur's theory of reference, yet Frege himself dissociates his semantics right at the beginning from Ricoeur's ultimate objective – i.e, the reference of poetic and other literary discourses. For Frege, the movement from sense to reference is limited only to what he calls scientific statements. With regards to poetry, in terms of an example from epic poetry, Frege writes 'we are interested only in the sense of the sentences and the images and feelings aroused'. This is echoed by Carnap who says "the aims of a lyrical poem in which occur the words 'sunshine' and 'clouds' are not to inform us of certain meterological facts but to express certain feelings of the poet and to excite similar feelings in us".[102] This is not merely a sentiment

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

expressed by logicians and semanticists but as we shall soon see, it is also the position of certain highly articulate and self-conscious literary theorists and literary critics. Hence, the theme of non-referentiality of literary discourse is immanent to literary theory and not merely an external philosophical judgement passed upon it.

To see the rootedness of this ideas within literature itself, we shall briefly consider the work of Roman Jakobson and Northrop Frye.

It may be remembered that Roman Jakobson pairs six functions of communication with six factors as below :

addresser — emotive function
addressee — connotative function
code — meta-linguistic function
message — poetic function
contact — phatic function
context — referential function

For our present context, it is the 'poetic' function that is important; by the 'poetic' function, be means the high lighting of the message for its own sake. The poetic function arises where the massage draws attention to itself, puts itself before us and dominates our attention exclusively. We may say that the poetic function occurs when a commnication, as it were, congeals before us aud we are drawn to its own texture. Insofar as we take a poem to be a discourse in which the poetic function in Jakobson's sense, is dominant, we get the idea that a poem obliterates all reference to any thing beyond it; it is for itself and we contemplate it for its own sake rather than for the sake of anything which may be said to be disclosed by it. In short, the poetic function is an eclipse of the other directed movement which is reference.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Roman Jakabson's idea of the poetic function, thus, initiates the theme of the non–referentiality of poetic discourse; the suggestion here is not merely that a poem lacks reference, but rather, that it is a poem and thus fulfils its proper 'poetic' function precisely by eliding reference. In considering this position, Ricoeur advises us to keep two further features of Jakobson's theory of communicative functions and not to flatten it out by an over–simplification. The first precaution that we must observe is that even for Jakobson, the predominance of one function does not mean that the others are abolished; with a new predominance, a new heirarchy is established and this means that the other functions will be altered in their functionality. In the case before us, the predominance of the poetic function in a discourse does not, we may say, abolish the referential function, but alters it. And this brings us to the second aspect of his model — the notion of split–reference. He writes "The supremacy of the poetic function over the referential function does not obliterate the reference but makes it ambiguous... it leads to split–reference, as is cogently exposed in the preambles to fairy tales of various peoples – (it was and it was not).[103]

The theory of Roman Jakobson is instructive for us insofar as it alerts us to precisely this idea of split–reference. We may understand this as involving a cessation, a suppression of ordinary reference, precisely such that on the basis of this suspended reference, a new kind of reference, a new kind of disclosure, can come to prevail. The impelling question at this state would be what is this new disclosure like; Ricoeur believes that an answer to this question can be glimpsed if we turn our attention to the argument of Northrop Frye.[104] At first, the encounter with Frye appears to be merely a negative and external opposition,

...3

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

for Frye emphatically rejects any idea of poetic reference or poetic truth. But as with Jakobson, here also Ricoeur allows us to be instructed by Frye and be helped towards a positive insight, precisely by his seeming denials and rejections.

In *Anatomy of Criticism*, Frye opposes literary discourse to informative or didactive discourse in terms of two types of signification, centrifugal or outward signification and centripetal or inner signification. In didactive discourse, the symbol functions as a sign that stands for or 'points to' or represents something. As against this, literary symbol represents nothing outside itself. Frye writes "Verbal elements understood inwardly or centripetally, as parts of a verbal structure, are simply and literally, verbal elements or units of a verbal structure".[105] This would make Frye's view somewhat akin to a pure structuralism which does not even give much place to the notion of sense. But Frye moves away from such a pure structuralism, for while asking the question of the unity of a poem, he writes "the unity of a poem is a unity of mood. Poetic images express or articulate the mood". He further says "the mood is the poem, not something else still behind it".[106]

We seem to be in touch with the broader current of emotivism at this point for one of the marks of demarcation of emotive from the cognitive is precisely that the emotive is sense without even in principle the possibility of reference. At this level, positivist epistemology and literary theory support each other. As Ricoeur shows, Todorov's 'Opaque discourse' is precisely the discourse without reference the emotivists were talking about. Similarly almost echoing Carnap, Ayer and Stevenson, Jean Cohen says the function of prose is denotative, the function of poetry is connotative.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But here again to push beyond the barrier placed before us does not involve a total negation or rejection of the position but to ask a question which would unlock the constraints of emotivism and lead us back on the road to reference. The reference to moods and feelings in the analysis of literature as usually developed by emotive theorists is not in itself without value or indication for us But there are two issues about the emotional significance and function of literature which are not generally emphasised or kept in focus by the emotive theorists.

The mood or the feeling in question i.e. the feelings expressed in the poem, has a certain distinct character which distinguish it from non-literary moods and feelings There are several ways of marking the contrasts and differences between the two types of emotional states, but I would like to briefly comment upon two such phenomenological contrasts – firstly, the feelings expressed in a poem have an intentional relation to the objects and events which are represented in the poem, whereas in life, the relation between feeling and object is a causal one. It is because the relation is intentional that the non-existence of the object is irrelevant to the feelings and emotions in the poem. Secondly, because the relation is intentional, there is a certain necessary congruence or appropriateness between the feeling and the object – the emotional tone and content of the poem seems to fit the exigencies of the situation without any excess or defect. This correspondence which is an aesthetic norm or standard is what literary critics like T. S. Eliot call 'the objective correlative'.

If we keep these two features of emotions and feelings expressed in literature, we may begin to have an understanding of emotions as in their own way intentional and cognitive. And in fact, Ricoeur, by another route (i.e, by way of a long engagement with Nelson Goodman's *Languages of Art*) comes to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

same point namely, to put it in Goodman's terms, " in aesthetic experience, emotions function cognitively ".[107] But still we have to settle two further issues before we can speak firmly and with theoretical justification, of the truth of art and of the reference of a poem. These two questions are – (i) what is the nature of the objective or existential situation referred to in a poem i.e., what is the nature of what we previously called displayed reference or suspended reference ? Or to go back to the very initial formulation with which we started this discussion; it was said that the reference of the text is the world of the work. Now it is this conception of the world as the reference of text that requires to be clarified. The second question that has to be settled is a connected issue. We saw that the displayed reference or the secondary reference of the text emerges only after the suppression of the primary or literal refrence. Just as the metaphorical sense is constituted on the basis of the suppression of the ordinary or customary sense, so also the reference of the text, what we previously called the world of the work, is accessible only after the suspension of literal reference. We might indeed say that textual reference is to literal reference what metaphorical sense is to ordinary or literal meaning. The point to be clarified is about the processes involved in the suspension of literal reference.

Since the two are connected and since further, the first, the suspension of literal refrence, is a condition for the display of textual reference, we can begin with this process of withdrawl of literal reference.

Hester refers the reading of text to the epoche of Husserl which suspends the affirmations of external reality of the natural standpoint. Because of this suspension or bracketting, the free play of consciousness is revealed; similarly, in reading by means of the suppression of reference, the autonomy of sound and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

image in the text is made possible. [108] For Hester, therefore, the perception of the literariness of a work of literature is conditional upon an elimination of reference; a naive reading must be overcome in order to grasp the poetic form as poetic. Just as the epoche of the natural standpoint in phenomenology leads to a distinctive phenomenological attitude and phenomenological experience, so also the overcoming of a naive reading and the suspension of reference leads to a distinctive attitude, the aesthetic attitude and an experience, the aesthetic experience, consequent upon that attitude. [109]

But for Hester, the matter ends there, whereas for Ricoeur, the suspension of reference is only the negative preparation for the emergence of secondary reference proper to texts. Here we may rejoin the idea of the subjective or emotive theory that the discourse of the poem is about feelings and moods rather than about things. In Northrop Frye's terms, the signification involved in poetic or literary discourse is centripetal or an internal signification of moods. But since moods and emotions as they function in a work of art, are intentional, we must take a mood as a way of finding oneself in the midst of reality. It is, in Heidegger's language, a way of finding oneself among thing. It is this reference to one's being in the world that is displayed by the text, on the basis of an epoche of its literal reference. The reference here belongs properly to the textual level and is not to be taken as a function of the references of the statements. Indeed, the reference of the text is displayed only after the customary reference have been elided; hence it cannot be their function.

Secondly, what is displayed in secondary reference is a mode of being in the world, a certain structure or form of involvement of the subject with the world. It is neither a purely subjective disclosure nor a purely objective representation,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

neither of feelings and other psychological events nor of things and relationships in their external facticity, but of the *vis-a-vis* of the subject and object.

Thirdly, this existential disclosure of the world as a possible life world for the subject is revealed and clarified in the interpretative work carried out on the text. It is through such interpretative work that the reference of the world is manifested. Hence, just as the sense so also the reference is bound up with the work of interpretation. Since interpretation is concerned with the possibilities of being in the world, every hermeneutics of the text is as much an interpretation of the self as it is of the world. It is in this sense that Ricoeur claims that there is a reflective moment in every interpretation. But this reflection is essentially mediated by an interpretation of symbols. There can be no immediate comprehension of the subject; a detour through symbols is always necessary. But this creates a problem, for if every interpretation is also an interpretation of the subject it would follow that a plurality of interpretations leads to a plurality of ways of self-understanding. But can we organise these different modes of understanding of the subject according to some types, just as we are able to organise the endless diversity of discursive formations according to the types of literary genres? Indeed, Ricoeur thinks we can distinguish some basic hermeneutic styles, what we may call interpretative genres. He discerns three major forms of interpretation of the self in the Western tradition, which he calls the Archaeological, the Teleological and the Eschatological respectively. Hermeneutic archaeology is a regressive mode of understanding which seeks to comprehend the formation of the subject in terms of its roots, be it desire, as in Freud or the will to power, as in Nietzsche. It is a decipherment of symbols in terms of their expression of drives and such other primordial exigencies of life.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Such a hermeneutic seeks to understand meanings in terms of their life-contexts.

As against the regression of an archaeological hermeneutics, the teleological hermeneutics seeks an understanding of symbolic formations, each explicating and interpreting the earlier forms. Both an archaeology and a teleology of understanding may be contrasted with an eschatology which seeks the final sense of a symbol in the light of a final end or terminus beyond the symbolic and the humanly discursive.

While the full delienation and exposition of these hermeneutic ways would be a problem for general hermeneutic theory, for a theory of literature, in the style of Ricoeur, the chief problem would be to relate the formation of literary genres to these modes of self-understanding One of the fascinating questions which arises at this point of contact between theory of genres and hermeneutical theory is how, in different genres of literature, the subject is comprehended; what modes of reflection is inscribed in these different discursive formations.

But the reference of the text is not to be limited to the presentation of the self; it is also a disclosure of possible world. It is this disclosure of an essential possibility of a virtual life which makes us grasp an aspect of reality that is obscured and repressed in our ordinary practical dealings with the world. By projecting a fictive possibility, a disclosure of that which is, is effected. It is in this way that a world is projected by the organization of the text; an attentive reading sends us from the sense to the reference, only here this referential passage is through the epoche of ordinary reference.

But still a final issue remains : since by its very nature there is a plurality of interpretations and since further, Ricoeur's

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

theory of interpretation, no longer takes authorial meaning or intention to be the norm of interpretation, how does one validate the correctness of one's interpretation, or is it the case that there is no place for correctness of interpretation and that every reading is a permissible reading? Ricoeur believes that we may recover the notion of a correct interpretation or authentic reading, not in terms of an identification with the text, nor in terms of an incorporation of a text in terms of one's own schemes of understanding, but in terms of a continuing dialectic between the text and its reading.

We may schematize this dialectic in the following representation :



One approaches the text not in the form of an understanding empty of all expectations or anticipations No reading is, in that sense, a naive or presuppositionless reading. Against this Boltmann and others, following Heidegger's stress on fore-understanding, have shown that all understanding of a text presupposes an existential encounter with it, in which one approaches the text with a definite pre-understanding. But while accepting the necessary corrective to objectivism, Ricoeur points out that a certain distancing – a separation of the textual discourse must also be effected, if one is to *read* the text and not simply incorporate it into one's own frames of conviction. It is here, for Ricoeur, that the value of the structuralist disciplines is to be seen, for they serve the function of distanciation. So the reading radiates out in the process of interpretation where the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

structure of the text is invested, not only with sense but with reference. After the display of the structure of the text has been completed, which reveals the other–ness of the text, the secondary reference of the text, the world disclosure enacted by it, is experienced and in this enactment, the subject finds himself relocated; a hermeneutic placement of oneself in the discourse opened out by the text takes place. This relocation of oneself, this finding of oneself by way of the otherness of the text, leads to a new formation, a new constellation of preunderstanding. One, therefore, approaches the text again with new anticipations and expectations. It is in this circular process of finding oneself in the understanding of the other that may be called hermeneutic experience and in this experience, the two functions of the text, namely, appropriation of the other and a new self–understanding on the basis of this appropriation, are distinguishable but inseparable moments.

We have attempted to follow Ricoeur's discussions of reference which, joined with the hermeneutics of texts and nourished by the semantics of language, takes shape as a theory of poetic and literary truth as consisting in the disclosure of a mode of being in the world, as an essential possibility for human subjects. Into this philosophy of reference, many disciplines and types of investigation have been drawn; as we saw, Ricoeur's theory includes the major insights of philosophical semantics, of structural linguistics, theory of literature and existentialist philosophy. But all this wealth of detail is organised and structured by two basic types of inquiry – phenomenology and hermeneutics. Ricoeur claims that we need to see the interaction between these two in the sense that while each limits the other yet, it also needs the other. In other words, within Ricoeur's theory, the phenomenological component is limited and qualified by certain basic hermeneutic insights, at the same time as his hermeneutic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

theory is nourished by a phenomenology. Coming after our study of the problem of reference in Husserlian phenomenology, it therefore appears natural to end our discussion of Ricoeur, with a brief account of the relationship between phenomenology and hermeneutics in his philosophy.

When we look back at the programme and project of phenomenology from the point of view of what, in the above, we have called ' hermeneutic experience ', the first limitation of phenomenology that becomes noticeable is its ideal of scientificity. This ideal encounters its fundamental limit in the ontological condition of comprehension. Secondly, the constant appeal to the immediacy of presence, its intuitional vehemence, appears narrow and constraining, when set against the aim of understanding as the goal of interpretation. Furthermore, from the point of view of the hermeneutics of text, the meaning, its sense as well as reference, is no longer tied to the act of originative intention; on the contrary, the text appears as autonomous and available to interpretation on its own terms. With this goes the reservation about the Husserlian project of ultimate foundations in subjectivity.

But inspite of these reservations and limitations, Ricoeur's hermeneutic theory is still thinkable only in connection with phenomenology. As Ricoeur himself notes, the hermeneutic concern with linguisticality itself has to be connected and nourished by a theory of sense, for the primary question is the structure of experience which is brought to language. In this sense, although in a very different way, Ricoeur seems to converge upon Husserl, in that the phenomenological is the nourishing ground of the semantic. For all its depth and refinement Ricoeur's theory of reference is yet nourished by this fundamental conviction In the next study on Derrida, we shall

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

see the implications for the problem of reference, of a reflection on language, which moves beyond these regulative guidelines,

Philosophy Department
Poona University
PUNE–411 007.

R. SUNDARA RAJAN

NOTES

57. P. Ricoeur; *Interpretation Theory*, Texas Christian University Press, 1976, p. 28.
58. *Ibid*, pp. 34–37.
59. P Ricoeur; *The Rule of Metaphor*, chap. 7, (trans) Robert Czerny, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978.
60. *Ibid*, p. 224.
61. P. Ricoeur; *Interpretation Theory*, p. 26.
62. *Ibid*, pp. 38–39.
63. *Ibid*, p. 42.
64. *Ibia*, pp. 1–3.
65. P. Ricoeur; "Structure and Hermeneutics", *Espirit*, Nov. 1963, pp. 569–627.
66. P. Ricoeur; *Interpretation Theory*, p. 6.
67. *Ibid*, p. 7.
68. *Ibid*, p. 11.
69. *Ibid*, p. 14.
70. *Ibid*, p. 11.
71. *Ibid*. p. 20.
72. *Ibid*, p. 28.
73. *Ibid*, p. 1..

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

74. *Ibid*, pp. 29–30.

75. *Ibid*, p. 32.

76. *Ibid*, pp. 32–33.

77. Josef Bleichir, "Ricoeur's Phenomenological Hermeneutics" in *Contemporary Hermeneutics*, p. 226, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1982.

78. P. Ricoeur: *Interpretation* Theory, pp. 36–37.

79. Plato *Cratylus* (trans.) *Great Books of the Western World : Plato*, (ed.) Robert Maynard Hutchins, University of Chicago Press, 1952.

80. Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, *Great Books of the Western World : Aristotle* (ed.) Robert Maynard Hutchins, University of Chicago Press, 1952.

81. P. Ricoeur; *Freud and Philosophy*, p. 21 (trans.) Dennis Savage, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970.

82. P. Ricoeur; *Interpretation Theory*, p. 10.

83. *Ibid*, p. 11.

84. *Ibid*, p 35.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*

87. *Ibid.*

88. *Ibid.*

89. *Ibid*, p. 37

90. Ricoeur; *Freud and Philosophy*, p. 9.

91. E. Cassirer; *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, 3 vols. (trans) R. Mannheim, New Haven, Yale 1957, p. 93.

92. P. Ricoeur; *Freud and Philosophy*, p. 13.

93. P. Ricoeur; *Interpretation Theory*, p. 57.

94. P. Ricoeur; *The Rule of Metaphor*, p. 272.

95. P. Ricoeur; *Interpretation Theory*, p. 49

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

96. Aristotle, *Poetics* (trans) Ingram Bywater, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, Random House, N. Y., 1957.

97. P. Ricoeur; *The Rule of Metaphor*, pp. 77-81.

98. *Ibid*, p. 49.

99. *Ibid*, p. 218.

100. *Ibid*.

101. *Ibid*, p. 218.

102. *Ibid*, p. 227.

103. *Ibid*, p. 225.

104. *Ibid*, p. 225.

105. Northrop Frye; *Anatomy of Criticism*, Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 73-74.

106. *Ibid*, p. 81.

107. Nelson Goodman; *Languages of Art*, quoted in P. Ricoeur, *The Role of Metaphor*, p. 231.

108. Marcus B. Hester, *The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor*, Mouton, The Hague, 1967.

109. *Ibid*.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-**

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs. 25/-**

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-**

Ramchandra Gandhi (ed) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs. 50/-**

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs. 70/-**

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs. 60/-**

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism, Rs. 50/-**

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-**

S. S. Barlingay (ed), **A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs. 50/-**

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs. 25/-**

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs. 30/-**

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Pune–411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 2
April 1991

PREDICATION AND LOGIC OF LANGUAGE (II)

Section I

Sense, Truth and Predication

First, a terminological remark. I use the term 'predication' in a special sense. Predication is the sense–structure of propositions. The generic concept of predication consists of the common predicative structure shared by all propositions. The term 'proposition' is also being used in a special sense. I follow Frege in distinguishing sharply between intelligible or *conceptual content* of statement (or judgments, assertions) and the *acts* of stating, judging, asserting. etc. A proposition does not *make* sense, it constitutes sense, it is a sense–content. Propositional *signs*, for example, an appropriate sentence–form, makes sense or *connotes* a proposition. Predication, then, is the sense formation (formative structure) of propositions. The thesis which I shall attempt to establish is that all *propositions* share a common predicative form (share common predicative features). This is the generic–intensional conception of predication [14]

This requires explication. The distinction between proposition, judgment and assertion as presented by Frege is, from one point of view, simple and straightforward. But upon closer examination certain difficulties arise. This is how Frege presents the point :

"An interrogative sentence and an indicative one contains the same thought; but the indicative contains something

Received : 8–5–1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

else as well, namely, the assertion. The interrogative sentence contains something more too, namely a request. Therefore two things must be distinguished in an indicative sentence : the content, which it has in common with the corresponding sentence-question, and the assertion The former is the thought, or at least contains the thought So it is possible to express the thought without laying it down as true. Both are so closely joined in an indicative sentence that it is easy to overlook their separability. Consequently we may distinguish :

1) the apprehension of the thought—thinking

2) the recognition of the truth of a thought–judgment

3) the manifestation of this judgment—assertion

We perform the first act when we form a sentence–question... we declare the recognition of the truth in the form of an indicative sentence". "The Thought : A Logical Inquiry" in Strawson (ed.), *Philosophical Logic*, p 21–22).

I use the term 'proposition' in the special way that Frege uses 'thought'. Although thinking is an *act*, Frege makes it clear that a proposition (thought) is not an act–not constructed. Sentences are constructed. A proposition is something *apprehended* in thought—conceptual content or intelligible (sense)-content Judgment is an *act* of consciousness which is performed by some agent. However, Frege stresses that "the act of judging did not make the thought of set its parts in order; for the thought was already there. But even the act of grasping a thought is not a production of a thought, is not the act of setting the parts in order; for the thought was already there with its parts in order before it was grasped." ("Negation", Geach & Black, pp. 126–127).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Note: Predication, as I use the term (and Frege too), consists in the structural relations of the "parts of the thought". I agree with Frege on the independence of proposition. I do not mean to commit myself to everything Frege says about thought, for example, that they are eternally (atemporally) existing objects. I wish to reserve judgment on the ontological status of propositions. At this point I merely wish to stress the logical independence and priority (in some sense) of propositions and predication.

The *acts* of thinking, judging and asserting (stating) must not be confused with *what is thought* (content)–the proposition. We construct sentences, but we do not construct propositions.

This preliminary distinction seems good enough to work with. Predication is the formative structure of propositions; it is not the formation of propositions. In a sense, then, the terms 'proposition' and 'predication' are interchangeable. The difference is that the former suggests a unified whole, while the latter suggests the structural relations of the constituents which make up the whole. The point I wish to stress is that the term 'predication' *does not indicate some activity* performed by someone, but indicates the structure of proposition.[15] This is a radical departure from the common use of the term predication. I wish to *recommend* that the term be used in this strictest sense, and I shall attempt to justify this use of the term. Frege, too, uses the term 'predication' in this way. The difference is that Frege restricts predication to singular and relational propositions, while I generalize the term for *all* propositions.

Predication, then, is not an act. It is not, for example, *affirming* or *denying* a predicate of a subject. It is not the construction of a sentence, etc. Predication is not to be identified with attri-

...4

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

bution, description, supplying a predicate to a subject, or *vice versa*, not assertion, and not judgment. It is important (crucial) to distinguish between predication, on the one hand, and judgment, assertion, on the other. A basic thesis of this work is that predicability and assertibility must be systematically distinguished. Let me develop this point in a preliminary way.

Predicability and Assertibility

A predication (proposition) makes sense.[16] We raise the question of sense/non-sense of a *sentence*. We construct sentences but not predications I agree with Frege that the sense of an indicative sentence is a proposition :

> " We may say a sentence expresses a thought " (Thought, p. 20).

A *sentence* is appraised in terms of expressing or making *sense* or *nonsense*. If it represents a proposition it has the sense–value–*sense*, if not, the sense–value–*senseless*. In a derivative sense the concept of predicability applies to the construction of indicative sentences. Such sentences–qua predicative content–have two possible sense–values; *Sense/Senseless*. Predication consists of the sense–formation of propositions.

Sense Values and Truth Values

I distinguish between *sense* and *meaning*.[17] The term ' sense ' is reserved for propositions. The term ' meaning ' is broader and applies, for example, to statements. Meaning includes such pragmatic features of language as the *use of expressions*, linguistic performances (illocutionary acts, forces), etc. It also includes epistemic features of language connected with judgment and truth–conditional structure, truth–functions, etc. ' Sense ' is *purely semantical* and is independent of epistemics and pragmatics. (This is developed below)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

"Predicability" refers to the sense–conditions of a predication (propositions). Rules of predicability (sense–formation) are not the same as rules of truth–formation. The latter are rules of assertibility. "Assertibility" refers to the truth–conditions of an indicative *sentence*.

We must now explore the independence as well as the connection between *sense* and *truth*. A well–formed indicative sentence may be appraised in terms of its sense (sense–value) and its truth (truth–value). Rules of sense formation are prior to (independent of) rules of truth–formation. We must proceed with caution here. For certain philosophers of logic and language analyze meaning precisely in terms of truth–conditions.

Let us explore this more closely. We have just distinguished between sense and meaning. We must now distinguish clearly between sense and truth. It was said that propositions made sense. But are *propositions* also true or false? This seems to be what Frege claims :

> "... What does one call a sentence? A series of sounds; but only when it has a sense, by which is not meant that every series of sounds that has a sense is a sentence. And when we call a sentence true we really mean its sense is. From which it follows that it is for the sense of a sentence that the question of truth arises in general...
>
> "... Without wishing to give a definition, I call a thought something for which the question of truth arises. So I ascribe what is false to a thought just as much as what is true. So I can say : the thought is the sense of the sentence without wishing to say as well that the sense of every sentence is a thought..." (*Ibid.*, pp. 19–20).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

When we speak loosely we say that a proposition is true or false. Frege's remark that " a thought is something for which the *question* of truth arises " leaves open the question whether propositions themselves *are* so-to-speak–the bearers of truth. In other places certain remarks of Frege suggest that sense is independent of truth. It seems, in fact, that is precisely the point of his distinction between *sense* and *reference*. Here are some remarks :

> " We now inquire concerning the sense and reference of an entire declarative sentence. Such a sentence contains a thought. Is this thought, now, to be regarded as its sense or its reference ? ... The thought, accordingly, cannot be the reference of the sentence, but must be considered as the sense ". (*Sense and Reference*, Geach & Black, p. 62)

Frege goes on to establish that the identity of the thought is independent of its reference. Prior to the above passage he said :

> " The regular connection between a sign, its sense and its reference is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite reference, while to a given reference (an object) there does not belong only a single sign . It may perhaps be granted that every grammatically well–formed expression representing a proper name always has a sense. But this is not to say that to the sense there also corresponds a reference... In grasping a sense, one is not certainly assured of a referenee " (*Ibid.*, p. 58)

(Note especially that proper names have sense, that reference is essentially connected with an object, and that sense is independent of reference–which has to do with existence of objects) Subsequently Frege says,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> "...Why is the thought not enough for us? Because and to the extent that, we are concerned with its truth value... It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the reference".
>
> " We are therefore driven into accepting the *truth value* of a sentence as constituting its reference. By the truth-value of a sentence I understand the circumstance that it is true or false". (*Ibid.*, p. 63).

In the last passage Frege in effect admits that sense is independent of truth–value. Here is another passage in which he explicitly contrasts predication with truth :

> "It follows that the relation of the thought to the True may not be compared with that of subject to predicate. Subject and predicate (understood in the logical sense) are indeed elements of thought; they stand on the same level for knowledge By combining subject and predicate, one reaches only a thought, never passes from sense to reference, never from a thought to its truth value. One moves at the same level but never advances from one level to the next. A truth value cannot be a part of a thought, any more, say, than the sun can, for it is not a sense but an object". (*Ibid.*, p. 64)

In this critical passage Frege makes it clear that sense and truth are independent and on " different levels ". He also has a clear sense that the constituents of predication are sense–contents, not object. Frege's followers, we shall see, fail to retain this important distinction.

There is another way to make the distinction between sense and truth. In introducing the distinction between proposition, judgment and assertion. Frege notices that the same conceptual

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(predicative) content may figure in different sentence forms-for example an interrogative sentence, and yet there is no truth value. The question of truth and falsity arises only in the case of the declarative or statement form. This is another indication that, strictly speaking, predicative content is independent of truth. In another place Frege makes the point still differently. He raises the question whether the being of a thought consists in its being true (having a truth value) :

> "Truth cannot go along with the sense of an interrogative sentence; that would contradict the very nature of a question. The content of a question is that to which we must decide. Consequently truth cannot be counted as going along with the content of the question. When I raise the question whether the sun is bigger than the moon I am seeing the sense of the interrogative sentence
>
> 'Is the sun bigger than the moon'
>
> Now if this sense were a thought whose being consisted in its being true, then I should at the same time see that this sense was true. Grasping the sense would at the same time be an act of judging; and the utterance of interrogative sentence would at the same time be an assertion, and so an answer to the question. But in an interrogative sentence neither the truth or falsity of the sense may be asserted. Hence the interrogative sentence has not as its sense something whose being consists in its being true. The very nature of the question demands a separation between the acts of grasping a sense and judging. And since the sense of an interrogative sentence is always also inherent in the assertoric sentences too. *In any case we need a short term for what can be the sense of an interrogative sentence. I call this a thought. If we use language this way, not all thoughts are true. The being of a thought does not consist in its*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

being true." ("Negation" – Geach & Black, pp. 118–119, my italics)

Of course Frege also means to include falsity here. This passage makes it clear from another point of view that thoughts are not *inherently* true or false. It is only where judgment and assertion are concerned that truth–value is introduced.

(*Note* : Searle generalizes this distinction between propositional content and different speech acts. For example,

1. Sam smokes habitually
2. Does Sam smoke habitually ?
3. Sam, smoke habitually !
4. Would that Sam smoked habitually.

Searle points out that the same predication or propositional content obtains in all four cases, but only the first is an assertion, and is true or false. (See *Speech Acts*, pp. 22 ff.) A *declarative* sentence has two functions associated with it : sense and reference. The thought is its sense. This is related to but independent of its reference. It is the *reference* of the sentence that constitutes its truth value.[18] Thus, strictly speaking, the thought (proposition) itself is not true or false. Frege's sense-reference distinction is designed precisely to distinguish between sense and truth. Nevertheless, we saw that for Frege sense and reference have *some* connection.[19] How does he explain ? The key point here is that *judgment* is the connection :

"... But so much should already be clear, that in every judgment[20] no matter how trivial, the step from the level of thoughts to the level of reference (the objective) has already been taken". (*Ibid.*, p. 64)

"We can never be concerned only with the reference of a sentence; but again the mere thought alone yields no

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

knowledge, but only the thought together with its reference i.e., its truth value. *Judgments can be regarded as advances from a thought to a truth value.* (*Ibid.*, p. 65 – my italics)

Thus far we are told that a declarative sentence has two independent (though related) components : a proposition (sense) and a truth–value (reference). The connecting factor is judgment—this is the *moment beyond* the sense to truth. This is still vague and metaphorical. We need to have a more clear grasp of the relation between judgment and truth. Is truth somehow a function of judgment ? Frege explicitly rules this out:

> " Our act of judgment can in no way alter the make-up of a thought. We can only recognize what is there. A true thought cannot be affected by our act of judgment" (Negation, p. 122).

It must be admitted that truth does not depend upon the *act* of judgment. It may nevertheless be dependent in some peculiar way upon judgment. Frege makes a compelling case for the independence of sense and truth, but the connection between them is not satisfactorily explicated. It is merely claimed that we connect them in judgment.

We have seen that, strictly speaking, a proposition itself is not what is true or false. Yet Frege speaks of thoughts as being true or false (almost by definition). I think a reason for this is that he uses the term 'thought' ambiguously; in a strict sense (in which it stands for sense) and in a loose sense (in which it stands for judgment) : For example,

> " In a similar way it has perhaps been said ' a judgment is something which is either true or false '. In fact I use the term 'thought' in approximately the sense which 'judgment' has in writings of logicians..." ("Thought" (footnote), p. 20)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Now a *statement* expresses a judgment, and it may be more accurate to say that statements (judgments) are true or false, not propositions A statements is an assertion. Frege's need to distinguish between sense and reference in the way he does is due to the fact that the very same expression—the declarative sentence—expresses sense and designates reference. (See "Sense and Reference", p. 61) On the one hand he distinguishes clearly between proposition (sense) and judgment or assertion (truth). On the other hand, he connects the proposition with the sense of a *declarative sentence*. But then he goes on to claim that assertoric force arises with the form of the declarative sentence, and here the original distinction is threatened (even undermined) :

> "The truth claim arises in each case with the form of the declarative sentence" (*Ibid.*, p. 64).

Again,

> "Only those sentences in which we communicate or state something come into question" (Thought, p. 21).

I am suggesting that the force of Frege's brilliant distinction between sense and truth is undermined by the unfortunate habit of calling propositions (in the strict sense) true or false. Frege himself succumbed to it. A way of avoiding the confusion is to distinguish between *predication* and *assertion*, between predicability and assertibility. Strictly speaking, only assertions (what is expressed in a declarative sentence) are true or false. The *sense* of a sentence is specified by its sense-conditions, while the *meaning* of a statement is specified by its truth-conditions.

I have spent much time on this point. But it is a critical point for logical theory. It is of the utmost importance to distinguish systematically between sense (the laws of sense) and truth (the laws of truth). As far as I know, Frege was the first

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

logical theorist to make a clear distinction here, and apparently at times he himself lost sight of the distinction.[21] Most logicians would admit some form of the sense–reference distinction. But then the carry–over into the sense–truth distinction slips by unnoticed. The very conception of logic turns on this point. For if there is a distinction between the rules of sense–formation (predication) and the rules of truth–formation (judgment/assertibility), then the primary task of logic is not so much the discovery of the laws of truth as the laws of sense. Frege's intentions here seem clear enough :

> "... I assign to logic the task of discovering the laws of truth, not of assertion or thought. The meaning of the word 'true' is explained by the laws of truth" (Thought, p. 18)

However, in another place he seems to have lost the priority :

> "To discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to discern the laws of truth... Laws of nature are the generalization of natural occnrrences with which the occurrences are always in accordance. It is rather in this sense that I speak of the laws of truth. That is, to be sure, not a matter of what happens so much as of what is. Rules of asserting, thinking, judging, inferring, follow from the laws of truth". (*Ibid.*, p. 17)

I believe it would be more in the spirit of Frege's intentions (and more accurate) to speak instead of the laws of sense. I suggest the following re-phrasing :

> The task of logic is the discovery of the laws of sense formation (predicability). The laws of sense are not so much concerned with *what is* as with what *may be*. Rules of judging, asserting, inferring, presuppose the laws of sense.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Let me proceed now to explicate, in a rough and preliminary way, the connection between sense and truth. We have distinguished between sense-values and truth-values. Strictly speaking, both are used in the appraisal of sentences (of a certain type). Sentences have sense-value (S and -S) in terms of the predicative content, and they have truth-value (T and F) in terms of the assertive-judgmental content (force). The key to the connection between sense and truth is judgment and assertibility (as Frege suggested). Propositions in the strict sense are not inherently true or false. They may be true or false in some oblique way mediated by the sentence and very likely by judgment and assertibility. The relation between a sentence and its sense is different in an important way from the relation between a sentence and its truth value. This is what Frege has been stressing. But the important *connection* has not been clarified."

A proposition is not something that is itself true or false. It is more accurate to speak of a judgment or assertion (statement) as being true or false. In apprehending a proposition one entertains some state of affairs (abbreviated : State). A proposition is an intelligible content. Let us say that a proposition *specifies* a State. A State is not a sense-content, not intensional. A State is a possibility. A *fact* is a State which obtains (exists, is actual). It is here that we find the special sort of relationship between propositions and truth.

Propositions do not specify facts. They do not support to specify *what is the case.* Only judgments (or the expression of judgments in statements) purport to represent (picture) facts (what is). If we can explicate the relation between States and facts we are likely to come closer to explicating the peculiar relation between possibility and actuality (sense and truth). Possibility has a peculiar relation to actuality. This is the model

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

for explicating the relation between sense and truth. In specifying the truth-conditions of a sentence (assertibility) ony indirectly gives (presupposes) the sense of the sentence. This is because reference presupposes (is a function of) sense To know the *meaning* of a *statement* is to know the conditions under which it is *true or false.* (Sometimes the latter disjunction is stressed (as a disjunction) suggesting that it should be taken *as a whole* and this is different from either disjunct alone. There is something suppressed here, a hidden tension For when 'true or false' is said by a truth-functional logician he can only interpret it determinately–in terms of the conditions under which the statement is true *or else* false, rather than as true-or-false.) But *sense* of *propositions* is given with the specification of sense-condition. Now sense conditions are related to truth-conditions in the way that the possible is related to the actual.

Can this relation be formally explicated ? To do so I shall make clear the relation/distinction between a property-word and a category (absolute)-word. (See Sommers' "Types and Ontology", in Strawson (ed.) – *Philosophical Logic*) The logical relation of contrariety holds between a term (expression) and one form of its opposite. For example, colored/colorless, wise/unwise, visible/invisible, true–false, etc., are *logical contraries.* Aristotle defines the special relation between contraries in such a way that to deny one term is to affirm the contrary. Thus, to say that *Socrates isn't wise* (where 'isn't' is the sign of denial of a term) is logically equivalent to the affirmation of the contrary : *Socrates is unwise.* Contrariety, then, is a form of term opposition. Another form of term opposition which is different from (and not to be confused with) contrariety is the complementary opposition : true/non-true, colored/non-colored, visible/non-visible, etc. The range of applicability (extension) of the latter (of complements) is different from the range of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

applicability of the former (contrary opposition). While everything in the universe of discourse is either colored or non-colored, not everything is either colored or colorless–for example, the equator is neither colored nor colorless, neither is the number seven. This is a key to a formal criterion of sense. For category-rules govern the contrariety relation, but not the complementary relation.

Now an absolute term is a term which consists of the disjunction (logical sum) of a term and its contrariety: *P-or-un-P*. An absolute term, then, has as its extension the range of applicability of the term together with its contrary. While a term has a contrary, an absolute term does not. This is an important logical feature of an absolute term (category–term). Contraries are polar opposites which stand in a privative relation to one another. They are not extensionally but *intensionally* (sense) related. There are categorial restrictions of the applicability (predieability) of a term and its contrary. The absolute term exhausts its domain, hence speeifies a category. A property word, by contrast, specifies a class, not a category. A class has a very different status from a category. Nothing outside a category is privative with respect to anything in a category. The notion of privation is *internal* to a category.

To see that an absolute (category) term has a different logical status from a class (property) term we may use Descartes' example in the Second Meditation–the conceptual experiment with the piece of wax. Descartes is attempting to make the distinction between a class–term and a category term. In the conceptual experiment Descartes is drawing a distinction between the properties of the wax, all of which undergo transformation (color, shape, texture, size, etc.) What remains permanent through all the transformations are its fertures-its categorial properties–/ extension. The wax, he says, is constituted by its features. Its

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

features do not undergo transformation. While we may perceive its properties by means of the senses, we can only *conceive* its features–in this case we conceive that the wax (*qua* material body) is an /extended/ thing. Its particular determinate size, shape, color, etc., are its properties, but its /extension/–is a categorial feature. This we do not perceive by means of the senses. Nevertheless, the feature is "intimately connected" with the property, for to have some determinate size or other presupposes the *feature* of extension. Yet the status of the feature is different in some fundamental way from the properties.

Now I have been attempting to draw a distinction between a class–term and a category term to show that they are at once "in the closest relation" yet of a different status. I am suggesting that this formal relation between a category–term and a property–term serve as the paradigm for making clear the relation and distinction between sense and truth.

The status of being /T/ is different from the status of being true or being false. Nevertheless, they are related in the way a property term is related to a category term. We shall say that propositions are /T/, while statements are true or false. To state the conditions under which a statement is true or false is not the same as to state or specify the /T/ conditions of a sentence. The concept (and status) indicated by /T/ is different from the concept indicated by the terms 'true' or 'false'. The intelligible is that which is /T/. To state the /T/ conditions of a sentence is to specify its sense. This is different from specifying the conditions under which a statement is true or false (truth–conditions). Rules of sense determine the /T/ conditions, but rules of truth (assertibility) determine the truth–conditions.

Although predications are categorially /T/, they are not inherently true or false. The categorial truth–status means only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that *propositions* are of the *type* (category) such that they may stand in relation to what is true or false. We saw earlier that to be /T/ does not entail being true or false, determinately. Thus, there is an important asymmetry between being /T/ and being true or else. The latter entails the former, but not *vice versa*. *Statements*, however, are categorially /T/, but here it does entail that they are true or false.

This will sound odd, especially for the truth-functionalist. For if the absolute predicate is the disjunction of a term and its contrary (the weak 'or' is used here), then is this really different from specifying truth-conditions (where this means the conditions under which a statement is true *or* false)? A counter question to this : is there any difference between the status of being possible and being actual (determinate), especially when it is seen that that which is possible *can* also be actual? The status of /T/ is that of possibility, while the status of being true or false is that of actuality (being determinate). It seems to depend upon how the 'or' is interpreted here-distributively or non-distributively. But this is not the crucial point. The point is that sense is linked with possibility status (configurability), while truth (or falsity) is linked with actuality and determinacy. A State-that which is entertained in the apprehension of a proposition-is a possibility. It is something which may or may not obtain. But that which is (is not) is actual or determinate. And this is precisely where judgment comes in.

Now it is this difference between sense and truth that, I believe, Frege was hinting at. A proposition is not inherently true or false, but it is still in "the closest relation" to the truth-i.e. /T/. A proposition is the type of thing that can stand in relation to what is the case. Frege claims that judgment intervenes and moves beyond sense /T/ to reference (determinate

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

truth value). The possible is of a different status from the actual (fact), and yet it stands in relation to the actual. But still there is a *world* of difference between the two.

The relation between the possible and the actual is real and objective, and is not *determined* by thinking or judgment. Nevertheless, it is *in judgment* that *we make* the connection between sense and truth, i.e., move from the level of sense to what is the case (fact). The concept of truth, then, is essentially related to judgment and assertibility. This is why it is more accurate to apply the terms 'true' and 'false' to judgments or statements, rather than to propositions (predications). It seems that this is what Strawson is getting at when he distinguishes between meaning (connected with sentences) and truth (connected with the *use* of sentences in *making* statements). (See *Introduction to Logical Theory*, pp. 174 ff.)

Note : For related discussion of these points see –

Kneale – *Development of Logic* pp. 45-54

Davidson – "Truth and Meaning", esp. pp. 310-ff where he says, "To give the truth-conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence".

Searle – *Speech Acts*. p. 125, agrees that meaning is specified by truth–conditions

Strawson – "Meaning and Truth" – *Logico–Linguistic Essays*, esp. pp. 179 and 182.

We may say, then, that intelligibility or sense stands to truth (assertibility) as possibility stands to actuality, or as States stand to facts.

Propositions, then, have the feature of /T/. They have *truth-status* (categorically) but no *truth-value*. To have a truth-value

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is to stand in relation to the actual–to what is. But propositions do not (qua proposition) represent facts but States. Propositions have sense values (sentences qua sense) but no truth values. Statements (judgments) have truth values. Statements *purport* to represent facts (what is the case). It is for this reason that we may appropriately inquire into their truth value. A proposition cannot *fail* to specify a State, for this is what it means for a proposition to constitute sense. But a statement cannot fail to represent a fact. A proposition *can fail* to represent a fact for it is not its function to represent facts at all. This means that it *cannot succeed* in representing facts either. There must be some intermediary, and this is judgment. It is the thinker–judge who represents facts by means of propositions (sense), just as it is the judge who makes a *reference* by means of the sense of certain referring expressions. *Judgment is a function on a proposition such that it is brought into relation to what is.* This opens the way for the distinction between sense–functions and truth–functions. This is why Frege rightly focused on judgment as the connecting function between sense and truth. We shall speak of judgment as introducing a truth–function on propositions. *A proposition cannot stand in relation to what is without the addition of a truth–function.* Judgment is a functional relation between sense and truth. To know the truth–conditions of a sentence is to know under what conditions it may be asserted. To specify the truth–conditions of a sentence (the conditions under which a sentence is (*true or false*)–is to specify the *meaning* of a statement–the assertibility of the sentence.

I shall now illustrate some of the points just made by looking at some "propositions" of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. He is a good example of a philosopher who confuses sense and truth.

...5

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The following remarks show on the one hand that he distinguishes between sense and truth, and at the same time confuses them :

2 – What is the case—a fact—is the existence of a state of affairs.

2.1 – We picture facts to ourselves.

2.11 – A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs

(See also 4.1 and 4.21.)

Contrast :

2.201 – A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-existence of state of affairs.

2.202 – A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.

2.203 – A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.

But then he immediately says :

2.21 – A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false (See 4.25)

Contrast :

2.22 – What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or falsity, by means of its pictorial from.

2.221 – What a picture represents is its sense,

2.222 – The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Wittgenstein then recognizes the need for judgment :

2.223 – In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.

2.224 – It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.

He then immediately overlooks the important distinction between state of affairs and fact :

3 – A logical picture of facts is a thought.

3.001 – 'state of affairs is thinkable' : what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves.

4.021 – A proposition is a picture of reality : for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation it represents. And I understand the proposition without having its sense explained to me.

4.022 – A proposition *shows* its sense.

A proposition *shows* how things stand *if* it is true. And it *says* they do stand.

Also, compare : 4.431 (A proposition is the expression of its truth-conditions), 4.024, 4.031, esp. 4.061 and 4.064.

Distinction between Syntax, Semantics, Epistemics and Pragmatics

It is timely to introduce some more terminology and make a further terminological remark. In the theory of signs (semiotic) it is customary to make a distinction between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics Briefly, *syntax* deals with the formal relations between signs, *semantics* deals with the relation between signs and the objects to which the signs are applicable and *pragmatics* is the theory of the relations between signs and those who produce or receive or understand them. This division seems straightforward, clear and useful. Certain philosophers of language take

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

one or the other of these areas as the focal point of their theory and priority (of some kind) is given to the preferred area or approach. In so far as they are concerned with the other two divisions they deal with them in a derivative way. For example, one approach has been to take logical syntax as primary and autonomous and attempt to explain meaning in terms of syntax. By contrast, a speech-acts theory focuses on the pragmatic features of expression and linguistic communication and attempts to explain meaning mainly in terms of acts of communication, and so on. Sometimes the three levels are ordered in some direction such that one is taken as primary, the second presupposes the first, and the third presupposes the second and third." For example, one arrangement is to begin with syntactic rules, then semantic rules presuppose syntax, and then pragmatic rules presuppose semantic rules, which in turn presupposes syntax, (in some level of rectitude), etc.

As useful as this division (in its various forms and combinations) may be for certain purposes (e.g. linguistics) it turns out that for theory of predication it raises more problems than it solves (clarifies). As it stands it is not precise enough for theoretical purposes in logical theory for the distinction cuts across and violates important distinctions-for example, the distiction between sense and truth. The distinction should not be thought of as being theory neutral. For the distinction itself presupposes (stems from) a particular approach to theory of logic and language. Also, since these three areas or branches have been interpreted in various ways and taken to stand in different relations, it becomes necessary for anyone who wishes to use these terms (viz., "syntax", "semantics" and "pragmatics") to theorize about language and thought to state explicitly how he is using them and what the connections between them are.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Realizing that such characterization of these terms stems from a certain view of language (or at least is not independent of some presuppositions) I shall state in a rough and preliminary way how I shall use these terms, and what their relations are.

Logical Semantics

This is the theory of sense and sense-relations between terms : the sense–formation of propositions and their constituents. Semantics, as the theory of *sense*, is concerned with the logical relations between linguistic expressions (sentences, e. g.) conceptual content (propositions, e. g.) and the objects (intelligible) they specify (states of affairs : States, e. g.). Semantics deals with predicability (thinkability/intelligibility) and sense–functions. It has nothing directly to do with truth–functions and assertibility. Of course assertibility presupposes predicability. This is a radical departure from the common use of the term 'semantics'. Semantics in this sense does not give an account of reference, although it is concerned with connoting (*specifying*) (e. g. an expression, say an appropriate sentence–form connoting or specifying a proposition). Semantics deals with possible objects (sense–contents), not with actual/existent objects.

Logical Epistemics [24]

This is the theory of truth–functions and judgment. It deals with the relation between expressions (e. g. a sentence), their sense, and their relation to *what is* as mediated by judgment. It is theory of judgment and *assertibility*. Epistemics is the theory of truth, and reference. It presupposes semantics, and is in a sense *applied* semantics. Epistemics deals with the relation between sense and truth. It attempts to state the laws of judgment and assertibility. Its objects are actual/existent objects. Epistemics deals with reference insofar as the latter plays a part in judgment and assertion. In this respect epistemics covers a part of what

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is customarily included in pragmatics—the *use* of expressions—e.g. to *make* reference or *make* an assertion.

I distinguish between semantics and epistemics in order to avoid a systematic ambiguity in the current use of the term 'semantics', which it used to cover both theory of *sense* and theory of *truth* (reference). Since this distinction is important for logical theory it seems sensible to use two *distinct* terms to avoid confusion. The term 'epistemics' is not to be confused with epistemology. (Perhaps 'ontics' might have been a better label.)

Epistemics is the theory of affirmation/denial—of *statement* formation. This will include theory of modality (modes of affirmation and denial). Reference plays a role in judgment, for in judgment the judge moves beyond sense to *what is*. In this respect reference is not to be taken in the full *pragmatic* sense (although it involves the expression and the *use* of the expression in *making* a reference, and in *identifying* actual objects and facts). But there clearly is some overlap between epistemics and what is understood as 'pragmatic' features of discourse. For in *judgment* expressions are *used*, and this introduces the notion of an agent (judge-user). Nevertheless, judgment is still independent of expression and communication, which, as we shall see in a moment, are legitimately included under 'pragmatics'.

Thus, epistemics, as theory of judgment as assertibility, includes the notions of agency and use. As such it is also concerned with *inference* (in contrast to *entailment*, which falls within the domain ontological semantics).

Logical Pragmatics

Logical pragmatics is the theory of *speech acts*. It deals with the relation between expressions (e.g. sentences), their sense, and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the *use made* of them in acts of expression and communication. That is, the analysis of speech acts (linguistic perfor-mances of expression and communication) fall under pragmatics, and it takes into account social conventions, institutional rules, illocutionary force, etc. For example, the logical conditions of asking a question, making a command, making an assertion, referring to an object...etc., are linguistic acts which are susceptible to logical analysis, which exhibit logical features. Where epistemics is concerned with the analysis of truth-conditions and assertibility, pragmatics is concerned with the *making* of a statement (assertion)—the commitment that is involved on the part of a person making the assertion (endorsement) in an act of communication. This applies not only to assertion (where the question of truth and falsity is relevant) but a wide range of linguistic acts in which the question of judgment and truth is *not* involved : making a promise, commanding, etc. These acts of communication introduce categories and exhibit logical features of their own which are not introduced or relevant at the level of semantics or epistemics. The logical analysis of *judgment* (epistemics), for example is independent of (prior to) the considerations of communicating and expressing a judgment (making a statement). Pragmatics would *presuppose* (in some clear sense) semantics and epistemics (rule priority) for example in the analysis of *assertion making.*[25] Judgment is the mere recognition of truth (as Frege points out), not the endorsement or commitment to truth that is conveyed in the *act* of assertion. Thus a distinction must be made between *assertibility* (epistemics) and assertion (pragmatics).

Note : The notion of *meaning* spans all *three* areas : semantics, epistemics and pragmatics. The term *'sense'* applies only in logical semantics. This is why it is important to distinguish between theory of *sense*, and theory of *meaning*. Now that we

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

have distinguished between semantics, epistemics and pragmatics it should be clearer that theory of predication–theory of the *sense* structure of *propositions* (sense–contents)—is purely semantic. This means that in *some* sense theory of propositional structure is *prior to* and *independent of* considerations of epistemics and pragmatics This point requires elaboration.

Even in *thinking* (the Fregean sense) expressions of a particular language are involved. This is how we have access (in thought) to propositions (sense–contents). Nevertheless propositions themselves, as Frege stressed, are independent of thinking (the act) or the mode of expression or representation. This means that propositions are independent (in some sense) of any particular natural language. It becomes crucial in logical theory (theory of predication) to isolate the special problems and features connected with *expression* of propositions in a particular language. Frege says,

> " Much of language serves the purpose of aiding the hearer's understanding, for instance the stressing of part of a sentence by accentuation or word-order ... A sentence can be transformed by changing the verb from active to passive and making the object the subject at the same time... Naturally such transformations are not indifferent in every respect; but they do not touch the thought, they do not touch what is true or false. If the inadmissibility of such transformations were generally admitted then all deeper logical investigation would be hindered. It is just as important to neglect distinctions that do not touch the heart of the matter as to make distinctions which concern what is essential. But what is essential depends upon one's purpose " ("Thought", p. 25).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

If our purpose is to give an account of expression and communication in natural discourse then pragmatic–epistemic features of language are essential. But if our purpose is to give an account of the sense-structure and formation of propositions, then these feature are irrelevant. Thus, theory of predication is concerned with the structure of propositions. Propositions are expressed and apprehended via some mode of representation (sentences in a particular language), but propositions are nevertheless independent of the particular mode of representation. Theory of predication is not essentially concerned with natural languages (particular sentences), but only insofar as natural languages reflect (represent) propositions. So theory of propositions is independent of expression of thoughts (epistemics and pragmatics).

Logical Syntax

Logical syntax is the theory of the formal (structural) relations between signs or expressions. The constituents of propositions stand in determinate relations, and syntax is concerned with the formal representation of elements of thoughts in their mutual configurative arrangments.

Logical syntax is *not* autonomous in the sense that its rules are independent of semantic, epistemic and pragmatic functions. Logical syntax is shaped by these forces. It deals with the "special" arrangements of signs and their structural features as they function in thinking, judgment and expression. However, syntax is autonomous (independent) in one sense: *given* the semantic, epistemic and pragmatic features and functions of signs, certain structural and formal relationships between them may be abstracted and investigeted in their own right. This is what logical syntax is concerned with. Thus, the structural relations between signs is objective and the investigations of these features is a legitimate independent study.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Syntax is shaped by semantic, epistemic and pragmatic functions. There are degrees of determinants of syntactic form. For example, the logical syntax of predication would deal with the sense-formative structure of propositions independently of epistemic (truthfunctional) or pragmatic functions. This aspect of syntax, for example, would correspond to Frege's treatment of propositional (conceptual) content apart from the judgmental function (stroke).

Syntax at this level is the formal-structural features of semantic (sense) functions. The logical syntax of predication presented in the next section attempts to explicate precisely this aspect of syntax: the formal-structural features of predicative formation abstracted from content. Syntax, being formal, does not take into account the material content of predication. For this reason the rules of syntax (the proper formation of sentences) does not guarantee the semantic correctness of predicative content. Thus, a sentence may be well-formed syntactically (structurally) but may fail to have a sense value: *sense*. Part of a well-formed *predication* is its syntactic form. This is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for sense-formation. Certain sementic features of *content* cannot be captured by syntax, and these play a role in sense–formation. It is a mistake to suppose that logical syntax can (or should) be sufficient to account for sense-formation. This is not what syntax is about. It is only one aspect of sense-formation.

Logical form is often identified with logical syntax. This is correct only when it is understood that syntax is the attempt to capture the structural and formal features of semantic, epistemic and pragmatic functions. Logical form is not autonomous and independent of semantic determination. Once syntax is given

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

it may be considered apart from content (sense-content), but it could not get started apart from semantics. This is the sense in which syntax is *not* autonomous and independent. Syntactic rules—rules of proper sentence-formation–cannot get started apart from semantic funnctions and sense–formation. Rather it is precisely the attempt to capture and represent the formal features of sense–formation. The view that syntax is prior to and independent springs from the attempts to construct artificial languages. Natural logical syntax cannot get started in a vacuum—apart from semantic considerations, even though this may be possible in artificial syntax. Even the syntactic (formal) representation of so-called logical signs (formatives) cannot capture the *content* of these signs (functions). We shall see below that in the theory of formatives these functions have *form and content* of their own. The syntactic features of formatives do not capture the full *content* of formative functions.

Summary :

1) Logical Semantics, theory of predication, is the level of sense–formation—intelligibility, conceptual content. The act of thinking (in Frege's sense) applies here in the apprehension of propositions, wherein the thinker entertains a State.

2) Logical epistemics is the level of judgment and truth–functions—theory of assertibitity. It is at this level that sense is brought into relation with the actual (what is) and this gives rise to truth–falsity. This is the level af assertibility (not assertion). The act of judging (in Frege's sense) is not a psychological act but (like thinking) a *logical act.*

3) Logical pragmatics focuses on linguistic performances—speech acts. Here, for example, the logical conditions of making an assertion is relevant. From one point of view the analysis

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of speech acts of various sorts presuppose the two prior levels. Illocutionary forces, performatory utterances in acts of expression and communication occur at this level.

Philosophy Department
Haverford College
370, Lancaster Avenue
Haverford
Pennsylvania 19041–1392 (U.S.A.)

ASHOK GANGADEAN

NOTES

14. For an intensional treatment of predication see Leibniz, *Logical Papers* p. 19 ff.

    Note : A proposition is a natural element (unit) of thought. This does not mean that they are discrete *atoms*. We shall see later that propositional-terms stand in sense relations (configure) with other terms.

15. Searle, for example, characterizes predication as a speech-act. Although he distinguishes sharply (the way Frege does) between propositional content and assertion, etc., he nevertheless goes on to speak of "propositional acts" which are "slices" of illocutionary acts. He points out that "propositional acts" cannot occur alone. "When a proposition is expressed it is always expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act". *Speech Acts*, p. 29. See also pages 25, 123, 125)

16. Strictly speaking, a predication (proposition) *constitutes* sense-content, and appropriate sentence-form *makes* sense. Sometimes, however, I shall speak loosely and say indifferently that propositions make sense. A proposition, however, *cannot* make non-sense, for it essentially constitutes sense.

17. Sommers distinguishes between sense and meaning in "The Ordinary Language Tree" (*Mind*, 1959). His distinction is different.

18. Although I subscribe to Frege's distinction between sense and reference (truth) I do not accept his odd postulation of two entities, The True and The False. It seems a natural move to have made since reference is tied to some object. But this move is not the only (nor best) I would prefer (if I had to speak this way) to speak of The Actual (Actuality) or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

What-is-the-case. A sentence is true when the state of affairs it represents is actual (obtains), etc.

19. Linsky says, "Frege thought that sentences of fiction, myth, etc. did express 'thoughts' (propositions). They could do this even though they contained names such as 'Odysseus' which do not have a reference. Of course, such sentences would not have a reference. Of course, such sentences would not have a reference (truth-value), because since the reference of a sentence is a function of the references of the constituent names contained in it, sentences containing names without references would be without references themselves". *Referring*, p. 28.

20. (In his footnote Frege says : "A judgment, for me, is not the mere comprehension of a thought, but the admission of its truth").

21. Linsky says, "Frege's semantics deals with signs, their senses, and their references. Signs are said to 'denote' (or to 'refer to') their references and 'to express' their senses. These technical terms are used to refer to the relation of signs to their senses and their references. There is, however, no term in Frege's writings to stand for the relation of ssnse to reference. Frege says that the sense is a 'mode of presentation' of the reference". (*Referring*, p. 30)
This is another sign of unclarity in characterizing the relation between sense and reference.

22. On the one hand Frege makes a clear distinction between a proposition (sense) and truth (reference). He establishes their independence. Nevertheless, he sees that a thought is intimately related to truth :
"In thinking we do not produce thoughts but we apprehend them. For what I have called thought stands *in the closest relation to truth*. What I recognize as true I judge to be true quite independently of my recognition of its truth and of my thinking about it. That someone thinks it has nothing to do with the truth of the thought". (Thought, p. 35)
So, the proposition itself is not inherently true or false, yet it stands "in the closest relation to" the truth. It is this relation that we need to explicate.

23. See G. Harman – "Three Levels of Meaning"
P. F. Strawson – "Truth and Meaning" *op. cit.*

24. I stress the term *logical* epistemics to distinguish it from *psychologistic* theories. Theory of judgment and truth-functions is not concerned with *actual* thought processes. I use the term in the sense in which Frege understands judgment. It is an *act* (process) but it is a *logical* act, and is susceptible to logical investigation.

25. Searle distinguishes between propositional acts (predication and illocu r tionary acts) : "We might put it in this Fregean way : meaning is prio- to reference; reference is in virtue of meaning". (*Speech Acts*, p. 92)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

Proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, the book contains a critical appraisal of various aspects of the late **Kalidas Bhattacharyya's** philosophical thought, and includes his own final formulation of his philosophical position.

Edited by **Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastava**

The book includes contributions from **K. L. Sharma** (A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharyya), **Daya Krishna** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation), **S. K. Chattopadhyaya** (Professor Bhattacharyya's "Alternative Standpoints" of Philosophy), **K. Bagchi** (Subjective and Objective Attitudes as Alternatives : A study of Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Knowledge-Object Unity), **N. K. Sharma** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Philosophy : Alternative Absolutes), **R. S. Bhatnagar** (Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy : Study of a Fundamental Dichotomy in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Thought), **Mrs. Yogesh Gupta** (Pre-suppositions of Science and Philosophy : A Critical Study) **Mrinal Kanti Bhadra** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Freedom and Existentialist Thought), **Rajendra Prasad** (Freedom and Existential Thought), **Rajendra Prasad Pandey** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya on the Indian Concept of Man), **K. J. Shah** (Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated), **J. N. Mohanty** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician).

1/8 Demy, Pages 239. Price Rs. 60/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
Poona University, PUNE 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 2
April 1991

KṚTAPRAṆĀŚA AND AKṚTĀBHYĀGAMA : AN ANALYSIS, DEFENCE AND RATIONALE OF THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF ACTION

Introduction

For many centuries the Buddihst and the non–Buddhist trends of philosophical thought remained in existence almost side by side in the Indian subcontinent. Adherents of them entered into prolonged debates and controversies and brought forth charges against their opponents. In some of these debates the normally acknowledged distinctions between the so-called orthodox and heterodox schools are watered down to such an extent that they are held to be of no serious consequence. For example, adherents of the different non–Buddhist philosophical trends of thought, which flourished in the Indian subcontinent, repeatedly levelled two prominent charges against Buddhism in general with reference to its theory of human action. In so doing, the advocates of non–Buddhist trends under consideration held differences among followers of Buddhism to be immaterial, in so far as all of them subscribed to certain important common features of it. The charges under consideration were repeatedly levelled against Buddhism and fine points of their implications discussed to bring to the notice of the concerned that Buddhism cannot present an intellectually satisfactory account of the relationship between action (*kriyā*) and its results and consequences (*phala*) with reference to the doer (*kartā*) of the former. It was also further sought to be impressed upon the concerned that although

Received : 28–5–1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

it does seem to accept generally that action lead to results and consequences (*karmavipāka*), nonetheless, Buddhism makes carricature of the deterministic relationship between actions and their consequences (*karmaphala*). This is because of its double fault. On the one hand, it refuses to accept any permanent doer (*kartā*) and/or enjoyer (*bhoktā*). On the other hand, it allows actions to perish without their results being connected with them, or else seeks to connect any action whatever with any result, no matter whether the said action is done by the said doer or not. That is, the result one is satisfied with or suffers for (*bhunakti*) may not be the result of an action performed by him. If the charges under consideration[1] viz. *kṛtapraṇāśa* (an action perishes without its doer coming to enjoy or suffer for its results, since neither the doer nor the actions are static) and *Akṛtābhyāgama* (results of such actions accrue to one which he has never performed) are held to be true, then, it is alleged, Buddhism cannot be in a position to give a satisfactory account of voluntary action and consider appropriately the question of its responsibility. In addition, the charges under consideration, if true, are also said to have certain epistemic, ontological and social implications, leave alone logical implications of what could be alleged to be methodological incoherence.

In the present paper,[2] we intend to concentrate on some of the important aspects of the charges under consideration and controversy concerning them. We do not intend to be comprehensive in our consideration, it being needless for our present purpose. The main task that we address ourselves to in this paper is two-fold : (a) to state the charges in their prominent features and spell out the rationale by which they are backed, and (b) to analyse the prominent features of the Buddhist approach, articulate its rationale and spell out its implications.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This is sought to be done with a view to showing that the Buddhist approach concerning relationship between actions and their results and consequences is not irrational and indefensible as it is very often said to be. It is needless to say that it is also neither outrageously ridiculous nor outrightly trifling either, so that it may not deserve any serious cognizance of it.

The entire essay has four sections. The first is given to briefly stating the chief differences between the Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical perspectives which have significant bearing on their respective approaches and their rationales. As we shall see, here again the so-called division between heterodox and orthodox would turn out to be inconsequential. The second and the third sections are devoted respectively to articulating the non-Buddhist and the Buddhist perspectives concerning relationship between actions and their sesults and consequences, along with the respective rationales by which they are backed. The last section is directed at bringing out that at least in some respects the Buddhist approach seems to be richer and profounder in comparison with its non-Buddhist counterpart and that we could afford to ignore it only at the cost of our being myopic in vision and dogmatic in approach.

I

Chief Differences Between the Buddhist and the Non-Buddhist Perspectives

There are some points of sharp differences of opinion, perspective and focus between Buddhists. We have discussed some of them elsewhere.[3] Inspite of such differences they also share certain common concerns, some of which we have outlined elsewhere[4] in so far as they unfold a shared civilizational bond between them. This kind of stance of agreement on certain ...6

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

points combined with sharp difference concerning certain others, between Buddhists and non-Buddhists, is also noticeable with reference to the way they account for the phenomenon of human action. For instance, both Buddhists and non–Buddhists unequivocally agree that there must be some way of relating human world on the one hand and the world of things on the other. Otherwise, human i.e., anthropocentric–world will remain segregated from the world outside, i.e., cosmocentric–world. Indeed, very sharp and uncompromising segregation between them would make them very difficult to understand. Hence, there must be some connecting link between them. However, the controversy between Buddhists and non–Buddhists arises with reference to the determinative principle/s of such a relation, the nature, structure and constitution of the relata, the reasons behind advocating their respective stand–points and perspectives etc., which play an important role in their respective stands. These issues have a telling impact on the framework within which they are arguing. Hence, before we analyse their respective arguments, a brief discussion of the concerned determinative principles would provide an appropriate background.

Especially with reference to furnishing satisfactory account of human actions in their different aspects, the stances which the Buddhists and non–Buddhists adopted seem to bring forth five main points of difference between them. They are :

(i) *Common Structural Features* : According to Buddhists as well as non–Buddhists certain structural and constitutive features are common to the world of things and the world of humans. According to non–Buddhists – both orthodox and heterodox – some kind of stability, staticity or permanence is indispensable. On this view everything does not ever come to be destroyed. Anything, whether human or non–human, has some or the other stable nucleus which withstands the shocks of change – real or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

apparent. Orthodox trends like *Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Sāṁkhya* etc., hold that given such a stable nucleus of anything, change is either only functionally real or else it is ficticious altogether. *Paramāṇus* and *Ātmā* of *Nyāya, Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* of *Sāṁkhya, Brahman* and *Jīva* of *Vedānta,* or *Ātmā* and *Apavarga* of *Mīmāṁsā* are such stable elements/principles.

The unorthodox strands like *Cārvāka* and *Jainism,* which oppose Buddhism, also share this kind of approach, though with a fundamental difference between them. *Cārvāka* holds that the same stable elements, viz. *Aṇus* of *Pṛthivi, Āp,* etc., are structurally determinative of both humans and non–humans like. *Jainism,* on the contrary, holds that different kind of stable elements are at work in animate and inanimate world. Both of them, however, seem to accept change only to be functionally real and never at the cost of stability.

Thus, the non–Buddhist strands seem to hold some kind of stability to be absolutely essential in our account of anything. Those strands of them which accept change ensure that it is not accepted at the cost of stability – full or partial. That is, change is not allowed to make such a deep in–road into stability that the latter would either be weakened considerably or jeopardised and negated altogether.

Closely connected with the consideration of the importance of stability there is another in which non–Buddhist opponents of Buddhism – both orthodox and heterodox – are unanimous. It consists in holding that we shall never be in a position to account for continuity of anything – with or without change – independently of stability or permanence. Thus, according to them continuity of anything would be available only if and in so far as stability of it – in strong or weak sense – is neither threatened nor rejected. It is this kind of clue which enables

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

them to relate the human and the non–human worlds with each other.

In contrast to this, the Buddhists – irrespective of differences among them – seem to hold that change and impermanence are inalienable structural features of anything–human or non–human, and that continuity of it has nothing to do with its stability. Thus, Buddhism, instead of permanence or stability, considers change and impermanence to be essential and structural features of anything [5] And, it also holds that although continuity of anything may be functionally significant, it has nothing to do with structural features of it. This means that continuity could be made satisfactory sense of independently of stability, and that it is not epistemically incoherent with change and impermanence as structurally inalienable features of anything.

In this way, both the Buddhist and the non–Buddhist strands seem to connect human and non–human worlds with each other but in a fundamentally different way. We shall have in the sequel an occasion to study bearing of this difference on their respective theories of action.

(ii) *Methodological/Theoretical Coherence V/S Absense of Counter–intuitivity* – The Buddhist and non–Buddhist strands seems to differ from each other very fundamentally in yet another respect. It may be held that while advancing a theory or putting forth a knowledge–claim what needs to be paid preponderant, if not exclusive, attention to is methodological/theoretical coherence. In order not to weaken or jeopardise such a coherence, facts, to satisfactorily account for which the theory under consideration has been brought forth, need to be 'seen', 'read' or interpreted in the light of the theory. As a result of this, it may be held that facts have such and such a structure, or that we have such and a knowledge of them, or that we are in a position to com-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

municate in such and such a way about them in so far as they have such and such a nature, structure and constitution. In this way, inter-relationship between world (human or non-human) and word (language and communication), or that between world and our knowledge of it – our cognition and interpretation of facts – is held to be decisively determined by overwhelming consideration of theoretical and/or methodological coherence. Approaches of *Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā, Sāṁkhya,* Jainism etc., as opponents of Buddhism, seems to be determined by such predominent concern for theoretical and/or methodological coherence.

On the other hand, it may be held that mere theoretical and/or methodological coherence is not the only thing that should be held to be a matter of exclusive concern. It also needs to be ensured that the theory we advance and interpretation of facts which we give in the light of it does not remain counter-intuitive. For, exclusive insistence on theoretical coherence may make us inclined either to disregard the facts in so far as they clash with our cherished theory. Or else, twist them in such a way that they would be given such an interpretation as would coherently fit with the theory under consideration. Both these alternatives are intellectually suicidal and hence unacceptable. Buddhists seem to insist that counter-intuitivity of a theory is a serious flaw of it and hence an appropriate effort needs to be made, while putting forth any theory, that it does not remain counter-intuitive. This consideration, too, is a major point of difference between the non-Buddhist and the Buddhist approaches concerning satisfactory account of human actions. It has important implications with reference to allocation of responsibility of a voluntary action as well as an appropriate theory of punishment. We shall have an occasion later on to take into account some of them.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(iii) *Objectivity V/S Uniqueness* – Thirdly, according to the non-Buddhist schools consideration of anything, no matter whether human or otherwise, needs primarily and decisively to be shaped and determined by taking into account objective, shareable common and hence communicable features alone. This enables us to study it as a kind or type of thing or entity, feature etc. Such a kind of it displays its nature without any residue, and the only way in which one thing or entity differs from another is because and in so far as it possesses smaller or larger number of such features in contrast to another, though each of them should in principle be shareable. Thus, on this consideration, uniqueness of anything does not depend so much on possessing non-shareable feature as not possessing a certain shareable feature, however contingently it may so happen. That is, uniqueness is a (contingently) resultant feature. In so far as such a contingency is removed the so-called unique thing will lose its uniqueness and would become similar to at least one thing other than itself. But in so far as this happens to be the case, the very basis of uniqueness would be lost. The *Brahman* of *Vedānta*, which is considered to be the only thing of its kind, is unique perhaps in this sense of the term.

This means admission of preponderance of cosmocentric perspective over anthropocentric or an outright reduction of the latter to the former. Let us take the first alternative of them bit seriously. Considered this way, approaches of the *Sāṁkhya* and the *Advaita Vedānta* seem to advocate this view to the extent to which they seem to consider the differential aspects of the anthropocentric, from the cosmocentric, to be irrelevant and incosequential for the consideration of the latter. Taking the second alternative seriously seems to be the advocacy of at least *Mīmāṁsā* and *Jainism* in so far as they seem to tailor the cosmocentric to the anthropocentric, and yet understand the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

latter only in its objective or shareable sense, which was sketched above. That is why, perhaps, those considerations of the cosmocentric which could not be shown to have bearing on human life were sought to be sliced off from both these strands. Thus understood, in *Mīmāṁsā* only those features of the cosmocentric were considered to be significant which have ritualistic bearing on human life. Or, in *Jainism* an individual is held to be completely subsumable under society and hence possessing every feature which is shareable.[6] On the *Nyāya-Vaiseṣika* approach, on the contrary, the cosmocentric and the anthropocentric seem, by and large, to be taken as isomorphic with each other, and hence whichever way one looks at, the same shareable features would have to be taken into account.

In contrast to this, the Buddhists' approach seems to hold that objetivity and shareability is different from uniqueness and *vice versa*, and that the latter means possession of at least one non-shareable feature by nature of the case.[7] This means that uniqueness is determined by *Svabhāva*, and not by contingency of non-possession of a shareable feature as is alleged to be the case by the non-Buddhist opponents of it. This consideration of decisive significance has important implications, some of which we shall have an occasion later on to brobe into, in so far as they influence formulation of the theory of action put forth by the advocates of the respective strands.

(iv) *Sakāraṇatā* V/S *Sahetukatā* – Differences between cosmocentric and anthropocentric, as advocated by Buddhists and their non-Buddhist opponents, could be understood along another salient point of controversy between them.

Irrespective of whether what happens in the world is short-lived or long-lived, it could be held that cosmocentrically everything happens only causatively. Thus, on this view, there just

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cannot be an uncaused event. For, to say that there is such an event, however accidently it might be, would be irrational and hence indefensible. That is, causal explanation of events is the only way of satisfactorily accounting for them rationally. It may further be held that since nothing happens irrationally in the world, nothing can happen in it which is uncaused. Such a kind of causal account of an event is a satisfactory explanation of it and it should, in principle, be capable of being given, sooner or later. Events my happen accidently or regularly. But none can happen without its being caused. Extending this consideration to the anthropocentric, it may be held that nothing happens in the human world as well which is not caused. This kind of extension amounts to holding that happenings in the cosmocentric and the anthropocentric worlds are similarly causal in character and could, therefore, be exaplained in the same way. Non–Buddhists generally seem to adopt this stance. It is further irrelevant to consider how they actually effect it. For, consideration of this kind would gather decisive importance provided detailed account of a single stand and its defensibility were our primary concerns here.

The Buddhists, on the contrary, seem to make an important distinction between the cosmocentric and the anthropocentric in so far as they hold that while whatever happens cosmocentrically is causal (*Sakāraṇa*) in character,[8] that which happens in human world is purposive (*Sahetuka*) in nature.[9] This means that the cosmocentric and the anthropocentric fall apart from each other in a certain decisive respect, and their satisfactory accounts need to be given differently to avoid either reduction or distortion. This also means that whatever is caused need not be necessarily purposive in character, while whatever is purposive in character need not necessarily be causally accountable. Additionally, it could be held that while whatever happens causally

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is in accordance with a rule (*Avinābhāva*), that which happens purposively may be so at the most only contingently. Thus understood, to tailor purposes to causes would be one kind of distortion, while to read causes in purposes would be another. Both of them are counter-intuitive in character. Number of happenings in human life could be dispensed with provided imposed or imbibed purposes are got rid of, making an allowance only for those which happen causally. For, since they happen by the nature of the case we have no way to stop them, as we cannot change nature of things at will.

The fundamental sort of difference that we sketched above makes it clear why the upholders of the non-Buddhist strands insist upon presenting highly deterministic account of happenings in human life, analogous to the account of happenings in the world of things. In one sense of it, it would amount to holding that doer of an action is analogous to a thing which behaves in a certain way, since both of them are subject to the same kind of rule-governness. The Buddhists, on the contrary, would oppose such a move since it would amount to reduction of the human to the cosmocentric without any residue. This sort of difference, too, would have important implications, some of which we shall have an occasion later on to consider.

(v) *Doer and Enjoyer : Identity V/S Difference* – Lastly, coming to the issue of allocation of responsibility and the relation of actions to their results and consequences on the one hand and the doer of actions and/or enjoyer of or sufferer for the results and consequences of actions on the other.

The Buddhists seem to accept, by and large, the following – First, as nothing is permanent, so too an action, the doer, the enjoyer/sufferer, results and/or consequences of actions are not permanent. Secondly, the relation between action and its result/

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

consequence is governed by an indispensable rule such that there can be no result/consequence of an action independently of action and that every voluntary action is purposive in character. This is especially because there is no quettion of considering anybody responsible for an action which he has not willed. Thirdly, the doer of an action and the one who enjoys or suffers for the results and/or consequences of an action need not necessarily be the same. Hence, the question of allocation of responsibility cannot be settled mechanically as is often sought to be done by opponents of Buddhism.

The non–Buddhist opponents of Buddhism, on the contrary, hold that (a) the doer of action and the enjoyer must be the same and this is determined by the stability or permanence of *Ātmā* (self) (b) No one can be held responsible for actions which he has not done, and one is entitled to enjoy fruits of only those actions which one voluntarily undertook–either in this or previous life, since it is permanent *Ātmā* that passes through chain of lives in order to suffer/enjoy results of actions undertaken by it. Difference of this kind also has enormously significant consequences and implications, some of which we shall have an occasion to study in the sequel.

On this background of the important differences between the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist approaches, we proceed in the next section to present an outline of their respective theories of human action, bring out their important features, and spell out their rationale as we proceed. Out of non-Buddhist and Buddhist approaches concerning human action and its satisfactory explaination we take up the former first for consideration. For, that will enable us better to articulate the salient features of the Buddhist approach, spell out lines of the defence of its rationale, and study its important implications.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II

An Analysis of Non-Buddhist Theory of Action

It is quite obvious that action (*kriyā*) needs to be distinguished from movement, especially because the latter is quite mechanical and non-volitional in character. Further, with reference to giving a satisfactory account of actions only those sort of actions–individual or collective–need to be taken into account which are neither undertaken under compulsion nor are performed out of ignorance. This is not because the latter kinds do not involve a doer. Nor again because they do not lead to results and consequences. It is rather because they are not consciously willed and thus are bereft of any choice. Accordingly, any attempt to present a satisfactory account of human actions needs to concentrate on consciously willed actions.

It is further clear, without much ado, that actions which human beings perform are not ends in themselves. They are rather means to ends. And since any end or goal that one may aspire to realise may not be a legitimate and worthy of being realised, goals worthy of being realised are sought to be discriminated from the unowrthy ones. Similarly, granting actions are proper means of enabling the desirous to realise legitimate goals, those actions which are properly instrumental to the realisation of legitimate ends are sought to be discriminated from those which are either not so instrumental, or else are of the nature of positive hindrance or obstacle in the realization of the desired legitimate goal. Advocates of various philosophical trends of thought have emphasised the need and importance of living human life in a worthy way. They have also denounced any mode of living human life in an unworthy way. Thus understood, various sorts of discriminations are sought to be instituted, elaborated and justified for reasons too numerous to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be gone into in the present paper. It is also needless to be done for the present purpose at hand.

Of the different non-Buddhist philosophical trends which flourished in the Indian sub-continent, adherents of four trends have registered prolonged and concerted opposition to the Buddhist account of human actions. Therefore, we need to concentrate on them in the present context, although adherents of other trends also came to trade later on along the path paved by the former for one reason or the other, directly or indirectly It is, therefore, needless to be exhaustive in our consideration of their oppositional relation to the Buddhist approach. Instead, it would be expedient and economical to concentrate on the four major trends. They are : (a) *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, (b) *Mīmāṁsā*, (c) Jainism and (d) *Advaita Vedānta*.[10] Of them, further, the objections raised by *Advaita Vedānta* are basically epistemological and ontological in character,[11] and since in the present essay we shall not primarily be dealing with epistemological and ontological aspects of human action, we hardly need to deal with objections raised by *Advaita Vedānta* seriously. A remark in passing, however, should not be considered out of place concerning the sort of objections which *Advaita Vedānta* has raised. As according to it knowledge alone is instrumental to the realization of the legitimate end, it is enough for it to point out that the Buddhist account of human life does not furnish the sort of epistemological and ontological basis which is conducive to the former. Its opposition to Buddhism, therefore, runs along epistemological and ontological route, rather than confronting its theory of action.

Adherents of the remaining three non-Buddhist trends of thought, viz. *Nyāya* (although we earlier mentioned *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* as a combined approach, this feature of it arose much later, especially after *Vaiśeṣika* as an independent trend of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

thought ceased to be and was taken over by later *Nyāya*, starting with Udayanācārya. Elaborate discussion of the stand of the school and concerted opposition to the Buddhist theory of action is found only [in the works written by *Naiyāyikas*), *Mīmāṁsā* and Jainism have opposed the Buddhist theory of action and its implications, and levelled charges mentioned above against Buddhism elaborately and quite repeatedly. They, in turn, have shouldered the responsibility of articulating an alternative theory of human action and defending it with ingeneous arguments marshalled in its support Here, again, opposition between the so-called orthodox and heterodox systems has been considered to be unimportant.

Coming then to *Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā* and Jainism. As remarked above, of them, the last is heterodox in chraracter and refuses its theory of action to have any allegience with the *Vedas*, while the former two, apart from other considerations, seek to present their theory of human action with clear anchorage in one or the other consideration originating from the *Vedas*.[12] In fact adherents of *Nyāya* often proclaim themselves to be interested in defending the tradition (*Paṁparā*) against onslaughts on it,[13] may they be originating from adherents of like–minded or unlikeminded trends of thought.[14] Thus understood, adherents of *Nyāya* could be considered to be self-styled home–guards of the tradition, protecting it from internal insurgency or external agression Adherents of Jainism also assume similar self–appointed role, but we will return to it in proper context later. The tradition that *Nyāya* seeks to safeguard and defend is concerning theory of action originating from the *Vedas* as outlined by *Mīmāṁsā*.[15] This sort of leaning of *Nyāya* and *Mīmāṁsā* upon each other is reciprocal in character although for different reasons. Whereas *Nyāya* is indebted to *Mīmāṁsā* for the foundation of theory of action, the latter is indebted to the former

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

so far as appropriate ontological basis of it is concerned. We need not enter into the details of the issue here, as it falls outside the scope of the present paper.

Adherents of *Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā* and Jainism accept in agreement that actions are required to be undertaken for the realisation of the desired legitimate goals, as former are instrumental to the latter. Such actions lead to results and conequences (*phala*), since there is an inalienable tie (*karmavīpāka*) between the two as the latter would not be available independently of the former. This point, as a observed earlier, is also acceptable to Buddhism. From this point onwards violent differences between Buddhist and non–Buddhist approaches concerning theory of action begin to surface. It is further held by adherents of *Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā* and Jainism that every action presupposes a doer of it, since action independently of the doer would just not be done at all. As conception of action is related with that of doer of action, so too the fact of action, i.e., action as an event, is related with doer of it i.e., agent. This is alright as far as it goes. But the adherents of the schools under consideration bring forth at least five major points in their theory of action around which prolonged debates and controversies (between adherents of Buddhist and non-Buddhist theories of human action) revolved for centuries. They are :

(a) ***Results of Action Connected with Stable Kartā*** - As stated above, that any action which is performed – good and bad – leads to results and consequences, or that every action that is performed necessarily presupposes some or the other doer – individual or group – of it is quite clear. But this in itself would not establish connection between doer of an action on the one hand and result/s and consequence of it on the other, especially if the doer is not stable and permanent. For, result of an action may

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

emerge after a long time since action is performed. To ensure non-severance of relation between the doer *(kartā)* of an action and result *(phala)* of it, adherents of *Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā* and Jainism hold that the doer *(Kartā=Ātmā)* is stable or permanent. Any change that occurs in it, as Jainism clearly accepts it to be the case, since everything according to it is liable to undergo change, is considered to be non-constitutive in character so that essential nature of *Ātmā* does not come to be jeopardised. This means, any change with reference to *Ātmā* is external to it and is more of the sort of an adjunct. Given this, via stability of *Ātmā* as *Kartā*, anchorage and bearing of *(Sāmānādhikaraṇya)* of action as well as its result could be established on the doer of action and thus through action its result could be connected with doer of it via its stability. Thus considered, neither action nor its result stands segregated from the doer of action. But with this, sufficiently strong coherent foundation comes to be laid not only for theory of reward and punishment but also atonement *(prāyaścitta)*.[16] We shall return to this point a little later.

(b) *Identity of Kartā and Bhoktā*—We saw above that an action presupposes doer of it and that any action leads to result. The result and consequences which follow from an action that is performed, would not make sense in the context of a theory of action unless they come to the lot of somebody. For, as action needs to be related to human life so too its result. But who could be that somebody with whom the results of an action are to be related? In principle, it could be anybody, irrespective of whether such a person is also the doer of the concerned action or not. But then, as we shall see below, it would make nonsense of an accepted theory of reward and punishment. In order to ensure that nothing of the kind happens, adherents of *Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā* and Jainism establish identity

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of doer *(krtaā)* and enjoyer (*bhoktā*) of an action via constancy of it. The *bhoktā* is actually the *bhoktā* of results and consequences of action. But since no result or consequence follows independently of an action that is performed, enthymemetically it is said that he (i. e. doer) is *bhoktā* of an action. We said this is not merely indirect and derived way of establishing connection between results of an action and doer of an action. It is rather enthymemetic, because it presupposes identity of the doer with the enjoyer or *vice-versa* via its permanence, so that doer of an action itself turns out to be the enjoyer of the results of an action, whatever may be the duration of time which may elapse between its being doer (i. e. performance of an action) and an enjoyer (i. e. emergence of results and consequences of action). This consideration has one important implication and we shall return to it in the sequel.

(c) *Reward and Punishment*– Results and consequences which originate from action could be considered either to be good, beneficial and hence satisfying or else as bad, evil and hence annoying. We saw earlier that results and consequences are directly related to the one to whose lot they come. But why should benefit accrue to anybody or why should an annoyance come to anybody's lot? The answer that adherents of *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṁsā* and Jainism give is because the enjoyer is the same as the doer, and therefore they (i. e. results and consequences) are related to the doer via his actions. Thus understood, beneficial results are rewards, while annoying ones are matter of punishment awarded to the doer for the sort of actions he undertook. Considered this way, there can be no result unconnected with doer's action, and anybody could be held responsible only for those actions one has performed, since in the context of theory of action only voluntary actions need to be taken into account. But since one has performed an action voluntarily and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

since doer of an action and enjoyer of its result is the same, the doer cannot help being held responsible for the sort of results which come to his lot. The permanence and constancy of the doer and its identity with the enjoyer make doer of action alone the nucleus around which consideration of reward and punishment revolves. And in this way internal coherence of the theory on which account of reward and punishment is based and responsibility is allocated does not come to be jeopardised, weakened or destroyed. Similarly, propitiatory, repentive and atonemental actions (*Prāyaścitta*) too, on this theory, would be related with the doer of those of actions of his in the performance of which some mistake or flaw had emerged such that it is required to be rectified for smooth allocation of responsibility. This sort of internal coherence of the theory is considered to be its asset and strength.

(d) *Determinism* – We saw above that advocates of non–Buddhist theory insist on the satisfaction of the condition of theoretical internal coherence and completely disallow any compromise with it on whatever ground, however weighty. This, however, brings forth one more point of great significance in the theory of human action advanced by the adherents of the trends under consideration. It amounts to upholding an uncompromising determinism, making no allowance for chance and contingency. If there is any likelihood of any sort of experience or fact going contrary to the dictates of internal theoretical coherence and determinism, then it is sought to be twisted and re-interpreted in such a way that neither determinism nor internal theoretical coherence is made any compromise with. To be able to see the point we are labouring to put forth and comprehend its implication, it needs to be made clear that in an attempt to satisfactorily account for human actions what one needs to concentrate ...7

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

upon are the actions performed in the present life of an individual or group concerned, and nothing else. But since in many cases restricting only to the life-span of an individual concerned does not necessarily enable the advocates of internal theoretical coherence combined with uncompromising determinism to satisfactorily account for results and consequences coming to one's lot, they bring in a hypothesis of chain of lives, both preceding and following the present life. Although this move enables the concerned advocates to save their uncompromising determinism combined with internal theoretical coherence they so valiantly seek to defend, yet it opens another Pondura's Box, to the consideration of which we turn below.

(c) *Infinite Regress and/or Platonism* – Such a series of lives lived by an eternal doer and permanent enjoyer which is identical with it is no doubt consistent with constancy of the doer and its identity with the enjoyer. For, it could be claimed that number of lives through which *Ātmā* passed in the past and would pass in future would not make any difference to the essential nature of it. This is fair enough as far as it goes, especially because no change is held to be structural in character. Thus, internal theoretical coherence is not jeopardised, and determinism also is not compromised. But what is the original important question with which the investigation under consideration commenced ? It is surely understanding the enigma of the present life and giving a satisfactory account of actions performed by a human being during it. But in the process one has brought in double danger : on the oue hand, to preserve internal theoretical coherence and to keep uncompromising determinism in tact, infinite regress is dragged in – regress extending infinitely both backward and forward starting from the present life. Can one say infinite regress is methodologically preferable to effect acceptability of either determinism or internal coherence ? On

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the other hand, one is concerned about the present life and actions performed in it. Their satisfactory account is the problem. But realising that it cannot be given within the limit of the present life one has brought in many lives and innumerable kinds of actions performed in them. How can indulgence into this kind of rampant Platonism be held to be a satisfactory solution of the problem ?

As mentioned in the beginning, advocates of the non–Buddhist trends of thought basically level two main charges against Buddhist theory of action, viz. *kṛtapraṇāśa* and *Akṛtābhyāgama* and hold that in so far as the Buddhist account is susceptible to these charges it is unacceptable. [17] The advocates of the concerned non–Buddhist trends of thought no doubt succeed in ensuring that the account of human action they present circumvents the charges the Buddhist theory is, according to them, susceptible to. But they articulate, in turn, such a theory of human action which, methodologically speaking, is open to serious charges of indulgence into infinite regress and avoidable Platonism. The former of these makes satisfactory account of any life and actions performed in it almost well–nigh impossible, while the latter seems to multiply the problems to be tackled with a view to dealing with the limited number of them which confront one in so far as one proceeds to satisfactorily account for the present life and actions performed in it. Thus, on the latter count it makes us swallow the bitter pill of Aristotle's charge against Plato, even though we are suffering from no desease for the cure of which the said pill is administered to us. Over and above these two charges, the said account also turns out to be counter–intuitive in character. But we propose to humbly return to it after we have presented an outline of Buddhist theory of action, to which we turn in the next section.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The reason of this, we earnestly hope, will become clear as we proceed.

III

An Analysis and Rationale of the Buddhist Theory of Action

It would be highly misleading to suppose that adherents of Buddhism are not serious in presenting their theory of human action. It is not the case that while non-Buddhist opponents take their task in all seriousness, adherents of Buddhism are flipant in their approach and hence given merely to flirting with their task. Such a view would be highly partisan, dogmatic and one-sided. It is, nonetheless, true that both Buddhists and non-Buddhists put forth different account of human life and present variant theory and analysis of human action. Such a difference between them does not emerge out of sheer love of novelty. In the case of non-Buddhist adherents of different trends of philosophical thought we saw above that their theory and analysis of human action is based upon and backed by certain important considerations—be they ontological, epistemic or methodological or otherwise. Likewise, in the case of Buddhist analysis and theory of human action it needs to be noted carefully that there are certain vital considerations such that if they are overlooked or ignored, it will not enable us to comprehend the Buddhist theory of human action in its principal aspects. This would, in turn, bring in such distortions of it as were articulated by non-Buddhist opponents of it. In order to save ourselves falling into such a trap, it is necessary to look to some salient and decisive aspects of the Buddhist theory of human action so that in their light its marked contrast with non-Buddhist theory would become clear and in the light of it we would not miss its seminally significant implications. It is this twin task to which we address ourselves in the present and the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

next section. For reasons too obvious for being stated, we take them into account in the same order in which we have mentioned them. Coming, therefore, first to the salient features of the Buddhist theory of action.

(a) *Result and/or Consequence of Action Necessarily Presupposes an Action:* We had observed earlier that Buddhists accept a kind of necessary connection by way of a rule between actions and their results and consequences. When they talk of actions they do not confuse them with movements, especially because while the former are purposive and volitional in character, the latter are non-purposive and mechanical in nature. The sort of invariable relation that is at stake between actions on the one hand and their results and consequences is such that every result and consequence of an action is inconceivable independently of action performed by some agent or the other. Further, such an agent may be individual or collective in character, and even when it is of the latter kind, the same kind of necessary connection between action and its result holds as when the agent is an individual. Thus understood, the general format of the relationship between action and its result would remain the same, no matter whether acting agent is an individual or a community. The relation between action and its results and consequences holds invariably only one directionally, i.e., from results and consequences to action, and not reciprocally. This is for two reasons :

(i) We cannot guarantee that just because an action has been performed, it would necessarily lead to some intended result or consequence, since it is a fact that some actions turn out to be abortive in character. For instance, one may begin sinking a well with the intention of ensuring water-supply but may give up mid-way for whatever reason it might be.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(ii) Secondly, every volitional action necessarily presupposes appropriate volition, but volition in itself does not guarantee that it will result into action commensurate with it. For example, I might intensely will to stand first in examination, but may be too sloth and indolent to study very hard. In this context it is further noteworthy to consider that the same result mtght arise out of alternative courses of action, and, therefore, it would be too rash to invariably connect certain result only with certain action. For example, I may will to have enough money with me, and I may come to have it through honest hard work, winning a lottery ticket or a jack pot or through charity or will of somebody, however I may not deserve it. Taking such kind of contingencies into account the only thing that could be accepted without any reservation is that any result or consequence of an action would not emerge independently of an action and that such a connection, although only one–sided, between action on the one hand result and cansequence of it on the other, could and needs to be understood only generically. This ensures that it would not collapse in face of whatever kind of contingency, which might force any other kind of relation between them to be either modified or rejected altogether. Acceptance of this kind of relation between them enables adherents of Buddhism to circumvent two lures which otherwise may force one to put forth a different sort of relation between actions and their results. One of them is of distorting facts and contingencies while the other is of disregarding them in so far as they seem to go contrary to the accepted methodological orientation.

(b) *Anityatā of Everything* – It was observed earlier, although passingly, that according to adherents of Buddhism impermanence (*Anityatā*) is a structurally inalienable feature of both things and organisms, including human. It is such a feature of anything that in face of it any kind of constancy and stability -

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

no matter whether structural or functional, central or peripheral- as an essential and indispensable feature of anything would simply be inconsistent with it. Given this, everything in cosmocentric as well as anthropocentric world is necessarily and exceptionlessly impermanent, no matter whether it is action, agent, doer, enjoyer, *Ātmā*, result and consequence, *dharma* (feature) *pudgala* (material component), *saṁghāta* (cluster) or anything else. In this way *Anityatā* takes everything within its sway however dear or alien it may be. An illusion of constancy and stability, however dogmatically and ingeneously it may come to be defended and however accustomed and indoctrinated we might be by it, is simply misleading Hence it needs to be got rid of so that we do not distort or ignore facts, being otherwise than what we are inclined to think of them. As argued elsewhhere, [18] this kind of *Anityatā* may be understood in either of the two senses, viz. in the sense of anything (i) not lasting more than a moment, or (ii) lasting at least for a moment. In whichever sense it is understood, it remains structural feature of anything that is real and can be disregarded only at the cost of misunderstanding that which is the case. Thus, *Anityatā* opens up permanent possibility of change and becoming, and precludes any stability or constancy in so far as it goes against such a possibility. In this way, *Anityatā* opens up the entire sphere of variability and is simultaneously non-satisfiable with any kind of constancy, although it does not preclude flow or *Saṁtāna*, a chain of becoming. When combined with action, agent, doer or enjoyer *Anityatā* has many important implications, some of which we hope to consider in the sequel.

(c) *Sahetukatā, Tṛṣṇā and Vāsanā* – The Buddhist insistance on the distinction between the context of *Sakāraṇatā*, i.e., cosmocentricism and *Sahetukatā* i.e., anthropocentricism is vitally significant. Any attempt to compromise with it will not only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

distort the Buddhist point of view but also would lead to our distorted understanding of facts as we encounter them in our lives. Happenings and events which occur as per *Sakāraṇatā* are governed by rule and could be made sense of only in accordance with native nature (*svabhāva*) of anything. But events occurring in human life are due more to craving (*tṛṣṇā*) and feelings (*Vāsanā*) connected with goals which we seek to realise in our lives and could only be understood with reference to the distorted picture we have of ourselves. To seek to understand *sahetukatā* in the light of *sakāraṇatā* is one kind of distortion, while to connect the former with one or the other kind of stability is another. The former of them amounts to reducing *sahetukatā* to *sakāraṇatā*, without realising that many events, which could be satisfactorily explained with reference to *Sahetukatā*, or many happenings in our life have no causal explanation of them, although they are connected with certain goals–however illegitimate–which we seek to realise. The latter kind of distortion, on the contrary, is not only inconsistent with *Anityatā* but is also counter–intuitive in the sense that it amounts to either wishing away change or else considering it to be irrelevant and peripheral. A move of this kind may be consistent with the theory one seeks to advocate, but is, nonetheless, distortive of facts as we encounter them and hence is counter–intuitive in character. The Buddhist insistance, however, on demarcating the context of *sakāraṇatā* from that of *sahetukatā* does not amount merely to bring to our notice that human world differs from the world of things in an important respect. Nor does it amount to holding that nothing whatever happens in our life which is *sakāraṇa*. For instance, our physical growth is very much a *sakāraṇa* phenomenon, although anything connected with our life is not necessarily *sakāraṇa* in this way. Dogmatic refusal to adopt this line of demarcation leads to certain kind of gross misunderstandings

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

concerning human life as we shall see in the sequel, which cannot be taken care of merely by looking to internal theoretical coherence of the approach one is bent upon adopting.

(d) *Insistance on Primacy of this Life and Happenings in it* – The philosophical problem of pain and suffering coming to human lot, its satisfactory analysis and appropriate resolution with reference to human life needs to present such a theory which looks primarily to this life, the sort of actions we undertake, and the events and happenings we come to be confronted with. As there are events which are causally explainable, likewise there many others which are not so explainable, in so far as they are fraught with contingency and accidentality, no matter whether occasioned in terms of simultaneity *(yaugapadya)* or succession *(krama)*.[19] Neither mere simultaneity nor succession, however cleverly and ingeneously interpreted, can take away accidentality they are beset with. Likewise, many of the events and happenings in our life—individual or social—are accountable solely in terms of our cravings, greed, sentiments and emotions, however intensely they seem to originate. If such varied phenomena are to be explained satisfactorily it cannot be done either turning back to experience or ignoring contingency. Similarly, change and impermanence of everything cannot be sacrificed on the altar of presumed permanence. What the opponents of Buddhism seem to be doing is doubly dubious : on the one hand, since the contingencies cannot be easily wished away, to convert them into certain kind of necessity, they are sought to be connected with previous lives. For example contingencies of certain rewards and punishments coming to our lot in this life. On the other hand, to make change and impermanence irrelevant and unimportant it is sought to be veiled and hidden under the carpet of one or the other sort of permanence and stability. Thus, it is sought to denied or wished away. Against this, Buddhism insists that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

unless we learn to face exigencies of contingencies and risks of unpredictability, our understanding of present life cannot be alright. And where and in so far as our understanding of the present life and happenings in it is inadequate, even if the present life comes to be connected with a series of lives extending both backward and forward, our understanding of human life as a whole not only cannot be respectably viable but is bound to be fraught with illusion and superstition as well. What we do in this life and whatever comes to our lot should be explainable solely with reference to the present life as the only reference point. If in our life we meet with contingencies and accidentalities, then we need to accept them to be so and proceed to make sense of our life together with them rather than inpependently of them. If some other life is conceived and if it is modelled after the present life, then that too cannot be free from an element of contingency, for the simple reason that contingency is a fact in the present life. Ignoring risks, contingencies and accidentalities creates a gross misunderstanding of the present life and such a misunderstanding cannot be removed by hinding it behind a chain of lives backed by permanence of self which passes from one life to another. It brings in determinism and through it a sense of security. But both of them stand on the basis of a systematic and well-contrived illusion, and therefore should be considered to be unacceptable according to Buddhists.

(e) *Anityatā and Non-identity of Doer and Enjoyer*-Earlier we had an occasion to outline principal points concerning *Anityatā*. We also talked about the the sort of contingencies and accidentalities we are confronted with. If and in so far as these two considerations are brought to bear upon each other, it brings forth certain points of seminal concern in the Buddhist analysis and theory of human action. Such points seem to originate from

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

different directions. First, even if our voluntary actions are purposive in character, there is no guarantee that the doer of actions will last till the realization of the end for which the action under consideration was instrumental. This is for two reasons: (i) as everything is impermanent and liable to change, so is the doer of action. (ii) There is no guarantee that the result of an action will arise immediately after, if not while performing, the action. This sort of impermanence with which both the doer and action are fraught necessarily brings forth two important points. First, result of an action may emerge after action has ceased to be. Secondly, the doer of an action, too, being impermanent, may cease to be by the time result of it emerges and thus it may not come to the lot of the doer himself. The first of them entails that an action is related with result only variably in two senses: (a) even if an action is performed, result may not follow and the said action may turn out to be aborative, as remarked earlier. (b) The same result could possibly be produced adopting alternative courses of action, although no result can follow independently of any action whatever. This is the sort of inevitable relation (*Avinābhāva*) between result and action we talked of earlier.

Anityatā applied to the doer, on the contrary, brings forth different considerations. Since the doer of an action may not last by the time its result emerges, such a result which has emerged may go to the lot of someone else, however accidentally and unintentionally this may happen. Given this, identity of the doer and the enjoyer/sufferer turns out to be dubious and the message sought to be delivered by the proverb 'reap as you sow'-questionable. In so far as this is the case, it makes little sense to say that the chain of action and its results can be terminated only through the doer of action enjoying or suffering for the results of it. For either the initiator of the chain of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

actions i.e., the doer of the action, may have ceased to be, or action too might cease to be. Further, the series of results of an action in inprinciple interminable. That is, result of an action fails to be necessarily connected with the doer of it. This is the essence of the charge of *kṛtapraṇāśa* often levelled against Buddhism. On the other hand, as results of an action performed by one may go to the lot of someone else, this brings in another consideration. It amounts to holding that the results which may come to the lot of someone may not have anything to do with the actions performed by him. This is the heart of another charge viz. *Akṛtābhyāgama* levelled against Buddhism. Thus, through combining *Anityatā* with doer and enjoyer respectively, Buddhism questions two important implications of the above-mentioned proverb, viz, in order to come to reap particular sort of benefit one must sow the seeds of performing only certain kind of action, and the sort benefit or suffering that has come to the lot of someone can be understood only on account of his having acted in a particular way. Through dissociation of the relation between results of an action and constancy of the doer of them, Buddhism questions the first implication of the proverb under consideration and the rationale by which it is backed. In so doing, it does not jeopardise or annihilate relation between actions and their results. Even non-Buddhists should not have compunction in accepting that the same sort of result could in principle be accomplished through adopting alternative courses of action. It also means to bring to the notice of the concerred that when a given agent acts, other individuals too act, and therefore the result of an action cannot be related to a particular agent in isolation from others. On the other hand, through dissociation of the relation between actions and constancy of enjoyer Buddhism questions the sesond implication of the above-mentioned proverbial wisdom. This does not, nonetheless, threaten the necessary relation between result of an action and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the action in so for as it is accepted that no result of an action would be forthcoming unless action is performed. Even non–Buddhists should have no reservation in accepting this. But through bringing to bear *Anityatā* alike on both doer as well as enjoyer, Buddhism questions identity of them and thus removes the very foundation on which the rationale of its opponents stands. This means that Buddhism is presenting an alternative analysis and theory of human action. The two theories viz. the one presented by opponents of Buddhism including adherents of Jainism, and the other presented by Buddhism, are such that they cannot be true together. Nor does dogmatic acceptance of and subscription to one of them automatically falsify the other. In spite of this, it is very strange to note that some adherents of Jainism have assumed self–styled responsibility of mediating between Buddhism and its opponents so far as analysis and theory of human action is concerned.[30] This sort of self–aggrandised role of mediator of them is doubly dubious : on the one hand, since they themselves are partisan subscribers to the non–Buddhist theory, their arbitration cannot be neutral and impartial. On the other hand, since the two theories cannot be true together, they are trying to reconcile that which cannot be reconciled. Of course, both the theories under consideration could be false. But if this is what the adherents of Jainism under consideration are seeking to establish, then their move is suicidal. But in addition, since they fail to provide a viable alternative to the two already in vogue, discharge of the self–assumed responsibility enables them to cut no ice at all. Even if the move under consideration is prompted by the subscription of the concerned to the doctrine of *Ahiṁsā*, it needs to be very clearly understood that application of *Ahiṁsā* in theoretical considerations and practical sphere of human life is backed by different sort of rationale, and one is not simply mechanical extension of the other.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Consider likewise the matter originating from the consideration of contingency and accidentality. Concentrating merely on the present life we do notice that in the case of some individuals either the result that comes to their lot is just not commensurate with their efforts, though we know it full well that the concerned persons did not shirk from trying as much hard as they should have. This kind of incommensurability may be seen in either way : On the one hand, actions, even when undertaken over a prolonged period of time, turn out to be aborative and just fetch no desired result at all. For instance, someone might sit in the same examination a dozen times and yet success may not smile at him even once. On the other hand, considered over a comparatively short span of time, the quantum of efforts put in and that of the result reaped may be completely disproportionate. For example, a farmer may do everything within his power to get a good crop. But cruel weather may strike such a heavy blow that after the harvest the quantity of grain that the farmer may get must be utterly negligible.

On the other hand, we also notice two-fold accidentality of another kind. While there are some who are rewarded disproportionately to the efforts they have put in, there are others who have been rewarded or received benefits in spite of utter absence of any effort on their part. We not only notice persons born in a filthily rich or extremely poor families, but also those who are born with disabilities of various kinds. Within the limit of the present life there indeed are such contingencies and accidentalities. There are cases and instances of extreme and prolonged suffering. What sort of theory of reward and punishment can explain such phenomena satisfactorily ? Given the theories of punishment which are in vogue retributive theory looks to commensurability between quantum of crime committed and the quantum of punishment awarded. The deterrant theory is more

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

concerned with the possible criminals and seeks to prevent them from committing crime. The reformative theory, on the contrary, looks more to the future of the criminal and possibility of dissociation between his future life and his inclination to commit crime. But what about the lot of innocent sufferers? Are we to say that either they are non-existent or that they do not suffer at all? Or else, are we to hold that their suffering is immaterial? But either of these attitudes would be equally deceptive and hence unacceptable. Buddhist analysis and theory of human action seems to open our eyes to such realities of human life which starkly gaze in our intellectual eyes for their satisfactory analysis. Instead of giving due credit to Buddhism for drawing attention of the concerned to some enigmas regarding human life and actions which men perform, it is futile to complain (i) that its approach concerning human action does not make satisfactory sense of reward and punishment in so far as it seeks to question many important presuppositions concerning human action as well as the rationale by which its satisfactory analysis and theory is backed,[21] or (ii) that the normal patterns of behaviour and relations adopted either individually or collectively or the whole pattern of human life (*lokasthiti*) anchored in them would be threatened.[22] If an illusion is perpetuated, it does not automatically become converted into truth. We should rather be thankful to Buddhism for drawing our attention to some of the flaws inherent in the analysis and theory of human action then in vogue, in the self complacent and dogmatic justification of which some scholars had taken great pains.

IV

Implications of the Buddhist Analysis and Theory of Action -

We presented above an outline of the Buddhist analysis and theory of human action and brought out some of the contrastive

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

features of them in comparison with outline of the analysis and theory of human action presented by non–Buddhist opponents of it. On this background we proceed to present below some implications of the Buddhist approach :

(i) *Majority is not Determinative of Truth* : The non–Buddhist analysis and theory of action has not only been in vogue over centuries in this sub–continent but it also has been a very formidable force to reckon with. It was accepted, elaborated and defended by adherents of a great majority of philosophical strands which flourished in this country. Taking this into account, a misconception may happen to be generated that that is the only way of making sense of human action and present an analysis as well as satisfactory theory of it. It may further be held that it suffers from no defect of any kind especially since it is supported by varied strands and large number of people. Buddhism pricks the bubble of this view and brings to our notice two important points of seminal concern : First, an alternative account of human action could be presented which successfully avoids such major flaws of the majority view as counter–intuitivity and subscription to unrestricted Platonism. Secondly, the account of human actien which Buddhism presents is also free from determinism and dogmatism. So far as internal theoretical consistency and coherence is concerned, adovcates of Buddhism seek to impress upon the cancernad that on this count the theory advanced by their opponents scores no precedence over the theory advocated by Buddhism, and that internal theoretical coherence need not be considered to be their exclusive monopoly, such that in so for as the Buddhist approach lacks it, it could be denounced without examination. It rather emphasises that even after strong efforts it cannot be dismissed on the ground of internal theoretical incoherence, unless one is to be dogmatic and irrational in doing so.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(ii) *Demarcation between Cosmocentric and Anthropocentric* It similarly urges upon the concerned not to overlook or ignore, for whatever reason, including concern for simplicity, two important considerations. First, there is a fundamental difference between cosmocentric and anthropocentric world. Given this, to either thingify organisms and/or human beings or to anthropomorphise the world are the moves which are equally intellectually perilous in character, although for different reasons. The former consists in reducing organism or man to things, while the latter seeks to elevate things to the level of organisms or human beings. It is to emphasise this sort of difference between the two worlds under consideration that Buddhism invokes the distinction between *Sakāraṇatā* and *Sahetukatā*.

Secondly, while presenting analysis and theory of human action it is enough to concentrate upon the present life only. Accordingly, assumption of a chain of lives either preceding or following the present one is both redundatnt as well as questionable. Further, analysis and theory of human action presented with reference to variability of action and impermanence of both agent/doer and enjoyer/sufferer along with rejection of the identity of the latter two is more flexible and insightful. This could be seen especially if it is understood that whereas the theory advocated by opponents of Buddhism accommodated and paved way for fatalism and indolence, that of Buddhism did not. From this two points seem to follow : First, accepting human action to be a fact and proceeding to present analysis and theory of it does not make it inevitable to accept *karma-phala*–theory as advocated by the opponents of Buddhism. Secondly, opponents of Buddhism seem to present an ingeneous rationalization of pain and suffering coming to human lot. Buddhim, on the contrary, through its teaching that it originates from *Tṛṣṇā*, ...8

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Vāsanā and *Sahetukatā* seeks to impress upon us the need of changing our attitude towards it and face it courageously in so far as, however contingently, it has come to our lot.

(iii) *Abhorance of Counter-intuitivity - Plight of Innocent Sufferers* - Buddhist analysis and theory of human action is abhorant of counter-intuitivity. What our experience teaches us is something which is not to be wished away or disposed of through clever and ingeneous ratinalization. Instead of making fetish out of theories of reward and punishment already in vogue, Buddhism seems to take plight of guiltless sufferers and innocent victims far more seriously than any other trend. This sort of concern for them seems to have originated right from the Buddha himself. It is no small wonder that he is called *Mahā-kāruṇika*.[29] It is such innocent sufferers who alone can be objects of legitimate *karuṇā* or pity. It is not merely a matter of formal sympathy or emotional empathy. It is rather a matter of great concern for their plight and efforts to help them bear the burden of it with courage and determinism. It must not have been for nothing that at one time multitudes embraced Buddhism, although no palpable material benefit accrued to them. Importance of *karuṇā* can especially be understood provided it is seen that it is opposed, on the one hand, to the attitude of rewarding the undeserved, and punishing the innocent, on the other.

(iv) *Possibility of Others Suffering because of us* - It seeks to emphasise as much as it needs to be that though actions are initiated by individuals or groups, for whatever reasons they might be, their results and consequences are limited by no fiat or contrivance only to the doers of those actions. Nor do results and consequences of actions undertaken by us necessarily arise during our life time. It is not, therefore, merely enough to insulate our life from pain and suffering coming to our lot. In so

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

doing, we cannot be either blind to the possibility or oblivious of the fact that we might make others innocent victims of the results and consequences of our actions. To put the responsibility of such results and consequences on the sufferers themselves is both inhuman and unjustifiable. It is inhuman because it refuses to consider various individuals on par and accept their equality irrespective of whether it is willed by God or not and irrespective also of whether it is sanctioned by any such authority as *Vedas* or not. But it is also unjustifiable because it mistakes clever rationalisation for satisfactory account of anything.

(v) *Changeability and Contingency* – Through emphasising transitivity and impermanence of everything it seeks to bring to the notice of the concerned that nothing is immunised and insulated from liability to change and destruction, inclusive of a social order. In face of the possibility of perpetual change it seeks to teach the concerned to learn to take life in all its aspects courageously and face boldly the risks that it enfolds. Accordingly, though stability, security and non–changeability are sought to be questioned along with complacency, continuity and flow are not allowed to be sacrified on the altar of discreteness as is sometimes alleged.[24] Nor is *Anityatā* sought to be understood in terms of its rigid sense viz., not literally lasting more than a moment as is made out to be the case by opponents of Buddhism,[25] although that, as a coherent posstbility, is not ruled out altogether.

We are aware that many of the points we have made above need much more elaboration than is done here. But it would be beyond the scope of a single paper to be elaborate and comprehensive on various issues connected with human action from the point of view of Buddhism. That is why we decided to delimit ourselves to presenting an outline of the Buddhist analysis and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

theory of human action. Even if the present essay serves as prolegomenon to Buddhist theory of action we should feel our efforts to have been rewarded.

Department of Philosophy
University of Poona
PUNE 411 007

MANGALA R. CHINCHORE

NOTES

1. (For Jainism) Malliṣena; *Syādvādamañjarī* with Hemacandra's *Anyayogavyavacchedikā-dvātriṁśikā*; K. 18, pp. 122–126; Dhruva, A. B., (ed.); Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune 1933.

   (For *Mīmāṁsā*) Kumārila; *Ślokavārtika*: *Atmavāda prakaraṇa*; Ks. 4–8, p. 489; Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, (ed.) Tara Publications, Varanasi, 1978.

   (For *Nyāya*) Jayanta Bhatta; *Nyāya-Mañjarī*; Part II, pp. 15-16; Madhvāchārya (ed.); Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1969.

   See also, Bhāsarvajña; *Nyāya-sāra with Nyāya-Bhūṣaṇa*; pp. 532-533 Swāmi Yogindrānanda (ed.), Sad Darshana Prakasana, Varanasi, 1968.

   (For *Vedānta*) Śankarācārya; *Brhma-sūtra-Bhāṣya*; II. i. 36.

2. I am deeply indebted to Prof. M. P. Marathe who helped me at various stages in writing this paper.

3. "Some Thoughts on Significant Contributions of Buddhist Logicians"; Chinchore, M. R.: *Journal of Indian Philosophy*; Vol. 15, 1987, pp. 155–171.

4. "Lost Buddhist Texts : The Rationale of Their Reconstruction in Sanskrit"; Chinchore, M. R.; *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*; Vol. 17, No. 3, 1990, pp. 285–312.

5. Dharmakirti; *Pramāṇa-vārtika*; Ch. I, Kl. 68–69, Swāmi Dvarikada Shastri, (ed.); Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1968.

6. Jainism considers only two main types of actions to be undertaken, viz either by *Srāvakas* or *Sramaṇas*, see for details, *Acāranga* and *Thāṇānga*.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

7. Dharmottara; *Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā;* p. 15, Shastri, Chandrasekhara, (ed.); Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1954.

8. Chandrakirti; *Prasannapadā* (with Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka Śāstra*) p. 20; P. L. Vaidya, (ed.), Mithila Institutute, Darbhanga, 1960.

   See also, Dharmakirti; *Pramāṇa-vārtika,* Auto commentary on *Svārthānumāna pariccheda;* K. 25, pp. 10–11; Dalsukhabhai Malvania (ed.); Hindu Vishwavidyalaya Sanskrit Publications Board, Varanasi, 1960.

9. Chandrakirti; *Prasannapadā,* pp. 4–5. See also, Dharmakirti; *Pramāṇa-vārtika;* Autocommentary on *Svārthānumāna-pariccheda;* K. 270, pp. 93–94.

10. Kāśmira Śaivism also joined them later on. See for further details : Utpaladeva; *Iśavara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśiṇī;* p. 158; Nirnaya-Sagar Press, Bombay, 1918.

    I am grateful to Dr. S. S. More of our Department for bringing this reference to my notice.

11. Śankarācārya; *Brhma-sūtra-Bhāṣya;* II. ii. 18–32.

12. See for details : Gautama; *Nyāya-sūtras;* I. i. 1. 4. 1. 19, 4. 1. 60 – 4. 2. 1 and its various commentaries upto the *Pariśuddhi.*
    See also Kumārila : *Śloka-vārtika t Codanā-Sūtra-pariccheda.*

13. Gautama; *Nyāya-sūtras;* 4. 2. 50–51.

14. *Ibid;* 1. 2. 1–3.

15. Jayanta Bhatta; *Nyāya-Mañjarī,* Part I, Anhika 4, pp. 213–220.

16. Cf. various *Dharma-saṁhitas.* See *The Dharma Śastra : Hindu Religious Codes,* Vols. I–V, Text and English translation by M. N. Dutta, Cosmo Publications, New Delhi, 1979.

17. *Loc. cit.,* note 1.

18. Chinchore, M. R.; "Some Epistemological and Social Implications of Kṣaṇikatā"; *Annals of the Bhadarkar Oriental Research Institute,* Vol. LXVII, 1987. pp. 57–76.

19. Dharmakirti; *Vādanyāya,* p. 9.

20. Prabhacandra; *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa; Jaya-parājaya-vyavastha-pariccheda.* See also, Mallişena; *Syādvādamañjari;* K. 20 & 30. See also Hemachandra's *Anyayogavyavacchedikadvātriṁśikā,* pp. 154–155, 174.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

21. Kumārila; *Śloka-vārtika; Atma-vāda prakaraṇa;* pp. 488–493.

22. Utpaladeva; *Isvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarṣiṇī*, p. 103.

23. Dharmakirti; *Pramāṇavārtika*, I. 36–134 and Manoratha Nandi's and Prajñākara Gupta's Commentaries on it.

24. Ratnakirti; *Kṣaṇabhangasiddhi* in the *Ratnakīrti–nibandhāvali;* Anatalal Thakur, (ed.), Kashi Prasad Japaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1975, pp. 67–95.

25. *Loc. cit,* note no. 18. See also Udayanācārya; *Atmatattvaviveka,* especially the section in which the theory of *Kṣaṇabhaṅga* is criticised.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 2
April 1991

THOMAS S. KUHN AND L. FLECK
TWO SOCIOLOGISTS OF SCIENCE

Professor Kuhn's socio–psychological approach to the philosophy of science–once fiercely debated and critiqued by the Rationalist and Positivist schools–is now one of the most influential theories (if not *the* most influential theory) in the philosophy of science. Kuhn's catchy terminology ('revolution', 'paradigm', normal science', 'revolutionary science') has become part and parcel of every discussion in the said area of philosophy – and his scepticism regarding the claims of objectivists and rationalists is the basis of new paradigm of thought not only in the philosophy of science but in the whole of the humanities and beyond. This 'New Philosophy of Science' (as opposed to the positivist 'Received View') is generally pluralist, relativist and anti–objectivist. It is a different question that Professor Kuhn has integrated many of his critics' criticisms in later versions of his philosophy of science. It cannot be denied that a pop version of his early views is of immense influence.

While the Received View–philosophers were mainly interested in science as a system of knowledge, the 'New Philosophers of Science' (among whom are Toulmin, Feyerabend, Polanyi etc.) stress the fact that science is primarily a human activity. Psychological and sociological arguments have therefore become increasingly important in the discussion. Professor Kuhn is a well–known thinker today. Hardly known is another thinker of whom some commentators think that he anticipated the more important

Received : 6–3–1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the ideas which are now known as Kuhnian : the Polish physician–socioiogist L. Fleck. Various writers have reported on this alleged family–likeness.[1] We propose to discuss in this article the similarities and dissimilarities in the thought of the two thinkers. Only in a scrupulous reading of the two authors can we determine if Professor Kuhn's claim to originality can be upheld.[2]

1. *The Thought of Professor Kuhn* [3]

In 1962 Professor Kuhn published a book which should revolutionize the discussion of science : The *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Professor Kuhn tried to show that change in science is discontinuous, that it happens in strange convulsions (called 'revolutions'), followed by periods of relative calm, that some of the factors responsible for their happening are external to science and that some of these external factors could be accounted for by psychology or sociology only. Crucial terms are *paradigm or paradigmatic science* (signifying the said periods of calm, normality and peace, when a community of scientists know *what* they are after and *how* they are after it). Professor Kuhn asserts that in these phases the scientists belonging to the community of investigators proceed according to a set (or sets) of established rules which are not questioned and which are based on a set (or sets) of established examples of scientific behavior. A crucial role in the mediation of these accepted rules is played by manuals and textbooks. Decision–making, seeing, thinking, are all determined by this set of established rules. We can then distinguish the following phases in the development of a theory :

1. a pre-paradigmatic phase; no paradigm as crystallized yet.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

2. a paradigmatic phase : a dominant paradigm influences the thought of the community of investigators adhering to the paradigm dogmatically; this influence, even though dogmatic and restrictive, is at the same time the condition for the possibility for success (not ultimate success but all the success possible according to paradigm P);

3. a post–paradigmatic revolutionary phase; the shortcomings of the paradigm are slowly becoming obvious; the world view of the scientists working according to paradigm P crumbles, as too many irregularities become manifest which cannot be accounted by P; a new Paradigm P is in the making; etc.

Professor Kuhn asserts further that successing paradigms are at least partially incommensurable (i.e., both community C proceeding according to paradigm P and community C' proceeding according to paradigm P' are imprisoned in different world views (V and V'), and there is now meta–paradigm that would account for and integrate both P and P'). Both communites of scientists see the world through different sets of glasses, and there is no way in which they could communicate to each other their respective findings.

Professor Kuhn names among the thinkers who influenced him most Koyré (1939), Meyerson (1930) ...,Whorf (1956) and Fleck (1935). He acknowledges the fact that Fleck is an author who anticipated many of his (Professor Kuhn's) own thoughts [' 1981, 8]. In the Foreword to the English translation of Fleck's *Entsehung (Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact–* 1979) Professor Kuhn declares:

> ...acquaintance with Fleck's text helped me to realize that the problems which concerned me had fundamentally sociological dimension. That, in any case, is the connection

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in which I cited this book in my *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. But I am not sure that I took anything much more concrete from Fleck's work, though I obviously may and undoubtedly should have (viiif.)

Rereading the book now...I find many insights that I might fruitfully have worked into my viewpoint' (ix).

The following texts represent Professor Kuhn's systematic contribution to the philosophy of science (we leave his important historical works aside):

1.1 *The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research* (1961)

This speech Professor Kuhn gave in 1961 anticipates the main ideas of the *Structure*. At this time he still favored the term *dogma* which he used in roughly the sense *paradigm* was going to have later.

1.2. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962)[4]

Kuhn proclaims in this text a historiographical revolution; the envisaged new historiography should do justice to the personal element in scientific discovery; the relevant new terms will be 'normal science,' 'revolution' and paradigm; facts will be viewed as theory-related. [1962, 15 ff.]. The student has to go through a painful phase of initiation, during which the ruling paradigm is implanted in his thinking.

Once a paradigm is established it will defend its place and rank not only in the thought of scientists, but also in textbooks and manuals. Goal and purpose of normal science are not the finding of new phenomena, but the elucidation of the paradigm-relevant phenomena. Normative science can therefore be likened to puzzle-solving. A paradigm influences in this sense not only the explanation of current phenomena but also the discovery of yet unknown phenomena.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Paradigm-change begins with the awareness of an anomaly. Nature 'acts' contrary to our paradigmatic expectations. At first nothing happens. Only gradually does the suspicion arise that there is something wrong woth the current paradigm. Gradually a new consciousness of a new world emerges. The new paradigm and the old may be so different, that the respective world views are incommensurable, i.e., members of the two groups cannot make themselves clear to each other anymore. Revolutions are changes in the perception of the world. The transition from one paradigm to another is unconscious in the sense that scientists (figuratively speaking) just wake up one day with a different set of glasses on. They see a different *gestalt*. Paradigm-change is *gestalt*-change.

Scientific progress is than nothing but transition from one paradigm to another. One of the possible interpretations of Kuhn's theory is that we do not increase our knowledge of the real world in time; we can call ourselves fortunate if we belong to the group of scientists who adhere to the latest paradigm.

1.3. *The 1969 Postscript*

This Postscript is Kuhn's reply to some of his critics. 'Paradigm' seems to have been misunderstood by a large number of critics and Kuhn proposes various clarifications. He also attempts to analyse phenomenologically the ingredients of a paradigm. In 1974 Kuhn proposed a further clarification of his usage of 'paradigm' by illustrating it with practical examples (e.g. language-acquisition).

2. *A Thought Experiment*

Suppose there is a thinker T who argues that science is a cumulative enterprise. Suppose further that T stresses the fact that science is a human enterprise, fruit of the concerted efforts

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of groups of experts. These experts adhere – still according to T – to a specific style of thought. This thought style makes adherents see the world in a specific manner (distinct from other manners based on different thought styles). Suppose T argues that the fact that thought styles make thought group members see the world in different fashions has to do with a *gestalt*-vision of the world. There is then, for adherents to a thought style S a thought obligation (a constraint, almost a moral duty) to see the world in a manner M. Students have to be initiated in the thought style of the thought group, and this initiation has a lot to do with cases we know from anthropology. Initiation is initiation in a *gestalt* view of the world. T would argue further that there are phases of relative calm in science which alternate with phases of unrest and upheaval during which a new *gestalt* view is being developed. Question : Would it not seem to every unbiased observer that T has been most diligently initiated to the pop version of Professor Kuhn's philosophy of science ?

3. *The Thought of L. Fleck*

Fleck's paper *Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache* (published in Basel/Switzerland in 1935) offers a parallel account of two case studies. In chapters 1 and 3, Fleck thematizes the historical development of the modern notion of venereal disease. In chapters 2 and 4 we can find Fleck's sociological account for what happened epistemologically. Fleck proceeds quasi-inductively from the facts to the interpretation without first establishing an explanatory system.

A science can never get rid of its past. Fleck seems to find ample evidence for this hypothesis of his in the discussion of the notion of venereal disease. The past lives on : in concepts, technical terms, language and institutions. Fleck argues that many so-called 'scientific facts' go back to pre-scientific *Urideen*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

archetypal structures which inform thinking and seeing. This linked-ness is, however, hardly conscious to any of the concerned scientists. An *Uridee* in Western thought is e.g. the atom theory.

Thought systems, once established, tend to defy change :

> Once a full-grown, closed system of meaning (consisting of many details and relations) is established, it will obstinately resist against whatever contradiction might come up (Fleck 1935, 40, our transl.)

Fleck observes that the attitude of a fixed group of specialists toward contradictory insights is characterized by the following features :

1) what does not fit into the system will be overlooked;
2) it will remain unmentioned even if it has been noticed
3) if it keeps recurring, great efforts will be spent on proving that it is not really contradictory
4) it will be described in terms of the established theory.

There is, then, a general 'conservative' attitude among members of a group of specialists and accordingly in the development of theory a phase of calm (Fleck calls it the phase of 'classicity'–*Klassizität* [1935, 42]) in which problems can be solved without changing the prevalent theory, and then a post-classical phase in which problems accumulate and cannot be solved anymore.

All knowledge is socially conditioned, says Fleck. We should, therefore, never claim that '**X** knows fact F' but rather that '**X** knows fact F based on thought style S as member of thought collective C'. Fleck defines 'thought collective' (*Denkkollektiv*) as

> *Gemeinschaft der Menschen, die im Gedankenaustausch oder in gedanklicher Wechselwirkung stehen.... Träger geschichtlicher*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Entwicklung eines Denkgebietes, eines bestimmten Wissensbestandes und Kulturbestandes, also eines besonderen Denkstiles (1935, 54f.)

A thought collective is any community of humans who exchange thought or are in a relationship of thought–interaction.... the thought collective is the means of transportation for a thought area, a specific pool of knowledge and culture.

A thought collective can, then, be scientific or non–scientific. It is made up of individuals, but it is at the same time a whole, a unity, with inherent synergetics and its specific dynamic. Fleck considers himself a sociologist, but keeps faculty sociologists [5] at a safe distance.

The profounder a scientist's knowledge of his area of specialization is the more he will depend on thought style, and the weaker will be his ability to think independently and differently. Against the notion of basic terms Fleck holds that observartional terms are always unclear. Unclearness is as a matter of fact even proof for the quality and originality of an insight. All really valuable experiments are unclear, incomplete and unique (1935, 112). Once they become repeatable, clear and precise, they are only useful for demonstrations. Fleck describes the course of a discovery according to the protocol of a group of investigation:

(1) the group hits (by chance) on promising material;

(2) predominant in the group is a certain guiding psychological 'mood';

(3) collective–psychological mental associations add themselves to the general atmosphere;

(4) a first unreproduceable and retrospectively not clarifiable 'first observation' takes place (Fleck says of this first observation that it is 'chaotic', 1935, 117);

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(5) slowly an awareness of what has been 'seen' crystallizes;

(6) this crystallization still depends on the chaos, but it is itself already an artificial product (1935, 117ff.)

There are, then, no mind-independent protocol (or: basic) sentences :

In der Sprache der ersten Beobachtungen sind die Ergebnisse ebensowenig aussagbar wie umgekehrt, die ersten Beobachtungen in der Sprache der Ergebnisse (1935, 118).

In the language of the first observations, the results are as little expressible as vice versa the first observations in the language of the results.

It is possible, then, to speak of two phases in the discovery of a fact :

In a first phase of unclear *gazing* the constraint, the style is absent;

In the second phase we perceive a *gestalt.*

Every empirical discovery will therefore be either an addition to the thought style, an improvement; or a thought style revolution.[7]

Every thought collective is administratively divided into different circles. Every scientist may belong to one or more exoteric circles but only to one esoteric circle. There are accordingly elitist and popular versions of the same thought style–scientific ideals like certainty, excactitude etc. are notions of the popular version (1935, 152). Accordingly there is journal science, vade–mecum science and popular science. Fact is, according to Fleck, a notion that is strictly vade–mecum science. Before vade–mecum science it is a hypothesis, after–'reality.'

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. *Kuhn and Fleck Compared*

It seems indubitable that the popular version of Kuhn's paradigmography (based on Kuhns early work) shows a lot of similarities with Fleck's work. Are critics now entitled to the contention that Kuh'n is nothing but an up-dated version of Fleck 1935 ?

1. Fleck always held that his sociology of knowledge was more than just philosophy of science. He thought of himself as a sociologist of culture. Thought–styles are not restricted to science—all thinking takes place in languages, groups, group languages, be it scientific, artistic, journalistic etc. Fleck himself was open to all these other manifestations of thinking and thought style and tried to integrate them in his theory. Professor Kuhn, on the other hand, concentrates on science, and there mainly on physics. Fleck tried to show that his theory holds true in general and specifically for science. Fleck has, however, failed to radically prove that this is the case. Professor Kuhn has tried to narrow down the field of investigation and produce more evidence than Fleck did.

2. Fleck's epistemology is basically evolutionary. The avant-garde of the thought–collective are far ahead while the main body of the army of investigators are still trying to get familiar with the basics of yesterday's insights. Culture, science, the arts are therefore always 'on the way'. Fleck does not share the catastrophism of Kuhn's early theory whose terminology suggests revolutions, break–downs, dethronements.

3. Fleck refers to the *Urideen* as some kind of a psychological alphabet, which is crucial for the interpretation of world, because the mind seeks refuge with those whenever it is at a loss : Hand

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of God, the atom, regularity of nature e.g. are metaphysical concepts which inform Western thought.[5] Fleck did not arrive at a clear formulation of these concepts, but he asserts that they exist and are of a tremendous influence. Kuhn abandoned this idea of a subconscious alphabet of metaphycical categories.

4. Kuhn shares with Fleck the dilemma of reductionism. Both authors speak globally of 'knowledge' or 'thought' without specifying what ontological or subjective–criteriological elements are involved in the process of knowing. Both authors tend to forget (or overlook the fact) that there are heuristic anticipations (see Lonergan 1957, Fluri 1987/88): the ivestigator always knows already a lot about the prospective discovery which is the *x* of his equation. Lonergan also showed that different kinds of heuristic structures are operative in different fields of investigation.

Both Kuhn and Fleck are preoccupied with the subject and they do not seek objective structures in knowledge

5. Conclusion

Various authors suggested that Kuhn (the Kuhn of the early works and the popular interpretation of this philosophy) is deeply indebted to the almost unknown L. Fleck. Kuhn himself mentions Fleck as an author which was important for him, but he also declares (in the Preface to the English translation of Fleck 1935) that Fleck had not been that important to him after all. Several similarities seem obvious : the thought style–thought collective–thought constraint notion, for example, and the gestalt–interpretation of the theory–ladenness of experience. We mentioned, though, that Professor Kuhn has changed many

...9

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of his earlier views. A real evalvation of Fleck's sociological approach to knowledge (scientific and otherwise) has yet to take place.

Philosophy Department
Boston College
Chestnut Hill
Massachusetts–02167–3806

PHILIPPE H. FLURI

NOTES

1. cf. Schäfer–Schnelle/Prefaces zu Fleck–2 1980 and Fleck 1983 (Seiten ix und 10): Wittich [1978, 109]; Baldamus 1979; Baldamus 1966; von der Ohe 1971; Merton 1977; Schäfer 1977, Stock 1980, May 1982.

2. L. Fleck (1896–1961) was a physician by profession; born in Lwow (Galicia) he was interned in Buchenwald during World War II where he was engaged in serological research [cf. Schäfer–Schnelle/Preface ²1980, vii ff.].

3. We will not discuss the whole body of writings published by the two authors but only those we deem relevant for our discussion.

4. Our quotations refer to ⁵1981.

5. He mentions mainly Comte, Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Jerusalem.

6. Similiarly it can be shown that Chinese thought is informed by the Yin-Yang and Wu-Xing theory of nature (cf. Fluri, forthcoming).

7. The English translators of Fleck translated his terminology as follows: thought style (Denkstil), thought collective (Denkkollektiv), (thought) compulsion (Denkzwang), ideo-vision (Sinn-Sehen).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baldamus, W., "The Role of Discoveries in Social Science" (1966), in Shanin T. (Ed.), *The Rules of the Game*, London, 1972

—, *The Structure of Sociological Inference*, London : Robertson 1976

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

—, 'Ludwik Fleck and the Development of the Sociology of Science' in : diff., *Human Figuration : Essays for Norbert Elias*. Amsterdam : Sociologisch Tijdschrift 1977, pp. 135–156. Baldamus, W., 'Das exoterische Paradox der Wissenschaftsforschug. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftstheorie Ludwik Flecks', in : *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie*, 1/1970, pp. 213–233

Fleck, L., *Entstehung und Entwicklung einer Wissenschaftlichen Tatsache*, Basel : Schwabe 1935 (Frankfurt/M : Suhrkamp ²1980) =

—, *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*, Merton/Trenn (Eds.) Chicago : UP 1979, contains : Preface by Th. S. Kuhn, pp. vii–xi and Introduction by Trenn, pp. xiii–xix

—, *Erfahrung und Tatsache*, Schafer/Schnelle (Eds.), Frankfurt/M : Suhrkamp 1983.

Fluri, Ph.. *Einsicht in Insight. B. J. F. Lonergans kritische-realistische Erkenntnis-und Wissenschaftstheorie*, Konstanz : Maus 1987, Frankfurt : Haag & Herchen 1988

Fluri, Ph., *Der Weg der Natur : Theorie und Praxis der chinesischen traditionellen Wissenschaften*, forthcoming (1990)

Gethmann C. F., 'Kuhn', in : Mittelstrass J. (Ed.), 1984, Bd. 2, 504–507.

Koyré, A., *Etudes Galiléennes*, Paris 1939

Kuhn, Th. S., 'The Functions of Dogma in Scientific Research' (1961), in : Crombie A. C. (Ed.), *Scientific Change*, London : Heinemann 1963, 347–369.

—, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago : UP 1962 =

—, *Die Struktur Wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen*, Frankfurt/M Suhrkamp ⁵1981, contains :

—, 'Postskriptum – 1969' pp. 186–221

—, *The Essential Tension : Selected Essays in Scientific Tradition and Change*, Chicago : UP 1977, German as :

—, *Die Entstehung des Neuen*, Frankfurt/M : Suhrkamp 1978, contains :

—, 'Neue Uberlegungen zum Begriff des Paradigmas' (1974), pp. 389–420

Lonergan, B. J. F, *Insight : A Study of Human Understanding*, London : 1957

May, M. de, *The Cognitive Paradigm. [Cognitive Science, a newly Explored Approach to the Study of Cognition Applied in an Analysis of Science and Scientific Knowledge*, Dordrecht : Reidel 1982

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Merton, R., 'The Sociology of Science – an Episodic Memoir' Merton/Gaston (Eds.), *The Sociology of Science in Europe*, Carbondale : 1977

Meyerson, E., *Identität und Wirklichkeit*, Leipzig : 1930

Mittelstrass, J. (Ed.) *Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie*, Mannheim, Wien, Zurich : Bibligraphisches Institute 1980 ff. (3 Vols.)

Schäfer-Schnelle, 'Ludwik Flecks Begründung der soziologischen Betrachtungsweise in der Wissenschaftstheorie', in Fleck ²1980, pp. vii-xlix

Schäfer, L., 'Theoriendynamische Nachlieferungen. Anmerkungen zu Kuhn -Sneed -Stegmüller', in : *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 31/1977, 19-42

Schnelle, Th., *Ludwik Fleck-Leben und Denken*, Freiburg : 1982

von der Ohe W., *Serendipity Reconsidered : Sociological and Metatheoretical Considerations regarding the Occurrence and Appreciation of Unanticipated Research Results*, Marquette U Master's Thesis 1971

Stock, W. G., 'Die Bedeutung Ludwik Flecks für die Theorie der Wissenschaftsgeschichte', in : *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 10/1980, 105-118

Whorf, B. L.. *Language, Thought and Reality*, New York, 1956

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 2
April, 1991

PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLES AND LANGUAGE

All credit for showing the place of mind in the process of acquiring knowledge goes to Kant. After Kant, it is Wittgenstein who takes a revolutionary position in his approach to the theory of knowledge. It is he who deserves recognition for showing the place of language in acquiring and judging knowledge. It may be said that Wittgenstein has replaced Kant's concept of mind by language. The place of language in Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy is as fundamental as the notion of mind in Kantian philosophy. Moore is the first philosopher to give credibility to our intuitions stemming from common sense and ordinary language. Though, Moore could make his impact on the method of philosophy, it is Wittgenstein who is remembered most for showing the place of language in doing philosophy. Austin, Ryle, Strawson, Hare, Searle, Putnam, Donnellan, Kripke etc., to mention only a few from a very long list, are known for their contributions to philosophy following the method of analyzing ordinary language.

There is no doubt that the ordinary language analysis coupled with one's linguistic intuitions about terms and their uses is well accepted as a valid method of doing philosophy today. Ryle, for example, by adopting this method ordinary language analysis; came to certain important conclusions about the human mind.[1] Speech act analysis has credibility mainly because the insights about the working of ordinary language are used in developing this method.[2] What is normally included under the title of

Received : 2-3-1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meta-ethics is basically the analysis of value in ordinary language. Hare, for example, extensively uses this method in developing a theory about moral language. [3]

Individual philosophers, without making special efforts to organize the insights about the working of language have used the ordinary language analysis as a means to arrive at their own philosophical conclusions paying hardly any attention to their powerful method of doing philosophy. 'Pragmatics' is the name given to the study of language from the perspective of 'language as a means' as a part of semiology. It is a growing field drawing literature from the field of philosophy and linguistics.

The studies of linguists of the pragmatic aspect of language, often have been in the direction of understanding the mechanism of language. And some of them, perhaps, saw it as an alternative to Chomskian model of understanding language. Philosophers have found pragmatics to be quite close to what they have called 'ordinary language analysis'. They have often used isolated insights about the working of language in solving philosophical riddles without paying much attention to many of the underlying pragmatic principles of the language that they are using. As they have primarily concerned themselves with the theories of meaning, rules, and other related issues, they were forced to study pragmatics of language incidentally without which they would not have found it possible to explain, for example, what is 'meaning'. A fuller understanding of pragmatic aspects of the working of language is yet to be achieved despite numerous attempts by philosophers and linguists. This paper aims to put a step towards that by highlighting certain pragmatic principles, some of which may go otherwise unnoticed.

The speakers of any natural language have to adhere to, among other things, the pragmatic norms of the use of language,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is quite obvious. In any dynamic society, the activity of introducing new words, modifying the uses of the existing ones in order to express thoughts more rigourously or more precisely or in an unambiguous manner, introducing some change in the uses of the words, or creative deviation from the normal uses of words, etc., are inevitable. And all these activities are subsumed under the single heading 'pragmatics' in this essay.

Some of the pragmatic principles that we use to organise our language are not so obvious because we have internalised them. Some of these principles that we shall discuss in this paper are as follows : [1] the *Principle of Regularity in use* [2] the Principle of the *Economy of vocabulary*, [3] the *Elasticity or Rules*, [4] *Creative Uses of Words*, and [5] the Concept of *Enabling Institution*. It is not the case that only one pragmatic principle would be at work at a given time; they may all work together to facilitate the use of language.

1. *Regularity in Use*

Every user of language knows this principle, though one might not be conscious of this. Frequent deviations from the normal use of words cannot be appreciated. Consider for the sake of argument the following example : a person uses a natural language always with one deviation from the normal use of one of the words that constitute his sentence. This deviation is such that he does not repeat is pattern of deviation every time he uses the same word in the same sentence; but would do it differently whenever he uses the same sentence again. Or he utters the same sentence second time, but this time he deviates in the use of some other word. Though the use of all the words except one, each time he utters a sentence, is in accordance with the accepted rules of the language, one would necessarily fail to understand his speech. This is because one cannot mark the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

deviation from the normal uses of words, as he deviates every time he utters a sentence. We do not make any beginning in understanding any of the sentences he utters. Not even one sentence one could be sure of understanding when he spoke. Such deviations cannot be noted and taken into consideration while interpreting his sentence. Only in conjunction with the sentences that have been understood, the sentences that have not been understood can be put to certain interpretations. And marking a deviation from the normal use of a word requires certain new interpretation of rules for the use of the deviated word. And this could be done only on the basis of the sentences that have been understood. On the other hand, one can perfectly understand what a person intends to communicate even if he deviates from the normal uses of words provided that his deviation of the term is consistent and regular. Every time he uses the word, he should be using the word in the same manner in which he has used it earlier. This is how inquisitive parents understand their child's language even though a child's language does not conform to the rules of an adult language. Some children associate certain sounds with certain concepts in their own peculiar manners. This association is discovered by curious parents and communication is made possible. Deviation from the normal use of words is not an insurmountable problem; philosophical literature is full of such cases. The most notorious words which are known for their irregular behaviours in philosophy are ' knowledge ', ' truth ' and ' real '. Every landmark in philosophy is marked by the use of these words in certain deviant manners in the history of philosophy.

For mal languages take the regularity and consistency in uses of symbols or words for granted. It is not possible to define what is contradiction, for instance, without assuming that the uses of words are regular and consistent. The principle of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

regularity in use, is a bare minimum of rational and purposive use of language.

One cannot hope to get any concessions from observing the strict rule of regularity and consistency in the use of words. In order to evoke a certain type of response in a person, even the poets who are known for their breaking of the conventional rules of language, have to make a careful choice of words depending on the contexts. A poet's effort in hunting for the right word to invoke a certain type of emotion in the reader shows that regularity in the use of words is prior to poet's deviation in the use of those words. Poets make use of the fact that language is used in a systematic and regular manner in formulating their sentences. Without there being regularity and consistency in the use of words by the people, poets would not have succeeded in invoking certain images in their poetry using the method of deviation from the normal uses of words.

2. *Economy of Vocabulary*

If the principles of regularity and consistency in the use of words apply to every word of a language, the principle of economy of vocabulary applies only to a selective group of words or expressions. There are mainly two ways in which one practises the principle of economy of vocabulary : [a] *Economy of Words,* [b] *Formulations of Compound Words.* The philosophical position of Quine, namely, that there are no words which are redundant in laguage is the other side of the principle of economy of vocabulary. There are no two words with identical meanings in a language because language is an efficiently evolved system– this is another way of stating the same principle of economy of vocabulary. The main aim of the principle of economy of vocabulary is to avoid duplication of words and their functions.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

[a] *Economy of Words*

Even if one values clarity, one does not simply undertake a project to introduce new words for each sense of the various terms which are ambiguous. Introducing a new word is the last option that one exercises when everything else has failed. Imagine the number of words and the efforts on the part of the users of language that is needed if one were to replace the word 'Mary' by unique words in order to represent each individual called by this name all over the world. If there is any confusion due to the multiplicity of reference of the name 'Mary', we simply provide an identyfying description of the person along with the name in question in the context for the identification.

One copes with the situation by simply distinguishing two or more senses of term for a limited purpose, instead of introducing a new word for every sense of a term burdening the rest of the speakers of the language having to remember those words. Moreover, in the case of clear homonyms, one can use the terms without ever stating different senses of them. For instance one is not put to any difficulty even if one does not state explicitly the different senses of the term 'cricket' while using this word. A situation where one is likely to use this term as the name of an insect would be quite different from the one where this term is used to refer to a game. This type of ambiguity does not create any serious practical problem for the users of language. Similarly, it serves no purpose to replace the term 'wicket' by three distinct words to distinguish the three senses of the term, namely, the batsman, the pitch and the stumps. The term 'wicket' in the sentence 'England has only two wickets in hand now' can never be confused with the pitch or stumps.

Homonyms are wrongly thought to be linguistic accidents by some philosophers.[4] There seems to be an optimum use of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

principle of economy of vocabulary underlying such linguistic accident. For instance, one could clarify the two or more notions that are associated with a term, or preferably coin new terms to use them as separate words. For instance, the term ' kite ' as the name of a bird could be easily distinguished from the plaything, and one could use two separate words if one wants. ' Kite ' as the name of a natural kind which cannot be confused with 'kite' which is a plaything. One does not take the trouble to assign new and distinctive words to different homonyms distinguishing their different senses, because one does not encounter any practical difficulty because of homonyms.

Exen a homonym which denotes two or more complex notions could be used without stating its different senses explicitly. For instance, the term ' house ' when used in different contexts denotes different complex notions. When used to refer to the place where humans inhabit, it means one thing; and when used to refer to industrial complexes it means quite another. Besides, when the term is used to refer to a body of elected representatives, as in the case of house of commons ' it denotes yet another thing. But one does not find the necessity to coin separate words for these different senses of the term in question for all practical purposes

[b] *Formulations of Compound Words*

If having two or more senses attached to one word is one way of economizing on the vocabulary, then forming compound words by using the words in currency is another. In general, when the situation becomes very complex due to the expansion of knowledge or for other compelling reason, one normally compounds the existing words or introduces new expressions to meet the situation effectively. The uses of the term 'bank', for instance in a variety of contexts, posed the difficulty of obscurity of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meanings; and compound words were conveniently introduced, like, 'blood bank', 'question bank' etc., demarcating the different uses of the term 'bank' to meet the situation effectively. This is what must have been the reason why the use of term 'war' is extended beyond recognition. We have invented the ways of coping with situation of referring to different forms of wars using certain combination of the words which are in currency. We have now, 'world war', 'economic war', 'star war', 'civil war', 'cold war' etc. We can even anticipate the possible situations where the need would be felt to coin the compound words : 'communal war', 'sports war', 'cultural war' etc. No doubt that man is an economic user of words in language.

It is possible to compound words without burdening the speakers of language, and such a method is preferred for the obvious reason that it would help the speakers to keep their vocabulary within the manageable number. Surely, economy of vocabulary favourably affects the economical use of human memory. There are yet other less consciously used methods used by the members of a society which seem to be based on economic use of memory. This is no other method than adding new ceiteria for the uses of words while modifying or completely discontinuing the existing ones.

Certain criteria would be shared between the parent term and the newly formed compound word when we follow such a method. To consider the example of 'war' again, it is with the war spirit that we approve of economic sanctions against a country. Nonetheless, one does not fight economic war with guns and bullets. The specific criterion for identifying an economic war is different from that of a military attack. Non-cooperation may be the main thing that is shared between 'economic war' and 'cold war' on the one side, and 'war' on the other. 'Civil wars' have non-cooperation as a common

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

criterion with 'economic war'. 'Star wars' have certain other criteria common to military attacks. All wars share some resemblances; they belong to a family.'

[3] *Elasticity of Rules*

Elasticity of rules is a unique feature of natural language which is absent in all artificial and formal language. Bending of a rule of a word could be from very inception of 'one use' in one context to frequent use of long durations. Some of the noteworthy types of cases of bending the rules of the use of words are : [a] providing operational definitions [b] extending the use of a term, [c] restricting the use of a term, and [d] metaphorical uses. Of theses cases, operational definition lasts longer than the other two. In fact, some of the concepts in science are only defined operationally. 'Heat' for instance, is only defined operationally. On the other extreme, we have 'one time' bending of the rules of use of words occurs in certain metaphorical uses of words in poetry for example. Extending and restricting the uses of words could range from very temporary to relatively permanent bending of rules.

One is quite aware of the nature of arbitrariness of rules. But while considering arbitrariness of rules and uses of words, one does not take into consideration the fact that a certain word which has currency in language resists change of its use. This is obviously so because the advantage the word has will be lost once it is allowed to be used in a different manner. All stipulative definitions of words do not 'click', only some would having gained greater significance after the stipulated uses of the words. Here we may cite the logical positivists' use of the term 'meaningful' in the context of sentences as a good example of this kind where a stipulative use of the word has remained as a permanent feature of the term by scoring over its regular use and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

acquiring a new sense for this use. But such cases are very rare. Most of the terms take time to 'adopt' themselves to the new uses acquiring new senses. All such cases which fall short of acquiring new senses can be said to be cases of using the words in special manners by bending the rules of words such as an attribute of a thing to be the essence of the object. Arbitrariness of the rules of the uses of words are marginally different from this. These new stipulations, though arbitrary, are guided by certain considerations. Arbitrariness of rules might refer to total arbitrariness between the symbols and symbolized through conventional rules. [6]

[a] *Operational Definitions*

A term can be defined operationally. It can be defined in any manner the way the user of the language finds fit. One way of defining a term operationally is to take a criterion to be the concept. That is, to take a criterion more seriously than the concept itself.

A definition of a term can be accepted as operational provided that the definition is in terms of one of the attributes of the object that the term in question stands for. That is, one might take a frequently found attribute of an object as a symptom [7] of its existence. And if there are any invariable attributes of that object, one could make a hypothesis about the presence of that property of the object on the basis of the existence of the object. And the existence of the object can in turn be inferred on the basis of the presence of a frequently found attribute of the object in question. And one may choose to use this very attribute of the object as a criterion for knowing the presence of the object as well as its necessary attributes by accepting it as a criterion by convention, And using a symptom as a criterion is the same as providing an operational definition by convention

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in an arbitrary manner for the use of the word. For instance, 'tuberculosis' is defined operationally in terms of the presence of certain bacillus in the human body.

Any unit of measurement, is an operational definition, i.e., a unit of measurement is defined in terms of an invariable property of a substance which would be used for comparing the things that have the same property in multiples of the unit. A unit of weight is defined in terms of gravitational force that exerts on an object and this unit is used to compare the gravitational force exerted on different objects in multiples of this unit.

[b] *Extending the Uses of Terms*

When one extends the use of a word, one includes even the objects that do not normally come under the purview of the notion. For example, in the early phases of civilization, man believed that only movable things had life. He changed his view soon after he discovered that plants also respond to light, oxygen, water, minerals etc. This warranted a change in the use of the expression 'living being'. He chose to extend the use of the expression even to refer to plants which were not formerly included as part of its extension.

[c] *Restricting the Use of a Term*

The classical example of restricting a term is the Logical-Positivists' use of the terms 'true' and 'false'. They restricted the uses of the terms claiming that only descriptive statements could be true or false but not metaphysical and ethical. By restricting the use of the terms 'true' and 'false', Logical Positivists have restrained coining two more terms for expressing the specific senses they had in mind.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

[d] *Metaphorical Use*

One may find it convenient to use a word in an extraordinary manner in a context. For instance, if one does not have a word to refer to a creature that one finds in the garden, one may refer to the creature by calling it 'lizard' being fully conscious of the fact that the creature in question is different from what is known as 'garden lizard' or only other form of lizard. That may serve the purpose of showing the creature to a friend and be pleased by the discovery of a new creature in one's own garden.

Stretching the use of words is a very common phenomenon. We use words in a metaphorical way sometimes overtly and on other occasions in a very subtle manner. Metaphorical use could be an easily recognizable phenomenon as is the following. When we say, 'Time and tides wait for none', one is expected to understand 'time' and 'tide' on the analogy of conscious beings. An example of a more subtle metaphorical use of terms is our attempt to understand the structure of an atom in terms of the structure of the solar system. We may try to understand in a yet another manner, the material world in terms of mathematical concepts such as positively charged protons and negatively charged electrons. Or for example, a male female distinction may be used in classifying material world. Though sentences using such concepts will be literally meaningless, one could take them to be metaphorically meaningful. That is to say, the rules that are invoked for comparison or metaphorical uses of words are not the normal criteria for the use of those words. Ryle points out that we speak of the human mind on the analogy of the human body or physical objects, and therefore we ask the wrong question as to where the mind exists. [8]

One speaks of the memory of a computer, but this is possible only when we take it in a metaphorical sense. A close analysis

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the use of the word 'memory' indicates that the two are different. Human memory, for instance, can fade over the years. And there is a sense of temorality, i.e, early memory and the memory of the experience of the recent past in the case of human memory. Such things are not applicable to computer memory. Computer memory cannot 'fade', and does not have temporality as a part of it; it is either fully there or wiped out partially or totally; but it can never fade like human memory. There can be a mix up of events in human memory. The sequence of events can change while retrieving what is stored in human memory. These things cannot happen to computer memory. We can safely claim that the coucept of memory as applied so to computer is nothing but a stretched metaphorical use of the term in question.

Which is a metaphorical use and which is not, can perhaps be identified only after doing proper analysis taking case by case. However, when we use a term that is normally used to describe things that belong to a category to describe things which belong to another category we pay the price of linguistic oddity of sentences having no literal meaning for such exercises. Without the category jump a use of a word in a sentence does not turn out to be a metaphorical one. Only when we are clear that a statement is literally meaningless, can one take a metaphorical meaning of it into consideration. Literal meaning of a term is logically prior to metaphorical one. If one does not know literal meaning of a word one cannot use it in a metaphorical manner. This is because, normal use of a word is logically prior to its use in a deviant manner.

4. *Creative Use*

Man's creative use of language is best exemplified in his uses of the word 'good'. One uses this word in variety of contexts,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and the rules for the use of this term are sometimes provided anew. Moreover, there does not seem to be a hard and fast rule in allowing the combination of this word with other words to form compound words. One can formulate a criterion for a 'good magnet' using superconductor material which has not yet been manufactured. Similarly, one can use one's own criterion to determine something to be good or bad. For instance, imagine that one has recently bought a car. And also imagine that one knows nothing about the technical details about the functioning of the different parts of the car. One can still venture evaluating the car, claiming that it is a good or a bad car even if one is totally unaware of the criteria normally used for evaluating cars. R. M. Hare gives many examples of this kind to argue that new criteria could be evolved by the users of language to use the word 'good' in an entirely new manner in in a new situation.[9]

Not only that one could use words in a language creatively, but also one would notice creative uses of words. How does one know otherwise that Kripke has used the expression 'rigid designator' in a creative way? One knows the words 'rigid' as in the sentence 'Indian society is rigid as opposed to a permissive society'. One knows the word 'designator' as in the case of 'morning star' designating the planet Venus. But one cannot conclude that the expression 'rigid designator' means something that is rigid and that it is a designator together. 'Rigid designator' makes no sense unless treated as a metaphor, or a technical term having stipulated rules for its use; ordinarily, it is only a human being or a system governed by men which could be rigid, and not words. That is, the first symptom on the basis of which one can conclude that the expression cannot be interpreted literally. And hence, the conclusion : Kripke must have used this expression as a metaphor to express his unique thought-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Normally, the man in the street does not feel that his language is inadequate to express his thoughts and feelings. It is the creative thinkers such as philosophers, writers, scientists, to mention only a few, who feel the inadequacy of the language. They use language creatively in one or the other of the following manners. One uses a word creatively by over emphasizing one of the existing criteria over the rest. Sometimes, one coins a new word or an expression by providing criteria for the use of the expression. Besides, there are other situations where one uses the words creatively. For instance, using an evaluative word descriptively, or using a descriptive word evaluatively, are some of the other types of creative uses of word.

One can creatively introduce a new expression using the method mentioned above following the spirit of economy of vocabulary. The new expression has to be learnt independently of the existing vocabulory and hence does not reduce our efforts in learning and remembering it. For instance, one could have the following and many more expressions using the word 'good' denoting not a basic value, but a derived value from a set goal. 'Good car' 'good typewriter', 'good chronometer' etc. share no criteria with 'good' representing the basic value. They have independent criteria and their criteria have to be learnt independently in order to familiarize oneself with these expressions.[10] They do not belong to the same family sharing family resemblances. This is because the word 'good' denotes different type of notion than the word 'war' in the former example. The word 'war' shares its criteria with other expressions carved out of this term; while, the word 'good' denoting a basic value does not share any criterion with the expressions, because the sense in which the term combines itself with other terms in order to yield new expressions is different from the basic notion of good. The term 'good' designating a derived value from a set goal,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

combines itself to form expressions in tune with our principle of economy of vocabulary.

5. *The Concept of Enabling Institution*

Invoking a new convention, or providing new criteria or modifying the existing one for the use of a word and a host of others, belong to the enabling institution of language. What an enabling institution is can be fruitfully explained by taking a parallel example from ethics. Promising is an act that can be performed by any human being. An agent does not acquire any obligation until he promises. Having promised someone of something, it becomes an obligation on the part of the person to keep the promise. 'Promising' as an institution makes it possible for one to come under an obligation if one so chooses. However, the institution of promising does not ensure anything about the content or fulfilment of promise. It also permits an agent to promise two people in such a manner that the agent cannot meet the obligations arising out of both the promises. Why should one promise in this manner without ensuring that one is in a position to meet the obligations arising out of these promises, is a different issue altogether; but the fact that it is possible to promise in such a manner indicates that 'promising' is an enabling institution. And these conflicting obligations that one has acquired are due to one's act of promising.[11]

'Enabling' is defined as opposed to 'directive'. A directive principle, for instance, does not give an agent the freedom to choose his course of action. There would hardly be any choice left to individuals to choose from either in the manner of their action or the goal of their action. Imperatives and commands are directives in this sense.

Language consists of many enabling instituitions. Barring the failure of communication as the only dis–incentive to behave in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

an inconsistent manner in the use of language, there are no 'directives' in language. Naming an object, conceptualizing from experiences, providing a new criterion or modifying the existing criteria for the use of a word, following or not following the conventional rules, using the words descriptively or evaluatively etc., are all possible because they are all enabling institutions in language. What an enabling institution does in the context of language, say of naming, is to make it possible to name or re–name an object the way one wants it. And similarly, the enabling institution of conceptualizing allows the users of language to conceptualize the way they want to suit their needs. Language allows us to use the words with their old rules and usages or modify them according to our perceptions and needs

[a] *Emphasizing a Name or a Criterion*

'Naming' being an enabling institution, it permits the user of the language to use a name [i] with the same word with the existing criterion, or [ii] with the same word with a new criterion for identifying the object, or [iii] with a new word with an existing criterion for identification of the object named or [iv] with a new word with a new criterion for identification. This enabling institution of language, permits him to use a name rigidly or nonrigidly. If the speaker wants to use a name rigidly then he has to emphasize the name against its criteria, and if he wants to use a name nonrigidly, he has to emphasize the criteria.

Both the proper names and definite descriptions work well as referring expressions. Depending on the context, one may choose between a proper name and a definite description for the purpose of referring to an object uniquely. Everything would be all right till someone challenges a definite description as a criterion for a name. If there is such a challenge claiming that a definite

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

description is either not a definite description at all for the reason that it describes more objects than one, or is a false description of the object, or is a description of some other object but not the object in question, then there can arise a dispute. If there arises such a dispuet, whether definite description should overrule the name or *vice versa*, cannot be said in advance. Which one of the two should overrule the other, solely depends on the intention of the speaker. What we normally do in the absence of any dispute is to depend upon failure or satisfaction of criteria for the uses of words.

When a criterion for the use of a word is challenged, the normal criterion for its use is suspended for the moment. The dispute could be for one of the two following reasons : [i] The name is undisputed, but there is disagreement over the criterion for the use of that name. [ii] The criterion is undisputed, but there is a disagreement over the name for which it is a criterion. Depending upon various other considerations, one of the disputants would re-assign a name or a criterion or modify the existing ones by using the enabling institution of naming and resolve the controversy. The controversy over the issue of proper names between what is known as the Cluster Theory and the Causal Theory discussed by Kripke seems to centre around this issue of emphasizing of the one over the other of the two referring expressions.[12] Which of the two, whether a name or a definite description, should be treated as more basic is the issue that these two theories are eager to settle.

The issue of emphasizing one thing over the other is nothing but giving logical priority to one over the other. That is, in the logical description of the world, whether we should take name to be logically prior to a definite description or *vice versa*, is the issue. Viewing language from a meta–level, one is tempted to say that the definite description which serves as a criterion

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to identify the object referred to can only have a secondary place, since in the absence of names one needs no criteria for name. Moreover, it is logical to think that criteria cannot be prior to names because criteria change but names do not.

To view the same problem from a different point of view, it sounds logical to claim that the enabling institution of naming could be used only if one knows what one is to name in advance before naming anything. That the thing that is being named has to be either perceived or conceived; and in either case there has to be some unique description of that very thing *prior* to one's using the enabling institution of naming; otherwise one cannot know what one has named. And if one does not know what one has named, it is as good as not naming anything.

The shift in the emphasis is possible only when there are two things which are interrelated. Moreover, which one, whether the name or its criterion, should be used with emphasis need not be decided in advance. In most cases it may not matter at all. Should there arise a dispute or doubt, which the speaker intends to emphasize, gets clarified from the context.

Imagine the following situation where the speaker provides criteria one after another for the identification of the place called 'Nariman Point' in Bombay. The speaker says : 'After coming out of the Churchgate station, one needs to turn right and keep going till one reaches the cross where one has to turn left in order go to the Life Insurance Corporation building. The place where you turn to your left is called 'Nariman Point'. If the hearer expresses a certain inability to follow the instruction or put it into practice, the speaker may offer another criterion : Keep going from Malabar hill towards the Churchgate railway station. Instead of taking a turn to your leaft near the railway station, go ahead. Soon you will notice a building called 'Air

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

India '. The turn to your left near that building is called 'Nariman Point'. If the hearer still fails to grasp the criterion, the speaker might offer yet another criterion stating that one could come to Nariman Point from Mantralaya. In his last attempt, the speaker may ensure that the hearer follows his criterion by sketching the approach road to 'Nariman Point' from a place familiar to the hearer.

Notice that the speaker has empasized the name rather than the criterion for its use in the above example. The speaker did not consider any one of the criteria he listed to be essential for the identification of 'Nariman Point', though each and every criterion he stated was sufficient in itself to function as a proper criterion. Since he was familiar with the place and the name, the speaker could offer new criteria with ease to overcome the difficulty of his hearer in identifying the place.

One could imagine a situation in crime detection where a criterion is being used with emphasis against names by a police inspector of criminal investigation. He may weigh the finger prints on a sharp instrument suspected to be used by the criminal in committing the crime more than the names mentioned by an eyewitness. The inspector could be willing to reconsider the name of the criminal on the basis of the statement made by the eyewitness in the wake of some dispute about names. However, he may not agree on the point that the criterion of finger prints on the sharp instrument is not a genuine criterion at all, i.e., it does not identify any person uniquely.

In archaeological research, it may be advantageous to treat the inscription of a name on a wall as significant and the description of what the person named did as an over-estimation; or the description of what a person did as authentic but the name as inauthentic. One could easily multiply examples of this sort.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Essentially, this is what is highlighted by Donnellan in the case of a definite description though he does not draw the same conclusion from his example.[13] His own example is that of a person called 'Smith'. Smith was a noble person with whom no one was unhappy. Somehow Smith was found killed one day. In this example, 'Smith's murderer' is a referring expression, and some one makes the statement 'Smith's murderer is insane'. Donnellan gives two plausible interpretations following which one would assign opposite truth values to the same statement. The first interpretation of the expression 'Smith's murderer' is : the person is insane in the literal sense implying thereby the criminal should be treated in a mental hospital. The second interpretation of the expression is : having known how noble Smith was, someone opines that Smith's murderer must be an insane person, implying thereby there could have been no rationally acceptable reasons for murdering Smith and hence a harsh punishment should be awarded to the criminal. Donnellan claims that on one interpretation, namely, where one uses the definite description referentially, the statement may be false, i.e., the person who murdered Smith is not an insane person. And on the second interpretation if the speaker has used the definite description attributively, namely, that the one who has murdered Smith must have been insane in the sense that Smith was an excellent person who could not have troubled any one to get killed in this manner may be true. Thus, he notes that definite descriptions may be used referentially or attributively and that makes some difference to the truth value of the statement in which the definite description occurs.

We may note here that when a definite description is used attributively, it hardly refers to any one particular individual; any one who fits the description is the referent in such situations. On both the interpretations given above, the definite description

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

has been used with emphasis. That is, even if a person P is convicted for the murder of Smith after taking all the available circumstantial evidences into account, and subsequently even if there emerges any compelling reason to review the legal judgement in question, one cannot shift the emphasis of the criterion 'Smith's murderer' over to the name 'P' of the person convicted while reviewing the case. That is, one cannot begin reviewing the legal sentence against the person P taking 'Smith's murderer' as one of the criteria to identify him.

When a definite description functions as a criterion for fixing the reference of a name, the criterion has primacy over the name or the object named. Once the object is named, and one is able to use the name independently of the criterion, i.e., once the speaker is in a position to provide additional and independent criterion for identification of the object named, he is in a position to emphasize the name and use the name as a rigid designator.

Given a name in currency, the users of language could offer new criteria for fixing the reference thereafter or identifying the reference in different contexts; and given a criterion, the users of language can decide on the name and the object that satisfies the criterion.

[b] *Conceptualizing*

The enabling institution of conceptualizing is used mainly in two ways. One way is to conceptualize anything for the first time, and another way is to modify the existing conception. Formulating a new concept is done normally by formulating a criterion for the use of the word associated with it. And modification of a concept is done by altering the criterion, or by adding new criteria for the term associated with the concept.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A user of a natural kind term might want to emphasize the the term or a criterion. And each user can emphasize either the term or criterion depending on his perception and need. The change of the criteria for the use of the word 'whale' is an example of this sort. Scientists, at a certain stage of development in zoology, felt the need to modify the classification : emphasizing zoological classificatory criterion, they decided to call whales 'mammals'.

A criterion is chosen arbitrarily as is the case with a proper name. In the example of angina discussed by Wittgenstein, to claim that such–and–such a bacillus is found in one's blood is to claim that the person is suffering from angina, provided that the presence of that bacillus in one's blood is taken to be the criterion for the disease angina. If the presence of the said bacillus in one's blood is not taken as a criterion, it serves as a symptom since the two are naturally related. Wittgenstein claims that doctors use names of diseases without ever deciding which phenomena are to be taken as criteria and which as symptoms. [14] One can generalize and cover a wider range of terms. The shift in our treatment of a phenomenon as a symptom to our treatment of the same phenomenon as a criterion or vice versa, is permissible in language. One and the same phenomenon could be treated as a symptom at one time, and a criterion at another time. Thus, our conception of angina largely depends on what we take as a criterion and what we take as a symptom.

It should be obvious by now that to claim that something is a criterion is not to claim that it is an essential criterion. Assigning a criterion for the use of term does not hinder one's further choice of criteria for the same term. Each and every word can be revised by providing new criteria or modifying existing ones. This is being done by creative writers all the time.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

On the analogy of proper names, one can say that when one uses a common name with a certain emphasis, the criteria for identification of the objects referred to by the name in question are suspended for the time being. A new set of criteria including all the previous ones, or modified version of some of them, is introduced in the place of old criteria. Now, if the new set of criteria are not accepted as they come in conflict with the old set, naturally there arises a dispute. The dispute is largely linguistic. Only in those cases where there are ways of showing that a criterion is false, can the disputes be settled without invoking any arbitrary rules of language.

It should be noted, however, that a criterion cannot be shown to be false so easily. By showing that some cows are wild, one cannot show that cows are not domesticated. That is by showing that there are exceptions, one cannot show that a criterion is false. Since a term can have many criteria, giving counter examples does not help to prove that the criterion is false. In order to show that a criterion is false, one has to show that it does not identify even one individual of that kind. In the example of the term 'cow', one should be able to show that not even one cow is domesticated only then has one shown that 'domesticated animal' connot be used as a criterion to identify cows and hence any further description based on this criterion of cows would be a false description.

As in the case of proper names, if one knows the object that is designated by a name, the person in question could provide more criteria than what he is familiar with in the initial stage for the identification of the object. This freedom and ability rests with users of language : to provide the same criterion with which he identified the object named first, or to provide a new one for his hearer. After having known what gold is, one is in a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

position to offer any one of the attributes of gold which is unique in a context as an identifying description for the metal. And on another occasion, some other attribute of gold may be offered as a criterion for identification of the same metal by the same speaker. A criterion for identification of an object is always chosen from the available attributes of the object in a context.

A criterion is selected arbitraily, and the speaker has the ability to select a property of a natural kind as its criterion if and only if he knows the conditions under which the criterion can serve as a criterion. That is, any true description of an object cannot serve as a criterion for identification of that object. 'A pet animal' cannot serve as a criterion for 'cat' in a general context where there are other pet animals. However, if the context were such that only one animal, namely, cat is the pet animal, it would serve as a criterion.

What is noteworthy from the discussion above is that one cannot claim that any criterion for identification of a natural kind may not be a universal criterion for no attribute of a thing seems to be its attribute unconditionally. However, within a certain domain of discourse, one could speak of absolute criteria for identification of certain natural kinds. For instance, one could speak of valency 79 as an absolute criterion for gold within a certain framework of science. No doubt, this criterion could be treated as the essence[15] of gold within the same framework.

However, the framework within which we are conceptualizing could be changed as a matter of choice. For instance, one could shift one's framework to the subatomic particles. From subatomic perspective, when a certain number of protons and the same number of neutrons etc. come to form an atomic structure,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

collectively they produce a solid body having the properties p_1 to p_n which are nothing but what are known in the ordinary transactions as the 'properties of gold'. There is no reason to believe that science would not advance any further and could not embrace a different theory of subatomic particles in the next decade. Human inability to conceptualize is the only limitation that is there for any shift in the perspective of any subject matter, may it be science or philosophy.

Under certain circumstances, it does not exhibit certain other attributes. Therefore, there cannot be any absolute criteria for gold applicable under all circumstances. For instance, when a woman has to find out whether her goldsmith has given her a golden necklace or not, the valency test is of no use. She has to decide whether the ornament is golden or not on the spot. Therefore, an attribute of gold can function as a criterion in a context, but it may not function the same way in some other context. And hence, by declaring an attribute of gold as essential or absolute, one has only sealed the possibility of changing one's perspectives in future. Any attempt to provide a universal criterion to be used for identifying gold under all circumstances would be frustrated.

However, it is possible to check the shift in the perspective in an arbitrary manner and claim an attribute of gold to be the essence of gold. That can be achieved only by insisting on an arbitrarily chosen criterion from one particular perspective alone. For instance, one could insist that gold should have an attribute 'x', otherwise we shall not consider it to be gold. By stipulating what is not going to be considered as gold, one has closed every possibility of adding any further criterion for the use of the term 'gold'.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

One could fix one's perspective in an arbitrary manner and achieve success in producing essences of different natural kinds. By arresting the possibility at the level of human psychology [16] of viewing the same subject matter from different perspectives in an arbitrary manner, all that one would achieve is to produce certain analytic sentences. One such example from science is : 'Gold has valency 79'.

If the criteria of the concepts are sealed, then there is no possibility of any change of perspectives. For instance, if we limit our conception of natural right only to the right to live, we have eliminated the very possibility of including the right to freedom, or right to work in it; and hence no change of perspectives on the matter could be anticipated.

Note here that by insisting that only that thing which has the attribute x is gold, one has laid emphasis on the criterion rather than the name 'gold'. This would be a clear case of emphasizing a criterion over the term. In contrast, if one emphasizes the name 'gold', one would be open about the criteria for the identification of the object designated by the term. When 'gold' is used with emphasis, one cannot claim a particular criterion to be an essential criterion. 'Gold is not gold because it does not satisfy the criterion x'. Any context where one speaks of an essence, one speaks of a criterion with emphasis, and where one speaks of a name with emphasis, one does not insist on a criterion for the use of the term.

By having enabling institutions like naming and conceptualizing, language has facilitated man to think in a diverse manner about the things and values around him. It has made it possible for man to change and adapt himself to the demanding environ-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ment. The very continuation of the human species rests largely on its linguistic ability and efficiency.

Department of
Humanities and Social Sciences
I. I. T.
Powai
BOMBAY 400 076

P. R. BHAT

NOTES

1. See his discussion on 'Descartes' Myth' and 'Knowing How and Knowing That' in *The Concept in Mind*, by G. Ryle, Penguin Books [first published by Hutchinson 1949], pp. 13–24 and pp. 26–59.

2. See *How to do Things with Words* by J. L. Austin, Oxford University Press [first published by the Clarendon Press, 1962], Oxford, 1982.

3. See especially his discussion on 'good', 'meaning' and 'criteria' in R. M. Hare's *The Language of Morals*, Clarendon Press, 1952; *Freedom and Reason*, Oxford University Press, 1963 and *Moral Thinking*, Clerendon Press, 1981.

4. Kripke, S. *Naming and Necessity*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1972, 1980, pp. 7ff. Kripke thinks that it is a linguistic accident that we have the same name which designates different people. Also see J. W. Meiland's discussion on 'The problem of Ambiguous Reference' where he treats ambiguous reference as a problem. *Talking about Particulars* by J. W. Meiland, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1970, pp. 1–7.

5. See for his notion of 'family resemblance' *Philosophical Investigations* by L. Wittgenstein, [eds.] G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968, pp. 65–70.

6. Wittgenstein writes : 'For when I say that the rules are arbitrary I mean that they are not determined by reality in the way the description of reality is. And that means : it is nonsense to say that they agree with reality, e. g. that the rules for the words "blue" and "red" agree with the facts about those colours etc. See L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammer*, R. Rees [Ed.], trans, A. Kenny, Basil Blackwell, 1974. p. 246.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

7. See for his notion of symptom *The Blue and Brown Books*, by L. Wittgenstein, Basil Blackwell, 1958, pp. 24–25.

8. See his discussion on 'category mistake', *The Concept of Mind*, pp. 20–24.

9. See his discussion on 'Meaning and Criteria' in *The Language of Morals*, pp. 94–110.

10. *The Language of Morals*, pp. 94–110.

11. See B. Freedman on enabling institution of promising, 'A Meta-Ethics for Professional Morality', *Ethics*, Vol. 89, 1978, pp. 8–9.

12. See Lecture I in *Naming and Necessity*. Also see the introductory remarks to *Naming, Necessity*, and *Natural Kinds* by S. P. Schwartz, Cornell University Press, 1977.

13. See K. S. Donnellan 'Reference and Definite Descriptions' in *Naming, Necessity*, and *Natural Kinds*, pp. 46 ff.

14. Wittgenstein, L., *The Blue and Brown Books*, Basil Blackwell, 1958, pp. 24–25.

15. Wittgenstein writes for example: 'I say, however: if you talk about essence–, you are merely noting a convention.' Remarks on the *Foundations of Mathematics*, [Eds.] G. H. Von Wright, R. Rees, G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 3rd Edn., p. 65/74.

16. However, this kind of social and psychological pressure works only for a decade or two.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

OUR LATEST PUBLICATION

REGULARITY, NORMATIVITY AND RULES OF LANGUAGE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

Prof. Rajendra Prasad

pp. 310 Rs. 100/-

In this volume twenty essays of Prof. Rajendra Prasad, published earlier in different journals in India and abroad, are collected. In these essays philosophical analysis is brought to bear upon such themes as nature of language, relation between language and philosophy or that between modern logic and philosophy. There are essays in the collection which consider such issues as practical relevance of philosophy, the distinction between apriori and empirical propositions etc. In addition, some essays deal with concepts of substance, mind and religious belief, while some other discuss problems connected with objectivity of historical judgements, relation between man and god, role of reason and sentiment in human life. The last four essays in the collection discuss difficulties connected with philosophical synthesis and consider relation between tradition, progress, freedom, reverence and creativity.

The essays would be immensely helpful to both students and teachers of philosophy.

For further details contact :

The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Philosophy Department,
University of Poona, Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 2
April 1991

SRI AUROBINDO AND THE PROCESS OF PHYSICAL TRANSFORMATION

Bengal has always stood as a state of great revolutions. Majorly, revolutions took place in art and literature, in politics and in spirituality. Abanindranath Tagore and Rabindranath Tagore led the first revolution, while many a young souls spearheaded the political revolution taking India towards its independence. Sri Ramkrishna and Swami Vivekananda heralded a Uniqne Vedantic revolution in spirituality. The political revolutionaries dreamt of a new India, a free India. Sri Ramakrishna showed us by his experiences of the oneness of God while Vivekananda taught us the oneness of man. All these revolutions essentially prepared the dawn of a New Age that was actually to be heralded by Sri Aurobindo. It is as if the eastern sky was lit with a spiritual aura for the coming of Sri Aurobindo.

Sri Aurobindo actually imbibed the spirit of these revolutions and fulfilled them in their highest aspirations. In literature, Sri Aurobindo has given us *Savitri*, an epic gathering in itself the dreams not only of Tagore but of all other great poets of the world. At the same time it gives us the promise of fulfilling man's dreams of a resplendent future. In politics, it was Sri Aurobindo who prepared the Indians with the necessary will and force for achieving the freedom of the country. He gave us the strength of idealism which is the driving force of all great

Received : 10–4-1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

revolutions. He installed in the hearts of Indians the image of Mother India.

In spirituality, he went beyond the Vedantic experiences. Initiated and guided by Sri Ramkrishna, Vivekananda and Sri Krishna himself, he installed on earth the Mother, the Divine Shakti and the Supermind, the Truth Consciousness—Force necessary to transform this earth into the Divine's own home.

Thus, Sri Aurobindo is a combination of all the three great revolutions of Bengal and at the same time their culmination. Even if the other figures of Bengal's revolutions fade away in the memory of man, one name will eternally shine in the hearts and minds of men – that of Sri Aurobindo. And Bengal shall be remembered as the birthplace of this great Avatar.

Mother says that Sri Aurobindo's is an eternal birth. That is, on the physical level the influence of his birth will be felt for eternity upon the earth. At the same time it is the birth of the Eternal in time. What I would like to focus upon is that on the spiritual level most of his sublime experiences, except that of the Supermind, were in a way attained by the Vedic and the Upanishadic Rishis. His experiences of Nirvanic Consciousness, of Nirguna Brahman, of Saguna Brahman and that of the Para Brahman have been spoken of and described in our ancient spiritual Scriptures. It is only in his establishing the Supramental on the physical level and in his attempt to transform the body that Sri Aurobindo stands out unique and unparalleled.

So, his emphasis has been on a divine life in a divine body. All that is achieved and attained on the levels of mind and life must be based on a new transformed body. In the past, many have dreamt of a divine life as something belonging to a heaven, beyond the terrestrial existence, after the cessation of physical life. But Sri Aurobindo dreams of a divine life upon this earth.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with this very body as the base. The earth must be made as the heaven. So, Sri Aurobindo's focus is always on a terrestrial heaven, on a transformed human body and earth.

Since the beginning of civilisation, man has developed the levels of mind and life, developing his mental faculties such as the sciences, and, the life–energy faculties such as the arts. He has been asked to go in the discovery of his inner worlds too, where, to his credit he has achieved supreme heights. During all this inner and outer progress, the body's urge for progress was neglected. It served only as a slave and an instrument. But now, the body itself is aspiring to express its divinity and we too should focus our attention on its inner need.

For the new creation, the New Race that is to manifest, a new body has to be prepared. For, it is only in the body that the New Consciousness can establish itself permanently. Till now there have been in the past beautiful dreams of a beautiful world, but they were all based either on a change in man's outer environment or on an enhanced capacity of man's mind. But the Future that Sri Aurobindo envisions will come through the body of man, as it were. For, whatever is established on the level of the body remains permanently on earth, while all other things either tend to fade out or disappear. For instance, the ideas, the idealogies, the philosophies that men had followed, say ten thousand years back, have hardly any influence on man's life today. But, the habits, the ways of living on the body level have not changed much and the body has held on to those habits very stubbornly. This is so because, the body alone understands truly and therefore once the body understands, accepts, absorbs a vibration, a habit of consciousness, those acts become almost eternal. That is the advantage and at the same time the drawback of the body. While there has been a lot of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

progress in man's mental, vital and even spiritual levels, man's body has remained the same, without any perceptible evolution. It is perhaps because of its stubbornness to change that it has been considered as a hindrance in man's spiritual progress and therefore most of the religions advocated neglect and rejection of the body. It is only in Sri Aurobindo that we find once again a focus on elevating and transmuting the body to its own divine pinnacles.

In his philosophy of evolution, Sri Aurobindo traces the stages through which evolution has taken place. He says that from Matter burst forth Life, and that when the plant and the animal kingdom ware ripe enough, there came upon earth man, the mental being. In the same manner, man has to give way to higher race, the Supramental race, says Sri Aurobindo. Man is only a transistional being. He'll be surpassed by a New Race, emphasises Sri Aurobindo.

Can that New Race, with a consciousness infinitely superior to man's mind, ever house itself in this body? Can a fully divine consciousness board in this body of death, decay and desease? This body is fit only to hold the mental consciousness, but to lodge in itself the Supramental Consciousness, it has to undergo an enormous transformation. What is mortal in it has to become immortal; its pain has to be translated into Bliss and its ugliness into Beauty. A New Consciousness has therefore to have a New Body.

Even as such, the human body has at its core something that is immortal. As Nolinida writes : the human form in its origin is a sentinel between the Formless and the form. That is to say, when Sachchidananda became the Many the first form that he takes up is that of the human. This is the secret of our human body and Sri Aurobindo says that we have to achieve a body

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that is nearer to that 'Original' body and not remain satisfied with our present one which is nearer to the animal body.

Scientists have accepted that matter is energy. Therefore our body is nothing but concentrated energy. Scientists have discovered that $E=Mc^2$, whereas yogis in the past have told us that energy is something conscious. So, our body is compact conscious energy. Like an ice cube which is condensed water, the body too is condensed energy which is dense and impenetrable. Still, it is condensed 'Conscious' energy. And this consciousness is immortal and eternal.

The Vedas have told us that by realising the immortal within us we could become immortal. That is to say, by realising the *ātman*, the soul, we could achieve immortality. But, that is only one kind of immortality. There could be other kinds too: to realise the Manomaya Purusha on the mental level is to realise the immortality of the mind. Similarly, one could realise the Pranamaya Purusha. Ultimately, on the level of the body, one could realise the Annamaya Purusha and achieve immortality of the body.

In Sri Aurobindo's vision of the Yoga of Transformation, it is by realising this immortal consciousness, which he named as the Supramental Consciousness, that one could transform the body.

What is this supramental consciousness? And what is its relevance to the transformation of the body? It is important to clarify these questions before we proceed with the process of physical transformation.

Supermind is that special poise of Sachchidananda in which begins the ordered manifestation of the entire creation. When Sachchidananda wanted to manifest into the Many, there were

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

infinite possibilities of self–manifestation that were open to him. If he proceeded simultaneously in all these infinite ways then there would be an infinite chaos. So, there had to take place a selection of one particular mode of becoming, one particular way of self–manifesting–and this was done by the special poise of the Supermind taken up by Sachchidananda. It is therefore Supermind that is at the head, the source of present creation. For, it is the Supermind has ordered the presnt creation by deploying itself into the multiple forms.

Thus Supermind is the link between Sachchidananda, or the upper hemisphere of Sat, Chit and Ananda and the Creation or the lower hemisphere of Mind, Life and Body. This is the "bridge" that Sri Aurobindo found out and it is of crucial importance for the transformation of the body. That is so because it is this supreme consciousness of the Sachchidananda, that alone can do the work of physical transformation. It is Supermind alone that can penetrate the dense matter and touch the golden fountains of immortality at the bottom of Matter. No other intermediary force or power can do this stupendous task of breaking open matter's somnambulism and awaken it to its true status.

Very interestingly, Science too speaks of the immortality of the body. It is very surprising but it is true. Scientists have proclaimed that essentially the cells are immortal and that death is a historical anachronism. Men die because they see others die, says a Russian Scientist, S. Malinikov. He further says that death is only a midway intervention of Nature, a kind of a temporary solution in the pursuance of her evolutionary goal. There have been also experiments conducted on the level of cells. There are two types of cells–the germ cells and the somatic cells. The germ cells are those that carry the genetic heritage and are therefore immortal, whereas, the somatic cells go to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

form the different organs and tissues of our body. And it is these somatic cells that die. Scientists kept these somatic cells–plucked from different organs of a body–in different nutrient environments and to their surprise they saw that kept seperately these cells did not die. If that is so, then why do these cells die in our body ? Scientists say that when these cells are brought together in our body, there is a lack of harmony amongst themselves which invites their death. Each cell tries to live for itself and there is a fight for survival. It is this disharmony and constant struggle between themselves that is the cause of the death of the somatic cells in our body.

Spiritually too separativeness is the cause of an individual's death. Ego is the bar to immortality. Individualisation is itself a kind of limitation and this limitation is another form of death. If one can expand and become universal and one with the other individuals, not only in one's inner consciousness but also on the level of the physical consciousness, then death will not be there and one can become physically immortal.

Now, coming the to process of the actual physical transformation, we must note that Sri Aurobindo went through the whole process but on the level of consciousness and in principle whereas it was left for the Mother to do the work on the level of the body. Sri Aurobindo did not reveal the secret of the process, whereas the Mother has left behind many descriptions of her experiences in the physical transformation and we shall be taking recourse mainly to these descriptions.

The first step towards physical transformation is to become conscious of one's body. It may seem to be frivolous to mention such a thing as this, for you may say that we are conscious of our body every minute of our existence. Without it we do not even exist. That is very true. But, the existence of the body is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

very much taken for granted and we do not pay much attention to the body as a body. Most of the time it is a vehicle of our ambition, an instrument to fulfil our passions, a slave of our desires. It is only when it revolts and it becomes sick that we pay specific attention to the body. We do not want such a negative approach to the body. We want a conscious approach to it, to its movements, to its needs and necessities, to its capacities and incapacities. We must become conscious of the movements: When we are writing we should become aware that it is the fingers that are actually doing the work; when we are running we should become aware that it is the legs that are running.

The Mother narrates in this regard a beautiful incident from Sri Aurobindo's life. His fingers had become so very conscious that when he wrote the 'Arya,' he would silence his mind and sit before the type-writer. And all the immaculate material for the 'Arya' would come down directly into the fingers and they would type independently of his mind's dictates. In fact, it seems, Sri Aurobindo used to read on the typed page and come to know what he had written. Normally, we first know what we are going to write and then only we take up a paper and pen and put it down. But in Sri Aurobindo's case, all the supreme knowledge of *The Life Divine*. *The Synthesis of Yoga, The Human Cycle* etc. descended straight on to the fingers which then typed it out.

We have similar examples in other great men. For instance Bethoven. He was deaf when he composed the 5th and 9th symphonies. He could do that because his fingers had become so very conscious that they could receive directly the pourings of the musical notes. There may be many such other examples and all these would go to show that what Sri Aurobindo has asked us to do is not something impossible or out of reach.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In fact, the present trends and achievements in the Olympic Games and other world-meets in sports and gymnastics show that such an effort of becoming conscious of one's movements is being tried out and that too very successfully. The aim of physical education is not to achieve laurels and win cash prizes. It should be to awaken the body-consciousness, to become more and more conscious of very part of our body. For example, when young gymnasts have achieved excellence, is it not that it is their very body which has taken up those harmonious movements and actions ? There is no interference of the mind or the vital organs at those moments; the body is left to itself and it acts most gracefully eventhough it is only for a few minutes. This is the role of physical education.

Along with such external attempts at becoming conscious, we have to try to achieve the inner awareness too. In Sri Aurobindo's yoga, what we attain within must reflect without : the outer must be a reflection of the inner. The movement must be from inside towards outside. That is, in fact, the drawback in all the achievements taking place at present in world gymnastics and sports. The competitors, are concentrating only on the external gains, but, until there is the inner psychic awakening one cannot really take to the yoga of transformation. You may say that the process of the psychic realisation is itself a life-long process; so how can we take-up other processes on the physical level ? It may be true, but Sri Aurobindo's yoga is integral and all the movements and processes have to be taken up simultaneously, parallelly, and not one after the other. It is in this sense that both the attempts of inner awareness and the outer awareness of the bodily movements have to go hand in hand.

Alongwith this psychisation, there must take place spiritualisation and supramentalisation too. We shall not discuss at this

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

stage what these processes are, for, today we shall concentrate exclusively on the work and process of physical transformation gleaned from the notes of the Mother.

In the second stage, one has to gain mastery and control over food, sleep and the sex–impulse. These are the three basic instincts of the body and the ancient yogis too tried to get over these limitations of the body. Food has a great influence on our body's consciousness and its workings, for, as the Upanishad says, the 'eater eating is eaten.' Each one of us has particular preferences in food and we are slaves of our childhood tastes. It is very hard to get over our tongue's preferences and we eat more than what is required for our body.

So, the ancients had prescribed detachment and simple vegetarian food as the first step towards the conquest over greed.

Such simple food may to an extent purify the physical consciousness, but it does not solve the basic problem of having to take something external into our bodies. And anything external will leave behind its own influence. So, the solution to this problem could be to learn to absorb universal energy which is all around us. In fact, children do it naturally and spontaneously. They do not depend only on the material food given to them. The universal energy is the secret of their inexhaustible energy. What the children do unconsciously has to be done consciously by the adults.

Perhaps, this too has been achieved to some extent by our ancient Rishis and Yogis. Still, the body remains the same–it may feel more energetic, have a better health, feel youthful for long, prolong its life–span, but, in the end it remains the same ignorant, tamasic, incapacitated body. Sri Aurobindo is interested not in an indefinite prolongation of life; he aims at a complete

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

transformation of the basic substance of the body. Any solution short of it is not acceptable to him.

Next, the problem of sleep has a major role in this process of the physical transformation. Sleep, in common people, occupies almost one third of man's life. It means that automatically we spend one third of our lives in inertia, in unconsciousness, in the dark depths of the subconscience. And, Sri Aurobindo's yoga cannot permit us to live in the subconscious–it goads us to live in our subliminal regions. Because, when we sleep we get into the subconscient worlds and very rarely do we travel into the higher regions of light. And, the Mother says that even the sleep has therefore to become something conscious–a period of our life during which we do not sink into unconsciousness and inertia. If we can do so, we could gradually contact the Sachchidananda—peace and a few minutes or seconds of that contact is sufficient to energise our body. This way, we could make our sleep not only conscious but also short in duration. The Mother has explained how such a thing could be done but for the present let us leave this point at this stage and move to the next obstacle, that of the sex desire.

Sex–impulse is natural in man and it is Nature's method of perpertrating her creation. So, any yoga that seeks to transform man has to take this point into consideration and it cannot just close its eyes to this universal energy. In the old methods of yoga, this impulse was sought to be suppressed, but, Sri Aurobindo says that it must be sublimated. And the best way to do so is to submit it to the psychic influence which alone can succeed in this task. That's why, as I said earlier there has to be a parallel movement of psychicisation alongwith the outer attempts at controlling and gaining mastery over the psychological difficulties. One cannot just take a new year resolution and start

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

on this yoga — one has to have the inner preparation first and only then can the outer movement follow.

However, although many a yogi has achieved success in mastering these psychological difficulties, Sri Aurobindo is not satisfied with this mastery. He seeks to go to the root of the problem of the body. Nor is he satisfied with the old visions and aspirations of a divine body. In pre–Vedic times there was a concept of the 'glorious body', in the Upanishadic times they spoke of '*jyotirmaya–deha*' and later too there were concepts of '*Animaya–deha*' or a 'Divya–tanu'. They have all thought of a body which is light and supple and plastic and luminous We also hear of some yogis having achieved some kind of a divine body. In deep South, near Pondicherry, in a town called Vadalur, Ramalinga Swamy seems to have purified his body to such an extent that when he left his body there war left behind only a *jyoti*. There may have been many such instances of a purification but they are all basically individual *siddhis* and achievements and exceptions. But, Sri Aurobindo is interested in bringing about the new divine body which will become an evolutionary principle in the future. It will be a universal evolutionary principle just as mind is the prerogative of every human child that is born on the earth.

Having gained mastery over the psychological difficulties, one has to move to the third step in the transformation of the physical. And that step is to substitute the organs in our body with their true centres of energy. If we analyse our body, we see that all the organs in our body—the heart, the lung, the stomach, etc. are all there as though only to supply energy to the body. So, if we can find some other source of energy then the organs may perhaps become redundant and ultimately get atrophied and fall off. The Tantras seem to have an answer to this problem of finding a different source of energy. The *Chakras*, the seven

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Chakras, that the Tantriks speak of, the Muladhara Chakra at the base and the Sahashradala Chakra at the top, represent subtle centres of energy. And if these *Chakras* could be awakened, then they could supply the necessary energy to the respective organs which fall under their contact and influence. If this could be fully achieved, then at a certain stage, the organs may become redundant and drop off just as the tail in human beings seems to have shrunk into non–existence just because of non–use and non–functioning.

Then, if that is so, why did not the Trantrics achieve the physical transformation, you may ask. The answer is that the Tantrics had a different ideal in front of them and they awakened the *chakras* for their specific ideal In the conceptualisation of the new body, as envisioned by Sri Aurobindo and the Mother, the *chakras* can, however, be useful if they are awakened in a different manner (beginning with the sahashradala and going downwards). In the process, Sri Aurobindo also discovers five other centres of energy taking the full number of the centres to twelve. There is one centre on the knee level, which is the centre of the subconscient and there is another below the feet, which is the centre of the Inconscient. Three other centres are there above the *sahashradala*, the highest one being the *Vijnana Padma*, or the Supramental Lotus.

Sri Aurobindo and the Mother worked on these lower centres too trying to transform them. You all know about Sri Aurobindo's injury on his right leg, just above the knee. It was but a revolt of the sub–conscient level and not a mere accident. The Mother too had a so called attack of the inconscient which expressed itself in the Mother having filariases. Though in the beginning Sri Aurobindo cured her of her filariases, it came back to her much later, when the Mother was working on the Inconscient level of the cellular mind. Later on, this disease was con-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

quered by the Mother. This is only to tell you how Sri Aurobindo and the Mother worked on different levels of the body and purified them and conquered the body's difficulties on these levels.

To go down and work on the level of the calls one requires the power and strength of the Supermind. And in 1956, there was the manifestation of the Supramental Light and Force. As you know already, on 29 February 1956, the Mother gave a great blow on the golden gate and there was the downpour of the Force and Light. But, as the Mother describes, this Force was swallowed up immediately by the Inconscience of the Earth. It is a sign of the earth's acceptance of new Light and at the same time the cause of the delay in the working of the Supermind on earth's transformation.

However, once the Force came down, manifested in the general sense, the work was to fix it in the body. So, in 1958 the Mother asked herself how to fix it in the body. The first thing she did was to liberate the body from the despotism of the mind and the vital organs. This created a kind of a vaccuum and the doctors thought the Mother was ill. And to couple with it, she was assailed by doubts which dissuaded her from taking up this work, telling her that how could she imagine of succeeding in the work when Sri Aurobindo himself left it undone inspite of knowing the whole process and the procedure ? For about fifteen years she was tortured with these doubts — a torture worse than all the physical tortures one can imagine. If she had listened to them, it would have been the end of her work. But she did not give in even for a second and she hung on to the work. Sri Aurobindo had told her that she must continue the work till the end and she too had promised the Lord that she would do so. So, she kept up her promise.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

On 24 July 1959, there was a direct descent of the Supermind in her body. It came in directly into her body without passing through the other levels of the mind and the vital organs.

At this juncture, I would like to clarify one thing. When I am talking of the Mother, I mean the Mother as the individual, detaching from it the Mother as the Avatar, or as the Supramental Aditi or the Universal Mother. I would like to focus on this Mother who has a body and try to understand how the body of this individual Mother is undergoing the work of transformation. If we mix up issues, then the whole purport of our study is meaningless.

The Mother tells somewhere that it is easy to become a saint or a yogi because one knows what one has to do. The ancients have already chalked out the path and one has only to follow on that path. But, when it comes to the process of physical transformation, she does not know what to do. She says that it is like walking in a vast desert full of traps at every step. It is like going in a dense virgin forest full of dangers and where one cannot see the next step. So, when she says these things, she is the individual body suspending her divinity, so to say. For, otherwise, you may ask that how is it possible that the Mother being the Divine Shakti herself does not know all these things ? That is why I am saying that if you bring in the universal or the transcendental Mother, the whole effort of the physical transformation becomes a hoax. Even though she is the Avatar, she has a human body, a body like any one of us, may be as stupid and stubborn. And it was this body that cried out in all sincerity to the Lord, saying, " Lord show me the path, I surrender myself to thee ". So, let's keep this vital point in mind before we proceed further.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

So, as I was saying, the Supramental force came directly into the Mother's body in 1959. Very interestingly, it started entering into her body from her feet and it rose up gradually to her head. When it reached the head she felt that it might burst and she wanted to stop it. Then she was advised not to stop the Force but to bring it down into the body, calm it and restore peace through widening the calls. She did so and succeeded in retaining we the Force.

At the climax of this experience, for a split second, the Mother lost her consciousness and she was 'on the other side', as she puts it 'There, in the other world, she saw Sri Aurobindo's room which was almost similar to the one at Pondicherry. It had all the furniture, the books and all the other details. Similarly, her room too was there in that other world'. So, tomorrow even if something happens to the rooms in Pondicherry, you can be sure that these rooms in the other world will remain for eternity. At the same time, there is a difference between the two rooms, says the Mother. In the other world, the objects were self–luminous and they did hot reflect any outer light. That is to say, they had a glow inside them. And what this glow is, we will understand later, at the end of today's talk. So I leave it at that for the present.

The Mother asked Sri Aurobindo when this 'other world' could be brought down to earth. And he replied that the earth is not yet ready. Then she heard the Supreme's voice telling her that she was given this experience as a promise of the things to come in the future. But, for the present, she should go back to earth and work on the individual as well as the collective levels.

Then began the Mother's work on her body. Just as it is necessary to have silence in the mind and peace in the vital

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

organs for attaining higher levels of consciousness, so too one must have the immobility of the cells for the yoga of the body. What it means can be understood by a narration of the Mother, Sometime, in the 30s, there was a terrible storm in Pondicherry. Sri Aurobindo was in his room, writing something. The Mother; wanting to close the windows of Sri Ausobindo's room, entered it. To her utter surprise she found that Sri Aurobindo was sitting there quietly, almost unaware of the storm and not a single paper had flown away from his table. Everything was still. That was so because Sri Aurobindo's immobility in his body was so solid that the storm could not enter into his room. On a different occasion, Sri Aurobindo seems to have told one of his disciples that in order to protect himself from a mob he would require two or three days of preparation. With the strength of his divine consciousness he could defend himself anytime, but, here he is speaking of his body protecting itself out of its immobility.

Next, in her plunge into her body, the Mother comes across the physical mind. There are different levels of mind—starting from the supermind to the Cellular mind—and the physical mind is the mind in the physical, in the body. This is the centre of the falsehood in our bodies. Normally, it gathers all its information from the senses. So, it has its hold on our nervous system. We live on this level most part of the day.

Its main characteristic is its repetitiveness. It repeats endlessly like a parrot, like a broken gramophone. That's why we keep doing often things over and over again. Because of the habit of repeating, the physical mind has a millennial memory, an implacable memory. All that has happened to it in the past, it retains in itself and keeps repeating those things. That's how habits are formed on the body level; that's how illness comes to the body. In fact, death itself is a habit, says the Mother. Secondly, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

physical mind is full of fear. That's why we constantly fear every little thing : we tell ourselves, ' don't get into the rain, you may catch cold ' or ' Have you shut the door ?' " Have you closed the gas ?" etc., etc., All the time, this mind is busy in preparing for small or big catastrophies.

So, this physical mind's restlessness had to be quietened, its fears appeased and calmed down before the Mother could proceed further. She did that by bringing down a burst of Love from the last supreme attitude. This transforming Love illumined, organised and silenced the physical mind and the cells of her body prayed, " supreme Lord of the Universe, we implore Thee, give us the strength and the beauty, the harmonious perfection needed to be Thy divine instruments upon earth. "

After crossing the physical mind the Mother reaches the level of the cellular mind. This mind is in between the physical mind and the true matter of the cells. That is the last stage of falsehood where death is hidden. It is the most dense, dark and dangerous thing. It constantly repeats and holds on to the negative vibrations of death and disease. So, if this mechanical and negative vibration could be replaced by a conscious and a positive vibration, then the cellular mind would keep repeating the new vibration too. This seemed to be the solution to replace death. it is not possible to remove all the negative vibrations in the cellular mind, for, if one goes to do it one has to face the habits that are millions of years old. So, the better way was to introduce a new vibration—the vibration of the supramental consciousness.

But, how to drill this new vibration of the supermind into that impenetrable magma—the cellular mind ? The means to do it was to use the mantra. The Mother was given an ancient mantra : *Om Nnmo Bhagavate*. The most ancient mantra has

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

become the mantra of the future. This is the solution she found out and her body repeated this mantra every second of day and night. Ultimately, the Mother succeeded in hooking the supramental force, harmony, light and bliss in the cells of the body.

Speaking of the cells, once the Mother gave the description of a true cell. She said that a cell is a luminous thing, in the shape of an egg, but a little more pointed than an egg. In the centre of the cell there is a blush light. The outer ring is opaque, which obviously is the physical mind. This is the true matter that the Mother discovered. Sri Aurobindo established the reality of Matter, the Mother revealed the true Matter.

The Mother's own new body is formed out of these true cells, the true Matter. And she gives its description. It is a beautiful body, human in form but neither male nor female. Its head is a silouhette with a bright sun shining in it and the colour of the body in a shade of golden orange which deepened into red as it went towards the feet.

Sri Aurobindo, describing the divine body, says that it is a body of beauty and bliss which will radiate its inner light just as a lamp-shade diffuses the light inside. The Mother worked on her own body and brought about such a divine body. And if one body can do the work, then the way is clear for other bodies to do the same. The Mother thus achieved the work that she had undertaken: to hook the supramental to the cells of the body. In due course, the supramental Force and Consciousness will take up the work of the transformation. The Mother has left behind, in the subtle physical level, her new body and those of us who aspire to see it will be able to Vision it.

For mankind to realise the new body it may take thousands of years. But, when Nature took millions of years to bring out

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the human form, it does not matter if another couple of thousand years are taken to bring about the new body. What the Mother has done is sufficient guarantee that the New Body will one day dawn upon earth.

So, ultimately, what we understand is that this process of physical transformation is a simple matter of trans– substitution: substitute the false Matter with the true Matter, the false consciousness with the true Consciousness. And this true consciousness is the supramental Consciousness. It is just this switching over from the false to the true, that is the secret That's how Matter can become divine, for the divinity is already there deep within the cells though veiled by the falsity of the Cellular mind and the physical mind. In yoga too, we have only to replace the ego with the psychic being. Everywhere it is the same work: substitution. On the level of the body transformation too it is the same. Substitution is another word for transformation.

This truth is as simple as the falling of the apple. That scientific truth brought in a new revolution, but this spiritual truth will bring in a new step in evolution. *

Sri Aurobindo Ashram
Pondicherry–605002

V. ANANDA REDDY

NOTE

* A talk given at Sri Aurobindo Bhavan, Calcutta, on 9/11]1989.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 2
April, 1991

A CANDIDATE PARADIGM FOR HUMAN ECOLOGY

Introduction :

The concern with man–Environment relationship is as old as man. Human struggle with environment in order to master it has reached its climax in today's world. The result has been the unintended consequence of resource overuse and abuse of the physical environment. These human actions have had remifications on all the theories of Science and Humanities. The scientific theories that are positivistically oriented accept man's mastery of nature as axiomatic. The theories then propose ways and means of understanding the laws that govern nature so as to manipulate and control it.

The concern of social theories is with the consequences of these actions on man and his environment. Historically it has been observed that domination of man by nature has prompted technologies that promote domination of some men over others. In the environmental paradigms as they exist today this dimension is side–tracked. While the social theories, be it Marxian or Structural functional, have failed to give environment its due credit. They have looked upon physical environment purely as a " natural resource " a means for producing economic goods and practices. These theories, however, have studied the effects of such a " transformation process " on human societies. But they have failed to acknowledge environment as having a seppate identity worth noting.

Received : 23–6–1989

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Therefore, there is a need to develop a new paradigm to fill this lacuna. As a first step "adaptive dynamics" paradigm is identified as a viable environmental theory while Habermas' critical theory is identified as a viable social theory. This is an attempt to develop a new paradigm for man-nature relationship by means of a synthesis of these two frameworks. Such a task would demand a theoretical analysis and critique at three levels.

As a first step a clear theoretically sensitive discussion of the basic concepts and propositions of the two theoretical frameworks is required. Next, it will have to be shown that the incompatibility between these two frameworks is only apparent. This will be supplanted with the reasons for a theoretical synthesis. This final level of analysis relates to the modes of combination and the appropriate methodology required for such a combination.

Presuppositions of Adoptive Dynamics Paradigm :

The adaptive dynamics paradigm originates in the general system theory. The fundamental assumptions of the theory are as follows :

1. The theory begins with the assumption that socio-cultural systems are examples of organized complexity.
2. These complexities are to be studied as processes in time rather than entities.
3. These processes are determined by various parts in the system.
4. These processes follow a logic of their own. This logic is mathematical and formal. It can be explicated through mathematical modelling. Such an exercise would help man understand these processes in a better manner, so that they can be subject to manipulation and control

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The socio-cultural systems fall under adaptive systems. These complex adaptive models are characterized by the elaboration and evolution of the system. They thrive on disturbances and variety in their environment. A typical response of an open adaptive system to its changed environment is that, the system changes. These changes can be either ontogenic i.e., 'within' system changes or phylogenic i.e., 'of the system changes'.

The ecological models that arose from these processual adaptive dynamic models have guided major studies in man–environment relationship. To name a few, models used by the 'club of Rome' studies, (Medows, 1972, Mesarovic and Pestel, 1975, Tinkerg 1976, Gabor et al, 1976), the system dynamics (J. J. Forester 1974), the Ecological carrying capacity models, by William Stesser of Edinburgh University.

The Adaptive Dynamics Models

The 'adaptive dynamics paradigm' suggested by J. Bennett (1976) does not deny the systems approach, but Bennett has asserted the primacy of socio-cultural factors over the environmental. Bennett has defined Human Ecology as an historical ecological transition in man. It follows the dynamics of adaptation of man to his environment at three spheres : Population, technology and energy consumption. He goes on to identify the uniqueness of "Human Ecology", He identifies two steps that are unique in Human ecology. Firstly, the symbolic step of naming certain substances of physical environment as "natural resources" and secondly allotting economic value to them. This is a cognitive step in human interaction with environment. This step enables man to act upon physical environment and extract substances from it, that are used to produce and transform energy.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Since assigning economic value to goods is a cognitive step that arises through and within social organisation, these values are not determined by biological needs alone; they also have culturally determined wants for goods and energy. Since there are no absolute standards for these cultural wants, there is no automatic biologically determined control over them; it is, however, substituted by cultural feedback loops of information flow and communication, which are cognitive in nature. Because the control is cognitive in nature, at best it is imperfect. It serves both the interests, namely the purpose of action and means for control of these actions, when they become dangerous. This is possible through reflection on the meaning of the act and after reflection, subject it to control.

It is these cognitive steps in the ecological paradigm, that are parallel to Marxian theory. The ability of man to extract natural resources and subject them to forces of production, the ability of self–reflection of human–beings, is finding added emphasis in interpretative theories of today. These cognitive steps that make Human Ecology unique are correctly identified and given their central position in the Paradigm proposed by Bennett. Thus, he is able to rise above the deterministic processual model of systems approach partially.

But he still adheres to the systems approach when he posits an external origin to 'change' when he traces the causes of ecological transition in man. Bennett goes on to trace the peculiar problems faced by human societies, when he seeks to answer the following questions :

1. How human societies maintain short term equilibrium ?
2. What causes disequilibrium in such societies ?
3. What kind of adaptive strategies are used to restore equilibrium ?

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The maintenance of short term equilibrium is attributed to what Bennett calls as subliminal controls that exist in primitive societies. These controls are exercised traditionally through rituals and work practices in these societies. When such societies come in contact with other societies, which have larger resource consuming instrumentalities, which innitiate a higher technical development, the sublimial controls tend to break down. This transition from equilibrium to dis-equilibrium is demonstrated in the highly generalized adaptive dynamics paradigm for human Ecology. The paradigm includes the socially problematic aspects of man's relations with nature. The basic component of the paradigm is the transformation process, or the social production. Beneath the transformation process are two terms technology and social organisation, that are considered as means to futher the process of production. The processes signify one generalized motive force that defines the reasons for action, the desires, needs and wants of people involved. These processes can function to limit or enhance the operations of energy processes. The formal controls below processes indicate that sublimial regulations have not been historically sufficient to preserve the system from over use and abuse of resources. Therefore, formal controls based on information and feedback become necessary. Finally, human biology is inserted in order to indicate that output of energy and social organization will have an influence on human physiology and gene pool.

Points of Disagreement :

Thus, the paradigm is based on the premise that the social processes have a primacy over the individual 'self'. Infact the systems follow a logic of their own, over which man has no control. This is in line with one possible interpretation of Kant. Kant argues that the basic mode of human action is ' freedom '. But because humans are posited within causal laws of nature,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

this struggle for freedom remains unexercised. This forces human beings to return to the 'inner–self' i.e., to subjectivity, in order to attain transcendence. There is always a discrepancy between "what is" and "what ought to be" in today's world. The attempt of any theory ought to be towards 'freedom of self'.

Habermas also agrees with this enlightenment doctrine which assumed human-enstrangement. He proposes (Giddens, 1977) that understanding human conduct is not only a causal endeavour, but it also consists of uncovering its intelligibility by relating it to the rules that constitute form of life. Habermas stresses the point that the generalizing sciences, that dictates the system approaches in positivistic sociology and hermeneutics have for a long while gone their separate ways. The problem is to show that logical relations connect them on the level of epistemology; Science can only be comprehended epistemologically, which means as one–category of possible knowledge and the evolution of scientific disciplines have led to 'scienticism'. This has resulted in the conviction that we can no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather identify knowledge with science. Thus, it conforms to only one type of knowledge constitutive interest, that of prediction and control of occurances, or technologically exploitable knowledge. This kind of knowledge denies the diachronic process of social systems. The systems theorists advocate a synchronic dimension. The chess game is usually cited as an example. Just as in a chess game there are various elements, so do social systems have various elements. If the relationship between these elements and the rules of the game are known, then anyone can play the game, from any point, within the game. The system theorists argue that similarly social systems follow a logic of their own. These rules and relationships between social elements can be explicated. Just as in a chess game a present permutation and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

combination of elements that exist at any one point of time are a-historic i.e., the present situation may be arrived at by any possible earlier moves and thus they have no bearing on how the game can proceed, or the further course of events. Similarly, the present social situation cannot be used to predict future evolution.

But this approach is unable to adequately explain the newly emergent social elements beyond those assumed earlier. It portrays a static image of society. It is a fact that social system do undergo change and evolve, over time. This the synchronous approach is unable to account for (Gouldner, 1970). It is this crisis that has led to the emergence of hermeneutics and critical theories. Habermas has stated that such a synchronic approach is only one possible logical form in which discourse can take place and is directly connected to instrumental or purposive rational action.

The second type of knowledge constitutive interest is emancipatory. This communicative interest assumes interaction. Interaction is dialogical rather than monological. A dialogue assumes a degree of normative concensus between communicating individuals. One cannot, therefore, be concerned with interaction without being able in principle to enter into a dialogue. This is the locus of hermeneutics, which confirms to knowledge constitutive interest in understanding. Hermeneutic problems relate to to inter-twining of language and experience in different forms of life, which ordinary language both expresses and mediates. Habermas takes reflexivity to be fundamental to the interest in emancipation, just because it is in the course of self-reflection that the subject is able to grasp and transform, the conditions under which he acts, through embodying his knowledge of these conditions within the rationalization of his action. Thus, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

shift to historicity is a necessary condition for self-reflection and emancipation, for a critical theory.

The adaptive dynamics paradigm, though rooted in systems approach, does recognize the importance of historicity and therefore trancends the purely instrumental interest. It attempts a theoretically generalized history of human Ecology, even as it maintains its systems approach. Therefore, the paradigm can be retained with modifications.

The second reason to retain the paradigm is because this is the only paradigm that recognizes the 'social production' as well as environmental dimension. The alternate Marxian theories are not adequate to explain environmental domination by man, This is elaborated by Issac Bulbus (1982), when he considers Marxian Structuralist theory of production. Bulbus points out that both the optimistic and pessimistic theory of technology is unable to serve the emancipatory interest of man. Thus, contrary to Marx, the social relations of production possess a partially autonomous logic of development. This takes us back to Marx's Instrumental theory coupled with the insistence that the logic of technological development is repressive which is what Weber and Ellul argue, that there is an inherent identical logic underlying industrial production as such and this logic is repressive. Bulbus answers this problem by identifying and promoting technologies that are not distructive to the environment. But this only partially solves the problem i.e., the domination of nature, the problem of domination of man remains.

A way out is to develop a theory that is rooted in the emancipatory theory and is able to adopt an ecological dimension. The adaptive dynamics paradigm (Bennett 1978) is identified as an ecological theory, to be modified, to suit emancipatory interests of man, mainly because it adopts a historical perspec,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tive. But this paradigm alone is not sufficient for two reasons. Firstly, it ignores the socio-political dimension. Secondly; it posits an external point of origin to change. This is because it lacks a grounded theory of learning process, to locate the origin of change within Human Social Systems. Such a theory of learning would adequately explain the origin of change that is responsible for the ecological transition from one stage to another. The emancipatory interest would thus have to be a central concern of a 'Theory of Human Ecology'.

This emancipatory interest also provides the guiding inspiration for critical theory. (Held, 1980) The theory aims at the liberation of human being from being dominated by forces constraining their rational autonomy of action.

The Presuppositions of Habermas' Critical Theory :

Habermas has developed a research programme which is at once philosophical, critical and pragmatic, all at the same time. Habermas' critical theory has three major concentrations, which have relevance to ecological attitudes and ethics.

1. as a philosophical theory i.e., an epistemic problem.
2. as a meta-scientific mode i.e., critical theory as a philosophy of social sciences.
3. as a substantive social theory i.e., hermeneutic dimension.

These are rooted in various ways in which 'critique' can be interpreted.

The first clue to the notion of a critique is as associated with 'crisis'. This relationship of association was found by Hypocratis. Hypocratis regards, in an individual organism, a 'crisis situation'. This is determined by an up or down in the body of an organism. Thus, a disorder or a structural imbalance in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

an organism is identified as a root to 'crisis'. But merely a disorder is not a sufficient condition for the need of a 'critique'. This systemic disorder has to be identified as such, by the organism itself, through its perception of the malice. Thus, Habermas suggests that such a situation has an objective structure and a subjective hermeneutic dimension. The significance of the crisis is not because it represents a structural disorder but that this disorder is precieved as such by the organism.

The person who is capable of recognizing a system of crisis and to prescribe remedial steps becomes a 'critique'. In case of an organism it is a healer.

In ecological context, the environmental crisis is identified as a problem of pollution resource over use and abuse by all. Here, apart from other notions, the central idea is that a physician, in diagnosis of the disease, is guided by the conception of 'well-being'. This normative idea is a guiding principle and a goal for medical practice. Thus, the activity of the critique is to talk to the patient for understanding of what an illness means to the patient.

Therefore, the investigations besides being subjective and objective, will have to be normative in nature. Michel Foucault (Dreyfus & Robinow 1987) suggests a methodology for identifying the concept of 'well-being'. His methodology states that in order to find out what our society means by environmental 'well-being', we must investigate what is happening in the field of environmental 'crisis'. Roughly this boils down a commitment to 'deep ecology' or ecological egalitarianism. The normative principle of sustained yield can become the guiding principle.

Thus, a critical theory as a philosophical theory ought to enumerate the conception of what is 'normal' in a society, if a 'crisis' has to be identified.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The second meaning of a critique as understood by Habermas, pertains to Aristotle. In socio-political context Aristotle observed that a state has certain multiplicities leading to a system. Thus, these various structures would at some time indicate certain structural imbalances over what is just and right. A social system can encounter a period of crisis which is exprsssed as conflict. The critique is a person who is able to identify disorder and take corrective measures.

In environmental context this crisis is manifest in the nature important problems existing in human ecology today. The present way of techno-ecological exploitation raises certain problems, with increasing knowledge about environment.

1. The mastery of some men over others as a consequence of technical interest in resource exploitation conflicts with the egalitarian principles accepted as a ' world view '. (Bennett, 1976)

2. 'Economic growth' as a criterion for development is increasingly questioned as against 'quality of life'. This is because there are limits to growth in material spheres, due to environmental constraints. At the same time, increasing material standards does not guarantee distributive justice. (Jenning & Hoebel, 1955)

3. The technical interest dictates that nature be treated as an instrumentality, but increasing knowledge about nature dictates that nature be treated as a system of great complexity not fully understood. (Schroyer, 1988)

The critique is the environmental scientist who brings up these issues, and takes corrective measures.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The third meaning of critique originates in the Roman medieval periods. During the renaissance period, the Romans depended on Greek Scriptures for the borrowed civilization they reconstructed. This was a literary critique whereby alien meanings had to be a hermeneutic activity. This notion of critique as a hermeneutic activity is important. For proper understanding of scriptures the appeal had to be to human reasons, for re-interpretation. When this happens the appeal is only to faith and reason. Thus, reason was not just a tool but the final arbitrator. At this final stage reason is public. But for Kant a critical reason had to be a critique of pure reason. Thus, for him critique becomes a self-critique and reason becomes ' a-public'.

In case of human ecology the need for a self-critique is obvious. If the present techno-ecological path of instrumental use of nature is followed to its logical extreme, it will lead to self-destruction. Therefore, a reflexive and hermeneutic methodology is needed for deciding on corrective measures.

One can follow Habermas' logic and attempt to develop a ' critical human ecology '. Habermas suggests a three tier research programme to develop a critical theory of society. The ground level consists of a general theory of communication, at the next level it serves as a foundation for a general theory of socialization in the form of a theory of acquisition of communicative competence; and finally Habermas sketches a theory of social evolution based on the previous two levels which he views as a reconstruction of historical materialism.

Contribution of Habermas to the theory of social evolution is two-fold. He has developed a new theory of learning which incorporates both communicative actions and instrumental actions under human action. In re-interpreting the base superstructure theorem he has stressed the primacy of communicative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

action. Thus, his reconstruction of historical materialism states that normative structures play an equally important role in resolving system problems in social evolution.

He then sees systems as life-worlds that are symbolically structured, social system crises, according to him, arise in economic, political or socio-cultural sub-systems leading to systemic changes. For example, in capitalist societies due to internal contradictions, these societies are endangered from atleast one of these four possible crises namely economic, rationality, legitimation or motivational crisis.

Habermas, like all Marxists, seems to have given almost no importance to the ecological crisis. He only states that capitalist form of society has an established growth mechanism that compels population growth and an increase in production on a world wide scale. This growth has two limitations–the finite resources and population. These limits have not yet been reached but one absolute limit to growth can be specified, namely the limit of thermal load imposed on the environment by the consumption of energy (Connerton, 1976).

Thus, Habermas, like all Marxian Scholars, considers ecological issues as technical issues. This seems to follow necessarily from his theory of constitutive interests, particularly the interest in control and domination. If this is so then new levels of social learning can only be social and inter-human. Such an anthropocentric view would limit the ecological attitudes and ethics. Such a Habermasian version of critical theory is possible.

In so far as the new levels of normative learning would be anthropocentric, the prospect of new ecological attitudes and ethics would imply some modifications in the marxian theory of technology. As Bulbus (1982) has argued that modification of just relations of production would not produce technologies that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

are less dominating, because domination is internalized in the very mode of production. Therefore, there is a need for identifying technologies that are non-domineering. Bulbus has proposed the doctrine of 'small is beautiful' as presented by Shoemaker. This would be a narrow way of solving the ecological crisis as it proposes a partial solution.

Therefore, the critical paragdigm needs elaboration to encompass the ecological dimension. The adaptive paradigm with its ecological and historical dimension can be strengthened by the critical dimention. The mode of combination of the theoretical frameworks can be now elaborated.

Habermas, in the development of a general theory of communicative action, gives certain clues to the mode of combination. He states that in order to arrive at a general theory of communication certain universal pragmatic rules of communication need to be reconstructed. In the light of these reconstructed rules/strategies, the "communicative competence" of an individual can be established. These two would then form the foundation for a general theory of communication.

Similar steps can be followed to arrive at a general paradigm of Human Ecology. We will, therefore, have to reconstruct the adaptive strategies used by human–beings in their interaction with nature. In the light of these 'adaptive strategies' an "ecological competence" will have to be developed. These would provide the foundation for the general paradigm, We will then elaborate on the causes of ecological transition through a theory of learning and suggest an appropriate methodology for the same.

Reconstructive Strategies :

Habermas uses the term reconstructive sciences to designate any undertaking aimed at explicit systemic reconstruction of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

implicit pretheoretical knowledge. In case of human ecology such an exercise will have to define a guiding principle that is normatively ideal in man-environment relationship. (This is done by defining a " reconstructive adaptive strategy ").

The methodologs for applying such a theory will have to incorporate a hermeneutic and historical dimension along with empirical analysis. This is in order to make a critical social theory empirical and scientific without being reducible to empirical analytic science.

Therefore, as a first step let an reconstructive adaptive strategy be defined.

This is a very complex job, mainly because the problem with human-social systems is that they adapt to environment by changing and not by resisting change. The feed-back is positive and they do not tend towards any one particular goal. When the criteria of ' what is adaptive ' shifts from an individual to a group, its welfare and survival, human ecology in the sense of having a ' practical intent ' becomes an enquiry into the adaptive consequences of human activities. Here one factor must be noted. Adaptive strategy aimed at group survival is given prime importance and it may be at times mal–adaptive to an individual. Several concepts of adaptive strategies will have to be examined n order to justify and define a reconstructive concept.

The adaptive strategies adopted by individual human beings fall under two spheres (1) the biological (Steward 1978, Huizing, 1975; Jenning and Hoebel, 1975) (2) socio–cultural adaptation, between individuals as studied by social psychologists, (Thomas and Zenneski 1960) and between individual and groups. (Merton, 1968; Mills, 1960; Peel, 1972).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The systems theory as suggested by Talcott Parsons (Parsons, 1967) refers to adaptation problem, as problem of providing facilities for the use of system, i.e. given certain goals to arrange resources to attain these goals. Thus, it is a means of solving the problem of self-maintenance. Adaptation as a value-pattern in societies is also studied by Parsons. From systems theory this definition of adaptation as a 'means' poses a question, namely which mechanism in the system can create adequate adaptation of the system to the environment. Even if we find the mechanism, at what price ? For, only strategies that have already proved to be adaptive, can belong to this object domain, other adaptive strategies not thus proved will be ignored, thus excluding an independent evaluation of reasons. But can we ignore the fact that normative validity claims of adaptive strategies meet recongition because they are well grounded ? It can be decisive for an analysis to know whether a population acted on the basis of an accurate or false information and opinion. To make judgement we have to be able to systematically evaluate adaptation claims in a rational intersubjectively testable way. To do so, we require a concept of adaption with normative content. But if philosophical ethics and socio-cultural theory can know nothing more than what is contained in the everyday norm consciousness of different populations, and if this cannot even be known in a different way, it then cannot rationally distinguish between adaptive and mal-adaptive strategies.

Thus, the empirical concept of social science is not satisfactory because it abstracts from systemic weight on grounds of validity. The philosophical is untenable because of metaphysical context in which it is embedded. A third concept of adaptive strategies is the 'reconstructive concept'. This should satisfy the following : A recommended adaptive strategy should be (1) in general interest, (2) as well as satisfy normative validity claims.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Assuming that idea and reality do not split, the adaptive strategy must fulfil three criteria : (1) It should leave the physical environment ecologically beneficial (2) The adaptive strategy should be sustained and strengthened by the social organization, so that it becomes culturally acceptable (3) Finally satisfction of both these criteria, one at the environmental level and the other at both individual and group level would lead to the satifaction of normative validity claims, given the adaptive strategy.

Ecological competence consists of identifying certain pragmatic features of ecological activities which can be logically reconstructed.

1. It is the ability of an individual to incorporate environmental dimension into his every-day life. What is suggested here is that he should look upon his environment as something which is a part of himself and any action on his part would have consequences to himself in the end i.e., to see the consequences of his actions as having ecological consequences.

2. This would imply the normative basis which accepts equality, non-domination and a dialogical approach to differences. Incorporated in the concept of ecological competence here are both the physical and social environmental aspects.

3. The human decision to be 'one' with nature does not depend upon any epistemic presuppositions or changing contexts. Man in any ecological context also is capable of engaging in this kind of action. Therefore, a universal and pragmatic investigation can be proposed.

Having defined a reconstructive adaptive strategy and the notion of ecological competence, we can now review the transition in human ecology in its light. A theory of learning will help to locate the causes of change within human societies.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Habermas has stated that two series of initial conditions may appear in a system that stimulates new learning–processes initiating change in a system. These initial conditions can also explain the Human Ecological transition. This ecological transition in man has been from equilibrium to disequilibrium towards larger resource consuming instrumentalities which are motivated by the goal to emancipate man from vagaries of nature.

According to Habermas these two series of initial conditions are :

1. The unsolved system problems. In case of human ecology this problem takes the form of providing adequate subsistence production in order to emancipate man from vagaries of nature.
2. New levels of learning that have already been achieved in world views, but not yet incorporated into action systems, thus remaining institutionally inoperative.

In case of human ecology this would mean new value systems that question various axioms, on normative grounds, in economic, political and environmental spheres. (Schroyer, 1979).

It is Habermas' contention that human species organizes its experience in terms of prior interests. That there is a basis for interest follows from understanding of humans as tool making and language making animal. The basic interests that mankind has are :

1. The interest in creation of knowledge which helps him in controlling objectified processes and to maintain communication.
2. A technocratic interest in control of nature.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

3. An interest in reflexive appropriation of Human life. This is the interest in reason, in Human capacity to be self–reflexive and self-determining, to act rationally; This is an emancipatory interest.

Habermas claims a universality of hermeneutics whereby he argues that interaction is founded in ordinary language communication, which is the organizing mode of intersubjectivity. The norms governing everyday communication are rooted in practical demands of sustaining community existence. Language is a medium whereby an intersubjectively formed social life is carried out. Language is a medium of doing things through communication with others. Interaction is, thus, dialogical rather than monological, as is the case in instrumental actions guided by technocratic interest. One cannot be concerned with interaction without being able in principle to enter into the dialogue. This is the locus of hermenutics which conforms to the knowledge-constitutive interest in understanding.

Habermas acknowledges that science as understood epistemologically is one category of possible knowledge, which is guided by the interest in controlling objectified processes and technological interest dictated by instrumental rationality resulting in strategic action. The domination of this interest in today's world has led to ' Scienticism '. This has resulted in the conviction that we must identify knowledge with science. As a result, the knowledge constitutive interest in understanding and emancipation has suffered and human ecology is facing a crisis both at normative levels as well as material levels.

Thus, objectification of nature as a source for drawing ' natural resources ' both in Marxion theory and adaptive dynamics paradigm is directed by the technical interest in control and mastery. This has led to contradictions in human ecology.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

1. The objectification of nature severly conflicts with the assumption of nature as a complex system. This assumption is increasingly supported by knowledge through technological evidence made available today. (Schroyer, 1983).

2. The objectification of the subject i.e. human being, which is necessary for the production process is another contradiction. It conflicts with the emancipatory interest and belief in dialogue and interaction.

Habermas in his own work in historical materialism has criticised Marx for ignoring communicative action which is equally importont in production processes. He has demonstrated this through historical studies. In fact it is Habermas' contention that it is normative structures which determine the rules of communicative action. These play an equally important role in resolving system problems in social evolution. Habermas finally suggests a reframing of base super structure theorem. He states that it is the endogenous learning process that provides growth of technically useful knowledge. The equilibrium according to this between forces and relations of production is rare. Hence, endogenously caused development of productive forces makes it possible for structural incompatibilities to become obvious and this causes disequilibrium. It is the development of new normative learning that may restore equilibrium.

The modified Paradigm :

Following the guidelines stated by Habermas we need to modify Bennett's ecological paradigm. Bennett's paradigm based on the older Marxian approach shows the primacy of 'social production' over socio–political and normative superstructures. But if we were to accept the primacy of superstructures, then the Ecological paradigm needs to be modified.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The social organization presses, technology and sublimial controls over resourse use and distribution i.e., the normative dimension should form the basic component of the diagram and not the 'transformation process' as suggested by Bennett. Thus, the super–structures guided by the ecological competence and the reconstructive adaptive strategies follow egaliterianism as a normative commitment at the level of life world analysis. It means acknowledging the equality of right to live and blossoming of all forms of life. This primacy of superstructures would then provide an alternate understanding to the transition of societies from ecological equilibrium to ecological disequilibrium.

This transition and the current ecological crisis could then be attributed to the change in normative structures due to the theory of learning suggested by Habermas.

The solution of these crises have to be sought through interaction. In asserting the claim to universality of hermeneutics Habermas states that interaction is the locus to hermeneutics, which conforms to the knowledge constitutive interest in understanding and hence emancipatory in nature, Understanding human conduct is a causal endeavor and consists in uncovering its intelligibility by relating it to the rules that constitute a form of life. The methodology that dictates this kind of analysis will have to be an interpretative methodology.

There are two sequential aspects of social science methods. Weber distinguishes them as the difference between the 'what' and the 'why' of a phenomenon. The 'what' questions explicate adequacy at the level of meaning. The 'why' questions give causal adequacy. Weber goes on to add that causal explanations are possible in interpretative sociology. It is, accordiug to him, wrong to suppose that because human action is subjective and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

therefore unpredictable, human conduct tends to be predicable to a layman or a scientist to the degree to which it is rational in terms of selection of means to attain specific ends. Predictability is more in actions, free of emotions. Motive explanation is definitely a causal explanation because it can be attained via a prior grasp of the subjective meanings that men attached to their actions. The task of the social scientist is to concern himself with the interpretative understanding of social action and thereby supply it with a causal explanation of its course and consequences. Social action is expressed in terms of the subjective orientation of the agent. Action is social if the actor takes account of the behaviour of others. Understanding the problem of other is problematic. At the core of Weber's analysis is the distinction between behaviour, Verstehen and action (Habermas, 1988). Each of these can be explained by the observer, but the first cannot be framed in the subjective intent of the actor because it is habitual. Action on the other hand has to be framed in terms of its meaningfulness to the actor.

The possible criticism of an interpretative approach is as follows. Since interpreting meanings involves an empathetic experience, meaning has to be understood and described with the great degree of certainty in the 'correctness' of the interpretation. Since there can be on absolute standards for a correct 'description' one can argue that interpretation will always be subjective. The way out is, one can perceive multiple meanings to understanding of an act. Alternately, one can study the opposite in crisis to get clues into the ideal phenomena as suggested by Foucault.

In case of Human Ecology an interpretative methodology would mean understanding the possible alternate way of perceiving an ecological crisis to draw upon what is meant by 'ecological well-being'. This has a significance, because various

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

groups like administrators, policy planners, the people affected by it, each will have an alternate understanding of the phenomenon. Thus, clues can be drawn to understand what is their ideal type of 'environmental well–being'.

Towards a 'Critical Theory of Human Ecology'

The objective of this exercise was to develop a new paradigm for man-nature relationship based on omissions and underdeveloped implications of the two frameworks of adaptive dynamics and critical theory.

Finally, such a paradigm will need to be further developed to create a 'critical theory of Human Ecology'. Since the paradigm recognises an emancipatory interest as fundamental, it can be considered as a variant of the self–enstrangement theories. Fay (1987) has suggested that a 'critical social science' can be developed as a separate discipline (instead of a purely' critical theory) which has humanist variant of self-enstrangement theories as a basic foundation. He has suggested the research programme for such a Social Science. This can then be applied to specific instances of Science, say, Human Ecology.

He suggests a humanist variant of 'self–enstrangement theory' which will simultaneously explain the social world, criticize it and empower its audience to overthrow it. The theory would reveal how a particular social order functions, show the ways in which it is fundamentally unsatisfactory to those who live in it, and do it in such a manner that it itself becomes the moving force, helping to transform this order into something radically different.

The research programme can be characterized by a complex of theories that are systematically related to one another. These theories have to be scientific in the sense of providing comprehensive explanations of wide areas of human life in terms of a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

few basic principles, explanations, subject to public empirical evidence. They would be critical in the sense of offering a sustained negative evaluation of social order at hand. Finally, they would be practical in the sense of stimulating members of society to alter their lives. This complex of theories will consists of :

1. A theory of false consciousness
2. A theory of crisis
3. A theory of education/learning, and
4. A theory of transformative action.

But the development of such a research programme is beyond the scope of the present paper. *

Tata Institute of Social Sciences
Post Box 8313
Sion–Trombay Road, Deonar
Bombay–400088.

JYOTSNA BAPAT

NOTES

Bennett, John, W.; *The Ecological Transition*, Pergamon Press, N. Y. 1976.

Bulbus, Issac; *Marxism and Domination : A Neo–Hegelian, Feminist, Psycho–analytic Theory of Sexual, Political and Technological Liberation*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, U. S. A. 1982.

Connerton, P.; *Critical Sociology*, Penguine Books Ltd., London, 1976.

Dreyfus H. L. & Rabinow, Paul; Michel Foucault : *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, The Harvest Press, U. K. 1987.

Fay, Brian; *Critical Social Science : Liberation and its Limits*, Polity Press, Cambridge, Great Briton, 1987.

Forester, J. J.; *World Dynamics*, Hutchinson, London, 1974.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Gabor, D. Colombo, U. King A. & Galli, R.; *Beyond the Age of Waste*, Hutchinson, Lodon, 1976.

Giddens, Anthony; *Studies in Social and Political Theory*, Hutchinson of London, 1977.

Gouldner, Allevin, W.; *Comming Crisis of Western Sociology*, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., London, 1970.

Habermas, Jürgen; translated by Nicholsen S. W. & Stark J. A. *On the logic of Social Science*, Polity Press, M. I. T. 1988.

Huizenga, J.; "Cultural and Biological Adaptation in Man", in Salzano, M. (Ed.) *The Role of Natural Selection in Human Evolution*, North Halland Publication Co., 1975.

Held, David; *Introduction to Critical Theory : Hockheimer to Habermas*, Hutchin & Co, (Publishers) Ltd. London, 1980.

Jenning J. D. and Hobel E. A. (Ed.) *Reading in Anthropology*, Mc Graw Hill Book Co., N. Y. 1955.

Meadows, D.; *The Limits to Growth*, Hutchinson, London, 1972.

Merton, R.; *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Amerind Publishing Co. Pvt. N. Y. 1968.

Mesarovic M. & Pestel E.; *Mankind at Turning Point*, Hutchinson, London, 1975.

Mills C. W.; *Images of Man*, George Brazille Inc. N. Y. 1960

Parsons, Talcott; *Social Theory and Modern Society*, The Free Press, New York, 1967.

Peel, J. D. Y.; *Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972.

Schroyer, Trent; "Critique of the Instrumental Interest in Nature", *Social Research*, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. (158–184), Spring, 1983.

Steward, J. W,; *Sociology, the Human Science*, McGraw Hill Book Co., New York, 1978.

Tinberg, J.; *Reshaping the International Order*, Hutchinson, London, 1976.

Tomas, W. I. & Zennenski, F.; "Three Types of Personality", in C. W. Mills (ed.) *Images of Man*, George Brazille Inc. N. Y.

* I wish to thank Professor R. Sundara Rajan, Philosophy Department, Poona University for greatly helping me in preparation of the paper. His useful comments enabled me to separate grain from the chaft.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Statement about Ownership and Other Particulars about *Newspaper INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY*

FORM IV (RULE 8)

1. Place of Publication ... Philosophy Department, University of Poona, Pune–411 007

2. Periodicity of its Publication. ... Quarterly.

3. Printer's Name and Address ... Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, Philosophy Department, University of poona, Pune–411 007.

   Whether Citizen of India ... Yes.

4. Publisher's Name and Address ... Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, Philosophy Department, University of Poona, Pune–411 007

   Whether Citizen of India ... Yes.

5. Editors' Names and Addresses ... (i) Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, Philosophy Department, Poona University, Pune–411 007.

   (ii) Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Opposite Stadium main gate Premchand path Rajendra Nagar Patna–800 016.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(iii) Dr. M. P. Marathe,
Philosophy Department,
Poona University,
Pune–411 007.

(iv) Dr Mrinal Miri,
Philosophy Department,
N. E. H. U.,
Shillong–793 014

(v) Dr. R. Sundara Rajan, ..
Philosophy Department,
Poona University,
Pune–411 007.

(vi) Dr. S S. Deshpande,
Philosophy Department,
Poona University,
Pune–411 007.

Whether Citizens of India, ... Yes

6. Names and Addresses of Individuals/Institutions which own the newspaper .. Department of Philosophy,
Poona University,
Pune–411 007
And its
Pratap Centre of Philosophy,
Amalner–425 401

I, Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Sd/- Surendra Sheoas Barlingay

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIVIDUAL LIFE MEMBERS

299. Smt. Jyotsna Saha
Research Scholar
Philosophy Department
North Bengal University
Raja Rammohanpur 734 430
Darjeeling (W.B.).

300. Dr. (Smt.) Bhaswati Bhattacharya (Chakrabarti)
U/A, W/174 (Western Sector)
Darjeeling 734 430 (W.B.)

301. Prof. Kalyan Kumar Bagchi
Philosophy Department,
Visva Bharti,
Santiniketan 731 235
Birbhum (W B)

302 Dr. Pratima Ganguli,
P G. Department of Philosophy
Bhagalpur University,
Bhagalpur 812 007 (Bihar).

303 Dr. Chote Lal Tripathy
Philosophy Department
Allahabad University
Allahabad 211 002

304. Dr. Shyamal Krishna Banerjee
Department of Philosophy
Vidyasagar University
Midnapore 721 101 (W. B.).

305. Dr. Pratap Chandra
C/91 Gaur Nagar
Sagar 470 003 (M P.)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 3
July, 1991

PREDICATION AND LOGIC OF LANGUAGE (III)

SECTION 2

A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF PREDICATION

Constituents of Predication

Predication is the sense-functional structure of propositions. The formal concept of predication holds for all propositions. Every proposition has two types of constituents : terms and formatives. Every proposition consists of two main terms standing in predicative (sense) connection. Formatives (predicative) are sense-functions, and they operate on terms, which are sense-contents. Just as propositions are non-linguistic intelligible contents their constituents are of the same status.[26] Terms are extra-linguistic constituents of propositions. They have no being (function) apart from propositions. Formatives, too, as sense-functional connectives, have no being (function) apart from propositions. Terms and formatives can be explained only in terms of their fuuction in propositional (predicative) structure.

Terms and formatives are correlative concepts, and one can only be understood in terms of the other, as they mutually function in propositional formation. They are essentially " incomplete " when taken apart from the other. As structural constituents of propositions they are elements of predication.

Every proposition, then, consists of two main terms sense-functionally related by a main formative. The formative unites the two terms and thereby gives unity to the proposition. This

Received : 8-5-1990

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

main formative is called the propositional (predicative) formative, and it is a *dyadic* connective. (It is sometimes called the predicative copula).

The Formal Concept of a Term

The formal characterization of a term may be given in terms of its predicative function–its function in propositional formation Terms, unlike formatives, have (are) intelligible sense–contents. Later we shall give a syntactic characterization of terms; they occupy prior or posterior position in the structure of a proposition. A term is not a linguistic expression, although it is represented by linguistic expressions Nor is a term an (actual) (existent) object which is a constituent of the world. A term is an intensional content--perhaps a good word is Frege's notiou of " conceptual content ". A term, like a proposition, is apprehended in thought and in apprehending a term we enertain (apprehend) an intelligible object. Such objects are possible (not existent) objects. Just as a sentence of appropriate form) *specifies* or connotes a proposition, and hence a State, a term-expression specifies (connotes) a term, and hence a conceptual object. To specify or connote is not to refer, nor to identify or pick out, etc [27] It is a neutral term stripped of epistemic-pragmatic functions Specification is a purely semantic relation between a sign and what it signifies Signs representing terms may be distinguished from signs representing formatives. Formatives are sense-functions and do not have sense–content, as terms do Examples of linguistic expressions representing terms are : 'Socrates' (proper names), 'man' (common names), 'red' (property words) 'the philosopher who drank the hemlock' (singular definite descriptions), 'lover of some girl' (relations) 'Socrates being wise' (states), etc

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A term should not be thought of as a static atomic element. The sense-content of a term is the network of possible configurations (predicative relations) in which it stands to other terms. A term is constituted by a nexus of predicative possibilities. This is what it means to have sense-content : to configure predicatively with some terms and not others. The identity of a term is determined by the possible configurations in which it stands-its predicative possibilities. No two terms can be distinct and yet have all the same possible predicative possibilities.

A special metaphor may be helpful here. The sense of a term is its configurative position in thought-its location in logical space. (Logical space metaphorically represents the totality of the intelligible world). In logical geography one locates the position (sense) of a term by its predicative possibilities with respect to other terms. To have sense-content, then, is to be located in logical space and to displace it in a particular way. To be one (self identical) term is to be in one location. Two distinct terms occupy different positions and each takes up a space of its own. (See Sommers' "The Ordinary Language Tree" *Mind*, 1959).

Terms, as sense-contents, are constituted by their predicative relations. This is all it means to say that a term has sense. To configure with other terms is to stand in sense relations, and to so stand involves sense-functions. Here, again, we find the mutual functional dependence of terms and formatives in sense-formation.[28] A term cannot be apprehended in atomic isolation. Formatives do not have location in logical space, they do not displace logical space (have sense-content); rather, they structure logical space.

Types of Terms

A term is identified formally by the characteristic role it plays in propositional formation, and it plays such a role in terms of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sense-content. Sense-content, it was mentioned, is constituted by configurative possibilities with other terms in logical space The identity of a term may be further indicated by discerning its *logical type*. Type differences between terms are exhibited in its sense-content. Terms must not be confused with the linguistic expressions which repsesent them: nouns (noun phrase), names, verbs (verb phrase), adjective, etc. Type (linguistic) differences between expressions need not reflect nor correspond to type differences between terms (propositional constituents) Nor should terms be confused with the grammatical functions indicated by 'subject' and 'predicate'. To be a sense-content is not the same as being a substance (individual object) or attribute (property). Terms (sense-contents) may specify individuals, universals, relations, events, states of affairs, property, mass, etc. They can be concrete or abstract, etc. A term can specify any *type of thing* whatever But this does not tell us anything about the type of term. What determines the *logical* type of a term? Clearly there are differences between individuals and states, but it could still be that terms specifying individuals and states are of the same logical type–i.e. both terms could still be singular terms. A theory of logical type is needed to fully characterize terms. What are relevant criteria in determining the logical type of a term? Aristotle's theory of categories is an early attempt at this. It was an attempt to give an account of the logical type of *terms*. In contrast, Kant's theory of categories focused on the formative functions.

Ostensibly terms of one logical type specify individuals which could be of different *ontological* type: minds, bodies, concrete abstract, etc); another type specifies universals, still another type indicates relations, etc. Why is a term specifying a state of affairs thought to be of different logical type from a term

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

specifying an individual ? A theory of logical types must answer such questions.

A distinction must be made between intelligible content and concrete (existent) physical objects. Sense-contents are of an entirely differeut status. ome theory is required to explain what is to count as an intelligible content (Meinong's theory of objects is one such attempt.) A theory of sense-contents would give criteria for determining what is to count as our intelligible content, for not every linguistic expression that purports to connote a term so succeeds. Just as certain linguistic constructions (sentences) fail to have the sense value–*S.* (e.g. category mistakes like 'The number seven is blue') so too certain expressions purporting to specify sense contents are vacuous : 'the rouud square', for example. The point, then, is that a general theory of objects is needed which will account for type difference between terms, and account for the relation and distinction between terms (sense-contents), as one type of object (intelligible) and, say, concrete physical objects.

Type differences between terms do not alter the formal role of a term qua term) in predication. The formal concept of a term does not discriminate between type of object specified, or position in propositional structure. A term specifying some concrete individual plays the same (formal) predicative role as a term specifying a State. There is a type difference (ostensibly) between an individual specifying term and a State specifying term. But as terms they both play a sense–formative role in propositional sense formation. For example, 'the cat' (specifies an individual) and 'the cat's being on the mat' (specifies a state) but both perform a common function as term in predication.

However, there is an important difference between terms and propositions (predications, The concept of a term is insepara-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ble from the role it plays *in* predication. But a proposition (qua proposition) plays no role in predication, for it is not a term. We may put the point in this way : while both terms and propositions *specify*, they specify different types of object. Term and propositions have different functions; a proposition is complete but a term is incomplete. One indication of this difference is that a proposition has truth status (/T/), but a term does not. This is similar to Frege's claim that a concept can never be an object, and vice versa. A term cannot be a proposition, and vice versa. The reason for stressing this difference is that a *state-term* seems to violate this difference, for it is at once a term and yet appears to have propositional structure : 'Socrates being wise', 'The cat's being on the mat', etc. Aren't these *propositional* terms? Do not propositions themselves play a role as term in compound propositions? The answer is No. It is true that a State term is complex and consists of the State specified by some proposition, but as a *term* it must undergo transformation to play the role of term in predication : this transformation is called *'terminalization"* ; it corresponds to the linguistic transformation of nominalization. If 'Socrates is wise' represents a proposition, then, 'Socrates' being wise' is a terminalized transform. The latter is a State term and it is propositionally incomplete, in the way that 'Socrates is wise' is not. A term, no matter how complex its internal structure, is *simple* in its role as a term in predication. Thus, even when internally complex, a term is logically simple from the point of view of its predicative function. The same holds for linguistic representation : linguistically complex expressions specify simple terms. All terms are atomic or elementary in predication. For example, "the philosopher who drank the hemlock" is linguistically complex in structure, but the State specified is simple. Similarly, 'Socrates' being wise' is complex in structure, but the State specified is elementary in predication. Conversely, a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

proposition, no matter how complex its constituent terms, is simple or elementary in its propositional unity

A Formal Characterization of Formatives

The other main type of constituent of porpositions are formatives. Formatives are sense functional connectives which synthesize terms into a unified predication, specifying the mode of sense-connection. These logical functions are purely semantic. Formatives are commonly called logical particles or connectives. Examples of logical particles are : is/isn't, all/some, un-, no, not, if then , either or , and, etc. These natural formatives indicate semantic, epistemic and pragmatic functions at once. For example, the *is* and *isn't* are used in making statements and indicate not only semantic sense-connection between terms, but the epistemic function of judgment as well as the pragmatic function of assertion (affirmation/denial). We must be careful from the beginning to isolate the sense functions of formatives from the epistemic and pragmatic functions in the formal semantical) analysis of formatives. For example, in the statement 'Socrates is wise' the natural formative 'is' indicates judgment and assertoric force. We may remove these functions and represent the sense functional formative in isolation by replacing the complex 'is' by the more 'neutral' 'be', as in: 'Socrates being wise' (which represents the predicatlon stripped of judgmental and assertoric force The same holds for the so-called "propositional connectives" like 'if .. then...' This natural sentential connective in the *statement* 'If clouds are present then rain falls' indicates semantical, judgmental and pragmatic functions (as does the 'is'). Here too the semantical function must be isolated from the judgmental and pragmatic functions in the formal analysis of its predicative function. This is especially important in the case of "sentential connectives", because there are important disparities between propositional content and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

judgment-assertive content : statements are hypothetical, propositions are not.

Again, formatives are logical sense functions which unite terms into propositions, and in so doing they determine the particular *mode* in which the connected terms stand to one another. In the sense functional analysis of propositions, the sense of a proposition is *not* merely a function of the sense of the constituent terms. For while formatives indicate formal sense relations between terms in predicative connection, they also have *content* of their own. Formatives have form and content. To have content is not to have sense-content.

It is appropriate to draw a distinction here between *predicability* and predication. The former indicates that two terms (if they are predicable may configure in a proposition. This is not the same as a predication–which is a particular *determinate mode* in which they configure. For example, the terms presented by ' men ' and ' mortal ' are predicable (configurable), but this leaves open the determinate mode in which they configure: ' All men are mortal ' or ' Some men are mortal ', ' No men are mortal ', etc. The latter involve predications. So does ' Men are mortal ', which is not a fully determinate predication. Formatives, then, place terms in sense-connection and make determinate the mode in which they are sense-related.

This is another way of understanding the earlier point that terms and formatives cooperate in function and are incomplete with respect to each other. It is partly in this sense that terms are incomplete while propositions (predications) are complete; terms are completed into propositions by formatives. Formatives are configurational features of terms in relation. Since, as we have seen, the sense–content of terms consists in their predicative possibilities with other term, it seems to follow that formatives

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

are already present (and functional) in the very notion of sense-content. In the sense-formation of a proposition formatives, apart from terms, are empty, and terms without formatives are without direction or determination.

The P-Formative

Two main features formally characterize formatives :

i) they are signs of logical opposition

and ii) they all function as part of the predicative mechanism of propositions, i.e., gives synthetic sense unity to propositions,

Every proposition has a main formative/connective which functionally connects the two main constituent terms. This is called the 'predicative' or 'porpositional' connective: ***P-formative.*** For example, in the sentence 'Socrates being mortal' the main predicative conncetive is represented by 'being'–this is the P-formative. This formative is a binary connective. We shall see in a moment that in the full representation of the P-sign it is a *dual* sign.

The function of sense-connection between terms indicated by the P-sign is a primitive and unanalyzable relation. It is immediately given in thought and is constitutive of thought. Attempts are made to analyze or picture this intensional function and reduce it to ***extensional*** models. These metaphors are given the name 'semantic interpretation' e. g. the class interpretation of a general statement. The extensional models are aids and not replacements for the intensional relation. For example, in the predication " All men are mortal " it is sometimes said that the terms stand for classes of objects, and the class of men included in the class of mortals. Or it is said that certain objectss *fall under* the concept 'mortals', or that some ***belongs to or***

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

inheres in certain objects, etc. These models are extensional/referential; they are used to 'interpret' and replace the immediate intensional (sense) connection between the terms. The class interpretation of 'men' and 'mortal' is extensional. However helpful these pictures, diagrams, models, 'interpretations' may be, they are not *replacements* for the immediate intensional relation. 'Man being mortal' *means* Man being mortal. This is the best that can be done. It cannot be improved upon. *Sense. connections cannot be pictured, they can only be thought.*

The P–formative is essentially oppositional in its function: it indicates positive or negative sense connection between terms. This is a formal property of the P-sign. It may be captured syntactically both in terms of its *special position* as well as *charge*. The negative charge (disconnection) presupposes that terms are predicable. In other words, negative connection of terms (dis-connection) is a form of connection (synthesis). The oppositional characterization of formatives was given by Sommers in his "Calculus" paper. Sommers uses a plus sign for the opposite function. I follow Sommers (and Leibniz, see *Logical Papers*, p. 3–4) in using tne +/– notation to represent formatives. However, Sommers does not treat the formatives as sense-functions in the way I am suggesting. The '+' and '–' have only *logical* meaning here, no arithmetic significance.

The P-sign *orders* the terms of a proposition. Being the main predicative connective it is natural to place it syntactically between the two main terms of a proposition. The identity of a formative will be preserved by the position it occupies in the internal logic (syntactic) space of a proposition. Thus, if A and B are term variables the P-formative will be placed as follows:

A +/– B

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The P-formative orders the terms in the sense that the term preceding the P-formative is the *prior term* of the predication, and the term following the P-formative is the *posterior term*. We shall use these names to replace the more common (but misleading) subject–term and predicate term.

Q-Formatives

The P-formative by itself does not give complete determination of the sense-connection between the terms. The *scope* and *extent* (logical quantity) of the sense connection must be indicated. The P–formative by itself does not indicate whether the connection in sense is *total* or *partial*, nor whether the sense connection in sense is *total* or *partial*, nor whether the sense connection is symmetric or asymmetric, i.e. *logical direction* of the predication. The Q-formative indicates the extent and direction of the predication. It is an *auxiliary* to the P-formative. Every proposition explicitly or implicitly has a P and auxiliary Q-sign. Actually *logical quantity* has nothing to do with numerical quantity. The term 'quantifier' can be misleading here. The Q-formative, as an auxiliary to the P-formative, plays a sense-functional (intensional) role in predication. The Fregean view treats the quantifier *extensionally*. I am suggesting an intensional interpretation. The Q-formative completes and modifies the P-formative and thus it has *both terms* within its scope. It modifies (logically quantifies) the predication indicating whether the connection is total, partial or indefinite. It determines the logical direction of the predication by determing the *extent* of term involvement in the sense connection. That is, the Q–formative qualifies the sense–connection.[29] For example, in

i) Men are mortal

The Q-sign is omitted and the predication is indefinite. The

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

logical direction is not specified and the predication as it stands may by convertible (symmetric) or not. However, in

ii) All (men) are (mortal)

the Q-sign is indicated and it modifies the P-sign indicating that the prior term is *totally* connected with the posterior term. This gives direction to the predicative relation because this combination of Q and P signs yields an asymmetric total connection. It does not indicate whether the posterior term is totally connected with the prior term. In

iii) Some (men) are (mortal)

the Q-sign indicates that the terms are partially connected and it indicates the predicative direction as symmetric. Examples from natural language of Q-formatives are : All/Some, If, Either.. etc For example, in

iv) if (clouds be present) then (rain falls)

the "if" is a Q-formative which determines the extent and direction of the predicative tie between the two terms. This particular combination of Q-P formative has the same formal features of the 'All...are...' combination.

(In one respect this view of the Q-formative closely resembles one aspect of Frege's view of the quantifier. For Frege the quantifier does not apply merely to the prior term but somehow applies to both terms, and to the propositional function as a whole. What Frege did not stress was that the quantifier plays a predicative sense-functional role, Instead, he stressed an extensional interpretation of the quantifier.)

Thus, the main predicative connective is really a dual sign. Again, following Sommers' oppositional characterization[20] the Q-formative 'all' is a negative sign, while the opposite formative

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'some' is positive. This formative is placed before the prior term but it is understood that it is an auxiliary to the P-sign and essentially functions as part of the sense formative structure of proposition. Now if *A* and *B* are term variables (i.e., stand for any type of term), and if we take a natural formative like "all... is...", then predicative form is indicated as follows :

Some/All (A) is/isn't (B)
+/- (A) +/- (B) (Formal representation)

The main predicative connective by itself is:

Some/All---is/isn't---
+/-( ) +/-( )

Here it is clear that the full P-formative (with auxiliary) is a dual sign.

T-Formatives

Terms too have a formative charge. Every term—in virtue of its sense—includes and excludes–and thus has a contrary opposite. To have sense is to have a *predicability range* (PR) i.e., to configure and fail to configure with other terms. To use the spacial metaphor again, a term's sense is its location and displacement of logical space. (A term's identity (sense) is determined just as much by what the term is impredicable of as by what it is predicable of; the term formative is essentially tied with its sense-content) No other term can occupy that space. To have sense is at once to include *and* exclude. A term excludes certain other terms. There is a special type of term exclusion which Aristotle called contrariety opposition. We referred to this notion earlier in explicating the notion of an absolute (category) term (word). Here, again, are some examples of logical contraries:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

wise/unwise, visible/invisible, colored/colorless, etc. Contraries, (unlike the type of opposition called complements, are privatives and stand in intensional relation. Each term, then, has a logical charge with respect to its contrary. It doesn't matter which is taken as positive and which as negative; what is important is that contraries are opposites (of a special type). Often in natural language the negative T-formative is indicated (e.g. *un*wise, color*less*, *in*visible) but the positive charge is left implicit. In the logical notation both signs will be explicit.

Thus, T-formatives are also oppositional and they too play a role in the predicative sense formation of propositions. The syntactic position of the T-formative is immediately preceding the term and *within* parenthesis:

(+P), (−Q), etc.

A predication is not well-formed if the T-formative is not indicated. Thus the general formal representation of a predication is:

$$\begin{array}{cccc} [\,+/- & (+/-A) & +/- & (+/-B)\,] \\ \uparrow & \uparrow & \uparrow & \uparrow \\ Q & T & P & T \end{array} \leftarrow \text{(FORMARIVES)}$$

Thus, there are three basic types of formatives—P, Q and T formatives. They are essentially signs of logical opposition, and they function as part of the predicative formation of propositions: they are sense-functional. Sommers has pointed out the oppositional feature of formatives, but he has not sufficiently stressed their *cooperative* predicative functions, nor does he treat them as sense-functional signs.

(Predications as a whole have charges-positive or negative-and this is indicated by the main P-formative.)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Basic Predicative Forms in Oppositional Relations

The force of the oppositional thesis of formatives in the analysis of syntactic form of propositions begins to emerge when the complex oppositional relations between basic predicative forms are shown. In the following square of opposition I ignore (for simplicity) the T-formative for the moment and focus on the complete predicative formative: Q——P——; there are four basic propositional forms :



In this square of opposition each of the four basic predicative (propositional) forms stand in either partial or total oppositional relation to the others. These oppositions are formal oppositions in sense-formation. Forms (1) and (4) are in total opposition, and form (2) and (3) are also in total opposition. But forms (1) and (2) are in partial opposition, and the same holds for (3) and (4).

Form I : Form 1 is called total conjunction (TC) which means that there is a total sense-connection between the two terms. But since the Q-sign is negative the predicative connection has a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

direction. This predicative form is *affirmative* and *asymmetric*. The asymmetry means that the predicative connection goes one way and is not reversible (convertible). The formal indication of asymmetry is the internal opposition relation between the Q and P signs when Q and P signs are opposite, the predication is asymmetric, and when they are the same, the predication is symmetric. Symmetry or asymmetry of predication is connected with the *syntactic position* of the terms : prior or posterior position plays an important role in predicative structure. In Form–1 the direction of predication is such that the prior term is totally connected with the posterior term–and it is here that the predication is asymmetric, for in this form the posterior term is *not* totally connected with the prior term. This means that the Q–sign distributes [31] the prior term in the predicative connection. This is a good reason for placing it before the prior term.

Summary : The positive P-sign indicates that the predicative form is affirmative, the negative Q sign indicates that the predication is total and directed. The opposition between the Q and P sign indicates the asymmetry of the predication.

Form 2 Total Disjunction (Negative and Symmetric) This is a negative predicative relation, the two terms are totally and mutually disjoined. This form is symmetric so the predication is convertible with no change of sense-formation. This means that position of terms plays a different role in this form than in the Form 1. The sign of symmetry here is the consonance between the Q-P combination. Since both are *negative* this indicates that both terms are distributed in the predication. This form is in *partial* opposition to *Form I*. They have the same Q-sign, but opposite P-signs. Total opposition in predicative form is when both Q and P signs are jointly opposite.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Form–3–Partial Conjunction (Affirmative Symmetric) : This is a partial conjunction (connection). The positive Q-sign indicates that the two terms are *not* totally connected. Both terms are mutually connected, and the predication is symmetric–both Q and P signs are positive. Neither term is distributed in the predication. This form is the total opposite of Form–2 and a partial opposite of Form–1. Like Form–1 the P–sign is positive, but unlike Form–1 the Q-sign is positive. Like (2) it is symmetric, and it is unlike (1) in this respect.

Form–4–Partial Disjunction (Negative Asymmetric) This is a partial disjunction in sense–connection. This form is asymmetric, and the prior term is partially disjointed with the posterior, while the posterior term is *totally disjoined* with the prior term. This relation is the mirror image of Form–1. The negative P–sign preceding the posterior term is distributed in the predication. Q and P signs are in opposition. This form is the total opposite of the Form-1, and partial opposite of form–2 and 3, but in different respects : like (2) it is negative and unlike (2) it is partial and asymmetric; whereas like (3) it is partial but unlike (4) it is negative and asymmetric.

Summary

These are the four *basic* predicative forms. The T-formatives have been omitted for simplicity. We shall see shortly that when T-formatives (opposition) is introduced there are four distinct modes in each of the four basic forms, bringing the total number of distinct combinations to sixteen forms.

It must be stressed that these oppositional relations are *formal* features of *sense*–relations. Although the plus and minus signs are used to indicate the oppositions, it must be remembered that

...2

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the opposition is in sense-relations (predicative formation). At this point in the presentation of predicative form the *content* of the formatives is ignored. We have been concerned with the formal features of the sense relations which hold for *any* proposition.

Formal Characterization of Entailment

We have seen in the square of opposition that the oppositional thesis of formatives apply not only to the internal (predicative) structure of propositions, but also to the oppositional relations between propositions. This characterization of formatives takes on even greater force when we apply it to the concept of entailment. *Entailment is an extended form of predication* (sense formation). It applies to extended predicative relations between propositions Entailment must not be confused with inference, just as predication must be distinguished from judgment or assertion. Inference is a judgmental function which presupposes entailment relations for its validity. *Entailments* (like predications) are not *acts* of any kind, but purely intensional relations. However, sense relations which hold in virtue of *predicative form* (entailments) must be distinguished from sense relations which are "synthetic', for not all sense-relations are entailments. Entailment relations hold in terms of the *formal properties* of sense relations, not in terms of sense-content. Entailment relations may involve only two propositions (Immediate) or more than two (Intermediate). Entailment relations depend upon the form of predication.

Entailment becomes clear only when there is proper understanding of predication. Attempts to account for logical form by first working out a calculus (or controlled by the interests of calculus) has reversed priorities Once the concept of predication is clarified entailment and inference also become clear, and a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

philosophical calculus suggests itself. Entailment has nothing to do with truth or falsity. It is determined only by the formal properties of predicative relations. We saw earlier in the square of opposition that each basic form exhibited formal properties : affirmative/negative, total/partial, symmetric/asymmetric... ... Entailment is only the *extended predicative relations* between terms which are determined by the formal properties of predications involving the terms in question. Let me illustrate :

Given the predication schema :

(a) – (A) – (B)

with its property of symmetry *another* predication is implicitly given :

(b) – (B) – (A).

This entailment relation is immediate since only one proposition (two terms) are involved. This formal sense–relation between (a) and (b) is called immediate entailment.

Note : Entailment is a formal extension of sense–relation between propositions. But it is not tbe same as the *internal* sense–relation between (A) and (B) in (a).

To take another example which is not immediate :

Given (c) – (A) + (B) and – (B) + (C)

an *entailed predication* is

(d) – (A) + (C)

An entailment relation holds between (c) and (d). In this case a distinct predication is formed (determined) by the formal properties of the given case. In this there is a *transitivity* of the predicative relation between terms (A), (B) and (C) which determines or *yields* (d). Rules of entailment determine which predication(s) are *yielded* when other predication(s) are given.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The *given* predications are called *antecedent predication(s)* and the yielded are called *consequent predication(s)*.

Entailment relation, again, has nothing to do with the content of the predications only with formal properties. In the second illustration, for example, the entailment rule (law) is one of *transitivity of the predicative tie*. Notice that the formation of the entailed (consequent) propositions(s) depends upon the *internal* predicative relations between the constituent terms of the antecedent predication(s). That there should be entailment relations is not surprising since we saw that the sense of a term is constituted by the sense possibilties (predicatibility) it had with other terms.

We shall see in the next part (a) that *valid inference* presupposes entailment relations, and is valid in virtue of entailment. Validity depends upon sense relations, not upon truth-relations (between premises and conclusion .

The Calculus

Sommers has shown that a general calculus of terms is implicit in the opposional notation. There is a straightforward mechanical method of determining entailment relations. The rules of the calculus are determined by the formal properties of the predicative relations The relation of predication is a *unique* relation, but like the cancellation rule used in determining entailment it is governed by the *transitivity* principle. The transitivity principle does not hold for the *predicability* relation, as Sommers has shown in " Types and Ontology ". But it does hold for the predication rel tion : For any three terms if A and B are predicatively related and B and C are predicatively related, then A and C are predicatively related. Here is an illustration of the cancellation rule :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

1) (−A+B and −B+C) + (entails) (−A+C)

The calculus works in this case since the logical "addition" of the "antecendents" yield the consequent. The cancellation of the "B" term is governed by the transitive property of the predicative relation (This is a preliminary and incomplete presentation These points will be discussed more systematically later).

It should be noted that analytic *statements* such as "Bachelors are Unmarried Males" are not the same as entailments. Entailments depend upon the *formal* properties of the predicative relations, but analytic *predications* depend upon the sense–content relations between the given terms This is discussed in detail below.

Section 3

The Predicative Analysis of General Propositions

In this section I shall attempt to establish the view that general *propositions* are predicative in form. I stress the term 'proposition' here for, as was pointed out earlier, there are important differences between proposition and judgment (assertion, statement), that there is a disparity between propositional form and assertive form If it can be established that general propositions are predicative, then this will be a major step towards establishing the generic concept of predication, and a critical move away from the Fregean analysis of predication. For it is generally accepted that one of the major contributions of Frege was his thesis that general propositions were not predicative in form The classical Aristotelian view of general propositions, which held sway until the time of Frege/Russell, was that they were indeed predicative in logical form Yet it was precisely in this assumption that Frege viewed the classical theory as most deficient. Logic could not advance, he held, until it was clearly

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

recognized that general propositions were of a radically different *logical* form from predication. Thus, for example, the classical view was that the proposition "All humans are mortal" was predicative—the predicate 'are mortal' being affirmed of the subject 'all humans'. Frege maintained, in opposition to this, that the logical form of such a proposition is :

"For every object, if it is human, then it is mortal" which is symbolized as :

$$(x)\ (Hx \supset Mx).$$

In this quntificational analysis the quantifier applies to a compound (proposltional) function which involves a propositional formative (connective)—'if...then...'. And since propositional connectives form propositions which are not predicative—compound propositions—it is clearly shown that general propositions are not at all predicative in form.

Neverthless, the idea of predication (in Frege's sense) is central to the analysis of general statements. For the compound propositional function $(Hx = Mx)$ exhibits of predicative relation in both the antecdeent (Hx) as well as the consequent (Mx) ...whieh are atomic propositional functions. ((Hx) by itself is not a predication, but is a *predicative function*). Predication, on the Fregean view, is essentially logically singular–that is, predication consists in the juxtaposition of a predicate (function)–absolute or relative—to an *individual object* or ordered sequence of individuals : Fx, Gxy, Hxyz, etc. Frege rejected the subject-predicate model of predication and replaced it by a *functional* model in which the predicate is an essentially incomplete function which applies to (is completed by) an individual object (or ordered sequences of objects). For example, the subject/predicate proposition

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Socrates is wise"

is replaced by the functional notation :

Ws

where the predicate is the function "W"–an incomplete sign, and "s" represents the *individual* Socrates

(In this section I shall restrict attention to cases of absolute predication. For present purposes we may ignore relational predication for it too involves predicates applied to individuals–in ordered sequence)

Predication, then, essentially involves the completion of predicate function by an individual. Frege's analysis of atomic propositions (atomic propositions are predicative) involved Function and Argument or Concept and Individual) Object. A particular ontology is already built into this view of predication viz, that reality consists of two types of entities–concepts (functions) and objects (individuals). The connection between predication and ontology will be discussed later The central point to focus on here is that for Frege atomic propositions are predicative, *predication is essentially logically singular,* and that there is an essential asymmetry between the constituents of predication–both in terms of their logical function as well as in terms of what they represent.

It is this view of predication that I wish to reject. I must reject it if I am to establish the view that general propositions are peedicative in logical form. The Fregean view–that predication is logically singular–is a common denominator in the most important recent discussions of predication For example, writers such as Quine, Geach Strawson and Searle, who disagree on certain important points in logical theory, nevertheless all presuppose the Fregean view that predication is logically singular.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The first task, then, is to reconstruct the assumptions which lead to the view that predication is *essentially* singular, and to show that this view of predication is mistaken. Of course I do not mean to suggest that singular propositions are not predication, for they are predicative. My aim is rather two show that the concept of predication is not essentially singular, and that other forms of propositions are predicative. I shall follow Sommers in calling it "the dogma of singular predication".

The Dogma of Singular Predication

The dogma of singular predication is the mistaken view that predication is essentially logically singular—that it consists in a relation between a singular term (logical subject) and a general term in predicative position (predicate). On this view singular terms are logical subjects, and only such terms are logical subjects. Singular terms perform a referring role in predication, and singular terms alone are referring expressions. General terms, in contrast, are essentially predicative and cannot be logical subjects, and do not function referentially in predication. This means that there is an absolute asymmetry between logical function of singular terms (logical subjects) and general terms (logical predicates) : a singular term cannot be predicative, and a general term cannot be a logical subject. The implication is that singular propositions alone are predicative, and general propositions (propositions whose constituents are general terms) are not predicative in logical form.[32]

This view, which derives froms Frege, forms the basis of cannonical notation of quantificational theory.

The first step, then, is to show that this view of predication is held, with some variations by certain of the most prominent ercent writers on predication. I shall focus on Quine, Geach,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Strawson and Searle. The next step will be to challenge the key assumptions which constitute the dogma of singular predication. Again, these are :

1) Predication consists in a relation between singular and general term (terms are expressions).

2) Singular terms are essentially logical subjects, and only singular terms (definite and indefinite) are logical subject.

3) General terms are essentially predicative, and cannot logically occupy position of logical subject.

4) Singular terms are referring expressions, and only singular terms are referring expressions. Logical subects are essentially referring expressions, or identify [specify] individuals. General terms apply to the references of singular terms.

5) Consequently, there is an absolule asymmetry between subject and predicate, between singular term and general term.

6) And, predication is essentially linked with reference and satisfaction [truth], hence with fact and existence.

Let us begin with Quine. In *Word and Object* Quine characterizes predication in the following way :

"The basic combination in which general and singular terms find their contrasting roles is that of *predication* : 'Mama is a woman', or schematically 'a is an F' where 'a' represents a singular term and 'F' a general term. Predication joins a general term and a singular term to form a sentence that is true or false according as the general term is true or false of the object, if any, to which the singular term refers". (p. 96)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It should be especially noted in this characterization that the *relation* of predication is one in which the singular term refers to an individual and (if it exists) the general term is true or false of it. In this characterization predication is essentially a relation involving *reference* to an individual and *satisfaction* (true or false *of*) of a general term. The general term *applies* to the *referent* of the singular term.

In discussing Quine's characterization of predication Strawson claims that the distinction made between singular and general term requires further clarification and explanation. He says,

> " If my reading of Quine's sentence is correct, there is a much more important point to be made. It is that the distinction drawn remains inadequately explained. The explanation raises, rather than answers, questions. 'Predication joins a general term and a singular term to form a sentence...'—a sentence in which the two kinds of term exhibit the obscure differences I have set out But what is it that *accounts* for these differences. Unless we can answer this question, we shall certainly not fully understand the distinction; indeed we shall not know what predication is... Singular terms are what yield truth–value gaps when they fail in their role. General terms are what yield truth or falsity, when singular terms succeed in their roles, by themselves applying, or failing to apply, to what the singular term applies to. This is more or less what we have. It scarcely seems enough. We want to ask 'Why' ?"("Singular Terms and Predication", *Philosophical Logic*, P. F Strawson (ed.), Oxford, 1967 p. 73)

The point is that Strawson concurs with Quine in the basic characterization of predication, but he criticizes Quine for not going far enough in explaining the critical distinction between a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

singular and general term. Strawson agrees with Quine that the distinction is not accounted for by claiming that a singular term applies to just one object, while general terms apply to more than one object. For a singular term such as 'Pegasus', may apply to nothing at all, while some general terms such as 'natural satellite of the earth' may each apply to just one thing. Quine insists that "it is by grammatical role that singular and general terms are properly to be distinguished". It is this contrast in grammatical role that Strawson claims requires explanation. He points out that the two contrasting expressions in Quine's characterization of predication, 'is true of', associated with the general term and 'refers to' associated with the singular term, themselves require explanation :

> ".. the difference in force between the expressions 'is true of' and 'refers to' calls as loudly for explanation as the expressions 'general term' and 'singular term' themselves. Neither pair, unaided, serves to explain the other. This is why I ignored the difference of expression and used instead the undifferentiated idiom of *application*". (*op. cit.*, p. 74)

Strawson attempts to improve on Quine's explanation with the following proposal :

> "The characteristic difference, I suggest, is that the singular term is used for the purpose of *identifying* the object, of bringing it about that the hearer (or, generally, the audience) knows *which* or *what* object is in question; while the general term is not. It is enough if the general term in fact applies to the object; it does not have to identity it" (*ibid.*, p. 74).

Whether or not this is an improvement remains to be seen. The point to notice is that the notion of identifying an object is an epistemic/pragmatic one. In effect Strawson is relying upon such

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

criteria to distinguish between singular and general term. Strawson apparently believes that this is an improvement over Quine's appeal to contrast in grammatical role. In any case, even though Strawson uses more "neutral" term 'applies to' it is clear that he subscribes to the view that predication is logically singular and that a predication consists in a general term "applying to" an *object* which a singular term "identifies".

Let us turn for a moment to another aspect of the singular dogma of predication. It is that predication consists in a relation between an expression (predicate) and an object (which is *referred to* or *named by* a logical subject). Let us call this the "extensionalist thesis" to contrast it with the intentionalist view that predication consists in a *sense-relation* between constituents of propositions. The extensionalist view of predication is that it consists in a relation (of satisfaction--true or false of-) between a predicate (expression) and an *object* (referent). Geach gives a clear statement of the extensionalist view of predication: "As used in this work, the terms "subject" and "predicate" will always be linguistic terms; I shall never call a man a logical subject, but only the name of a man—the name "Peter", not the Apostle, is the subject of "Peter was an Apostle", and not the property of being an Apostle but its verbal expression is a predicate. I shall say, however, that what the predicate in "Peter was an Apostle" is predicated of is Peter, not his name; for it is Peter, not his name, that is being said to have been an Apostle. In saying that something is predicated of Peter, I do not mean that this predicate is true of or applies to Peter, but only that in some significant sentence, true or false, it is predicated of Peter. I shall say that a predicate is *attached to* a subject, is *predicated of* what the subject stands for, and *applies* to or is *true of* this if the statement so formed is true" (*Reference and Generality* p. 22–23).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In this characterization the view that predication is logically singular is implicit, and the extensionalist thesis is quite explicit. Notice that Geach is cautious in hinting at a distinction between the relation of predication and the relation of satisfaction–a predicate being *true of* an object.

Geach gives a provisional explanation of the terms "subject" and "predicate" which links predication with assertion, but shortly afterwards he distinguished the two notions. The provisional explanation is: "A *predicate* is an expression that gives us an assertion about something if we attach it to another expression that stands for what we are making the assertion about. A *subject* of a sentence S is an expression standing for something that S is about. S itself being formed by attaching a predicate to expression" (*Ibid.* p, 23).[33] Notice here that the terms "subject" and "predicate" are *expsessions* (linguistic items) and that they are defined in terms of what an *assertion* is about, etc. (Later on I shall drop these terms (subject and predicate) altogether, partly because of these connotations.) Geach realizes that it is a mistake to identify predication and assertion, and he attempts to avoid this confusion by linking predication with what he calls a "proposition". In Geach's sense, a proposition does not convey assertion, but it is a linguistic entity; it is not a proposition in the sense of Frege's thoughts. Geach's favored characterization of predication is then presented: "Thus our explanation of 'predicable' and 'predicate' will be: A *predicable* is an expression that gives us a proposition about something if we attach it to another expression that stands for what we are forming the proposition about; the predicable then becomes a *predicate* and the other expression is *subject*; I call such a proposition a *predication*" (*Ibid.* p. 25).

Another feature of the dogma of singular predication is the absolute asymmetry between subject and predicate. This asym-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

metry is explicitly recognized by both Geach and Strawson. First Geach :

> " Given my explanations of " subject " and " predicate ", it follows that a name can occur in a proposition only as a logical subject; if the same expression appears to be used now predicatively, now as a name, that is a misleading feature of our language. Thus names and predicables are absolutely different. A name has a complete sense, and can stand by itself in a simple act of naming; a predicable on the other hand, is a potential predicate, and a predicate never has a complete sense, since it does not show what the predication is about, it is what is left of a proposition when the subject is removed, and thus essentially contains an empty place to be filled by a subject " (*Ibid.*, p. 31-32)

Geach proceeds to reject the notion of a term which can function either as subject or as predicate in different predications :

> " A term, as conceived in Aristotelian logic, is supposed capable of being a subject in one proposition and a predicate in anorher; since only names, not predicables, can be logical subject, this notion of terms has no application whatsoever." (*Ibid.* p. 34)

Strawson's version of the asymmetry is more sophisticated than Geach's. For Strawson argues that a category criterion determines which of two given terms is logical subject and logical predicate, so that it is possible for certain non–singular terms to occupy subject position. Nevertheless, singular terms are absolutely always logical subjects :

> " Two terms coupled in a true sentence stand in referential and predicative position, respeetively, if what the first term designates or signifies is a case or instance of what the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

second term signifies. Items thus related (or the terms that designate or specify them) may be said respectively to be of lower and of higher type: and this is why I called the new criterion one of type) (*op. cit*, p. 83).

Strowson continues below :

"...so implicit in this criterion of relative position is the consequence that a term designating a particular can never occupy predicative position. A term signifying a kind or property, however, may occupy referential or predicate position depending upon whether it is, or is not, coupled with a term of still higher type."

Strawson does not seem to notice that his criterion would lead to general predications, since it permits general terms as logical subjects if it is "lower" in type. Nevertheless, he insists that singular terms can never occupy predicative position.

We now have enough to begin with. The above references were given in order to show that certain important writers on predication do subscribe to the dogma of singular predication, in one form or another. Let us turn attention now to the rejection of the dogma. I shall proceed step by step to reject each of the assumptions of this view of predication.

Rejection of the Dogma

Strategy

As we reflect on the set of assumptions (thesis) which constitute what we are calling the dogma of singular predication it is apparent that the thesis mutually support one another and together form a formidable circle. For example, one thesis is that a logical subject is an *individual*, and individuals are specified by *referring* expressions. But singular terms are logical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

subjects. Conversely, logical predicates are essentially incomplete expressions " —is P " or " P— " which are completed by individual expressions. But a predicate is not a name, not a referring expression–they function in a fundamentally different way from singular terms or referring expressions. Since general terms are essentially predicative, it follows that they perform a different logical (grammatical) function from singular terms; since they are essentially predicative, they can never be logical subjects, are not referring expressions. Furthermore, since predication consists in a relation between subject and predicate, it is clear that predication involves a relation between singular and general terms. Thus, if we begin with a certain view of logical subject and predicate–it leads to the singular dogma, and if we begin with a certain conception of the difference between singular and general terms it leads likewise to the singular dogma. The dogma of singular predication is essentially tied to another thesis–that singular terms alone are referring expressions. Now I am not suggesting that those who subscribe to the singular dogma actually argue in this way, I propose it as a reconstruction of their view.

There are various ways in which we can go about challenging this view of predication. We could, for example, argue that general terms can be logical subjects, and if logical subjects are referring expressions, then the case has to be made that general terms, too, refer. Or, we may proceed by denying that a logical subjects refers at all (is a referring expression) on the grounds that predication is independent of both *reference* and *satisfaction* (an *expression* being true or false of an *object*), it being the *sense*–structure of *propositions*. This strategem requires a distinction between proposition and statement, between sense on the one hand, and reference truth on the other. Still another way to proceed is to challenge the thesis that there is an absolute

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(or relative) asymmetry between logical subject and predicate, between singular and general term. This approach requires a defense of the concept of a term as a propositional constituent which may function either in prior or posterior position. We have seen that Geach dismisses such as suggestion (which was essential to the Aristotelian theory of predication) as completely wrong-headed. This means that a *term theory* of predication, in which a term is conceived as being potentially either subject or predicate, must answer the quite legitimate charges leveled against it by its opponents. In any case, the assault on the asymmetry thesis will involve establishing that singular and general terms can each play the other role in predication ... etc., etc.

Thus, there are various ways of going about breaking through the tight circle of theses which constitute the singular dogma. In what follows I shall be eventually following through each of these lines of attack, as well as others. However, the best way to reject the dogma is not in a piecemeal and fragmentary way, but in a wholistic and comprehensive approach. There is, I believe, a basic assumption upon which the singular dogma (in its various dimensions) rests. It is what I have called the *extensionalist* thesis. This is the view that predication consists in a relation between an expression (linguistic) and an individual object (reference of a logical subject). The *relation* is that of *satisfaction* i.e., the predicate *expression* being *true or false of the object* referred to be the logical subject. On the extensionalist thesis predication is a relation which essentially involves the notion of reference and truth (satisfaction). I am claiming that this thesis is the *root assumption* of the singular dogma. If this can be shown to be an unsatisfactory account of predication then the cluster of assumptions which constitute the dogma may be rejected. This is the strategy I shall take.

...3

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The Term Theory of Predication

In section (2) I presented a generic analysis of predication which is the model we will now use in arguing against the extensionalist thesis. It should be noted, first of all, that the term theory of predication sketched in the earlier section is different in important ways from both the Aristotelian version of the term theory as well as certain recent versions, such as Strawson's. These differences will be brought out again as we proceed. The point that I wish to make here is that the compelling arguments which have been presented against *certain version* of the term theory do not automatically apply to the version I am arguing for. It is granted that certain versions of the term theory are vulnerable to some of the objections raised by its opponents. This does not mean that every version of the term theory is *inherently* inadequate. What is needed is a term theory of predication which can meet the objections and which is not susceptible to the mistakes of the extensionalist dogma of a singular predication.

Let us proceed then In sections (1) and (2) it was argued that predication is essentially an *intensional* concept—i.e., the sense-formative structure of *propositions*. It was pointed out that this characterization of predication and of proposition was not at all alien to Frege's logical theory. On the contrary, the notion of proposition presented was precisely the Fregean one. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the notion of the proposition was in effect subscribed to by Geach and Searle. For both these writers distinguish (as Frege did) between propositional account and assertion (judgment), and both concur that predication is independent of assertion. For example, Searle says,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

"Thus *a proposition is to be sharply distinguished from an assertion or statement of it*, (his italics) since in utterances of 1–7 the same proposition occurs, but only in 1 and 5 is it asserted. Stating and asserting are acts, but propositions are not acts. A proposition is what is asserted in the act of asserting, what is stated in the act of stating. The same point in a different way : an assertion is a (very special kind of) commitment to the truth of a proposition...".

"I might summarize this part of my set of distinctions by saying that I am distinguishing between the illocutionary act and the prorositional content of the illocutionary act" (*Speech Acts*, p. 29 7 30).

Note : Geach makes a very similar point in section 19 of *Reference and Generality* pp. 24–25. And Strawson makes the distinction in a different maaner—he distinguishes between the sentence (meaning) and the use of the sentence on some occassion to make a statement. (See *Introduction to Logical Theory*, p. 175.)

The point here is that Frege, Geach, Strawson, Searle, etc., claim in one way or another to distinguish between propositional content (sense, significance, meaning) on the one had and assertion, judgment, stating, illocutionary force, referring, etc., on the other. Also there is basic agreement that predication has to do with propositional content. The concept of predication explicated in sections (1) and (2) agrees with both these points. However, it was argued above that sense (propositions) and truth (judgment, reference, satisfaction) are independent concepts, and if they are related, they are related in a peculiar way which has not been properly understood. So despite the intention to distinguish between proposition (predicability, sense) and truth (assertibility), the concept of predication (as the structure

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of a certain type of proposition) becomes confused with reference and satisfaction. Searle is a good example. He says,

> " My use of the verb " predicate " departs seriously from the traditional philosophic use and requires justification. First, expressions, not universals, are predicated of objects. I adopt this convention because the introduction of universals seems to me both misleading and unnecessary in giving an account of the use of predicate expressions, and also because I wish to bring out the connection between the notion of predication and the notion of truth : *expressions, not universals, can be said to be true or false of objects*" (*Speech Acts*, p 26)

Here is a good example of the extensionalist thesis–that predication consists in a relation (being true or false of) between an expression and an object. Later in his book Searle stresses the point again :

> " The relation between predication and truth can perhaps be made a bit clearer. To know the meaning of a general term and hence a predicate expression is to know under what conditions it is true or false of a given object. It is true under certain conditions, false under others–and for some objects and some predicates neither true nor false under any conditions, as we shall see. If a speaker asserts a proposition concerning an object, he commits himself to there being the state of affairs in the world in which the predicate is true of the object the predicate indicates which state of affairs concerning the object the speaker is committing himself to The older philosophers were not wrong when they said : to know the meaning of a proposition is to know under what conditions it is true or false. But their account was incomplete for they did not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

discuss the different illocutionary acts in which a proposition could occur" (*Speech Acts*, p 125)

The tension between linking predication with propositional content, on the one hand, and linking it with truth conditions on the other, is intensified in Searle's case. For he claims that the proposition is not an act at all, but he goes on to treat predication as a speech act. Consider the following passages :

".. the characteristic grammatical form of the propositional acts are parts of sentences : grammatical predicates for the act of predication, and proper names, pronouns, and certain other sorts of phrases for reference. Propositional acts cannot occur alone; that is, one cannot just refer and predicate without making an assertion or asking a question or performing some other illocutionary act." (*Ibid.* p. 25)

and

"We have throughout the analysis of speech acts been distinguishing between what we might call *content* and *function*. In the total illocutionary act the content is the proposition; the function is the illocutionary force with which the proposition is presented. In the act of identifying reference, the content is the sense of or identifying description associated with utterence of the referring expression : the function is the role of identifying an object in which the sense is presented. As I have tried to make clear, this distinction does not genuinely apply to predication. *Predication provides only content, and the content is presented* at least in the kinds of simple speech acts we have been considering, is determined entirely by the illocutionary force of the utterance", (*Ibid* ,pp. 125-126)

In the first passage Searle speaks of the predication as a speech act (a propositional act) ("Predication is also an abstraction, but it is not a separate act. It is a slice from the total illocutionary

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

act..." p. 123) but in the second selection he stresses that predication provides only propositional content, and this (as he points out in an earlier quote from p. 29) is not an act at all.

Note : A similar tension is found in Geach. He makes a sharp distinction between proposition (predication) and assertion, and yet he characterizes predication in terms of reference and satisfaction. He sees, on the one hand, the need to distinguish between sense or significance (predication) from the concept of truth, but on the other hand he links the two notions anyway. The result of this tension is manifested in various passages of his book. For example, in the following passages he attempts the distinction only to end up saying something trivial :

> " In saying that something is predicated of Peter, I do not mean that this predicate is true of or applies to Peter, but only that in some significant sentence, true or false, it is predicate of Peter." (*Reference and Generality*, p. 24)

To summarize, it is apparent that there is common ground between the intensionalist theory of predication (which I am explicating) and the extensionalist theory advocated by the various writers discussed above. Both approaches distinguish between proposition (or sentence), to which sense or significance is attached, and various acts—judgment, assertion, referring—or functions which are performed on propositions. The intention is to treat predication intensionally, however, the extensionalist inevitably confuses predication with reference and satisfaction. The reason for this was already presented in section (1), viz., failure to grasp the peculiar relation between sense and truth.

Terms and Expressions

The point has been made that the extensionalist intends (or at least should) to treat predication intensionally, but fails. Part of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the reason for this is failure to recognize that *predication consists in a sense relation between terms*, not between an expression (linguistic) and an object. This is a category mistake. Predication is the sense-structure of propositions, and we have seen that the constituents of propositions are terms which are specified by expressions, not of expressions themselves. Neither expressions nor referents (objets referred to) are constituents of propositions. Propositions are neither linguistic expressions (sentences) nor objects themselves (states). This is granted by Frege. Propositions are intelligible contents which are independent of reference, judgment, assertion, etc. Predication, as the sense structure of propositions, consists in a relation—a configuration—between the constituents of propositions—i.e. between terms. The distinction between terms and expressions will be discussed in detail below where the distinction between singular and general terms is examined. The preliminary point being stressed is that the relation between a predicate (which is linguistic expression) and an *object* (which is the referent of a logical subject) is not *a relation of predication*, but a different relation—the relation of satisfaction. It is a mistake to identify predication with satisfaction.

Predication is a configuration of propositional constituents or terms.

Singular and General Terms

In order to get clear on the intensional concept of predication we need to examine more closely the notion of a term, and to distinguish between singular and general terms. Our present aim is to show how the extensionalist thesis leads to the dogma of singular predication, and to argue step by step against each of the theses which constitute the dogma. The critique of the extensionalist thesis will involve a clarification of the intensional analysis of predication.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

First some preliminary remarks. In section (2) where the generic-intensional concept of predication was explicated, I focused on the notion of a term *in general* with no regard for specific type differences between terms or between propositions. In the ensuing discussion I shall deal with type differences between terms, and corresponding type differences between propositions. The guiding principle in distinguishing between types of terms is that the differences must be evident in the sense-content itself, not in the reference or referent, nor in the grammatical role (as Quine suggests), nor in that of identifying/pragmatic functions which *expressions* are used to perform, such as that of identifying some particular (as Strawson suggests). Terms are sense-contents, and they do not refer, nor do they identify objects. Since they are not expressions they do not refer, nor are they *true of* objects.

Subject and Predicate Replaced by Prior and Posterior Terms

For the above reasons it becomes important to distinguish between the concept of a term and the notions of logical subject and predicate. In fact, it was suggested earlier that we drop *all talk of subject and predicate* in the theory of prenication, since these concepts are inherently confused and carry all sorts of connotations (linguistic, rhetorical, psychological, epistemic, pragmatic, judgmental, assertive, etc.) which confuse theoretical issues more than anything else. I am convinced that a major reason for confused thinking about predication, and for failure to recognize the generic-intensional concept of predication, is that predication has been essentially linked with the notions of subject and predicate. For one thing, the ordinary use of these terms, as Frege pointed out, carry connotations of ordinary grammar (linguistics) and indicate psychological-rhetorical distinctions. But even a specialized use of the terms (*logical* subject and predicate) is tied to concepts alien to predication:

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a) assertion—predication consists in affirming or denying a predicate of a subject.

b) expressions—subject and predicate are linguistic expressions, and predication is a relation between subject and predicate.

c) "about"—every predication is *about something*, and the subject of a sentence is what the predication is about, while the predicate is *what is said* (asserted) about it.

d) object/attribute—a logical subject stands for (refers to) an individual, and a predicate describes or attributes some property (quality, attribute) to that object, etc.

So, even the technical notions of subject and predicate used in logical analysis are tied to the concepts of assertion, judgment, attribution, description, reference, individual, properties, etc, and cut across semantic-epistemic-pragmatic-syntactic lines. Let us take Frege's advice[34], then, (although for different reasens) and drop all talk of subjct and predicate. The generic concept of predication is not the view that every proposition is subject-predicate in form. Let us follow the suggestion made earlier that we use the more neutral terminology of *prior and posterior terms* to replace subjecr and predicate, respectively. This terminology has the advantage of not locking us into the dogma of singular predication, as the subject-predicate terminology does. For it is much too easy to move from "subject" to "thing" or "particular", "object" or "individual", and from "predicate" to "property", "attribute" or "universal". Once a link (association) is made between "subject", "object" and "singular term", and between "predicate", "property" and "general term", the dogma of singular predication is a *fait accompli*. It then appears to follow *by definition* that predication is logically

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

singular, and that there is an inherent asymmetry built into the very concept of predication. By contrast, the neutral (purely syntactic) expressions–"prior term" and "posterior term" leave the issue open whether a singular or general or relational or state term, etc. can "occupy" prior or posterior position in predication, and it also leaves open the issue whether predication is inherently asymmetric.

Now we can begin anew. We have distinguished between term (as constituents of propositions) and linguistic expressions (which are used to represent terms), and we have dropped talk of subject and predicate in the theory of predication If there is any theoretical connection between singular term and logical subject and between general term and logical predicate it will have to be established independently. At this point at least there is no necessary connection between singular term and prior position, or between general term and posterior position. The question before us now is, "What is to count as a singular and a general term, and what is the basis of the distinction between them ?"

Before examining certain proposals which have been made, we must elaborate and clarify the issue. Thus far we have been *assuming* that there are important logical differences between singular and general terms, and perhaps even that these differences warrant our treating singular and general terms as being of *different types*. But until we have criteria for *type* differences between terms, and criteria for picking out those differences which are logically relevant, we have no basis for this assumption. What is most needed at this stage is a criterion for type distinctions between terms. What differences between terms are logically relevant from the point of view of predicative form ? How many types of terms are there ? Does difference in predi-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cative role, function or syntactic position ? Are certain terms suited only for a specific role in predication, or is the type of a term independent of predicative role of syntactic position ? These and other related questions must be answered if we are to understand the differences and relations between, for example, singular and general terms, and between singular and general propositions. Another way of putting the basic issue before us is:—granted that there are important logical differences between singular and general propositions, are these such that they are radically different (as Frege suggests) in logical form ? Or are the logical differences between them such that they nevertheless share a common predicative form (as I am urging) ?

Let us work with the commonly accepted inventory of terms, and perhaps even add a few, and hope that the criteria we are seeking will eventually emerge. It is commonly accepted that the following are different types of terms :

1) singular – "Socrates"
2) general – "human"
3) relational – "greater than"
4) mass – "water"
5) propositional or state – "(Socrates being human)"
"(The cat's being on the mat)"

etc.,

The first three are more or less uncontroversial, but the last two are questionable. Perhaps mass terms are cases of general terms. Perhaps "proposltional" or "state" terms are not terms at all. Or, perhaps they are singular terms, etc. Presumably, type differences between terms involve type differences between the propositions of which they are constituents.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Now there are other differences between terms; for example, there are simple terms, compound terms, complex terms, abstract terms, concrete terms, definite or indefinite terms, etc. But these differences are not usually taken to be relevant to the logical type of a term. Nevertheless, the question remains open as to how many distinct types of terms there are.

It must be recalled that terms are *sense-contents*—constituents of *propositions*. They are not linguistic expressions, not constituents of sentences. This distinction becomes crucial here. For it will be seen that *linguistic differences* between *exppessions* do not always reflect *logical* differences between *terms*. Expressions represent or *connote* terms, and different types of expressions may each connote the same term. For example, proper name, definite singular description (or descriptive phrase), singular pronoun, demonstrative, etc., are different expression-forms, yet they all specify singular terms Thus, " Socrates ", " The teacher of Plato ", " he " used to specify Socrates, " this man ", used to specify Socrates, etc. Important *linguistic* differences need not reflect logical differences. This is another reason for observing the distinction between terms and expressions. Singular terms are not to be identified with proper names (or even logically proper names), for other forms of linguistic expressions equally well specify singular terms. This point is developed below.

As we turn attention now to certain views of singular and general terms let us recall the guiding principle mentioned earlier: that since terms are sense-contents, criteria for type differences between terms should be purely semantic, i.e., should be reflected intensionally in the sense-content.

The Extensionalist View of Singular and General Terms

The extensionalist fallacy of predication is the dual mistake of confusing expressions with terms (propositional constituents).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in particular, singular terms with *names* (proper) or various forms of referring phrases, and general terms with predicative expressions, and confusing *predication* (sense relations between terms) with a relation between a predicate expression and the individual object referred to by the referring phrase. The notion of logical subject is identified with singular term or referring phrase.

The following passage from Geach illustrates this :

"Given my explanations of "subject" and "predicate", it follows that a name can occur in a proposition only as a logical subject; if the same expression appears to be used now predicatively, now as a name, this is a misleading feature of our language. Thus names and predicables are absolutely different. A name has a complete sense, and can stand by itself in a simple act of naming ; a predicable, on the other hand, is a potential predicate, and a predicate never has a complete sense, since it does not show what the predication is about; it is what is left of a proposition when the subject is removed, and thus essentially contains an empty place to be filled by a subject. And though a predicable may occur in a proposition otherwise than as a predicate attached to a subject, it does not then lose its predicative, incomplete character; it has sense only as contributing toward the sense of a proposition, not all by itself.

A predicable applies to or is true of things; for example, 'Peter struck—' applies to Malchus (whether it is actually predicated of Malchus or not). This relation must be sharply distinguished from the relation of name to bearer, which is confounded with it in the 'Aristotelian' tradition under the term 'denoting'. A predicable never names what

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

it is true of, and 'Peter struck—' does not even look like a name of Malchus". (*Reference and Generality*, pp. 31–32)

Geach points out again and that it is a mistake to confuse the relation between a name and the object named, with the relation between a predicate expression and the object to which it *applies*. He accuses Aristotle of committing this error :

"(Aristotle) treats predication as an attachment of one (*horos*) to another term. Whereas the *rhema* was regarded as essentially predicative, 'always a sign of what is said of something else', it is impossible on the new doctrine for any term to be essentially predicative; on the contrary, any term that occurs in a proposition predicatively may be made into a subject–term of another predication. I shall call this 'Aristotle's thesis of interchangeability'; his adoption of it marks a transition from the original name-and-predicable theory to a two-term theory...

"Aristotle's going over to the two–term theory was a disaster comparable to the Fall of Adam. What kept Aristotle from seeing he had gone wrong was the spectacular success of his theory of syllogism...and the beautiful theory will have blinded Aristotle to the shakiness of its foundations.

"It is logically impossible for a term to shift about between subject and predicate positions without undergoing a change in sense as well as a change of role. Only a name can be a logical subject; and a name cannot retain the role of a name if it becomes a logical predicate; for a predicate purports to give us what holds good or does not hold good of an individual, but a name just serves to name or refer to an individual". "History of the Corruptions of Logic" (*Logic Matters* pp. 47–48)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Whether or not Aristotle commits the error Geach attributes to him does not concern us here. For clearly it is an error to confuse "being a name of" with "being a predicable applying to". However, I shall argue shortly that the two-term theory is not, as Geach claims, inherently defective. Aristotle's movement to the two-term theory was a theoretical advance, and the interchangeability thesis is essentially correct. The ironic point in the above passage is that while Geach is busy accusing Aristotle of the error of confusing naming with predicating, he himself thereby comits the extensionalist fallacy of predication—he confuses expressions with terms, and predication with the relation between an expression and an object.

Quine is another good example of a writer who commits the extensionalist fallacy. It is clear that he treats singular terms as linguistic expressions (constituents of sentences) which are names or referring expressions, and general terms are (part of) predicative expressions. Both singular and general terms are constituents of sentences. He says,

> "The singular term 'Jones' is ambiguous in that it might be used in different contexts to name any of various persons, but it is still a singular term in that it purports in any particular content to name one and only one person. The same is true even of pronouns such as 'I' and 'thou'; these again are singular terms, but merely happen to be highly ambiguous pending determination through the context or other circumstances attending any given use of them. The same may be said of 'the man', or more clearly 'the President', 'the cellar'; these phrases (unlike 'man', 'president', and 'cellar' themselves) are singular terms, but the one and only one object to which they purport to refer in any given use depends on attendant circumstances for its determination". (*Methods of Logic*, p. 217)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Quine goes on to distinguish between *concrete* and *abstract* terms.

> " Concrete terms are those which purport to refer to individuals, physical objects, events; abstract terms are those which purport to refer to abstract objects, e.g., to numbers, classes, attributes. Thus some singular terms, e.g., 'Socrates', Cerberus', 'earth', 'the author of *Waverley*', are concrete, while other singular terms, e.g., ' 7 ', 3 + 4 ', ' piety ' are abstract. Again some general terms e.g., 'man', 'house', 'red house', are concrete (since each man or house is a concrete individual), while others, e.g. 'prime number', ' zoological species', ' virtue ' are abstract (since each number is an abstract object..." (*Ibid.*, p. 217)

Next, Quine draws a contrast between singular and general terms :

> " ...the singular abstract term differs from the general concrete term in an important way : it purports to name one and only one object, abstract though it be, while the general term does not purport to name at all. The general term may indeed "be true of " each of many things, viz. each red thing, or each man, but this kind of reference is not called naming; "naming ", at least I shall use the word, is limited to the case where the named object purports to be unique". (*Ibid.*, p. 211)

What does it mean for a singular term or name to *purport* to name one object ? And what does it mean for a named object to *purport* to be unique ? These questions will be taken up shortly when I turn to critique of the extensionalist thesis. Quine realizes that this talk of ' purport ' is vague :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

"The division of terms into concrete and abstract is a distintion only in kinds of objects referred to. The distinction between singular and general terms is more vital from a logical point of view. Thus far it has been drawn out only in a vague way : a term is singular if it purports to name an object (one and only one), and otherwise general". (*Ibid.*, p. 218)

Quine characterizes the distinction in syntactic terms :

"In terms of logical structure, what it means to say that the singular term "purports to name one and only one object" is just this : *The singular term belongs in positions of the kind in which it would be coherent to use variables 'x', 'y',* (or, in ordinary language, pronouns) ...

General terms, in contrast to singular ones, do not occur in positions appropriate to variables." (*Ibid.*, pp. 218–219)

Finally, it becomes clear that Quine makes an essential connection between general terms and predicate expression :

"The positions occupied by general terms have indeed no status at all in logical grammar, for we have found that for logical purposes the predicate recommends itself as the unit of analysis; thus 'Socrates is a man' comes to be viewed as compounded of 'Socrates' and '(1) is a man', the latter being an indissoluble unit in which 'man' stands merely as a constituent syllabus comparable to the 'rat' in 'Socrates'". (*Ibid.*, p. 220)

So much for exposition. Let us turn now to critique."

Criticism of Extensionalist View of Singular and General Terms

The extensionalist makes three (related) mistakes in his treatment of terms and predication :

...4

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

1) The first mistake is that of confusing singular terms (propositional-sense-constituents) with a particular form of expression–names and referring expressions, hence confusing singular term with reference.

2) The second mistake is that of treating general terms (propositional-sense constituents) as predicate-expressions, hence also confusing general term with predicative function.

3) The third mistake is that of treating predication (as the sense-formative structure of propositions) as a relation between a predicate expression and the object referred to or named by the subject–expression or singular term. The result is a confusion of predication (sense) with assertibility (truth) and it seems to follow that predication involves existential import.

Let us see why these are mistakes and why they take place. We will begin with the first mistake.

The Naming Fallacy of Singular Terms

The relation between a name and the object named is not logically important (relevant) to predication, for predication is the sense-formative structure of propositions. Neither names (expressions) nor objects named are constituents of propositions. Neither names nor objects can configure in sense-formation. If we treat names as referring expressions, and the relation between a name and the object named as that of reference then reference, too, is irrelevant to predicative formation. This has been established in section 1, and is really a point made by Frege. Reference is independent of sense, though related to sense. Besides, names (expressions) do not themselves refer, as Strawson and Searle repeatedly point out. It is the *user* of the expression who makes a reference in the use of the expression. We have seen

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that reference is an epistemic/pragmatic notion, but predication is a semantic concept. Thus, niether the referring expression, nor the reference made, nor still object play any role in predicative formation.

The Role of Names (Referring Expressions) in Predication

But clearly the extensionalist assumes that names or referring expressions contribute to the sense–formation (predicative content) of propositions. The question is 'How do names contribute to predicative structure (sense formation) of propositions?' One controversial suggestion is that names have sense or *connote* as well as denote or refer. This view was argued for by Frege, and I believe it is correct. The point is controversial because certain writers, notably Russell and Quine, have argued that logically proper names are *purely referring* expressions which have no sense (do not connote).

I believe that Frege is essentially correct in his view that names have sense and reference because this is the only way to explain how names (referring expressions) can contribute to the sense–formation of propositions (which Frege clearly recognized to be prior to and independent of reference). A name or referring expression plays a role in the representation of a proposition (predication) only insofar as it connotes a term (singular or otherwise). For we have seen that neither the name itself nor the object named are propositional constituents.

Names or referring expressions then, (or any expression for that matter), can play a role in sense-formation only if they connote terms (propositional constituents). It is therefore not surprising to find extensionalists gravitating to the view that a logical condition of the use of names or referring expressions is that they presuppose sense. For expample, Searle makes the following claim in his book :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

> " In every case, reference is in virtue of the facts about the object that are known to the speaker, facts which hold uniquely of the object referred to, and the utterance of a referring expression serves to communicate the reference because and only because it indicates those facts, communicates them to the hearer. *This is what Frege was getting at, rather crudely, when he pointed out that a referring expression must have a sense. In some sense a referring expression must have a ' meaning ', a descriptive content, in order for a speaker to succeed in referring when he utters it*: for unless its utterance succeeds in communicating a fact, a true proposition, from the speaker to the hearer, the reference is not fully consummated. *We might put it in this Fregean way : meaning is prior to reference : reference is in virtue of meaning.* It follows directly from the principle of identification that every utterance of a referring expression, if the reference is consummated, must communicate a true proposition, a fact, to the hearer. " (*Speech Acts*, p. 92, italics mine)

Thus, Searle is arguing, I believe correctly, that unless a name or referring expression connotes, has sense, it cannot succeed in its referring function. Sense precedes reference. It should be noted here once more that the epistemic/pragmatic functions attendant upon the use of an expression, in this case, of a name or referring expression, presuppose, rather than determine it. This is why Strawson's criterion of singular terms (expressions), which treats them as *essential* performing the function of *identifying* particulars or individuals misses the point. A proper criterion of singular terms (as propositional constituents) must be purely semantic, must focus on sense

In another place, Searle argues along similar lines to establish that proper names presuppose descriptive sense content. It seems,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

on the face of it, that definite descriptive phrases have sense (connote) singular terms while proper names are without sense. Searle sums up his discussion in the following way :

> "We can now resolve our paradox : does a proper name have a sense ? If this asks whether or not proper names are used to discribe or specify characteristics of objects, the answer is 'no'. But if it asks whether or not proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they reform the answer is ' yes, in a loose sort of way ' ". ("Proper Names" in Strawson ed. *Philosophical Logic* p. 96).

Searle's view that proper names have sense (the Fregean view) is not an aberration. Geach and Quine, also, are forced in one way or another to acknowledge it. First Geach :

> "So far as I said, we have not found any names other than proper names to be used as logical subjects of propositions *regardless of whether the things named are present or absent;* proper names are at any rate the only obvious examples However, as I shall try to show, it is plausible to suggest that general terms (substantival ones, that is) also admit of such use as logical subjects. Indeed, although the use of proper names in that capacity is much more easily recognized, it is arguable that such use depends on the possibility of general term's being logical subjects."

> ". For every proper name there is a corresponding use of a common noun preceded by ' the same ' to express what requirements as to identity the proper name conveys ... In all these cases we may say that the proper name conveys a *nominal essence*" (his italics). (*Reference and Generality*, pp. 43–44)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

That is, Geach is forced to recognize that proper names logically depend upon general terms, which he admits connote or have sense. Geach introduces the surprising notion of a nominal essence, surprising because this seems to run counter to the extensionalist spirit.

> ("In all these cases we may say that the proper name conveys a *nominal essence:* thus, "cat" expresses the nominal essence of the thing we call "Jemim" ... The nominal essence of the object called "Thames' is expressed by the common noun 'river'" (*Ibid.*, p. 44))

This talk of nominal essence, I believe, is just another way of speaking of sense–content, and is an admission that proper names, insofar, as they play a role in sense–formation of propositions, must connote. Geach goes on to give his general definition of a referring phrase :

> " My own specifications as to how the term is to be applied are as follows : (i) A referring phrase is always formed from a substantive general term combined with what Johnson called an *applicative* : i.e., an expression such as 'a', 'the', 'some', any'..."
>
> " It is always possible to substitute an applicative-plus-general-term for a proper name without destroying the syntax of the proposition..." (*Ibid.*, pp. 47–48)

It is especially surprising to find Geach saying this because, as we have seen, he repeatedly emphasizes the absolute distinction between singular term (name, referring expression) and general term (predicative expression). But here he claims that all proper names depend logically upon general terms and involve nominal essence (sense). In admitting this connection it seems natural to suggest that general terms too may be referring expressions and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

hence logical subjects. There would seem to be no good reason to hold out any longer. To close off this possibility Geach hurriedly invokes the singular dogma to rule out this natural implication :

> "I shall count an applicative-plus-general-term phrase as a referring phrase only when it stands in a context where a proper name might have stood. Thus, when 'a man' or 'the man who broke the bank at Monte Carlo', occurs predicatively after 'is', I shall not recognize it as a referring phrase; for in such places proper name used referentially can stand only by reason of a change in the force of 'is'...

The question is not whether Geach *wishes* to recognize it but whether he is forced to as a theoretical implication of his own view. I shall develop this point shortly. But now let us see how Quine is forced to recognize that names must connote. Quine rejects all talk of sense or meaning only to fall back on "purport". But this is just a disguised way of appealing to the priority of sense (the Frege point) For example, Quine says :

> "Singular terms, do not, after all, stand to objects quite as statements and predicates stand to truth values and extensions; for whereas every statement has its truth value and every predicate its extension, empty or otherwise, a singular term always *purports* to name an object. A singular term always *purports* to name an object, but it is powerless to guarantee that the alleged object be forthcoming; witness 'Cerberus'. The deductive techniques of quantification theory with free variables serve very well for inferences depending on singular terms when we are assured that *there are* objects such as those terms purport to name : so this question of existence then becomes the central question where singular terms are concerned". (*Methods*, p. 212)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

There is a tension in this paragraph. On the one hand Quine realizes that the relation between a name and the object named (referring relation) is such that the very function (status) of a genuine name is to stand in relation to that object. This seems to tie a name (qua name) to an *existent object*. But Quine also realizes that a name (qua name) may fulfil its function as name without the object named being existent (real). So, apparently a name can succeed in its function of naming something, even though there is no such thing. The way out of this bind is to speak of '*purport*' of a name :

> "In contrast to 7 and the Parthenon, there is no such thing as Cerebrus... The meaning of the particular word 'Cerebrus' merely happens to be such that if the word did name an object, that object would be a physical object, in space and time... There happens to be nothing such as the word 'Cerebrus' purports to name, near or remote, past, present or future..."

> "...The effort to preserve meaning for 'Cerebrus' by presenting some shadowy entity for 'Cerebrus' to name is misdirected; 'Cerebrus' remains meaningful despite not naming. Most words, like 'and' or 'sake', are quite meaningful without even purporting to be names at all. Even when a word is a name of something, its meaning would appear not to be identifiable with the thing named..." (*Ibid.*, pp. 212-213)

> "...There need be no mystery about attributing nonexistence where there is nothing to attribute it to, and there need be no misgivings over the meaningfulness of words which purport to name and fail. *To purport to name and fail is already proof of a full share of meaning*" (my italics, *Ibid.*, p. 215)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In another place Quine says,

> "a term is singular if it purports to name an object (one and only one), and otherwise general. Note the key word 'purports'; it separates the question off from such questions of fact as the existence of Socrates and Cerebrus. Whether a word purports to name one and only one object is a question of language, and is not contingent on facts of existence". (*Ibid.*, p. 218)

Notice that Quine reverts to talk of names (purport) apart from the question of whether the object named exists or not. The meaning of a name, then, is independent of the question whether it succeeds or fails in reference. But is this not to admit that a name which fails to *name* is not a name at all? When a name has meaning and yet fails to name Quine speaks of 'purport' of the name: the phrase (referring expression) purports to name, but fails. The question is 'how does the name' even purport?' Is this not a surreptitious way of appealing to the *sense* or *connotation* of the phrase? To purport to name is to connote. Quine is rightly afraid that this talk of sense easily leads to postulation of strange (possible) entities. We shall see below that this fear is unfounded. To admit terms as constituents of propositions, as sense–contents, is not to introduce strange entities into the world. Quine is, of course, suspicious of this talk of purport. He says,

> "Such talk of purport is only a picturesque way of alluding to the distinctive grammatical roles that singular and general terms play in sentences. It is by grammatical role that singular and general terms are properly to be distinguished". (*Word and Object*, p. 96)

It is very much in the extensionalist spirit to retreat at this point at syntax We shall see below that this criterion of syntactic position or role begs the question and does not help in the least.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The extentionalist, therefore, is forced in one way or another to admit that singular terms (names, referring expressions) connote or have sense, and he *must* make this Fregean move if he is to account for the role of singular *expressions* in the sense-formation of propositions. And this principle may be generalized for all expressions which are to count as *singular expressions* : proper names, definite singular descriptions, demonstratives, pronouns, etc. All of these expression-forms count as singular expressions because they connote singular terms. The conventions, epistemic and pragmatic features, reliance upon context of use (indexicals, e.g.), etc. are essential to the functioning of an *expression* in connoting singular terms (sense-contents), but these features of language (non-semantic) are irrelevant to the predication itself. Clearly proper names function in a different way from definite singular descriptions, and both differ from the function of pronouns, etc., but what counts from the predicative point of view is not *how* these expression-forms specify (connote) singular terms, only *that* they somehow do so. Here again we see the importance of distinguishing between *singular terms* (propositional constituents) and *singular expressions*. The extensionalist confuses the former with the latter. Now we can understand what such different expression-forms (phrases) as proper names, definite descriptions, pronouns, demonstratives, etc. have in common–why they are all called singular term-expressions Despite important differences in their epistemic/pragmatic roles, they have a common semantic function–to specify (cannote) singular terms (sense-contents) in their own peculiar ways.

All singular *expressions*, then, not only proper names, *cannote* singular terms. Definite descriptive phrases are no less the paradigm of a singular term-expression than proper names. On the contrary, it seems unfortunate that the proper *name* has

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

been taken as the paradigm of singular expression-terms. A better candidate would be singular definite descriptions, for these expressions show clearly that the *sense* is what is important in its role in predication, not its apparent function as a name. The extentionalist position became hopelessly lost when it not only failed to take note of an obvious linguistic fact, but even outright denied it, viz. that definite descriptions *are* referring expressions, and do not function as logical subjects of predication. Russell's "insight" that definite descriptions were "really" predicative, and not referring, was not an insight at all, but rather a consequence forced upon him by the dogma by singular predication, which takes proper names as the paradigm of singular terms and logical subjects. Quine took the next step and took pronouns (individual variables) as the paradigm of singular terms, since here there appeared to be no danger of sense-content. More on this below. At this point it should only be noted that if definite singular descriptions *are* singular term-expressions, then it should be possible for them to be logical subjects (referring expressions). The extensionalist holds that definite descriptions are *really* general terms (or predicative), from the logical point of view. (Frege did not subscribe to this view.) It seems now that the way is open for a singular term to occupy both *prior and posterior positions* in predication—and the absolute asymmetry thesis is threatened. This point is developed later.

The Predicative Fallacy of General Terms

Let us turn attention now to the second extensionalist mistake—the confusion of general terms (propositional sense-constituents) with predicative expressions. We have seen that both Quine and Geach make this mistake. I shall now try to show that general terms, like singular terms, can be referring expressions, can be logical subjects, and hence can occupy prior

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

position in predication. This will become clear once we see that the extensionalist claim that general terms are *essentially* predicative a unwarranted.

First of all, it must be recalled that only *names* are referring expressions, so we need not think that general term-expressions must be *names* in order to qualify as logical subjects (prior terms). But even this is beside the point, for again, like singular terms, general terms are not *expressions* but sense-contents of propositions. Hence, they are *not predicates,* not predicate-expressions.

The Fregean notion of a predicate is based upon the unification of term plus predicative formative. We have seen earlier (section 2) that terms and formatives complement each other in predication, but it is necessary to distinguish between term and formative and give them distinct syntactic representation. In ordinary English the copula ' is ' often serves the function of the predicative formative (connective). Now Frege, in moving away from tne subject/predicate model of predication. dropped the copula (the logical sign of predicative connection) altogether and replaced it with the notion of a function, or predicate expression :

'—is F' or 'F—'

A predicate, then is an *incomplete* sign, and it is completed by a singular term or object (a complete sign). There is no need for a logical sign of connection between predicate and logical subject (object). The reason for this is that the notion of a predicate (defined in this way) already involves the formative function. So the Fregean notion of a predicate is a *construction* involving a general term and the predicative formative (a function). Frege relied on the metaphors of saturated and unsaturated, and of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

completion, to describe predication and the constituents of predication. Given this notion of a predicate (term + predicative function) it follows necessarily that singular and general terms are of radically different types, and there must be an absolute asymmetry between subject and predicate.[36]

This concept of a predicate is a confusion of term and formative function. By appropriating the distinct formative function–predicative connective–to the predicate expression Frege locks the positive copula '+' into the predicate, and his notation leaves no place for the opposite predicative function represented by the '–' sign–the sign of predicative denial. Instead, he uses the negation sign (a propositional function which appiies to whole propositions) to perform the function of the negative predicative formative. Sommers has pointed out the unhappy consequences of this confusion between predicative denial and propositional negation in various places.[37]

We shall see later that this confusion of predicative denial with propositional negation leads directly to an extensionalist view of predication and is essentially connected with a move away from sense and towards truth-values.

But the concept of a predicate is unacceptable for a more immediate reason, for the logical function of a predicate expression is to *apply to* (be true or false of) the object referred to by the subjcet-expression. Geach and Quine have stressed rightly that a predicate is not a name, not a referring expression. But this conception of a predicate is an extensionalist one and the question here too (as with singular terms or names) is how the general term (or predicate) can play a role in the sense-formation of a proposition. Here, again, the extensionalist has no recourse but to commit the third mistake the extensionalist fallacy of predication. He is forced by his conception of a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

predicate to reduce the relation of predication (sense relation between terms) to the relation of satisfaction of an expression being true or false of an object. The challenge for the extensionalist with respect to names was to show how they could play a role in sense-formation of propositions. Since the predicate expression is *essentially* incomplete it cannot be a name, cannot function referringly. Likewise, it does not connote terms (propositional constituents). The only function it can perform is to *apply to* objects referred to by the subject term. And there is no question of predicates being logical subjects, for the predicative function is built into the predicate expression. The extentionalist has no satisfactory way of explaining how predicates enter into sense-formation of propositions. for predicates are *designed* for assertions and assertibility. [38]

It is not that Frege failed to recognize this problem nor to attempt to deal with it. But, as Searle points out, he makes the mistake of claiming that predicates refer (are referring expressions) and by confusing the function of a predicate with reference. Searle says,

"In a statement made using the sentence 'Sam is drunk what if anything stands to is drunk as Sam stands to "Sam?" Or is this an improper question ? Frege, who assumed it was a proper question, gave the following, answer. Just as 'Sam has a sense and in virtue of that sense has a referent namely Sam, so '—is drunk' has sense and in virtue of that sense has a referent. But what is the referent of '—is drunk ?' To this Frege's answer is "a concept" (*Speech Acts* p. 97)

Searle goes on to diagnose Frege's difficulty in a way that comes close to the diagnosis I proposed—that Frege is confusing term with predicative function :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

"The apparent contradiction arises because Frege is moving in two philosophical directions which are at bottom inconsistent. He wishes (a) to extend the sense-reference distinction to predicates, i. e. to insist that predicates have a referent; and at the same time (b) to account for the distinction *in function* between referring expressions and predicate expressions." (*Ibid.*, p. 98)

Searle points out, I think correctly, that Frege's attempt to explain how predicates function was based upon an equivocation of the notion "concept" : it stood at once for "property" referred to by the predicate, and for "the use of a predicate expression to ascribe a property".

> "And now the origin of the opparent contradiction is obvious. In conclusion (a) Frege used "concept" to mean property and hence, 'refer to a concept' means refer to a property. In argument (b) refer to a concept means 'ascribe a property in the use of a grammatical predicate'. He uses the word 'concept' in these two inconsistent ways (almost in the same breath...) But the properties of an object are not essentially predicative: they can be referred to by single noun phrases as well as ascribe to an utterance in the utterance of a predicate expression". (*Ibid.* p. 101)

Thus, the Frgean notion of a predicate leads to problems in accounting for the sense-formation of propositions. The problem for referring phrases (names) was to establish that they entered into sense formation in virtue of having sense. The problem for predicative expressions was to explain how they entered into propositions, and Frege mistakenly thought that this could be done successfully by claiming that they (predicates) *referred* to concepts. I am claiming that these difficulties stem from the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

extensionalist mistake of confusing terms with predicate-expressions, and the attendant error of confusing terms with predicative functions.

General terms are *not* predicates, but propositional constituents of a certain sort. General term-expressions connote or specify general sense-contents, in the way singular term-expressions connote (specify) singular sense-contents. Once we separate the notion of a general term-expsession from the confused notion of a predicate it becomes clear that general term-expressions, like singular term-expressions connote terms (sense-contents) and both types of expressions may be used referringly. This does not, of course, mean that general term-expressions are *names*, for they are not. But we have seen that *names* are only one form of referring expression. The consequence is that general terms, now that they are freed from enslavement to the predicate, may occupy either prior or posterior position in predication, may be logical subject or logical predicate. In this respect they are just like singular terms. From the predicative point of view, then, general and singular terms are on a par. Both forms of proposition, singular and general, are predicative. This point needs further development.

This point places the issue in new light. For the extensionalist holds that from the predicative point of view singular and general terms are absolutely different, and the difference is *explained* in terms of contrasting roles in predication. However, it now seems to be real possibility, even likelihood, that singular and general terms can occupy either prior or posterior position in predication, that they are symmetric from the predicative point of view. Wherein lies the difference between singular and general terms? Are they really of different logical type? Again we find a pressing need for criteria for type differences between terms.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

These and related points will be developed in a sequel. But now the way is clear for approaching in a fresh way the generic concept of predication. And here to reader is referred to Sommers' book—*The Logic of Natural Language* (Oxford, 1982).*

ASHOK GANGADEAN

Philosophy Department
Haverford College
370, Lancaster Avenue
Haverford
Pennsylvania–19041–1392 (U.S.A.)

NOTES

26. In sying that propositions (and their constituents) are not linguistic (extra-linguistic) I mean only that they are not to be identified with linguistic expressions (signs). Clearly they are linguistic in another sense—Frege speaks of *sentences* as expressing propositions. Sense-contents are linguistic in the sense that they are apprehended by means of linguistic signs.

27. Thus, there is a distinction between sense-content and sense (intelligible) object. Specification is not to be confused with reference (which is an epistemic function). Specification is a unique relation which holds between linguistic expressions, what they connote, and what is apprehended (object) in apprehending the sense-content. Thus, there is a distinction between apprehending a proposition (sense-content) and thereby apprehending a State (object).

28. Linsky speaks as though Frege distinguished between sense-functions: "Just as the sense of a declarative sentence is a function of the senses of the various signs occurring in that sentence, so is the reference of such a sentence a function of the references of the signs occurring in the sentence. Since the reference of a declarative sentence will remain unchanged if, in that sentence, we replace a sign by another sign having the same reference." (*Referring*, p. 26).

29. Frege makes a similar point about quantifiers: "It must here be remarked that the words 'all, 'any, 'no, 'some' are prefixed to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

concept-words. In universal and particular affirmative and negative sentences, *we are expressing relations between concepts;* (my italics) we use these words to indicate the special kind of relation. They are thus, logically speaking, not to be more closely associated with the concept words that follow them, but are to be related to the sentence as whole" "On Concept and Object", p. 48

Frege is hinting at an intensional interpretation of the quantifier, and he confirms the suggestion that the Q-sign applies to the P-sign.

30. There is one important difference here with Sommers. I am suggesting that the Q-formative does not especially modify or apply to the prior term (as Sommers maintains), but to the predication as a whole, for it is an auxiliary to the main P-formative, and modifies the predication as a whole. In this respect I am closer to Frege's view.

31. The feature of distribution of a term in predicative form indicates whether the term as a whole is involved in the predicative relation; a term is said to be distributed in the predicative function when the term as a whole is predicated, positively or negatively. For further clarification see Sommers' "Distribution Matters", *Mind* 84 (1975).

32. a) I am restricting attention here to the primary notion of predication—cases in which the predicate term is absolute and not relative. Of course relational propositions are predicative in form—and the logical subject involves more than one subject in ordered sequence. The arguments raised here may be extended to relative predication as well.

b) Of course it may be argued that Frege's proposed analysis of general propositions is predicative in some sense—in a sense different from singular propositions, although a Fregean logician would not wish to take this line. It might be argued, for example, that the attachment of a quantifier to a compound propositional function as in $(x)\ (Hx) \supset (Mx)$ is another sense of predication, since the compound function may be regarded as predicative and the quantifier may be seen as specifying the logical subject (namely, everything in the universe). There is some value in this suggestion, and later I shall exploit it in rejecting the dogma of singular predication. However, the poiont I wish to establish is that there is a *univocal sense* in which both singular and general propositions are predicative, viz. the generic sense which has been explicated earlier.

33. See Searle's *Speech Acts*, p. 25, for a similar view.

34. In section (3) of his *Begriffsschrift* Frege makes it clear that, "A distinction between *subject* and *predicate* finds no place in my way of representing a judgment". This is not because he isn't interested in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

predication, however, for this concept is primitive in his logical theory. One reason given by Frege for dropping this terminology (and with this I am in complete agreement) is that a logical language is concerned only with conceptual-propositional content (i.e. predication), whereas the distinction between subject and predicate is "merely" grammatical and therotical in import. (See *Frege Translations* (Geach & Black), pp. 2ff)

35. For discussion of the Two term theory see Aris Noah, "The Two-Term Theory of Predication" in *The New Syllogistic*, ed. George Englebretsen (Peter Lang, NY. 1987).

36. (1) We saw in an earlier quote from Quine that a general term is essentially part of the predicate, having no logical status apart from the the predicate: "The positions occupied by general terms have indeed no status at all in logical grammar, for we have found that for logical purposes the predicate recommends itself as the unit of analysis; thus 'Socrates is a man' comes to be viewed as compounded of 'Socrates' and '(1) is a man', the latter being an indissoluble unit in which 'man' stands merely as a constituent syllable comparable to the 'rat' in 'Socrates'". (*Ibid.*, p. 220)

37. See his-"On a Fregean Dogma" (in *Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics*, North Holland. 1967)

38. Strawson notices this point: "The main thing which I wish to carry away from consideration of Frege and Geach is the fact that both writers make an absolute distinction between two mutually exclusive classes of expressions, members of each of which can be combined with suitable members of the other to yield an assertion. Members of the two classes alike introduce terms; but members of one class introduce them assertively; and members of the other does not". (*Individuals*. p. 154)

* The earlier ideas of these essays were presented at the University of Poona, Department of philosophy, during my 1971-72 visit as Visiting Lecturer, and further presented at Poona in the summer of 1974 at the Summer Institute in Logic held at the same Department. I am thankful to the Department for giving me this opportunity which helped me in formulating my thought.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-**

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs. 25/-**

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-**

Ramchandra Gandhi (ed) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs. 50/-**

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs. 70/-**

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs. 60/-**

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism, Rs. 50/-**

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-**

S. S. Barlingay (ed), **A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs. 50/-**

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs. 25/-**

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Ringuistic Units, Rs. 30/-**

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Pune–411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Qnarterly Vol. XVIII. No. 3
July 1991

ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF REFERENCE (IV)

Section 5 : Meaning and Reference in Deconstruction

When we move from Ricoeur's hermeneutics to the theory of Deconstruction in Derrida, we note a certain similarity or affinity in over all concerns, yet co–existing with profound differences in aims, method and presuppositions. These striking contrasts in temper and method between the classicism and synopticism of Ricoeur's hermeneutics with its readiness for synthesis and participatory dialogue and the restless radical and subversive questioning of Derrida are so great and undeniable that very often it is only these contrasts that remain in view. Perhaps more fundamental than all other points of difference and disparity between Ricoeur and Derrida, there is this question of the attitude to philosophy of the respective thinkers. For, Ricoeur preserves the classical sense and feeling for philosophy as a universal discourse; it is true that in him, philosophy enters into dialogue with an astonishing variety of disciplines, from structural linguistics to psycho–analysis and comparative mythology and religion, but in all these encounters, philosophy preserves its autonomy and separate identity. This feeling for philosophy as, in a sense a self–assured discourse, is particularly evident in his discussion of rhetories and other figurative uses of language in *The Rule of Metaphor.*[109] While showing a sustained interest in the study of metaphor Ricoeur resists the assimilation of philosophy to metaphorical language in general. The attempt is to preserve a zone of validity and sense for philosophy which

Received : 24–2–90

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

will not be dragged into the ruses and strategms of metaphor. In a sense, it may be said that philosophy, in Ricoeur, aims at the rule of metaphor in the sense of mastery of the work of such figurative languages. It is in this spirit that he resists the suggestion that the problems of metaphysics, as for example, the doctrine of the many senses of being in Aristotle, are determined by the ideas of resemblance and analogy of the theory of metaphor. This intention to preserve the intentions of philosohpic discourse free from the problems caused by its textuality, this motivation to pursue philosophy as a theory of discourses rather than itself a discourse, is most clearly evident in his discussion of Derrida's 'White Mythology' in *The Rule of Metaphor*.[110] This discussion about the autonomy of philosophy is, however, conducted in terms of what may appear to be a highly recondite and purely technical issue, namely about 'dead' and 'living' metaphors.

The difference and contrast here is so basic and deep going that two very untypical and uncharacteristic features of Ricoeur's discussion of Derrida may be noticed. First, unlike other thinkers with whom Ricoeur is so constantly engaged in dialoge and comment, Ricoeur hardly ever meets with Derrida on any sustained basis; perhaps the passage in *The Rule of Metaphor* that I just now referred is the only long discussion of Derrida to be met with in Ricoeur.[111] But secondly, what is even more symptomatic, is that Ricoeur approaches Derrida uuder certain unquestioned stereotypes; for example, he takes Derrida's reflections on textuality and meaning as an expression of what he calls 'the absolute text' a text with no outside at all. He takes deconstruction as negating all referentiality. This caricatural image of Derrida as some kind of transcendental solipsist for whom nothing real exists outside the text has been the sloppy misreading of Derrida which has been very common with some of his more

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'vehement' critics, such as T. Seung in *Structuralism and Hermeneutics.*[112] It is true that Ricoeur's approach is never so blatantly unseeing and inattentive. Yet in Ricoeur too, there is a flattening of the argumentation of Derrida on the problem of reference. The possibility that what Derrida is really interrogating is the unsuspected complexity of the referential relation of discourse rather than reference itself is hardly entertained. This is all the more surprising, for Derrida himself has been very explicit precisely on this issue. Derrida, in a recent interview, has deplored such readings of his work which take him to be saying that there is nothing beyond language, that we are imprisoned in language, and other stupidities of that sort.[113] He goes on to explain that his object has not been to deny any connection between language and the real, but to show how the question of reference is far more complex than traditional theories will allow.[114] To distance oneself from the habitual structure of reference, to challenge or complicate our common assumptions about it, does not amount to saying that there is nothing beyond language

One of the aspects of the common assumptions about reference which Derrida is here suspending is the simple conviction that the relation between language and reality is a simple correspondence, that every significant expression stands for an object, which is signified. To question this picture of reference is not to deny that there is a world and that our thought and language in some sense are about it. It is to question the simplicity and obviousness of seeming self–evidence of the referential relation. And indeed on this point, namely, a distrust about and a profound interrogation of the presence of object to thought, of the immediacy and givenness of the referential relation, both Ricoeur and Derrida are one. Riceeur, too, a we have seen, is critical of the thesis of immediacy, whether it takes the form of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the Husserlian phenomenology of consciousness or of the immediate disclosure of Being in Heidegger's fundamental ontology.[115] We have already seen Ricoeur's critique of the phenomenological version of immediacy; hence, we shall confine our attention here to Ricoeur's reservations about the ontological version of immediacy in Heidegger.

Ricoeur appropiates the idea of Heidegger's fundamental ontology that Being, as distinguished from particular beings, is disclosed to human being in the interpretation of the mode of man's being in the world. This moment of disclosure of Being as unconcealed is, in Heidegger, connected with the emphasis on immediacy and self–presence. Being, although concealed over by beings, is yet immediately present to Dasein; in his later period, the emphasis shifts from the anticipatory projection of Dasein to the self–giving of Being itself.[116] Ricoeur appropriates this disclosive aspect of hermeneutics, but with an important proviso; insofar as it is a text which has this capacity for disclosure, it is in language or through language that it takes place. As Ricoeur puts it " the difficulty in passing from understanding as a mode of knowledge (hermeneutics) to understanding as a mode of Being (fundamental ontology) consists in the following the understanding which is the result of the Analytics of Dasein is precisely the understanding through which and in which this being understands itself as being. Is it not once again within language itself that we must seek the indication that understanding is a mode of being "? [117]

If we look at this text from the point of view of Derrida, it appears that Ricoeur here is emphasising the unexpungeable involvement of the question of being in the question of language. Any idea of truth as the disclosure of being which looks upon this disclosure as the transparency of language would not do, for the notion of something other than language, which, however, is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ultimately that all language is about, in other words, the idea of Being as the transcendental signified of all signifiers, any such idea of a transcedency of discourse, is a mirage, for the very idea of reference is thinkable only in terms of language. Further more, insofar as language is determinable in its meaning and reference only by interpretation and since interpretation is an open ended process, the comprehension of Being, the moment of altheia, is a reflection and not an immediate intuitive deliverance. The point of describing this moment of understanding of Being as reflection is two–fold, firstly it is to emphasise the mediateness of this moment of comprehension as given through and only through an understanding of symbols and secondly and consequently, it is to emphasise the recovery of Being as a *task* rather than an immediate illumination. The reflectiveness of understanding Being is a way of distanciating hermeneutics from the philosophies of immediacy. It is, of course, only too well known that both Cartesian and Husserlian philosophies are philosophies of immediacy, but what is to be noted at this point is that the illuminative comprehension of Being in fundamental ontology is also a form of immediacy. It is against this immediacy of existentialist comprehension that hermeneutic reflection suggests an open endedness and incompleteness of understanding. As Ricoeur himself puts this point of contrast, " while no immediate ontology is possible, it is possible by way of a hermeneutics of symbols." [118]

This open–endedness of hermeneutic interpretation which Ricoeur connects up with language expresses the deferment of meanings, the postponement of sense, which Derrida emphasises as one of the sides of 'difference' — the perpetual movement from signifier to signifier and the postponement of ' final ' meaning in this deference of signifier to signifier. The idea of an infinite task arises in both hermeneutics and Derrida's reflection on

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

languagh and sense. Yet, as I shall soon try to point out, behind this point of convergence, is concealed a profound disagreement between hermeneutics and deconstruction. But first it is necessary to foreground the convergent similarity.

The idea of interpretation as an endless task, of hermeneuics, therefore, as a programme, which by its very nature cannot claim to have reached any closure, is not new to reflections about meaning and interpretation. On the contrary, at the very origin of philosophical hermeneutics, Schleirmacher gives expression to this idea. "The task is an infinite one since it is an infinity of the past and the future which we wish to perceive in the moment of speech." [119] Schleirmacher even hints at the ideas of perpetual deferral and intertextuality. "Language is infinite because every element is determinable in a particular way through the rest" [120] But perhaps it is in the hermeneutical philosophy of Gadamer that we can see a sense of proximity to Derrida. For Gadamer too, Western philosophy, since the time of the Greeks, has been involved in a struggle against language, in a denial of the intimate relation of language and thought. He considers the task of philosophical hermeneutics to break with "the forgetfulness of language." For Gadamer also, interpretation is not a matter of penetrating to an ultimate objectifiable truth but rather being caught up in an endless "happening of meaning. [121] Ricoeur continues this endlessness of interpretation at a number of levels; as we saw, interpretations presuppose certain primary pre-understandings and arising within such presupposed frames, lead to further questions and further presuppositions; this endless dialectic of pre-understanding and interpretative understanding is one aspect of the infinity of interpretations. Another dimension of the same is the notion of plurality of interpretations, of the diversity of what we called hermeneutic styles.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Hence, for both Derrida and the hermeneutic tradition; interpretation is an endless process, but they reach this idea, as it were, from diametrically opposed ends. For Ricoeur and the hermeneutic tradition in general. interpretation is endless because of the wealth and over–abundance of sense. It is because of the fecundity of meaning that interpretation becomes an open dynamic process, nourished by its own success. Endlessness of interpretation is a sign of inexhaustibility of meaning. As against inexhaustibility which is the sign of the hermeneutic traditlon; 'dissemination' is the key of Derrida's strategy. Derrida, specifically referring to the endlessness of interpretation, writes– "if one cannot summarize dissemination, seminal difference, in its conceptual tenor, this is because the force and form of its disruption burst the semantic horizon". [122] Derrida's view is not that meaning is inexhaustible but rather that any specification of meaning can only function as a self–defeating attempt to stabilize and restrain the dispersal of the text A stress on multiple or even infinite meanings still attempts to evade this rupture.

Derrida is here suggesting that the ideology of infinite meanings and the consequent self–understanding of hermeneutitcs as an unending task still is captive to the metaphysics of presence, for what lends force to this programme is the implicit and implied idea of an already present fund of meanings, a totality in some sense already given and requiring to be articulated and drawn out in a series of interpretative acts. The picture is of a present totality which, however, can be appropriated, as it were, only piecemeal. It is precisely because an infinity of signification is given that the endlessness of the interpretative labour becomes a necessity. Somewhat as in the Platonic framework, time is said to be the moving image of eternity, the incessant activity of interprtation is in its own way the expression of the infinite wealth of meanings. This idea is, fundamentally a return to a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

phenomenological theme, for it may be remembered that Husserl felt that phenomenology is an endless process of clarification Hence Derrida feels that with this idea alone of the endlessness of interpretation hermenutics does not displace the metaphysics of presence. As opposed to this account of endless interprtative labour, for Derrida, the unceasing character of interpretation is a symptom of dispersal. It is because there is a deferral and postponement of meaning in the chain of signifiers, in other words, it is because meaning has to be redeemed within the sphere of intertextuality, where the meaning of a text is modulated by other texts, that the recuperation of sense can never be final. Dissemination is tied up with the non presence of sense in a text or syntax considered by itself. There is also another theme touched upon in Derrida's account of endlessness of interpretation; this unceasing process is not to be imaged as a linear progression, but rather as an uncontrolled oscillation between opposed or incompatible interpretations. As an example of the instability and radical perturbation of Derridean interpretation, we may cite his gloss on Nietzsche's comparison of truth with woman.

Nietzsche's statement " Perhaps truth is a woman ", according to Derrida is, under the pressure of a perpetual two-fold oscillation, first, the words 'truth' and 'woman' are themselves ineradicably polysemous and because of this plurality of senses, the meaning of the statement as a whole is not merely liable for varied interpretations, but it is undecidably so. Derrida says that the perpetually oscillating meaning of the statement can express three fundamentally different propositions. The first of them depicts the woman as a figure of falsehood; as such, she is censured, debased and despised. The second position presents the woman as the figure of truth. This is the Christian notion of truth; in this role again, woman is debased and despised, since this is merely the other of the first view. The third position is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the double negation of the first two.[132] Although taken in isolation these three positions are decidable, the oscillation between these three interpretations is undecidable; embracing any one does not assure stability of meaning for that very sense throws us onto the other and in this perpetual play and sliding of senses, our interpretations are never fixated but are ever in the position of 'between' of different constructions.

There is also the note of inner subversion and diremption in this process of endless oscillation. This subversive function is, of course, the most important function of Derrida's deconstructive strategies. They work by first inverting the order of priority and significance within a given binary opposition such as speech-writing, signifier–signified, intelligible–sensible, man–woman etc., and then in a second moment of a reversal of a reversal, seek to dismantle the pair structure of the oppositions. It is this deconstructive force witin the discourse itself which leads to the perpetual oscillation of understanding of meanings. Derrida does not claim to imposing any induced vertigo on the natural stability of discourse; the deconstruction that he practices is not read into discourse from the outside, but as his study of pharmakon in Plato so clearly brings out, this instability and going over into the opposite is inscribed in the very terms of the opposition; for instance, in the very attempt to contain writing as an inferior and supplementary form of discourse, as signifier of a signifier, Plato is led precisely to the opposite idea and uses the model of writing for true interior thinking.[124] The subversion, the inner turn-about, is a play within the frame of the discussion, a moment of insurrection within the argument.

There is a similar idea of the ineradicable contestability of all interpretations in Ricoeur as well as Gadamer, when they describe the basic opposition of two types of interpretation which Ricoeur calls the hermeneutics of trust and the hermeneutics of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

suspicion. But in Gadamer, particularly, one of these two hermeneutic modes, namely, the hermeneutic of trust, is privileged and in a different way, in Ricoeur also, there is a suggestion of a hope of ultimate reconcilement. This hope is given, as Gadamer very clearly recognises, in the very project of hermeneutics as coming to an understanding with another In these terms, mutuality and trust are inscribed in the hermeneutical project.[125]

It, therefore, appears that the one of the roots of the difference between hermeneutics and deconstruction has to do with the respective place given to writing in relation to meaning, understanding and speech. Here, again, before we attempt to give an account of Derrida's position, we may consider Ricoeur's treatment of the problem of textuality as against speech, for in his approach to writing, there are certain ideas which point towards Derrida and yet these indications are held within the over all configuration of a hermeneutic theory whose outcome is different from that of Derrida.

Ricoeur holds that when we move from oral speech to written discourse there is a loss as well as a gain. The aspect of loss has, in fact, been almost universally and exclusively recognised. Oral communication or speech has been privileged and writing has been seen as parasitic upon it. This privileging of orality over textuality is expressed most paradigmatically in Plato and Ricoeur, like Derrida, also concentrates on Plato's *Phaedrus* in this connection.[126] In the *Phaedrus*, Plato mounts an attack on writing in the name of genuine knowledge and true recollection. Writing cannot further true reminiscence but merely aid rememoration and also make possible, not genuine instruction, but a false conceit of knowledge. Ricoeur also mentions Rousseau and Bergson in this critique of writing. For Rousseau, as long as language relied only on voice, it preserved the presence of oneself to oneself and to others. Language was still the expression of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

passion. It was eloquence, not yet exegessis. With writing, began separation, tyranny and inequality. Writing ignores its addressee just as it conceals its author. It separater men just as property separates owners.

The tyranny of the lexicon and of grammar is equal to that of the laws of exchange, crystallized in money. Instead of the Word of God, we have the rule of the learned and the domination of the priesthood. The break up of the speaking community and the partition of the soil, the analyticity of thought and the reign of dogmatism were also born with writing. Bergson directly questions the principle of exteriority whice witnesses to the infiltration of space into the temporality of sound and its continuity. The written word has severed its ties with the feeling effort and dynamism of thought. [147]

It is interesting to note that Ricoeur too takes Plato and Rousseau as examples of the critique of writing and like Derrida, he too locates this critique within a larger consideration of the intellectual, social and moral powers and needs of human beings. For Ricoeur too, the elevation of speech over writing, the primacy of the spoken word, is no mere element in a theory of language, but it is the expression of an entire philosophy and metaphysics, what Derrida calls phonocentrism But while responding to this critique of writing, Ricoeur would, in a sense, agree that in moving from oral to textual discourse, there is a loss But we must locate this dimension of loss and diremption differently. For this more phenomenologically oriented comparison of oral and textual discourse, we may briefly recall Austin's formulation of the thre functions of speech acts.

1. The locutionary aspect–the act *of* saying.
2. The illocutionary aspect–the act *in* saying.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

3. The perlocutionary aspect–the act or effect achieved by saying.

According to Ricoeur, in the inscription of discourse in the form of writing, these three functions or aspects diminish in the order in which they have been stated above. [128] This can be seen when we remember that writing represents a fixation of meaning in which the 'said' assumes greater importance than the act of saying, because the content can be more easily preserved, but the performative aspect, the dynamic doing in saying, is less easily inscribed in writing and much less, the perlocutionary force and impact on the audience.

But this loss is the condition on which the gain in the access to text is manifested; as we have already seen, Ricoeur holds that the text gains a secondary reference, a capacity to disclose new ways or aspects of being in the world; it leads to a re-description of reality such that we see the world under a new aspect. Ricoeur holds that this new dimension of reference is possible only on the basis of the suppression of primary or literal reference, just as in a metaphor, the semantic innovation, the production of the new meaning, is possible only on the basis of the breakdown of the customary sense.

Ricoeur, therefore, sees the specific uniqueness of the text in terms of its capacity for new modes of reference. But even here he text is not an abrupt break from speech or oral discourse. On the contrary, Ricoeur sees textual functions as actualizations of certain implicit tendencies given in speech itself. Furthermore, Ricoeur is able to see the continuity between speech and writing, because he sees both of them as discourse which he sets off against language. It is this primary contrast between language as structure and language as meaning that is fundamental in Ricoeur and the contrast between speech and writing takes its place as a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

further specification within discourse. This point may be of some interest, for as we shall soon see, in Derrida also there is a critique of structuralism but that critique of structuralism is very different from that of Ricoeur and leads to the deconstruction of the speech/writing schema itself. For Ricoeur, within structuralism, a sign must not be defined in terms of some object for which it stands, but rather in terms of its relations with other signs within the system of which it is a part. By constituting itself as the study of language as a system in this sense, Ricoeur argues that structuralism excludes a number of fundamental phenomena. But most importantly, it excludes the primary intention of language which is to say something about something. With Frege, Ricoeur accepts the basic claim that we are not satisfied with sense but also demand reference. But Ricoeur grounds this demand for refereace in the claim that this demand is an expression in linguistic terms of the intentional thrust of human existence, that it is a mode of being in the world. It is true that in Ricoeur, intentionality has shed much of its cartesian aura, as a propulsion of consciousness, and appears more as a description of human existence than of subjectivity. But it is still, in its existential form, determinative of his philosophy of meaning, leading to primacy of reference over sense.

Derrida devotes a long and sustained study to Plato's *Phaedrus* precisely focussing on this issue of the contrast of speech and writing and the denigration of writing as an inferior supplementarity.[130] At one level, Derrida seems to be making the same points as Ricoeur, when he reconstructs the philosophical assumptions and presuppositions which give force to this critique of writing. Thus, like Ricoeur, he brings out the contrast between true recollection and a mere external rememoration; he also explicates Plato's argument that writing, while seemingly

...6

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

augmenting the range and scope of the knowable, by means of its external sedimentation in a material medium really robs cognitive processes of their real motivating impulse; they only contribute a false and decietful semblance of learning just as the art of cookery mimics medicine and cosmetics, true gymnastics. Hence, writing, sophistry, rhetoric and myth are all aligned, as figures of semblance, against the logos of philosophic inquiry. At this level, Derrida's study of the myth of writing in the *Phaedrus* moves on the same level as that of Ricoeur, but Derrida adds a series of complications to this seemingly smooth and compulsive philosophic reading of the text and it is these complications and perplexities which invest the entire critique with another level of antithetical significance. If we may put it that way, Ricoeur's reading moves only on one plane – the philosophical or argumentative. At this level he reconstructs the logical motivations of the critique and its presuppositions. It is not that these conceptual determinations and intentions are not there in the text; the argument of the text certainly moves along these levels. But in Derrida, there is, as it were, a bi–focal perspective on the text While he, like Ricoeur, also attends to the conceptuality of the critique, he is also concerned with its textuality i.e., the argument is embodied in the form of a discourse structured by a series of metaphors and other figurative devices. The rhetorical texture of the passage does not allow itself to be wholly pervaded by its conceptuality with the result that behind the foreground argumentation, in the background there is a struggle which is staged, a struggle between concept and expression, between thought and discourse It is to this agonistic struggle that Derrida's reading alerts us, by drawing our attention to a number of enigmas of the composition of the text. At first glance, such tactics may appear as distractions from a philosophic reading of the dialogue, as intrusions of stylistics into epistemology and theory semantics. But Derrida's point is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

precisely to make us see the effects of textuality upon philosophic arguments. We may begin to grasp this over determination of a philosophical text, to use a Freudian term, by first reminding ourselves that this critique of writing is presented as a myth, of the gift of the god Thoth to the Egyptian King. Thoth offers the gift of writing, among others to the king, but he rejects it and it is during the course of explaining the wisdom of the king's rejection that Socrates builds up the case against writing, whose philosophical foundations we have already seen. What is intriguing about it and constitutes itself as the first enigma of the passage is that the Socratic logos expresses its integrity and purity precisely by way of a myth.[131] But Derrida holds that this regression to myth is no momentary or isolated accident which befalls the philosophic logos, but, on the contrary, it is inevitable the moment Plato decides to embody Socratic speech in the form of writing. Plato himself regards the fact that his master, Socrates never even once wrote down his views, as not merely a personal detail about him, but as an expression of his philosophic integrity and power. Yet, Plato had to record this by writing. This complex relation between Socrates and Plato alerts us to a latent guilt and bad faith in the texts of the dialogues.[132] Perhaps this sense of guilt makes itself felt when Plato falls back upon the metaphor of writing at the very moment he is trying to describe the purity of genuine thought. So, speech is represented, not only as the opposite of writing, but as a 'good' kind of writing that is inscribed in the soul and similarly true memory is described in terms of engraving and inscribing.[133] In the very attempt to distantiate speech from writing, Plato describes it as a form of writing. This double edged feature of the dialogue reaches its most arresting moment in the metaphor Plato uses for writing 'pharmakon'. Pharmakon is not just an ambiguous term; its chief senses are 'poison' on the one hand and 'remedy' or 'cure' on the other. One would

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

think that these two meanings could hardly come together in a single utterance or context of usage, but that is precisely Derrida's point–that these two antithetical senses of the word are everywhere co–present in Plato's text, defeating all attempts to choose one or the other according to context; [134] we may perhaps put this in psycho–analytic terms by saying that in Plato, writing is the unconscious of speech.

The objective of such deconstructive strategies is not to invert an accepted order, to stand on end conventional priorities; in the case before us, Derrida is after much bigger game than merely to make out a case for writing; on the contrary, what he wants to show and wishes us to see (although perhaps such a 'visual' invitation is contrary to his style of argument) is that the binary opposition of speech and writing is itself radically unstable and is subversive. But what also must be 'seen' is that we cannot substitute a less infected form of thinking, use concepts and categories which would be immune from the difficulties and perplexities of the concepted model. A connected point also may be kept in mind. In questioning these patterns of our thinking, Derrida is not denying reality; the object of his critique is the way we think about the world rather than the world itself. In other words, I am suggesting that a nihilistic interpretation of deconstructionism, which unfortunately seems to be the gut reaction of so many of his critics is a naive reading. This point, I hope, will become more pertinent when we come to the issue of reference in Deconstruction. But it may still be asked why attach so much metaphysical weight and pathos to a distinction between speech and writing. That Derrida attaches the gravest consequentiality to this most evident in *On Grammatology* where he writes 'All the metaphysical determinations of truth and even the ones beyond the metaphysical onto–theology that Heidegger reminds us of, are more or less

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

immediately inseparable from the instance of logos, or of a reason thought within the lineage of the logos, in whatever sense it is understood : in the pre-Socratic or the philosophical sense, in the sense of God's infinite understanding or in the anthropological sense, in the pre-Hegelian or the post-Hegelian sense. Within this logos, the original and essential link to the phone has never been broken ". [135]

The enormous weight he attaches to the critique of speech is due to his claim that the link between reason or truth or logos and speech has been fatefully determinative of the Western philosophical, metaphysical as well as anti-metaphysical tradition and hence a critique of speech is also a critique of the self-presentations of philosophy in that tradition. This claim can be judged only on the basis of a close and attentive consideration of all of his texts, but particularly *On Grammatology* [136] and *Margins of Philosophy*. [137a] But we can make a few remarks here and now. First, as we shall see presently, the deconstruction of the speech-writing opposition is a model and basis for the deconstruction of the conception of self-identity as understood in the Western philosophical tradition. Second, in a different study I have shown how this engagement with the concept of the sign has serious implications for the Human sciences. [137b] The signifier-signified opposition is part of what may be called a binary complex, which also includes such other consequential oppositions as the intelligible and the sensible, reality and appearance, nature and culture, man and woman. The scope of deconstruction is, therefore, as wide and deep as human thinking itself.

But to return to the point with which we started these reflections on the aim and scope of deconstruction. I said that for Derrida, what is involved is the questioning of the schema of our thought and not so much any of its results. For example,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

it is the way we think about language, meaning and truth that he wants to expose and interrogate. The guiding principle of this interrogation is one of the most crucial operative 'concepts' of deconstruction, namely 'Differance'.[138] It would be impossible and pointless to attempt a summarizing of the idea of differance and for our present purpose, it is also not called for. What is more relevant and manageable is to keep in view the two component associations of the Derrida's term–*difference* and *deferance* in the sense of postponing, delaying etc. What Derrida is suggesting is that all signs exhibit these two features; writing only does so in a manifest or palpable manner, such that writing serves as a model for all language and signification. In that sense writing is a 'root metaphor' for language and understanding through language.

I propose to comment briefly on these two aspects–difference and deferance and I shall connect the first with Derrida's response to De Saussure and the second with his response to Heidegger.

Difference is a constitutive or defining condition for both the signifier and the signified, for De Saussure. He writes "in language there are only differences. Even more important; a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language, there are only differences *without positive terms.* Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it".[139] De Saussure is saying that a signifier is determined not by what it is, as it were, in itself or by itself, but in terms of its differences from other signifiers; so also the signified, the sense or concept, is fixed by differences

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

from other senses; the identity of both the signifier and the signified is a relational and oppositional identity. But it must be noted that this kind of difference is a synchronic characteristic of signs within a system. In a sense it may be said that Derrida attaches a temporal signification to De Saussure's difference. This is one of the overtones of the metaphor of writing, for writing as an inscripton, is a trace of thouht and speech in the temporal sense as an 'after-event'. For Derrida the meaning of any sign is perpetually deferred; the signified concept can never be fully present to tne signifier. The signified concept is never present in itself, in an adequate presence that would refer only to itself. Every concept is necessarily and essentially inscribed in a chain or a system, within which it refers to another and to other concepts, by the systematic play of differences. Such a play, then-differance-is no longer simply a concept but the possibility of conceptuality, of the conceptual system and process in general ".[140] (Differance, we may say, is not a concept, but a condition of possibility of all concepts and hence 'transcendental').

The idea of a meaning always postponed, deferred and concealed in the play of signifiers and thus never present in its identity takes us on to Heidegger's sense of difference. For Heidegger, the basic contrast is between Being and particular beings in plural and dispersal; it is this which he calls the ontological difference and further especially in his later works, there is the idea that Being is concealed in beings and there is, therefore, the presence of Being in the mode of absence. While these ideas do have a certain affinity with Derrida, yet there is also a difference for, in Heidegger, there is also the idea of a recovery and possession of truth in the resoluteness of 'thinking of Being'. In this sense, Derrida claims that Heidegger's thought, however radical and critical of metaphysics it may be,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is yet within the basic logocentrism of the Western tradition. Just as previously, we noted that Differance is a condition of possibility of all concepts and conceptuality, we can now say that it is also the condition of possibility of the ontological difference. It is precisely in this way that Derrida claims that deconstruction is more radical than Heidegger's fundamental ontology, in the sense that it explains the unexplainable in Heidegger.

I said that one of the reasons Derrida concentrates so much of his attention on the notion of sign understood as the unity of signifier–signified, as understood in structuralism is that it is this schema of the signifier and the signified that has also been the pattern of thinking of self–identity, Hence, to question the sign as Derrida does is to interrogate the schema of self–raflection. Considering that it is this pattern of self–reflection which has served as the philosophical matrix of humanism, the impact of Derrida's questioning can well be imagined.

The model af the sign is particularly apt for the understanding of the structure of self–identity or personal identity in the Western philosophical as well as humanistic tradition. As De Saussure describes it, the sign is the unity of the signifier and the signified where the signifier is the expression of the signified and the signified is the foundation of the signifier. Furthermore, the signified, although primary in one sense, is yet accessibe to us only by way of the signifier; we grasp the signified by way of the expressive power of the signifier. Applying this as the model of personal or self–identity we may make a number of comments:

1. We may say there is a foundation or the self in itself, analogous to the signified; this is the object term of self–consciousness, for it is that of which we are said to be aware when we are aware of ourselves. Of course, this

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

fondation or basis may be understood differently in different philosophical paradigms, as body self, as sensuous stream of impressions, as active will, or as desire, or reason, or of transcendental subjectivity, or as Dasein which it at once ontic and ontological or as soul or spiritual substance, or as the mystical unity of the individual and universal.

2. This founding reality of the self is expressed in a certain reflective awareness, which, we may say, corresponds to the signifier in the model of the signifier–signified complex Self-awreness or self–consciousness is the coming to awareness the active expression of the self.

Self-identity, therefore, is a sign in the sense that it consists of an expression (signifier) of an underlying sense (signified). But here we may recall a certain strategy of Husserl's treatment of meanings; we noted that Husserl says that although 'meaning' or 'sense' are originally given at the level of language thus standing for the meaning or sense of a word or other linguistic element, yet the notion can be extended to the level of prelinguistic acts such that we may legitimately speak, not only of linguistic meanings but also of act meanings. As per this, we can now say that although the notion of sign is first encountered at the level of language, yet we may extend it to the structure of self–identity. But as with Husserl, this is only an opening move, for in Husserl, it is the phenomenological stratum of intentional acts and their noematic meanings that explain linguistic meaning. So also even here, it may be said that the self-identity of the subject is the basis and foundation for identity of other things somewhat reminding us of Kant's point that the unity of self consciousness is the ground of the possibility of experience and knowledge.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It is because of this deep and interior connection between the identity of the self and the identity of objects, that it is possible for certain theories to presuppose self–identity although they are about very different phenomena. Thus a certain linguistic theory of signs and their signification which has nothing to do with self or personal identity, but because the schema it uses for its own inquiries is the schema of self–identity, such theories of the sign do have a certain metaphysical salience. Also, it is because of this bond that a critique of language can also function as a critique of metaphysics.

With these remarks in mind, when we turn to the implications of Derrida's deconstruction of the sign for the problem of the self and its identity, we find the following :

1. Derrida's critique of the presence of the signified and his counter–claim that the signified is always deferred and absent unsettles the conviction of the subject as presence. The notion of ' differance ' is a profound questioning of any philosophy of immediacy, particularly phenomenology.

2. The idea of the absent signified as set up by the play and dissemination of the signifiers, that it is a function of this perpetual ' sliding ' also calls into question the stability and self–presence of the subject.

Derrida himself draws the final conclusion from this critique of self–consciousness. In his ' Introduction ' to *The Origin of Geometry* he speaks of difference as transcendental. In *Speech and Phenomena* he says that difference is primordial nonself presence–it is not something which occurs to a transcendental subject, it is what produces it. [11]

But it may now be asked what happens to meaning and reference, to truth and falsehood, if neither a stable sense nor a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

subject is admissible. If all presence has been deconstructed and the signified is only the illusion thrown up the perpetual play of the signifiers, have we not abolished all notions of reference of our utterances and writings being 'about' something, as holding true of it ? This, of course, is the fundamental objection which Ricoeur has expressed, namely, that the very intention of language is to be true of something, that this drive from sense to reference is primordial and irrepressible. If this is so, it would follow that the network of ideas relating to referentiality of discourse, ideas like being about something, as holding true of it and so on, would be so fundamental that this network of ideas would pervade all our utterances; somewhat like the Kantian categories, they would be found wherever there is language, assertion or denial. If so, it would appear that no deconstruction could really get out of the schemas instituted by these notions.

Derrida is fully alive to this situation for he holds that all deconstructive strategies, in the very moment they call the binary oppositions of thought into question, also fall back into conceptual space organized by these oppositions. This involvement of a critique of concepts in the very conceptuality it seeks to call into question is the converse of 'ordinary' philosophical discourse. As noted in our discussion of Plato, while setting out to establish the primacy of speech over writing, the argumentation implicitly subverts itself. So also here, deconstructive arguments also suffer this kind of reversal. But Derrida would not, therefore, conclude that all critique is futile and condemned to a kind of unintended repetiton. Through these inner dislocations and aporetic reversals, it is possible to have a glimpse of reality; as he says there is something which glimmers through these 'broken' claims. The crucially important question that we havs to consider is what is the proper way of responding to this situation of a broken disclosure.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

This issue is an aspect of the more basic problem of reference in Derrida's thought. As we have already seen, an extreme response to Derrida's work on language and writing has taken that he dismantles the whole idea of reference, that for him there is nothing outside the text and that we are condemned to a solipsism of the absolute text. We have also seen how Derrida himself has protested against such 'nihilistic' readings. But it is now necessary to pursue the matter further and try to determine in what sense we should understand the deconstructionist critique of reference. For this purpose, we may begin with one of Derrida's remarks that " we need to interpret interpretations more than to interpret things."[1] I suggest that one of the things that this remark of Derrida may suggest, in the context of the problem of language and reference, is that what we have to examine is not, so to say, the phenomenon of reference, but the modes in which we understand and talk about reference; it is the discourses of reference to which we must shift our attention. This may recall to our minds the Kantian claim of the necessity of shifting the mode of inquiry. When we, thus, examine the modes of understanding the relationship of thought, language and reality, when we shift to the discourses of reference, Derrida suggests that in the tradition of philosophic thought there have been two basic models, two guiding praadigms which have shaped theories of knowledege and truth. It may not be even proper to call them theories of truth or theories of reference; they are comparable to Kuhnian paradigms which can serve as the matrices of a plurality of theories; there is a further point of analogy with the notion of paradigms. Like paradigms, these discourses of reference are seldom fully articulated; very often they are effective precisely because they remain implicit and assumed, The first of these models of truth is the idea of truth as an adequate correspondence with things. It is this idea of truth as a certain fit between words and things, the idea that the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

referential relation is a simple one of names or words standing for objects and states of affairs that has been the source of a number of realistic theories of knowledge and truth. Opposed to this is the idealist theory or 'picture', which sees truth as a form of inward reflection, as an interior presence before consciousness. It may appear to differ totally from the first view insofar as it seems to do away with the postulation of anything external, anything which may be said to be 'the other' of consciousness or the subject, but inspite of this manifest difference between them, they rest upon a shared presupposition that an object is what is present before the subject. Hence, the opposition and strife between these two views or preunderstandings simply describe an oscillation within the same circle of assumptions and presuppositions; hence the battle of the giants as Plato once called this strife between idealism and materialism,[143] is yet paradoxically of so little real transformattion; hence the appearance in history of philosophy of an illusory battle, of a strife in which neither position can be either established or overthrown, for in the very moment of establishing the one, the grounds for the re-emergence of the other are laid down. Hence the periodical returns and revivals of abandoned views. But the criticism of the concealed shared presuppositions has the appearance of dismantling the notion of truth itself. Since reference and validity has been predelienated by these concealed presuppositions, since they limit our discursive possibilities, any rejection of that hidden model strikes one as an elimination of truth itself; the spectre of a solipsism which has lost the world, looms up to paralyse our thought. Derrida, as we saw, has no pretensions of transcending the constraints and double binds which have held fast the discourse of philosophy from its institution; he does not believe that deconstruction could pretend to be a deliverance from these burdens imposed on tho-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ught by language. On the contrary, what is alone in our power is to interpret this predicament and here too Derrida talks of two modes of recognition, two interpretations of interpretations in his terms. "There are thus two interpretations of interpretation of structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth, or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile ... Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this interpretation is saddened, negative, nostalgic and guilty side of thinking, whose other side would be the Neitzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth."[144]

But still a few lingering questions and reflections may be permitted. The two kinds of interpretation that Derrida is talking of here may recall Ricoeur's description of the hermeneutics of trust and the hermeneutics of suspicion. This may be reinforced by the fact that Derrida mentions Neitzsche whom Ricoeur describes as a master of suspicion. But these are few further reflections which may somewhat delay the identification of Derrida's two interpretations with the hermeneutics of trust and of suspicion respectively. Ricoeur would perhaps fasten on the allusion to the overcoming of truth in Derrida's passage, but the accent falls upon the joyful acceptance or affirmation of the world.[145] Similarly the other interpretation Derrida is here contrasting evokes nostalgia and sadness and guilt, whereas the hermeneutics of trust would see itself under the sign of hope. Perhaps the hermeneutics of Heidegger with its search for Being lost and concealed over by beings but recoverable by thought is closer to such a hermeneutics of trust. But what is so unsettling about Derrida's contrast of two interpretations is that in *The Margins of Philosophy* where he does mention Heideggerian

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

hope for Being, he nevertheless remarks that from the side of the second Nietzschean interpretation of free affirmation, this hope is called into question. It now appears that the hermeneutics of trust and hope is the repressed othher of nostalgic guilt. [146]

This nostalgia, the dream of an immediacy and presence is the very principle and ground which animates the hermeneutical project. Henc, given in the very idea of a hermeneutics as the recovery of sense and meaning, there is a prejudgement of the hermeneutics of trust; it is in these terms that Gadamer feels that interpretative understanding itself is possible only in terms of participation and coming to agreement. In these terms, the so-called hermeneutics of suspicion is and can only be a limited moment, a phase of critical reserve and caution which is valuable only as a moment in a dialogue. Similarly the second interpretation named by Derrida and of which Neitzsche is the exemplary name, is also a transgression of the forms of discourse within which hermeneutics dwells. But a transgression into what ? At first, it appears that it is a transgression into the willful, the disorderly and the capricious, a celeberation of the death of truth. When this aspect of the matter surfaces, we are filled with a sense of doom and foreboding. But Derrida also apeaks in another voice. Here Derrida is talking of the movement of his own deconstructive critique. " Within the closure, constantly risking falling back within what is being deconstructed, it is necessary to surround the critical concepts with a careful and through discourse–to mark the conditions, the medium and the limits of their effectiveness and to designate rigorously their intimate relationship to the machine whose deconstruction they permit and *in the same process*, the crevice through which the yet unnameable glimmer beyond the closure can be glimpsed ". [147] What form of reality beckons us througn this notion of a crevice

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

opened up by deconsyructive critique ? To what are we bidden here to listen ? What awaits us ? An invertigation into such questions, howerer, falls outside the scope of the present series.

R. SUKDARA RAJAN
Philosophy Department
Poona University,
PUNE–411 007.

NOTES

109. P. Ricoeur ; *The Rule of Metaphor.*

110. *Ibid*, pp. 259–272.

111. *Ibid*, pp. 284–289.

112. T. K. Seung ; *Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, chapter 6, Columbia University Press, N. Y. 1981.

113. Christopher Norris ; *Derrida*, p. 144, Fontana Press 1987.

114. *Ibid.*

115. P. Ricoeur; "Existence and Hermeneutics" in *Contemporary Hermeneutics* (ed.), Josef Blucher, pp. 242–43, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980.

116. *Ibid*, p. 243.

117. *Ibid.*

118. *Ibid.*

119. Schleirmacher ; *Hermeneutik* quoted in Peter Dews *Logics of Disintegration*, p. 12, Verso Press, N. Y. 1987.

120. *Ibid.*

121. *Ibid*

122. J. Derrida ; *Positions*, p. 45. (trans.) Alan Bass, Athlone Press, London, 1972.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

123. J. Derrida ; *Spurs : Nietzsche's Styles* (trans.) Barbara Harlow, Chicago University Press, 1972.

124. J. Derrida ; *Desseminations*, p. 148 (trans) Barbara Johnson, Athlone Press, London, 1972.

125. Peter Dews ; *Logics of Disintegration*, p. 12.

126. P. Ricoeur ; *Interpretation Theory*, pp. 38-39, Texas, Christian University Press, 1976.

127. *Ibid*, pp. 39-40.

128. *Ibid*, pp. 26-32.

129. P. Ricoeur ; " Existence and Hermeneutics ", *Op. Cit.* p. 172.

130. J. Derrida ; " Plato's Pharmacy ", *Desseminations* (trans), Barbara Johnson, Athlone Press, London, 1981, pp. 61-171.

131. *Ibid.*

132. *Ibid.*

133. *Ibid.*

134. *Ibid.*

135. *Ibid.*

136. J. Derrida ; *On Grammatology*, pp. 10-11 (trans) Gayatri Spivak, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1976. *Margins of Philosophy* (trans) Alan Bass, Chicago University Press, 1982.

137. a) *Ibid.*

137. b) R. Sundara Rajan ; " Structuralism and Post-Structuralism in the Human Sciences " *Education and Social Change*, Indian Institute of Education, Poona, Vol. III, No. 2, 3 & 4, 1989-90.

138. J. Derrida ; *Speech and Phenomena*, pp. 129-58 (trans) D. Alkison, Evanston, North Western University Press. 1973.

139. F. De Saussure ; *A Course in General Linguistics* (trans.) Wade Baskin, McGraw Hill, N. Y. 1966.

140. J. Derrida ; *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 130.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

141. *Ibid.*

142. J. Derrida; *Writing and Difference* (trans) Alan Bass, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978.

143. Plato; *The Sophist* (trans), F. M. Cornford, *Great Books of the Western World* : Plato (ed.) Robert Maynard Hutchins, University of Chicago Press, 1952.

144. J. Derrida; *Writing and Difference*, p. 292.

145. *Ibid.*

146. J. Derrida; *Margins of Philosophy.*

147. J. Derrida; *On Grammatology*, p. 14.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Qnarterly Vol. XVIII. No. 3
July 1991

L. J. COHEN'S METAPHILOSOPHICAL RELATIVISM

I. Revisionism in Analytical Philosophy

How analytical is analytical philosophy? It is not easy to find an answer, because critics waver between perfect denouement and absolute practice. There are 'sceptics' who disbelieve that the 'prophylactic' account of analytical philosophy can save us from falling a prey to conceptual confusions, because analytical philosophy itself is a product of conceptual confusions. This is a theme that dominates much of the critique of clarity (critique of the distinction between sense and nonsense) advanced by Baker and Hacker.[1] The epithets of abuse these authors heap on the evolution of the ideas that are currently reigning supreme, will only make professional philosophers blush. They hold, for example, that analytical philosophy is 'a pipedream bred of confusion'; for them, analytical philosophy represents 'a barren mythology of twentieth century culture' (preface, x); again, 'what appears to be a sunrise is merely a false dawn'; 'it leads to wastelands of intellect' (p. 13); 'it is a sterile thunder without rain' (*Ibid.*). Is analytic philosophy, as it is practiced today, then, such a will-O'-the wisp? Or are there grounds to take it to be a 'metaphilosophy *par excellence*? Cohen answers it by taking analytical philosophy to be analytical because it has a distinct trait of independence from other varieties of non-metaphilosophical accounts of philosophy, and tries to defend with a strong and sustained argumentation so as to vindicate it by vindicating 'rationality' itself.[2] For Cohen,

Received : 24-4-90

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

therefore, the linguistic thesis of clarity has the widest possible implications in that it can occupy a very honourable place among disciplines like jurisprudence, law, economics, and art; and hence, its 'socio–political', implications are to be understood on a wider canvas of 'reasoning' and 'rationality'. From this, Cohen develops what may be called a 'dialogical' conception of analytical philosophy, taking the 'dialogue of reason' as synonymous with the 'dialogue of analytical philosophy' itself. Says Cohen, ".. The history of analytical philosophy is the history of dialogue itself". For Cohen, once this is recognised to be the unifying theme of the history of analytical philosophy, then the 'direction of its socio–economic political influence is apparent" (61). Understood in this way, analytical philosophy has immense prospects of becoming a species of *Kulturphilosophie* and as such, it will be a 'strong ally for any society' (192) which wants to promote a 'tolerant and democratic culture' (191). Analytical philosophy, says, Cohen, is "a cultural movement, that makes for tolerance, universal suffrage, ethical pluralism, non–violent resolution of disputes, and freedom of intellectual enterprise, and is in turn, promoted by them. Doctrinaire tyrannies certainly have good reason to ban it" (p 62). Cohen's revisionism is not based on any historical interpretation, but as he tells us, it is born out of a metaphilosophical reflection. As I unfold the story below, the major shortcoming of Cohen's vision of 'metaphilosophical revisionism' is that it lacks the historical–hermeneutical side of it, the importance of which is independently acknowledged by writer like Gordon Baker.' Hence, I believe the question how 'analytical' must be substituted with how 'historical' is analytical philosophy (see Section 5 below).

2. *Cohen's Metaphilosophical Argument*

Earlier, Rorty has given recognition to the metaphilosophical trait of linguistic turn, but failed to grasp its wider implications.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But Cohen goes further than this in weaving a perspective around it. By putting it to test, he brings it to the 'court of enquiry', and raises a searching question about its globalist character, so as to make it possible to assert that jurisprudence itself can be brought within its fold For Cohen, its inner contradictions, inconsistencies, paradoxes can be turned to its advantage by placing emphasis on its 'pluralistic character of metaphilosophy'. What follows from it is the contrast between two accounts of consensus : that is, consensus is an object–level elitist trait as far as the non–metaphilosophical accounts are concerned, but it is an attainable trait as far as metaphilosophical accounts are concerned. Incidentally, Cohen regards "Cogent philosophical arguments are only *ad hominems* at certain points". This explains why analytical philosophers need not bother about agreement, because their lack of consensus itself is quite compatible with the rationality of dialogue. Thus, Cohen makes it a positive virtue of analytical philosophy when it lacks a 'logic' or rules of paradigmatic reasoning. In this context, Cohen may be understood to formulate a metaphilosophical argument for demonstrating the very possibility of analytical philosophy, by assuming the dialogue of reason as providing its necessary transcendental premise. Read backwards, the argument becomes : analytical philosophy provides the conditions of the possibility for human rationality itself. I suppose that either reading is agreeable to him, but it is the former version that is faithful to Cohen's original account; thus analytical philosophy determines the boundaries of reason itself, or more precisely, the limits of analytical philosophy is the limit of reason itself. It appears as though, any disproof of the possibility of analytical philosophy will amount to a disproof of reason itself. Cohen wants to rule out the conceptual possibility of such a proof, even in the face of experimental proof concerning human irrationality itself.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In recent years, Cohen is mounting a vigorous compaign against the experimental proof of 'irrationality'.[4] Thus, Cohen vehemently denies that philosophical analysis is nothing but a species of computational analysis or its converse, namely that computational analysis (artificial intelligence) is nothing but a sophisticated type of philosophical analysis. It is, therefore, necessary to extend this argument so as to vitiate the argument which stands in favour of psychological language of thought. This is precisely the direction which Cohen takes. From this he develops what may be called an inductivist account of analytical philosophy which is backed up by his work of the last two decades. The key to such an inductivist account is an asymmetry thesis about deduction and induction, which states that: whereas induction can accommodate deduction because of its 'generality' and 'synopticness', deduction cannot so accommodate and therefore the former can provide the terms of integration between them. The question however is, does an inductivist 'option' defend analytical philosophy? It can obviate the change of sterility, but it cannot silence the cavils of critics. What follows from this is a view of 'metaphilosophical pluralism' that entails neither relativism nor nihilism but a sort of normativism, but without implying a singular 'computationalist account of analytical philosophy'. Cohen derives an advantage from it by separating the inductivist account from the computational, and claims that this gives certain autonomy to the issue about the possibility of analytical philosophy. It is not so much that Cohen denies the psychological reality of reasoning, and in fact agrees with much of it but at the same time, he denies that there is any analogy between philosophical analysis on the one hand and computational analysis on the other.

So, on Cohen's hypothesis even if it is true to hold that all problems of philosophy are *au fond* problems of language

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(which, I think, he takes with extreme reservations), it does not follow that mind should be regarded as a computer. With equal vehemence, Cohen expresses himself against the recent analysis of language of thought, particularly the hypothesis proposed by Fodor. Both of the above oppositions do not as yet prove that Cohen is a sceptic about founding the philosophy of language on the philosophy of mind Cohen's account rather prefers to found it on certain type of philosophy of reasoning, which makes adequate proviso for a non–linguistic variety of linguistic philosophy and non–verbal medium of thinking. Cohen seems to be a cartesian of a sort in his account of reasoning. *A fortiriori*, Cohen is a telementationalist, but not of the Boolean type, which gave importance to the isomorphism between the structure of human thought and structure of humam language, nor of the Fregean type which gave exclusive importance to the structure of language, but a classicist in the sense that he gives importance to the structures of thought or reasoning.[5] Accordingly, neither language, nor mind provides the necessary paradigm of analysis, but the paradigm that is to be favoured is rationality, which is neither linguistic nor computational in its core, but of the pragmaticist in type, in that its substantive issues lie in the socio-political realm. Using the above stance, Cohen tries to justify the inclusion of what he calls ' semantic descent ' along with ' semantic ascent' to accouut for techniques of analytical philosophy.

Cohen is sure to disagree with the Dummettian interpretation of philosophy of language which stresses the foundational interests of philosophy of language by advancing what is called the ' central–peripheral ' picture.[6] Against this positive outlook, Cohen's account is negative in that it deviates from this by calling attention to its contribution towards ' substantive ' philosophical analysis. What Cohen calls ' substantive ' here, is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

inconsistent with the above semantic descent. To the extent it engages in substantive questions, it makes a semantic descent. Thus, Cohen disposes of the telementational view adopted by Dummett by arguing that analytical philosophy does not stand in need of 'psychological' arguments for its support. The two arguments that he inveighs against here are : one, thinking cannot go on in a non–verbal medium; second, experiments to prove that we are liable to fallacies in logical arguments. But to what extent Cohen is determined to concern himself with the intentional demension of thought remains enigmatic till the end.

3. Semantic Ascent and Semantic Descent

In Cohen's revisionay outlook, one asymmetry between 'semantic ascent' and 'semantic descent' leads him to the other asymmetry between 'deductive' and 'inductive' modes of reasoning, and the strategy can by extended to cover 'meaning' and 'reference' or even 'realism' where it apparently works and 'anti-realism', where it does not work. If it were to work, then Cohen's inductivism must entail anti-realism. But since this term does not evoke much sympathy with him, the above consequence is suspect. As Cohen makes out, the most important trait of his outlook is the distinction between semantic ascent and semantic descent. Characterised as techniques of analysis, they undoubtedly wear a Russellian garb in that they roughly correspond to Russell's account of 'definition' and 'analysis' given in his lectures on Logical Atomism, wherein the former is understood to be concerned with meaning of words (or transformation of sentences) and the latter is roughly equivalent to the relation between language and extra–linguistic reality. That Russell's concept of analysis, thus, corresponds to definition of logical expressions has been very often overlooked. Looking at this way one can perceive the major shift from 'talk about objects' to 'talk about talk' found in Carnap and Quine in various degrees

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

moving it in one direction, but how one should locate it within his account of naturalised epistemology is enigmatic, to say the least of it. In brief, the tangle between semantics and epistemology is no longer clear. For Cohen, the thread that spins semantics with epistemology lies in what he calls semantic descent Complimentary methods as they are, still they are attributable to Quine.

From Cohen's point of view, such a complimentarity is to be emphasised for at least two reasons: one is that it reinforces the disanalogy between philosophical analysis and computational analysis; and secondly, it could be used to bring about the identity between 'talk about talk' and 'reasons about reason'. Thus, what the metaphilosophical account aims at is that it provides the norms about norms. The emergent view of analytical philosophy is that, even though there is no one precise method or norm in Cohen's sense, it gives us the norms about norms. Thus, on Cohen's view, neither deduction nor induction provides the ultimate norms of reasoning, but a metaphilosopical way of looking at the basis about their norms has the prospect of illuminating the above two techniques. No doubt the standard method of reasonings as reflected in deductive and inductive methods are not acceptable without major changes, which were fostered by the revolution in logic of mathematics as science. But the methods to standardise them cannot be said to be available within the purview of analytical philosophy, but the consequent problems that they generate go to make up the contours of analytical philosophy. Thus, Cohen is right in holding that it is these problems that go to make analytical philosophy as it is, and not the method which creates the problems. For Cohen, nihilism constitutes only the appearance of analytical movement, but its reality is different in that it contributes towards the study of norms about norms. It is not totally impertinent, therefore,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to characterise analytical philosophy as providing a normative epistemology.

Cohen's metaphilosophy, in a sense, can be equated with a (normative) epistemology of logic. But to what extent, the focus on 'reasoning' can provide an option for defence is not yet clear. As an important trait of analytical philosophy, normative epistemology is quite opposed to 'naturalised' epistemology because it succeed where naturalised epistemology fails. Though this may seem to be consistent with one interpretation of the aforesaid 'substantivity' of analytical philosophy, it is emphasised at the expense of foundational interests; and Cohen's thesis of complimentarity thus errs in making manifest one at the expense of the other. Thus, the normativism of analytical epistemology seems to overlook normativism in semantics, because both take us in divergent directions. One cannot hope to tackle normativism in other areas unless one knows how to tackle normativism in semantics. To reiterate this is to orient ourselves firmly in the foundational outlook. Thus, metaphilosophy is closely linked to foundationalism. But Cohen's outlook is metaphilosophical but without foundationalism.

Normative epistemology has two sources according to Cohens account: one is seen in the globalist preoccupations of deductivist logic, and second is the localist concerns of inductivist logic. A synthesis of both gives the normative character of analytical philosophy. This is a direct derivation from the premise that deduction is a limiting case of induction, or what in the words of Cohen, inferrability is a limiting case of (inductive) probability, or put it conversely, it amounts to holding that induction is a degenerative form of deduction and *vice versa*. Stated thus, one does not know the primacy of one rather than the other. On Cohen's understanding, there are enough justifications for making inductive probability to be triggered off on a singular case of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

intuition. Thus, induction can be given primacy because it is all–pervasive, and it can very well subsume deduction as well. From Cohen's point of view one can be a fallibilist inductivist rather than perfected deductivist. Stated thus, Cohen's dictum stands in support of the above asymmetry thesis. Again the normative character comes through when one considers its relevance to epistemology. Thus, while semantic ascent concentrates on what one means by calling an argument as 'inductively valid', semantic descent suggests what is rational about it within the sphere of epistemology. From the point of view of philosophy of language; while semantic ascent can be considered to be an inquiry into the structure of meanings, semantic descent is an inquiry into what the terms stand for, or simply refer. This is best illustrated in the writings of Russell down to Quine. While Russell was broadly analytic, but stood on empirical grounds; so also Quine whose brainchild semantic ascent is, is still able to concede that "there are no purely linguistic questions at all" (26). It follows therefore, analytic philosophy cannot merely stop at constructing a theory of meaning for natural language, but its *rationale* consists in creating "new solutions for new problems" (30). It is here that Cohen puts forward a suggestion saying that one way in which its basis could be broadened is by introducing 'analogy' which is classically considered to be a species of induction. The advantage that accrues to analytical philosophy, Cohen hastens to add, is that it facilitates an inquiry into the structure of metaphor. Metaphor, in Cohen's sense, therefore is a species of analogy. This lends a new direction to analytical philosophy according to Cohen, which is otherwise sterile Even analytic verificationism need not be thrown away as useless but it could be fruitfully married to religionism. His objections to naturalised epistemology become almost obvious : naturalised epistemology cannot differentiate between one's own norms and other–norms, by telling us how different people stand in relation to judgements.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Secondly, the cementing relation between facts and language cannot easily be dismissed; and thirdly, beliefs can only be fixed in accordance with norms. Though the first sustains Cohen's pluralistic outlook, its resolution is nowhere in sight; the second has not been successfully explained by realists. By virtue of the point about the first, the last hypothesis wears a dubious character, and Cohen's solution about normativism is nothing but a surrogate relativism, projected on the metaphilosophical screen. Cohen thinks that his project can steer clear of any charge of relativism by changing the relativistic conclusion into one about norms. The resultant anti–relativism does not merely aim at norms but a norm about norms, which recognises that not having any norms is also a norm. So, one is justified in calling Cohen's account of normativism as meta-philosophical relativism.

An essential aspect of Cohen's metaphilosodhical relativism is his cure for sterility, which lies counter–productivity, or what may be called the set of rancorous opposites. Cohen is not aware that it leads towards a particular version of, the *aufgehobonist* thesis which mediates between ' dialogical ' rather than dialectical opposites.[7] His asymmetry thesis, to be discussed below, is just an echo of this. Cohen is an *aufgehobonist* without an *aufgehobon* outlook, that is, one who prefers the ' localist ' rather than the ' globalist character of analytical philosophy. Consider the following simple argument; if we assume that all problems of philosophy are problems of language, then the problem of induction is also a problem about language. Hence, it is the concern with language that must illuminate the problem, and not *vice versa*. But Cohen cannot accept this in view of his localist commitments. But if Cohen 's portrayal of induction as the core of analytic philosophy is true, then it not only withdraws the pluralistic character it assumes at the beginning, but also completely distorts the *aufgehobonist* character of his outlook.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

5. The Strategy of 'deductive' and 'inductive' reasoning

Cohen's strategy is very clear : that is, by grouping deduction and theory of meaning with semantic ascent on the one hand, and theory of reference and induction with semantic descent on the other, he attempts to contrast philosophical analysis and computational analysis. Apart from the fecundity of this contrast, Cohen's attempt to map the development of the ideas over the past eight years runs a serious risk because it is too simplistic. Besides Cohen's reasons for making them fundamental is not too convincing unless he also explains how one is more fundamental than the other, while at the same time taking into consideration the reason why they are to be regarded as fundamental. For illustration, one can describe the same phenomena with which Cohen is concerned by adopting the following strategy; while agreeing that both deduction and induction play certain roles, one may centralise them by studying their respective roles in explaining the broad contours of the theory of meaning. One can even go to the extent of categorising the role of deduction and induction in terms of the following stages. In the earlier stage, there was a consistent attempt to bring the theory of meaning under the paradigm of deduction as reflected in the Tarski–Davidson paradigm, in which case deduction is more primary; at the later stage, an attempt was made to bring meaning under some inductive model or the other (a standard model like the one advanced as deductive-nomologicai) which also has the early positivist moorings; or consider again, a more advanced stage of the physicalistic Field, or the anti–realistic Kripke, or a still more advanced level in which it is identified with what has come to be christened as the 'epistemology of understanding'. Further developments in the post–fifties can be located at least in two major areas, namely, philosophy of language and philosophy of linguistics (Chomsky, K tz, and Vandler, each of which is unique in certain respects), where semantics still rules and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

comes in the form of epistemology of competence (the Chomskyan component reflected in Davidson, and Dummett, and more recently in 'information--processing' approach to the phenomenon of psychological explanation (as reflected in Peacocke and Martin Davies etc), and the stage at which it is called the 'epistemology of performance' (or understanding as reflected in McDowell, Baker, Hacker etc.). Though this is not purported to cover the entire gamut of developments, it certainly introduces certain order into our thinking. Cohen has not considered in detail any of them, though his references to work on philosophical psychology and philosophy of law are not scanty.

It does not mean that Cohen's approach is without any principle of order. On the contrary, for Cohen, the basic character of 'categorical' and the 'hypothetical' modes of reasings is best appreciated when deduction as well as induction, take on each one of the above modes, and possibly intermix with each other. Given his emphasis on 'intuition' (a single membered one at that which works paradigmatically at times where the jurisprudential mataphor is apt), it unfolds the whole story of analytical philosophy from a base which hardly requires the above stages, but which undoubtedly bears the stamp of overlapping progression of ideas. Cohen's list of thinkers and the doctrines corresponding to them is little longer than necessary, if only to reinforce the above insight. It is not very dfficult to realise that the particular order Cohen adopts is based on his earlier work on induction, and is, thus, open to the charge that it is biassed to one dimension of analytical thinking.[8] Cohen cites in support of his intermixing thesis the deductivist Hobbes' derivation of the sovereignty of state, the inductivist Hume's challenge to produce a simple idea without a copy of the corresponding impression, and the deductivist Hume's challenge to causal nexus, deductivist Quine's 'Plain truism' about 'inductive starting point',

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

inductivist Quine's scepticism about meaning, and inductivist Wittgenstein's case for 'assembling reminders' and Strawson's worry about how impoverished our social life would be if determinism is theoretically true (141) etc; but in all these his vision is narrowed down to a mixing of both deduction and induction in each.

Even scepticism and non–scepticism can take on deductive (Unger) and inductive (classical) forms. Cohen cites Chisholm's work as embodying deductivist's approach to epistemology; again, he cites both the deductivist Spinozoist Reformatory Movement, and Bentham's 'reformatory' utilitarianism for showing how deductivism can influence worldly events, before concluding with a remark on the 'synoptic' character of inductivism. Cohen also tries to identify 'realism' and 'anti–realism' with the deductivist and inductivist modes of thiking. No light, however, is shed on this, because the route by which he arrives at this indentity is not defensible. In fact, he nearly comes to withdraw the identity of a deductivist analytic philosophy with realism, and inductivist analytic philosophy with anti–realism and again backward to the problemmatic concerns of meaning and reference respectively. Thus, his efforts to found an inductivist analytical philosophy is doomed to failure at the start, for the very reason it has a deductivist opponent. Cohen's efforts to disentangle the analytical web of reasoning yield no success. His preference for an inductivist version of analytical philosophy is rooted in his understanding of induction as having 'greater generality' and 'synoptic' character. So, towards the *finale* Cohen's attack on the psychological (computat onal) account of analytical philosophy has its roots in his front against deductivism. A strong reason for Cohen's rejection of its basis is due to the fact that any acceptance of the formalist assumption cannot

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

do justice to the semantic richness of natural language, a reason which spills over to his critique of Chomsky's account of grammar. In a way, his current opposition to a computational analysis is just an outgrowth of the above critique. But Cohen's account does not make explicit this parallellism anywhere. The unifying theme in all this is that one cannot seriously believe that whatever that has been standardised by the formalist outlook is all that is in language. Such an endeavour, according to Cohen, overlooks the primary function of language, where the formalist account of logical connectives means more than what they stand for a formalist and hence they cannot sustain a psychological argument for reasoning. Cohen illustrates this with a particular case for the conversion of conditionals, where a logical rule cannot tell us how the conversion of $p \supset q$ to $q \supset p$ is justifiable.

6. *Cohen's 'Solution' of Induction*

The strength of Cohen's inductivist analytical philosophy turns on the account of induction which he gives. Cohen's solution consists of the following steps :

Step 1 : What semantic ascent teaches is that the distinction between 'ampliative' (counterfactualisable) and non-ampliative (non-counterfactualisable) is a conceptual equipment;

Step 2 : The technique of semantic descent teaches us that its nomological character depends no the degree of factual assertions which stand as evidence for such generalisations. (incidentally, even one single case can give rise to a law-like generalisation);

Step 3 : The degree of support a set of evidential assertions which support an inductive generalisations represents degree of 'legisimilitude' (nearness to law);

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Step 4 : Thus, whereas counterfactualisable generalisation has a high degree of certifiable evidence, the noncounterfactualisable has 'zero' degree legisimilitude;

Step 5 : One can increase the degree of legisimilitude, by either adopting a homogeneous class of events, or by varying the selected samples, or by simply adding a *ceteris paribus* clause;

Step 6 : Thus, it becomes obvious that one may alter the nature of the conclusion by suitably changing the former class;

and

Step 7 : Following (6) one may even go the extent of interpreting inductive fallacies not as involving incorrect scientific or inductive probabilities but as involving an altered class of evidence. The crucial step here, therefore, is (6).

What the above argument establishes is that the well known paradoxes of induction, given as the fallacy of the converse, the 'base-rate' fallacy, the gambler's fallacy, the sample-size fallacy, or the conjunction fallacy are not really fallacies, but they could be interpreted in a positive way; *a fortiriori,* no empirical evidence can show that analytical philosophers reason irrationally. What Cohen offers here is nothing but a pragmatic test for the possibility of analytical philosophy. The proof about the empirical possibility of illogical reasoning, therefore, poses no threat to analytical philosophy. Hence, every analytical intuition of every analytical philosopher is not incorrect, just as every reasoning is sanctioned by analytic philosophy and every intuition is valid, even if it is not true of false. The first nullifies the conceptual possibility of 'disproof' of analytical philosophy. The second accounts for its popularity. While its pedagogical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

implications are much less clear, its implications for cross-cultural studies is far too wide to discuss within the brief compass.

Department of Philosophy
Calicut University
Calicut
KERALA – 673 635

A. KANTHAMANI

NOTES

1. That analytical philosophy's claim to do a 'critique of language' is neither a critique, nor is it one about clarity, has been almost 'paradied' in Baker's and Hacker's *researche* account of *Language, Sense, and Nonsense* (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1984). Such an account throws a direct challenge to what it calls the a-historical clarification that has become paradigmatic in Frege research. In their exploding account, history is turned into archeology. In sharp contrast to L. J. Cohen's 'revisionism' of analytical philosophy (see f. n. 2 below), their historical outlook feeds on negative conclusions : however, Gordon Baker refuses to fully endorse this standpoint (see below f n. 3). An interesting offshoot of the above, somewhat contrary, outlook pervades Stuart Shanker's account where the 'prophylactic clause' of analytical philosophy is overstressed. See his *researche* account in his *Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics* (London : Croom Helm, 1986) which, until now, has failed to evoke any response which it deserves.

2. The *locus classicus* here is L. J. Cohen's *The Dialogue of Reason : Analysis of Analytical Philosophy* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1986) (page references in the brackets are to this book).

3. At present there are three ways of doing the history of analytical philosophy : the Dummettian way which scoops out its underlying presuppositions with a view to make analytical philosophy a systematic enterprise (cf. " Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic or ought it to be ? " in *Truth and other Enigmas* (London : Duckworth, 1978) abetted by certain interpretations of Frege research; the Bakerian way which attempts to make " philosophical understanding as essentially historical " ; even while making " historical investigation as an integral part

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of philosophical understanding", it makes overtures towards a 'hermeneutical' interpretation of its history" (Preface, p. xv.) and its antecedent namely, the Hacker–Baker's way which the note (f. n. 1) mentions (see above). Baker's divergence surfaces in his *Frege, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle* (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1988).

4. Cohen's current opposition has its origin in his earlier article like "Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?" in *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 4, (1981), pp. 317–370, as well as in his "Are people Programmed to commit Fallacies?" etc in the *Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 12 (1982), pp. 254–274. See also other references under f. n, 14 on p. 158–9 in Cohen's book.

5. The locution 'telementational' represents the preclassical (i. e. the Boolean) approach to logic and, I think, still holds a certain promise in the current context. (see f. n. 1.).

6. A major feature of Dumettian way of doing interpretative history is the distinction that is drawn between the 'central' (philosophy of language) and the 'peripheral' (epistemology etc.,). The above picture evokes a strong reaction in Stuart Shanker. See for example, his introductory article, "Approaching the *Investigations*" in *Ludwig Wittgenstein : Critical Assessments*, Vol. II (London : Croom Helm, 1986).

7. In my view, all the three 'prophylactic', the 'dialectical' and the 'dialogical' epithets can be subsumed under the same '*aufgehobonist*' outlook, and hence they all share similar questionable grounds. Some of the objections to the 'dialectic' are stated in my "Rorty's Metaphilosophical Argument" in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* (1989); the objections to the others are stated in my "The Idea of Semiotical Transformation in Philosophy and the Argument from Lin guistics' (Ms.) and argued from a hermeneutical angle.

8. Cohen's earliest work on induction is found in his *Implications of Induction* (London : Methuen, 1970) followed by another book on *The Probable and the Provable* (Oxford : OUP, 1977) and see also a large number of articles on induction and probability right upto the present.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

Proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, the book contains a critical appraisal of various aspects of the late **Kalidas Bhattacharyya's** philosophical thought, and includes his own final formulation of his philosophical position.

Edited by **Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastava**

The book includes contributions from **K. L. Sharma** (A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharyya), **Daya Krishna** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation), **S. K. Chattopadhyaya** (Professor Bhattacharyya's "Alternative Standpoints" of Philosophy), **K. Bagchi** (Subjective and Objective Attitudes as Alternatives : A study of Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Knowledge-Object Unity), **N. K. Sharma** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Philosophy : Alternative Absolutes), **R. S. Bhatnagar** (Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy : Study of a Fundamental Dichotomy in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Thought), **Mrs. Yogesh Gupta** (Pre-suppositions of Science and Philosophy : A Critical Study) **Mrinal Kanti Bhadra** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Freedom and Existentialist Thought), **Rajendra Prasad** (Freedom and Existential Thought), **Rajendra Prasad Pandey** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya on the Indian Concept of Man), **K. J. Shah** (Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated), **J. N. Mohanty** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician).

1/8 Demy, Pages 239. Price Rs. 60/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
Poona University, PUNE 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII. No. 3
July 1991

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST AND POSITIVIST APPROACHES TO SOCIAL ENQUIRY : SOME COMMENTS

Introduction

There has been contrasting epistemological claims between social constructionist and positivist approaches to social enquiry. Social constructionists hold the view that " there are several different but equally valid explanations, rationalities, logics, ethics "; while positivists on the other hand argue very strongly that ' there is a single truth.'

Social constructionists developed the ontological argument that all phenomena, irrespective of their form, are socially determined. They believe that our beliefs, traditions, attitudes, norms, sagas etc , which form the artefacts of our culture gives form and meaning to all matter or activities in the social world. The social constructionist position is based on the view that social and cultural norms determine all situations and guide the actor in constructing situations. This view has also been discussed extensively by scholars (Shott 1979; Hochschild, 1979) on the sociology of emotions The positivists, on the other hand, maintain that for us ' to explain and predict what happens in the social world in our search for regularities and causal relationships between its constituent elements ', we should adopt the traditional research approaches that are common in the natural sciences. The adoption of these approaches assists the researcher to be involved

Received : 24-3-90

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in the real experimental situations. Positivists believe that the adoption of these approaches would take us closer to the 'truth'.

The ontological and epistemological basis of the arguments presented above have been exhaustively discussed by Ahiauzu (1982) Gellner (1974 p. 129–56); Winch (1970 p. 78–111); Lukes (1973 p. 230–248). The debate on social constructionists and positivists in their analyses of the social world is not new. These concepts have re–echoed several times in well informed discussions. Our focus in this paper, therefore, is to discuss assumptions made by social constructionists and positivists about the social world, nature of the social world and the place of value–freedom in social enquiry. We shall also examine areas of conceptual clarification in social constructionists and positivists understanding of the social world. Our final task in this paper is an attempt at bridge–building by synthesising social constructionists and positivists views about the social world.

Assumptions About the Social world

To understand the contrasting arguments of the social constructionist and positivist in their search for the explanation of the truth, it is necessary to examine the issue of the social world based on four sets of assumptions (Burrel and Morgan, 1979). The first concerns assumptions which are of ontological nature. Ontological assumptions enable us to understand the *raison detre* or the very essence of the phenomena we are studying. These ontological assumptions sensitize the individual to ask relevant questions about the entity or phenomena under investigation. Ontological assumptions raise questions as to whether the phenomena under investigation is concrete or real by stimulating individuals to believe whether the social world around us is 'real and of an objective nature.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Beyond the ontological question are associated assumptions of the social world which are basically epistemological. The epistemological assumptions which we make centre on the basis for ths rationalisation of knowledge. In other words, the premise or grounds on which knowledge is understood and communicated to people in intelligible form The epistemological qusetion does not just terminate with the understanding of the grounds of knowledge and how to communicate this to people in intelligible form, but how one can discriminate between what is to be regarded as ' true ' from what is to be regarded as ' false '. The ability to discriminate between these parameters is what determines the frame of reference of each individual. In fact, Burrel and Morgan (1979) have argued that the " dichotomy of ' true ' and 'false' itself presupposes a certain epistemological stance ". This statement seems to be an attempt which questions the epistemological basis for the correct interpretation of the nature of knowledge and how it could be understood and communicated as a phenomenon which is concrete and identifiable or whether knowledge is something which is not of an objective form but something more subjective which is based on past experience.

Closely related to both the ontological and epistemological questions occording to Burrel and Morgan (1979), is a third set of assumptions which border on 'human nature'. The primary focus of the third set of assumptions is the examination of the relationship between human beings and the environment in which they are a part Burrel and Morgan (1979) have forcefully developed the argument that there cannot be a debate of any meaningful kind if the nature of human beings is excluded from discussions in all social science. We cannot agree more with this view, since the object and subject of enquiry anill social science is man.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The three sets of assumptions discussed above, according to Burrel and Morgan (1979), 'have direct implications of a methodological nature'. They go further to argue that:

> "each one has important consequences for the way in which one attempts to investigate and obtain 'knowledge' about the social world. Different ontologies, epistemologies and models of human nature are likely to incline social scientists towards different methodologies. The possible range is indeed so large that what is regarded as science by the traditional 'natural scientist' covers but a small range of options. It is possible, for example, to identify methodologies employed in social science research which treat the social world like the natural world, as being hard, real and external to the individual, and others which view it as being of a much softer, personal and more subjective quality". p. 2.

The issue raised by Burrel and Morgan here is the identification of the appropriate methodological stance, while making assumptions about the social world. In the literature, there exists the subjectivist–objectivist dimension, which explains that there are two theoretical and methodological approaches in social research– the ideographic and nomothetic theory. The two theoretical and methodological approaches will be discussed later.

In spite of the ontological, epistemological, human and methodological questions which dominate approaches to social science, there still exist every obvious rival claims made by social constructionists and positivists in their attempt to advance the inevitability of a single true explanation. The basis of this contention both by social constructionists and positivists rests on the implicit claim that both groups could logically explain or prove to satisfaction of all "reasonable men" that there is a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

single true explanation about the social world. Ahiauzu (1982), re-echoing the ideas of Winch, has argued that if social constructionist and positivist positions are accepted in their entirety, then we can conclude that "sickness may be explained by witchcraft or by medical science". Developing the logic further, Ahiauzu has argued that :

> "The physical sciences may be viewed as advancing towards the truth, or as having a discontinuous development with one paradigm replacing another but with no implication that later paradigms are nearer to the truth. On this latter view, Einstein's theories, for example, might be seen only as better at solving puzzles than Newtonian mechanics. A similar analysis has been applied to economics, where Smithian (laissez-faire), Jevonian (utility) and Keynesian (macro-economic) revolutions have been identified. Within political science, the relativistic/absolutstic question could be applied to the conflict and to the consensus theories of the state in capitalist society."

Taking a cue from the statement presented above, we can conclusively say that the debate or rival claims between social constructionists and positivists has had a long standing history and tradition in which each group claiming to be able to logically analyse all social phenomena. For example, the social constructionist position is strongly supported by Shot (1979 p. 1320), Hochschild (1979) and Averill (1990), whereas the positivist stance is supported by Kemper (1978a 1978b; 1980, 1981) in the sociology of emotions. In order to explore the social world and to understand both the social constructionist logics, ethics and rationalities and the positivist position in understanding and interpreting the social world it is necessary to briefly discuss the nature of the social world.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The nature of the Social world

Irrespective of the ontological nature of the social world, the argument has been advanced by Berger and Luckmann (1967) that :

> " reality is socially constructed ... (defining) ' reality ' as a quality appertaining to phenomenon that we recognise as having a being independent of our own volition .. (but that) despite the objectivity that marks the social world in human experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it."

A close examination of the ideas advanced by Berger and Luckmann (1967) shows that society should be :

> " understood in terms of an on-going dialectic process composed of the three moments of externaliation, objectivation and internalisation."

If we rest our case on the points raised above, we can possibly argue that the first of the three moments see society as a construction of man, with all the ' social institutions such as the state and other sub-institutional entities within society as products of the effort of man. The second strand ' sees society as an objective reality antedating and external to individuals '. But the objectivation process should be such that its products do not relegate the place of man in society. Ahiauzu (1982) has succintly argued that " Alienation may occur where the objectivated product as a repugnant power set over and against people" However, the process of objectivation should not be overstretched, otherwise this may lead to reification of the natural world as man-made. This, according to Berger and Luckmann, could lead to a situation whereby the natural world may

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

"become fixated as a non–human, non–humanisable, inert facticity" The third and final 'moment sees man as a social product'. Seen in this light, the process of socialisation across institutions results in the transmission of knowledge. The social world, seen in the context of the three moments discussed above can be explained through both social constructionist and positivist epistemologies.

Observing And Interpreting The Social World:

The Place Of Value–Free Enquiry

One vexed issue which had gained some prominence both in critical sociology and the social sciences generally is the 'ideal of value–freedom'. The 'classic case for the ideal of value–freedom in social science' was developed by Weber (1949). Weber has argued that in all social enquiry, what is necessary is the selection of appropriate topics for investigation. And that, if this was done, the question of 'value–relevance nor value–judgements' becomes irrelevant in all social enquiry Ahiauzu (1982) has argued that 'Weber's view has been challenged from both Marxist and non–Marxist perspectives by those who argue that a value–free stance is both logically and morally wrong.' Keat and Urry (1975) Gouldner (1973) also argued that a value–free stance has no place in social enquiry. This view was also advanced earlier by Hanson (1958) when he discussed the critical nature of the cognitive ability of human beings. Hanson went further to say that, "people, not their eyes, see. Cameras and eyeballs, are blind."

This means that social theorists should, as a matter of culture and tradition, highlight their value position in social research. Myrdal (1961) and Watson (1977) have also highlighted the importance and place of value–relevance in sociological

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

orthodoxy. Myrdal went as far as arguing that theoretical issues which we discuss are denoted in concepts which are "spaces into which reality is fitted by analysis". However, Hyman and Burough (1977) have warned that in an attempt to adopt value-position in our analyses of social phenomena, we must avoid the danger of reification in which "the irrational consequences of a specific form of social organisation are regarded as natural and inevitable".

From the views expressed above, it has become evident that both in critical theory and reflexive sociology, any attempt at positivism, is to be rejected. While we do not completely ignore positivism, particularly in the physical sciences, what we stand to question and reject is 'easy' positivism in social research.

Social Constructionist And Positivist Approaches To Social Enquiry : Areas Of Conceptual Clarification

There are great strands of controversy between social constructionist and positivist views as it pertains to the exploration and interpretation of the social world. One of the major areas of conceptual divergence between social constructionist and positivist approaches to social enquiry lie on the grounds of ontology. The social constructionist position builds on the ontological 'assumption that the social world external to individual cognition is made up of nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used to structure reality'. Social constructionists do not agree or believe that there are any 'real' structures in the world which these names, concepts and labels actually assist us to describe. The social constructionist view is that the names which we use in describing certain phenomena should be seen merely as artificial creations of individuals to enable them negotiate and ascribe meaning to the external world. However, the adoption of an extreme form of social constructionist position is what Kolakowski (1972 pp. 12–16) would

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

refer to as solipsism. The solipsist position does not acknowledge the fact that there exists any world 'outside the realm of individual consciousness'. He believes very strongly that, out there, nothing exists, and the social world is regarded simply as a creation of human mind. The solipsist view, therefore, is a relativistic epistemology which occupies an extreme position on the subjective–objective dimension of Burrel and Morgan's analytical framework.

The positivist ontological stance, on the other hand, stresses the fact that the social world 'external to individual cognition is a real world made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures'. The positivist position, unlike the social constructionists who create names, form concepts and use labels to make sense out of the social world, does not believe that names, concepts and labels are sufficient to explain or make sense out of the social world. It is the view of the positivist that whether we name, perceive or label structures or entities around us, 'they still exist as empirical entities'. The positivists further advance the notion that we may not, in some cases, be aware of the existence of some of these structures, and, therefore, may not have appropriate 'names or concepts to articulate them'. Positivist ontology adopts the realist approach by positing that the social world exists, out there, as a hard and objective entity, independent of the appreciation and perception of the individual. Burrel and Morgan argue that the 'the individual is seen as being born into and living within a social world which has a reality of its own'. It follows, therefore, that the social world is not the creation of human beings but exists 'out there' as a tangible entity possessing all the traits and characteristics of a natural phenomenon. Burrel and Morgan, therefore, highlighted the positivist argument that, ontologically, reality 'is prior to existence and consciousness of any single human being'. Keat

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

aud Urry (1975) went as far as arguing that 'the social world has an existence which is as hard and concrete as the natural world'. This argument seems to be at the opposite end of the solipsist conception of the social world.

Another area of importance that attracts conceptual clarification between social constructionist and positivist approaches to social studies is their epistemological stand–points. The epistemology of social constructionist rests on a continual search and use of laws or regularities to explain the social world. The social constructionist adopts a relativistic epistemology because he sees or believes that to understand and explain the social world requires the direct involvement of individuals in the 'activities which are studied'. Social constructionists reject the positivist epistemology or 'stand–point' of the 'observer' as reliable and a useful matrix for 'understanding human activities'. Social constructionists advance the notion that it is only possible to 'understand' social phenomena by occupying the frame of reference of the participant in action. In other words, one has to understand the behaviour of the phenomenon 'from the inside rather than the outside'. The social constructionist epistemology of social research, therefore, confirms the fact that all social enquiry is essentially subjective as opposed to the objectivist stance associated with positivism as enunciated by Burrel and Morgan (1979 p. 3) in their analytical framework. Douglas (1970 b pp. 3–44) has also forcefully advanced the argument that science cannot possibly generate knowledge which in its true form can be described as absolutely objective.

Positivism as an epistemology attempts 'to explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and caused relationships between its constituent elements'. The epistemology of positivism relies on the traditional approaches

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

adopted in the study of natural sciences. However, in terms of details and essentials, positivists, too, do differ in their approach. One group of positivist scholars believe that 'hypothesised regularities can be verified by an adequate experimental programme'. A second group within the positivist rubric believes that "hypotheses can only be falsified and demonstrated to be 'true'". But amongst both 'verificationists' and 'falsificationists' there seems to be an area of conceptual convergence. They both believe that 'knowledge' is continually growing; therefore, the cumulative process of knowledge does create room for obsolete knowledge to be discarded and new knowledge added to existing 'stock of knowledge'. This process, albeit, presupposes the elimination of false hypotheses.

There are, in fact, two rival claims or paradigms in all social science that identify the behaviours and responses of human beings to situation. The first view of human nature in any social scientific theory is the social constructionist position. Social constructionist conception of society is that 'man makes the social world'. The belief of the social constructionist is that the existence of society dependes purely on the continuous confirmation of the actions of its members. Social structure, according to social constructionist :

> 'has no reality except a human one. It is not characterisable as being a thing able to stand on its own and exists only in so far and as long as human–beings realise it as part of their world' (Berger and Pullerg, 1966, p. 63).

The view expressed above suggests that human actions and the meaning they impute to these actions is what underscores the social constructionist position. Social constructionists argue that human–beings create, re–create, enact and re–enact their environments; they, therefore, explore their environments with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

unqualified control. Social constructionist view of the nature of human–beings seems to agree with the 'liberating thesis' developed by social psychologists Katona (1940), Piaget (1968) and Chomsky (1966) who argue that human–beings create and master their environments through the process of learning and acculturation. Because human--beings create and master their environments, they are generative, and therefore, transform their habitats through their cognitive maps. Instead of being held captives in their environments, human–beings make attempts to liberate themselves by domesticating their environments. This view of human–beings would appear to be revolutionary because it challenges the existing structure of society. All be it, social constructionists believe that because man has superintendence over the social world, he interpretes it through his stream of consciousness. Social constructionists, in their attempt to interpret their environments, adopt a phenomenological appropch while constructing and reconstructing social reality through their 'finite provinces of meaning.'

The second view of the nature of human–beings is the positivist position. The positivist view of human–beings is that they are 'mechanistic'. Positivism holds that human–beings are controlled, conditioned and governed by environmental influences. The social world makes man. The positivist conception of the social world seems to have some form of symbiotic relationship with the 'enslaving thesis' developed by learning theorists Illich (1971) Freire (1970 a) and Freire (1970 b) who argue that human–beings allow themselves to be domesticated. Therefore, they are captives of their environments. This is because, they become 'conditioned to perform imposed behaviours.' The positivist ontology, epistemology and above all, his view of human nature, all seem to rest on the implicit dremise of objectivity associated with the scientific expert who

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

quantifies social action by asserting a position of determinacy and law-governed behaviour of human-beings.

In exploring and explaining the social world, social constructionists and positivists have both adopted different methodologies. While social constructionists favour the ideographic approach in analysing the social world, positivists insist in adopting a nomothetic method.

The ideographic approach to social enquiry locates its premise of argument on the fact that an understanding of the social world can only be made possible 'by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation'. This requires the person who is attempting to investigate the social phenomenon to have a close and proximate distance of his subject so as to understand all facets of the entity under investigation. This approach offers the investigator the opportunity to examine items such as 'diaries biographies and journalistic records'. The ideographic approach, because it affords the researcher the opportunity of examining his subject at close range, permits 'one's subject unfold its nature and characteristic during the process of investigation' (Blumer 1969).

The second method, the nomothetic approach to social enquiry, emphasises the systematic collection and analysis of data. This approach focuses on the collection of research data and the subjection of the data to the canons of scientific rigour through the formulation and testing hypotheses. This approach favours methods employed in investigations in the natural sciences. It sees the validity and reliability of research investigations through the adoption of quantitative methods to analyse data. Burrel and Morgan argue that the tools which make-up

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

nomothetic methodology are "surveys, questionnaires, personality tests and standardised research instruments of all kinds" (p 7).

Social Constructionist and Positivist Approaches to Social Enquiry-Attempts at Conceptual Bridge-Building

Any attempt at conceptual convergence between social constructionist and positivist approaches to social enquiry cannot be a straight forward academic and intellectual exercise. This difficulty seems to have stemmed essentially from the bipolar epistemological assumptions made by scholars of the two schools of thought. While social constructionists insist that their own approach to the study of the social world is the most viable option, positivists, on the other hand. have strongly argued that it is fatally wrong to compare two approaches that are not the same. Be that as it may. The exploration of the social world via any of the two methodologies point to the fact that both social constructionists and positivists have the same goal of analysing and interpreting the social world However, one fact that comes out clearly from the various views and arguments developed by social constructionists and positivists is that both have the same goal but different methodologies at arriving at their goals.

The ontological debate between the approaches adopted by social constructionist and positivist understanding of the social world has been amply discussed While social constructionists adopt ideographic methods in their enquiry, positivists adopt nomothetic methods via the performance of laboratory experiments, formulation of *a priori* hypotheses for testing and the quantification of facts. Silverman (1978) seems to offer a very useful analytical insight in this matter. He has argued that:

> "The behaviour of matter may be regarded as a necessary reaction to a stimulus Matter itself does not understand its own behaviour. It is literally meaningless until the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

scientist imposes his frame of reference upon it. There is no possibility of apprehending its subjective intentions, and the logic of its behaviour may be understood solely by observation of the behaviour itself. The action of men, on the other hand, is meaningful to them " (p. 127).

Attempts at establishing a conceptual bridge between social constructionists and positivists approaches to social enquiry became the preoccupation of early writers such as Dilthey (1976) and Weber (1949). They were particularly concerned in bridging the conceptual gap between social constructionists who believe in German idealism, coupled with their great plasticity and positivists whose law-governed position is based on their much avowed 'indeterminacy principle.' From his writings, Weber was apparently standing between the gulf that divides social constructionists position and positivism. In fact, Hughes (1958) and Runciman (1972) referred to Weber as fighting a war from two fronts. This is because 'Weber was dissatisfied with the superficialities which he regarded as characterising positivist explanations of society, and also greatly concerned with the subjective and 'unscientific' nature of idealist thought'. Weber's dissatisfaction with the two polar positions of positivism and anti-positivsm led him to adopt a unifying stance in his methodological writings, in which he developed the argument that all matters relating to social affairs can only be explained adequately 'on the level of meaning,' and that the essential function of social science is to be 'interpretive,' that is, to understand the subjective meaning of social action.

What Weber seems to imply in the above statement is that any attempt at bridge-building between social constructionists and positivists must necessarily start the process of abstraction from the understanding of the subjective meaning of social action. The theoretical or disciplinary plank on which this can

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be done is through interpretive sociology. Interpretive sociology enables the acting individual to create subjective meaning to social action in order to 'arrive at a causal explanation of its courses and effects.' Weber (1947) defines sociology as:

> 'a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its courses and effects... Action in so far as, by virtue of the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behaviour of others, and is thereby oriented in course' (p. 88).

Burrel and Morgan (1979) have argued that the above definition, with its emphasis on interpretive sociology, is an attempt by Weber in introducing 'fusion of idealist and positivist perspectives'. Weber supports this view because it provides 'causal explanations of social phenomena but insists that such explanations must be reduced to the level of the individual'. This has led Schutz to argue that:

> 'Weber reduces all kinds of social relationships and structures, all cultural objectifications, all realms of mind, to the most elementary forms of individual behaviour' (Schutz, 1967, p.).

The above statement clearly shows that Weber's interpretive sociology is concerned with the provision of causal explanations of social phenomena. However, in doing this, he avoids the problems of reification Weber's focus according to Burrel and Morgan, builds 'an objective science of sociology upon the foundations of subjective meaning and individual action' But this is problematic. Weber has, therefore gone further to say that the development of objectivity in the social sciences is only 'possible through the use of ideal types, which allow for the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ordering of elements of reality'. Ideal types are simply constructs which, for analytical purposes, were created by Weber to introduce some form of unity while analysing social phenomenon. Through the use of ideal types, Weber was able to 'incorporate the 'spirit' which characterises individual phenomena into a wider generalised whole'.

From the analysis presented above, Weber seems to have made very serious attempts to reconcile the potentially divergent perspectives of idealism and positivism. Weber, while emphasizing 'the importance of subjective meaning in explanations of social affairs, at the same time seeks to contain and limit the role of these objective factors'. Weber attempts to classify human action in different behaviour types such as 'rationally purposive' 'rationally value–oriented', 'emotional' and 'traditional' as a necessary honey–comb to assist him move towards conceptual convergence; but this does not completely remove the problems associated with the use of methodologies in two conceptually separate areas that have different ontologies, epistemologies, models of human nature and methodologies.

In an attempt to draw closer social constructionists and positivists in their understanding of the social world, Dilthey developed hermeneutics. In the words of Burrel and Morgan :

> 'Hermeneutics is concerned with interpreting and understanding the products of the human mind which characterise the social and cultural world' (p. 236).

Dilthey believes that human–beings through time, 'externalise the internal processes of their minds through the creation of cultural artifacts which attain an objective character'. Examples of such cultural artifacts are 'institutions, works of art, literature, languages, religions' and other forms of symbolic expression of human throught. Dilthey's hermeneutics ontologically

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

appears to come fairly close to the objectification process, associated with solipsism. He asserts that through hermeneutics it is possible 'the subject of study is needed to relive in the subjective life of the observer'. He goes further to say that 'social phenomena of all kinds should be analysed in detail, and interpreted as texts, to reveal their essential meaning and significance'. While the methodology of the social constructionist in the investigation of the social world is basically ideographic, that of the positivist is nomothetic. These two methodological approaches stand at two extremes of a continuum, but the method of hermeneutics attempts at unifying or obliterating them. Hermeneutics involves a situation whereby 'human scientists' adopt 'the style of literary analysts rather than that of natural scientists'. Instead of the traditional search for general scientific laws, hermeneutics explores the phenomenon or phenomena through textual analysis of meaning This involves defining clearly the basic rules of hermeneutics, 'so that the insights of interpreters of rare genius could be utilised by others'. Through this process, it has been argued that 'objective knowledge' about human–beings could be obtained.

Dilthey's pioneering works to hermeneutics were made more clearly and illustrated through the introduction of the concept of 'hermeneutic circle'. Dilthey saw the difficulty in isolating the total whole from its parts. He believes that an understanding of the whole cannot be independent from its parts, and *vice versa*. It, therefore, follows that an understanding and interpretation of social reality requires that a body of general laws should apply both to the whole and parts of the whole. This part–whole relationship becomes a characteristic of the social world, and, therefore, poses a very serious epistemological problem. Dilthey, therefore, saw the need for a systematic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

approach to resolving this problem. However, Rickman (1976) has argued that :

> 'there are no absolute starting points, no self–evident, self–contained certainties on which we can build, because we always find ourselves in the middle of complex situations which we try to disentangle by making, then revising, provisional assumptions' (p. 11).

The above statement clearly shows that the 'methodological rules of hermeneutics' do not move in one identifiable direction but follow an iteractive and circular pattern 'towards an increased understanding of the objectifications of mind'.

In, recent times, Dilthey's hermeneutic tradition appears to have given way to newer insights developed by Gadamer (1965). Gadamer argues that Dilthey's hermeneutic tradition has methodological flaws because he does not think that we can relate 'to a historic tradition as if it existed as an object apart from us, since there is an interplay between the movement of tradition and the interpreter'. Gadamer concluded by saying that, 'in order to understand social or cultural phenomena, the observer must enter into a dialogue with the subject of study'. Giddens (1976 p. 56) supported Gadamer's contention and argued that for us to correctly understand and interpret historical material, the material must not be different from other historical accounts which are part of our culture, or not too remote from our historical past, otherwise we may end up enriching our knowledge through the historical past of others, which may not portray the correct situation. Giddens, therefore, argues that instead of 'placing oneself "inside" the subjective experience of a texts' author, but in understanding literary art through grasping', we should see ourselves as 'the "form of life" which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

gives meaning'. The tool which serves in the process both as mediator and modulator is language.

From the foregoing, it seems Giddens' 'new hermeneutics', which takes its original source from Dilthey's 'early hermeneutics', has introduced a new dimension, which borders essentially both on epistemology and methodology. While Dilthey focuses his attention on how man re–lives and reconstructs the past through various cultural artifacts exemplified in the form of objective reality, Giddens' 'new hermeneutics' does not believe that we can reconstruct the past correctly by simply re–creating and reliving through an alien mode of existence. Giddens' was 'more concerned with appreciating the inter–change of the frames of reference of the observer and the observed'. The mechanism for appreciating the interchange process is facilitated by language. Hermeneutics, seen in the light in which Gadamer and Giddens sees it, 'becomes relevant to all areas of enquiry : a universal mode of philosophy' and 'not just a methodological foundation for the cultural sciences'.

Conclusion

Social constructionist and positivist explanations of the social world rest on their conception of the nature of the social world and the place of value–freedom in social analyses. Social constructionists and positivists have had long tradition of disagreements on issues which loom largely on ontology, epistemology, models of human nature and methodology. Because social constructionists and positivisits see the social world from two contrasting view–points, it has always been difficult to harmonise these views. While social constructionists favour pluralistic and relativistic approach, positivists insist on monistic approach and unity of truth.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Since we think that the explanation of social phenomena via any explicit conceptual rubric conflates rather than clarifies issues, in our view adoption of a stance of a middle–of–the road is likely to lead us to less fatal philosophical polemics in social enquiry. This leads us to accept Weber's view of the adoption of interpretive sociology, which enables the acting individual to create subjective meaning to social action. The use of interpretive sociology in social analysis allows the acting individual to 'arrive at a causal explanation of its courses and effects. If we understand the relationship between cause and effect, then we shall be able to interpret human actions more appropriately, using the canons of sociological paradigms.

Another attempt at narrowing the divide between social constructionists and positivists perspectives in their understanding of the social world is the adoption of Dilthey's traditional hermeneutics, and Gadamer and Giddens' 'new hermeneutics'. The first level of (Dilthey's) hermeneutics assists us to externalise the internal processes of our minds through the creation of cultural artifacts. We go beyond Dilthey's early hermeneutics and adopt Gadamer and Giddens' 'new hermeneutics' by introducing mechanisms where we can appreciate the interchange of the frames of reference of the observer and the observed. The most potent vehicle for both the mediation and modulation' of the inter–change process is language.

P. B. JOHNNIE

Department of Business
Administration
River State University of
Science and Technology
Nkoplu, Port Harcourt
(NIGERIA)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

Ahiauzu, A. I. (1982) "Relativism and Absolutism in Social Study," *Faculty of Management Sciences Lecture Series, Rivers State University of Science and Technology*, Port Harcourt.

Averill, J. R. (1980) "A Constructivist View of Emotions," in *Theories of Emotion*, (ed.) O. R. Plutchik and H. Kellerman, (New York: Academic Press).

Berger, P. L. and Luckman, T. (1966) 'Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness', *New Left Review* 35, pp. 56-71.

Blumer, H. (1969) *Symbolic Interactionism : Perspective and Method*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Princetice-Hall.

Burrel, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) *Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis*, (Heinemann, London).

Chomsky, N. (1966) *Cartesian Linguistics*, (New York : Harper and Row)

Dilthey, W. (1976) *Selected Writings*, (ed.) H P. Rickman, (London: Cambridge University).

Douglas, J. D. (ed.) (1970 b) *Understanding Everyday Life*, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing; London : Routledge and Kegan Paul).

Freire, P. (1970 a) "The Adult Literacy Process as Cultural Action for Freedom". *Havard Educational Review*, 40 : 205-225.

Freire, P. (1970 b) "Cultural Action and Conscientization." *Havard Educational Review* 40 : 452-477.

Gadamer, H. G. (1965) *Wahrheit and Method*, Tubingen : J. C. B. Mohr, (English copyright : Sheed and Ward, London, 1975).

Gellner, E. (1974) "The New Idealism—Cause and Meaning in the Social Science", in Giddens (ed.), *Positivism and Sociology* (London: Heinemann).

Giddens, A. (1976) *New Rules of Sociological Method.* (London: Hutchinson).

Gouldner, A. W. (1973) 'Anti-Minotaur : The Myth of a Value Free Sociology' in A. W. Gouldner, *For Sociology*, (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane).

Hanson, N. R. (1958) *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press) p. 6, cited in M. Blumer, "Concepts in the Analysis of Qualitative Data", *Sociological Review*, November, 1979, p. 657.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Hughes, E.; 1958, *Men and Their Work.* Glencoe, 111. : Free Press.

Hyman, R. and Brough, I.; 1975, *Social Values and Industrial Relations.* Oxford : Blackwell.

Illich, I. D.; 1971, *De-Schooling Society.* New York: Harper and Row.

Katona, G.; 1940, *Organizing and Memorizing.* New York : Columbia University Press

Keat, R. and Urry, J.; 1975, *Social Theory as Science.* London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Kemper, T. D.; 1978 a, "Towards a Sociological Theory of Emotions : Some Problems and Some Solutions". *The American Sociologist* 13, February, : 30-41.

Kemper, T. D.; 1978 b, *A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions,* New York : Wiley.

Kemper, T. D.; 1980, "Sociology, Physiology, and Emotions : Comment on Shott," *American Journal of Sociology* 85, May, 1318-23

Kemper, T. D.; 1981, "Social Constructionist and Positivist Approaches to the Sociology of Emotions" *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 87 No. 2.

Kolakowski, L ; 1972, *Positivist Philosophy.* Harmondsworth : Penguin.

Lukes, S.; 1973, "On the Social Determination of Truth" in R. Horton and R. Finnegan (eds). *Moles of Thought,* London : Faber and Faber, pp. 230-248.

Myrdal, G.; 1961, "Value-loaded Concepts," in H. Hegeland (ed.), *Money, Growth and Methodology,* Gleerup, p. 273.

Piaget, J.; 1968, *Le Structuralisme,* Paris : Presses Universitaires de France

Rickman, H. P.; 1976, *Dilthey ; Selected Writings,* London : Gollancz

Runciman, W. G.; 1972, *A Critique of Max Weber's Philosophy of Social Science.* London : Cambridge Uninversity Press.

Schutz, A.; 1967, *Collected Papers I : The Problems of Social Reality.* (2nd edn). The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff.

Shott, S.; 1979, "Emotions and Social Life : A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis". *American Journal of Sociology,* 84, May, 1317-34.

Silverman, D.; 1978, *The Theory of Organisations.* Heinemann, London.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Watson, T. J. ; 1977, *The Personnel Manager*. London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 3–6.

Weber, M. ; 1947, *Theory of Social and Economic Organisation* (trans. A. Henderson and T. Parsons). Glencoe III. : Free Press.

Weber, M. ; 1949, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Glencoe, III. : Free Press.

Winch, P. ; 1970, " Understanding a Primitive Society " in B. R. Wilson (ed), *Rationality*, Oxford : Blackwell, pp. 78–111.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 3, July, 1991

CONTRADICTION AND SUBLATION: HEGEL ON DIALECTIC

The objective of this paper is to formulate Hegel's dialectic by emphasizing on its two operative terms, namely, 'contradiction' and 'sublation.' It is proposed to be achieved in the following manner: Part I: Hegel's critical assessment of Kant's transcendental dialectic, Part II: To explicate the fundamental principles of Hegel's dialectic out of their implicit application in his main works, and finally, Part III: To evaluate Hegel's dialectic in terms of Logical Atomism and Positivism.

Before I come to Part I of the paper, I would like to explain that 'sublation' translated from the German term *aufheben* has remained problematical. It may be pointed out that in common German parlance, *aufheben* does mean 'abolition,' 'cancel out,' 'doing away with something,' 'overcoming,' 'leaving something aside for future use' and so on. None of these renderings fit into the much more technical and precise sense in which Hegel has used the term *aufheben*. Michaele George's [1] translation of *aufheben* into 'sublation' and 're–integration,' though archaic, connotes something of the philosophical significance of *aufheben*. 'Sublation' means to resolve into a higher unity and 're–integration' has the meaning of bringing again into a wholeness that which is fragmentary. The deduction of categories from one another in the *Science of Logic*, to anticipate a later discussion, shows that all lower categories are sublated into the higher ones and they have a direct reference to the wholeness.

Received : 18–7–89

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The more cumbersome compound 'to transcend and preserve' is perhaps nearer an adequate rendering of the meaning of *aufheben*, but I shall prefer 'sublation' to any other translation of the term *aufheben*.

I

Hegel acknowledges Kant's transcendental dialectic as his greatest contribution to philosophy; both for its basic distinction between 'understanding' and 'reason,' and for its insights into the nature of our attempt to apply our concepts to the absolute unconditioned. Hegel writes :

> "These Kantian antinomies still remain an important part of the critical philosophy; they principally effected the fall of the previous metaphysics, and may be looked on as a chief transition to modern philosophy; for they in particular assisted to produce a conviction of the invalidity of the categories of finitude by examining their content; and this is a more correct method than the former method of subjective idealism according to which their only fault is supposed to be that they are subjective and not that which they are in-themselves." [2]

Hegel appreciates Kant's refusal to go along the lines of Hume and to abandon universality and necessity in human cognition. Though Kant adopts the view of the empiricists that all our knowledge 'begins' with and terminates in sensibility, yet, he warns, our knowledge does not 'originate' from sensibility. Empiricists have failed to demonstrate that there lies much in the things which is not given in sensation, is not as such directly manifest. It requires the use of 'understanding' and 'reason.' These views, rooted in Kant's philosophy, represent one of the most important aspects of Hegel's dialectic. But I

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

shall argue that though Hegel's extension of Kantianism is constructed upon a foundation that has already been laid by Kant, it is a foundation whose radical implications are never fully understood or developed by Kant himself. Far from being content with Kant's rejection of metaphysics, Hegel proceeds to build a new metaphysical system based on his own exposition of 'understanding,' 'reason' and 'dialectic.'

Hegel's philosophy accepts and further develops the distinction manifested in Kan's philosophy between 'understanding' and 'reason.' In Kant, 'reason' is never in immediate relation to an object. It is 'understanding' that holds sway in his epistemology. For Hegel, the function of 'understanding'–through the process of abstraction–is to present contradiction between individual and universal, identity and difference, and so on And the realm of 'reason' seeks to unify that which the 'understanding' has divided. 'Reason' shows that the function of 'understanding'–to define things in terms of their 'isolation'–constitutes a process of abstraction. The function of 'reason' is to make manifest the 'concrete' relation in which an idea, concept or thing subsists. Kant argues that the function of 'reason' is to draw a limit to the extent of the categories of 'understanding.' Hegel's criticism of Kant's concept of 'reason' consists in the fact that while recognizing its dialectical characteristics, 'reason' fails to overcome the antinomies between finite and infinite, simple and complex, freedom and causality, conditioned and unconditioned. Speaking of these antinomies, say, of the antinomy between finite and infinite, Hegel remarks that its essential defect in its traditional forms is that it posits the finite as something existing on its own and then tries to make the transition to the infinite as something different from the finite. Hegel, however, regards 'reason' as the indispensable corrective to the deficiencies of 'understanding'. In the process

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of unifying the opposites, 'reason' *sublates* the finite and its negation, so that they are revealed as moments of a more inclusive whole. This 'wholeness' in which the contradictions are sublated, Hegel terms as the 'Absolute,' the 'Truth'. Hegel says:

> "The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end, is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature." [3]

The *Phenomenology of Spirit*, however, does not adequately furnish the whole dialectical process through which the knowledge of the Absolute Truth is possible. Its foundations are given in the *Science of Logic*. Hegel's Logic deals with not only the general forms of thought–with the notion, the judgement and the syllogism–but also it expounds the structure of Being-as-such, the most general forms of Being. His Logic is, therefore, both an epistemology and an ontology. Epistemologically, Logic presents categories by means of which we do our thinking. Ontologically, Logic expounds the Being, the Absolute Truth as quoted above from the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

The strikingly new interpretation of Hegel's Logic consists in his attempt to incorporate dialectic into it. It requires two lines of argument: the first showing that a given category is indispensable; the second showing that it leads us to a characterization of reality which is somehow contradictory. Hegel, in fact, fuses these together. This makes Hegel's Logic fundamentally different from Kantinn logic. The categories, in Kant's formulation, are valid if they were correctly formed and if their use was in conformity with the ultimate laws of thought and the rules of syllogism–no matter what the content to which they

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

were applied. Contrary to this procedure, Hegel's Logic and with it his dialectic is always dynamic and expresses dynamics of objective reality as well. With this I come to the second part of the paper.

II

Hegel's dialectic is basically motivated by the negative or contradictory character of the categories. As stated in Part I, Hegel's categories denote and deal with the reality. So the dialectic operating in reality is basically the dialectical nature of the categories. There are two terms which are operative in Hegel's dialectic. These are : (i) contradiction, (ii) sublation or *aufheben*. In fact, these are not two separate terms but mutually interdependent and under certain circumstances they pass into each other. Let me first explain Hegel's position on contradiction. In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel emphasizes by saying :

> "... everything is inherently contradictory, and in the sense that this law in contrast to others expresses rather the truth and the essential nature of things. It is one of the fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto understood and of ordinary thinking, that contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent a determination as identity. Nevertheless, if it were a question of grading the two determinations and they had to be kept separate, then contradiction would have to be taken as the profounder determination and more characteristic of essence. For, as against contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple immediate, of dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." [10]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Contradiction, for Hegel, is internal to each term. That is why every term, whether a concept or a reality, develops. Hegel continues, "...internal self–movement proper, instinctive urge in general...is nothing else but lhe fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self–contained and deficient, the negative of itself. Abstract self–identity is not as yet a livingness, but the positive, being in its own self a negativity, goes outside itself and undergoes alteration. Something is therefore alive only in so far as it contains contradiction within it and moreover is this power to hold and endure the contradiction within it." [5]

Hegel concludes near the end of the Logic that there is nothing, whether in actuality or in thought, that is as simple and abstract as is commonly imagined "Nothing exists as just brutely given and simply possessing one or two fully positive characteristics. Nothing exists that is just first and primary and on which other things depend without mutual relation. People intend to think about such things, but they cannot really succeed in doing so unless they stay on the level of imaginative pictures. Imagining that such things exist is possible only as long as we are ignorant of what is actually present. What appears at first simple and immediate is actually complex and mediated." [6] Mediation *(Vermittlung)* and mediated *(Vermittelt)*, and the opposites, im–mediacy *(Unvermittlung)* and *im–mediate (Unvermittelt)* are key terms through which Hegel explains not only contradiction but also sublation and dialectic. Let me clarify these terms.

To 'mediate' is to be in the middle, to connect two extremes. Everything, Hegel states, is mediated, that nothing exists as 'immediate' first. In the Logic, 'mediation' will involve the gradual development of categories to a point where there is nothing that is posited as first and independent. In Hegel's dialectic, the thesis is always regarded as 'im–mediate' or as characterized by 'immediacy' The second term, the anti–thesis,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is 'mediate' or 'mediation.' The third term, the synthesis, is the merging of 'mediation' and emerging as a new 'immediacy.' And this process goes on.

The synthesis of a triad both abolishes and preserves the differences of the thesis and the antithesis. This activity of the synthesis is expressed by Hegel as *aufheben* or sublation which is the other operative term of Hegel's dialectic. It may be seen as manifesting three distinct but mutually interrelated moments. "First, it has the moment of 'transcendece,' in which it goes beyond a 'limit' or 'boundary'; secondly, it is 'negation' of this first negation, this 'limit,' in which it is, 'overcome' or removed; and thirdly, it is the moment of 'preservation,' in which what has been 'gone beyond' or transcended is brought again into a new relation." [7] These three moments of sublation, though distinct, form a unitary process of Logic which is differentiated into its various components only for the purpose of helping an 'understanding' of the process itself. The very process by which a category 'passes beyond itself' and posits another category to which it is intimately related is, at one and the same Logical moment, the process by which it 'transcends' its limited abstract self–identity, 'negates' that identity and emerges into a connected unity or nexus, in which it is preserved as an intrinsic part of some greater whole. The differences between the first and the second member of each triad are sublated by the third. This, however, requires sufficient explanation and necessary substantiation. For this purpose, I shall take up the categories of Being, Nothing and Becoming, and bring out the various ways in which dialectic is operating in the formulation of the categories of Being and Nothing, and their sublation in the category of Becoming. The same process is applicable to the rest of the Hegelian categaries.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

As a matter of fact, the more general and more abstract concept is always prior to the less general and less abstract. And this principle not only decides for Hegel that the first category is Being, but also determines the order of the subsequent categories. Moreover, every logical deduction is essentially based on the principle that the subsequent must be contained in the antecedent. The breach of this principle in formal logic is what is called the fallacy of *illicit* process. There cannot be anything present in the conclusion which is not present in the premises. This is really the old principle *ex nihilo nihil fit*. I'll try to show that this is just as true of the Hegelian Logic as of the humble formal logic.

Hegel, first, formulates the category of Being as a pure indeterminate immediacy with no differentiation eitner within itself or relatively to anything external. To substantiate this definition of Being, I wish to take up an example, say, this table. We have to abstract from all its qualities whatever, its squareness, brownness, hardness, even its very tablehood. We have to think of its mere 'issues', its being, what it has in common with every other object in the universe. Such Being has no determinations.

But how can we deduce any other category from this Being? How can a 'mediation' be found in the Being which is a complete emptiness?

The solution to this problem constitutes the central principle of Hegelian dialectic. It rests upon the discovery that it is not true, as hitherto supposed, that a universal absolutely excludes the differentiation. Hegel states that Being, though absolutely indeterminate, contains its own opposite—the mediation—hidden within itself, and that this opposite has to be extricated or deduced from it and made to do the work Being, as a vacuum,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is the same as Nothing. The absence of everything is simply nothing. Hegel writes

> "Nothing, pure Nothing : it is simple equality with itself, complete emptiness, without determination or content... Nothing, therefore, is the same determination (or rather lack of determination), and thus altogether the same thing, as pure Being" [8]

Thus, Being is seen to contain Nothing. And to show that one category contains another is to deduce the other from it. The second category–Nothing–is not brought in by Hegel from anything external to Being It is deduced from the first category, and this means that the first contains the second, and is shown to produce it out of itself. This is how Hegel incorporates dialectic into Logic to express the entire deductive process of the categories used to signify specifically the sublation of one category into its opposite and thus it breaks down the absolute distinction set up by Kant between simple and complex, and so on.

However, the deduction of Nothing from Being and their identity, Hegel cautions, is not immediate. This identity is possible through a mediation and it is the category of Becoming that mediates between Being and Nothing. Becoming is the category that sublates Being and Nothing into itself. This is the first triad in Hegel's Logic.

Just as it is true that the higher categories contain the lower ones; similarly, it is also true, in another sense, that the lower categories contain the higher ones If Becoming is deduced from Being, then Being must contain Becoming. Conversely, Becoming must contain Being because it is deduced from Bieng. This is the dialectical principle known as 'the unity and the struggle

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of opposites'. So, Hegel remarks that Being contains Becoming *implicitly*, and Becoming contains Being *explicitly*. The first term in a triad is called by Hegel 'in–itself' or *an sich*, that is to say, *implicit*. The third term is 'in and for itself' or *fur sich*, that is to say, *explicit*.

What is true of the first triad is true of the entire series. The dialectic of Hegel performs the function of getting out of each category what is not in it. The view that 'is' and 'is not' exclude each other is the view of what Hegel calls the 'understanding' as distinct from the true view which is the view of 'reason'. At the level of 'understanding', two opposites like the one we have cited above, Being and Nothing, absolutely exclude each other. At the level of 'reason', it is shown that Being and Nothing exclude each other in as much as the supplement each other. Their exclusion is not absolute. What is absolute is their mutual supplementation. The result of their supplementation is a growth, a development, the emergence of the category of Becoming in which Being and Nothing are not annihilated but assimilated. This is another principle of Hegel's dialectic known as 'the negation of negation'.

Just as Being is implicitly Becoming, so Becoming is implicitly the next synthesis. In the next synthesis, we find that Becoming expresses itself in the moment of a 'determinate being' which is further expressed as below :

(i) as determinateness, such as quality,
(ii) as determinateness transcended : quantity,
(iii) as quantity qualitatively determined : measure.

Quality, for Hegel, is the internal self–determination which is identical with the being which it determines. Quantity is a determination which is external to what it determines. The com-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

bination of quality and quantity is found in what Hegel calls as measure Quality, when fully developed through repulsion and attraction, passes into quantity and *vice–versa.* This unity is called by Hegel as measure. This is a new category and a new sphere. Measure is the synthesis of the spheres of quality and quantity as the thesis and the antithesis respectively. With this synthesis we arrive at another principle of Hegel's dialectic known as ' the transition from qualitative changes to quantitative changes and *vice–versa* '.

We have so far explicated three laws of Hegel's dialectic; namely, (i) unity and struggle of opposites, (ii) negation of the negation, (iii) transition from quality to quantity, and *vice–versa.* These three laws of dialectic are operating in the whole process of Hegel's deduction of categories.

If, therefore, we understand by Hegel's dialectic as a gradual explication and development of the 'connectedness' of the categories of Logic, then dialectic is operating in our thought alone But such a dialectical nexus of concepts is not itself sufficient to account for our knowledge of the objective reality. Dialectic must come out of thought and confront the world which is given That is to say, it must have a relation to the objective world of matter into which man daily finds himself thrown.

Hegel very clearly recognizes this fact and in the subheading 81 of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences,* he writes :

"Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite. as that which in itself is other than itself, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn sud-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

denly into its opposite... All things, we say—that is, the finite world as such—are doomed; and in saying so, we have a vision of Dialectic as the universal and irresistible power before which nothing can stay however secure and stable it may deem itself. We find traces of its (Dialectic's) presence in each of the particular provinces and phases of the natural and the spiritual world. Take as an illustration the motion of the heavenly bodies. At this moment the plant stands in this spot, but implicitly it is the possibility of being otherwise the planet brings into existence by moving. Similarly, the 'physical' elements prove to be Dialectical... It is the same dynamic that lies at the root of every other natural process and as it were forces nature beyond itself."[9]

The above passage sufficiently demonstrates that the laws of dialectic are not only operating in our thought but are also the fundamental features of the change and development taking place in the material reality. So, the dialectis has this dual function to perform; viz., to show that dialectic is operating in human thought and that simultaneously it is operating in the objective reality. But as an absolute idealist, Hegel regards the dialectic of thought as primary and the dialectic of reality as secondary, as an externalization of the dialectic of thought. This is evident from the fact that Hegel first formulates the principles of dialectic in the sphere of Logic—the concepts and categories—and then introduces those laws of dialectic to the world outside. With this, I wish to come to the concluding part of the paper.

III

Hegel's dialectic and his philosophy as a whole is largely ignored by the philosophers in English-speaking tradition in the present century, until quite recently, with the efforts of T. H.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Green, Bradley and McTaggart, it could gain its popularity. One of the reasons of it—to avoid Hegel—may be the fact that Hegel's dialectic presents a counter–thrust to any form of Positivism and Analytic philosophy. The philosophies of Russell, earlier Wittgenstein and Ayer are the revivals and revitalizations of an essentially old philosophy. It is the philosophy of Bishop Berkeley and David Hume. In the Preface to First Edition of *Language, Turth and Logic*, Ayer writes, " The views which are put forward in this treatise derive from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein which are themselves the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and David Hume." [10]

Like the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume, Russell, earlier Wittgenstein and Ayer take it for granted that all our knowledge of the world is derived from sense-experience (in fact, Russell uses the term ' sense–data ' and Ayer calls the same as ' sense–contents '). The basic characteristics of the sense–data are that they are undialectical, unconnected, completely separate from one another, or, as Russell calls it, " .. absolute pluralism because while maintaining that there are many things, it denies that there is a whole composed of those things. We shall see, therefore, that philosophical propositions, instead of being concerned with the whole of things collectively are concerned with all things distributively. " [11] Like Hume, Russell and the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus* reject causal relation in the sphere of sensible–world. In fact, Russell and Wittgenstein convert Hume's empiricism and neutral monism into the semantic one. Both Russell and earlier Wittgenstein regard language as the only subject–matter of philosophy and the method of philosophy is the analysis of the complex propositions into the simpler ones or atomic propositions. This is an empiricism based on propositions and judgments, instead of on ' impressions ' and ' ideas ' as in Hume. This is indeed an important advance beca-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

use propositions are complete units of thought, whereas impressions, like terms or separate ideas, are incomplete fragments. Similar is the case with Ayer also. He too regards the subject matter of philosophy as language. And the function of philosophy consists in analysing and clarifying the concepts which figure in the everyday, and also in scientific use of language.

Thus, from Hume to the present–day Logical Atomists and and Logical Positivists, the basic principles of these latter philosophies have been the ultimate authority of the fact and observing 'the immediate given' has been the method of analysis and verification. They induce thought to be satisfied with the facts, to renounce their transgression beyond them, and to bow to the given state of affairs.

Contrary to this procedure, Hegel's dialectic clearly shows that facts themselves possess no authority. They are 'posited' by the subject that has mediated them with the comprehensive process of their development. Verification rests, in the last analysis, with the process to which all facts are related and which determines their content.

To substantiate this point, I would like to bring out the distinction between 'reality' and 'actuality' in Hegel's idealism. Without the grasp of this distinction, Hegel's philosophy as a whole is meaningless in its decisive principles. Hegel, in fact, does not declare that 'reality' is reasonable, but reserves this attribute for a definite form of reality, namely, 'actuality.' Thus, says Hegel in the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*: "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational." [1] Actuality is that in which the discrepancy between the possible and the real has been overcome. Its fruition occurs through a process of change, with the given actuality advancing in accordance with the possibilities implicit in it. As stated in Part II, 'contradiction

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is the basis of all movement and 'sublation' is the basis of all development. And these together are the operative terms of Hegel's dialectic. A given 'actuality' moves, because of some contradiction, because it strives to express its potentialities. A given 'actuality' develops because the lower stage is not annihilated but assimilated in the higher stage. What is actual is rational because it is the actuality of an entity that undergoes through the whole process of growth–the reality of an entity. And the whole process of growth or development of every 'actuality' is always dialectical and in it alone consists its distinction from mere transpassing of facts of Logical Atomism and Positivism.

Group of Philosophy
School of Languages
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi–110 067

R. P. SINGH

NOTES

1. Michael George ; " Marx's Hegelianism : An Exposition " incorporated in *Hegel and Modern Philosophy*, ed. by David Lamb, London : Croom Helm, pp. 119–142.

2. G. W. F. Hegel ; *Science of Logic* tr. W. H. Johnstone, L. G. Struthers, vol. one, London : Allen & Unwin Ltd., New York : Humanities Press Inc. 1966, p. 204.

3. Hegel ; *Phenomenology of Spirit* tr. A. V. Miller, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1973, p. 11.

4. Hegel : *Science of Logic* tr, A. W. Miller. Book Two, London, 1969, p. 439.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 439–40.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

6. David Kolb; *The Critique of Pure Modernity–Hegel, Heidegger and After*, Chicago : The University Press, 1986, p. 46.

7. See No. 1, *op. cit.*, *Ibid.*, p. 123.

8. See No. 2, *op. cit.*, *Ibid.*, p. 94.

9. Hegel; *The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, tr. William Wallace, London, 1892, second revised edition, p. 150.

10. A. J. Ayer; *Language, Truth and Logic*, Penguin Books, 1976, p. 41.

11. Russell; "On Scientific Method", in his book, *Mysticism and Logic*, Penguin, London, 1954, p. 107.

12. Hegel; *Philosophy of Right*, tr. T. M. Knox, London : Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 10.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII. No. 3
July 1991

BOOK-REVIEW

MATILAL, BIMAL KRISHNA; *The Word and the World : India's Contribution to the Study of Language;* Oxford University Press, pp. ix+189, Rs. 175/-(HB)

This book by the late Prof. B. K. Matilal, the Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at Oxford, (See his Obituary in this issue elsewhere) consists of two parts : the first part deals with language theories in a general way and the second part in a more elaborate and critical way. It has three valuable appendices too. It is not simply an exposition but also a critical analysis of the classical theories of traditional grammarians (especially Bhartṛhari), aestheticians and philosophers in India on philosophy of language. The history of the development of the theories and critical evaluations are given, though very often it is left to us to decide which theory is correct and which is not. The aim of the author is to present the Indian language theories–theories selected by him–to the Western readers in the contemporary language idioms. The issues of traditional thought and arguements are presented as it is current in contemporary thought in the West. However, the background and the goals of traditional thought seem to be overlooked in the process.

Prof. Matilal is a scholar both of Indian and Western thought and a great sanskritist. He is capable of circumventing the defects of the traditional *pandits* and the modern scholars–the former not knowing the modern thought and the latter not knowing the traditional thought and Sanskrit language. Naturally we should expect a proper interaction between Indian and Western thought which co–exist in our country, though in many

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

places while discussing the issues the text and the context are not given for those who want to refer to them. The issues are selectively discussed by him. There is no paradim which can hold all these theories together except that they are all theories of language.

All of us use language to convey ideas to others. How this communication takes place? What is the nature of language (ontology) and how do we communicate (epistemology)? These are the main issues discussed in these pages. Philosophy of language is an articulation of the intellectual form of our consciousness of the use of language. There are different articulations such as of the *Mīmāṁsakas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiyākaraṇas, Buddhists* and so on All these schools have their own presuppositions which give sense to what they defend or give reasons for taking such and such positions. The presuppositions are not exposed in these essays and the author does not show any partiality to any theory to show its relative merits. Partiality is the strength of the critic. What shall we do when there are different theories of language? One must see which of the theories articulates one's own experience of language and show a partiality to defend it. Remember, we understand language irrespective of any of these theories of language. Moreover, even if one holds a wrong theory of language he will also understand the linguistic communication.

I am afraid that certain concepts of Bhartrhari are taken in this work rather rigidly. According to Bhartṛhari the form of the word (the word in the intellect, universal) is the same as the form of the object. A word is applicable to reality as long as the identity of the form is felt and that is the reason for applying a word to an object, Therefore, whether you see one or many, or you see something changing, as long as the identity of the form of the word and the object is there you can mean the object by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the word. So, the objections of innumerability (*ananta*) and variability (*vyabhicāra*) are not valid (p. 37). The anthor also thinks that according to Bhartṛhari the so-called translation in the sense of 'transfer' of thought from one garb to another seems impossible (p 122) Well, in VP II, 250–398 where Bhartṛhari deals with primary and secondary meanings, we can see ample room for change of word meaning and sentence–meaning even when he is holding *anekaśabdadarśana*. Any language can produce within its own system words with forms which have identity with all the objects which are to be referred. It depends on the *pratibhā* of the translator. The system of language and the unity of reality is in one to one relationship. When we have a word to refer to a reality that reality becomes an object. Prof. Matilal doubts the absolute relationship of language and thought (p. 128). Here he refers only to VP, I. 123–4. One must read from VP. I. 118–131. The relationship is absolute.

The *sphoṭa* theory of Bhartṛhari is explained with text following the sequence of thought (p. 87–8). There is no substitute for the text to explain an issue. This is a model. Otherwise the author becomes the text and the text a context. We do not have proper presentation of Indian thought with intelligible texts as we have the Western thought in intelligible translations. In order to have proper undestanding of Indian thought, the perspectives of which we should compare with Western thought in proper comparison and competition, we should always resort to texts. Prof. Matilal's exposition of Bhartṛhari's text in pp. 87–8 is a model on this count.

Department of Philosophy
Poona University,
PUNE 411007

J. OUSEPARAMPIL

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

PROFESSOR B. K. MATILAL

We are sorry to report untimely sad demise of Prof. B. K. **Matilal.** Born in Jayanagar, Mazilpur (W. B.), India, in 1935 he was a Jubilee Scholar (1954–55) and winner of Hemachandra Goswami Prize and Gold Medal (1956). Later on he was a Harvard–Yenching Fellow (1962–64) and earned his M. A. and Ph. D. from Harvard in 1965. He commenced his teaching assignment in Toronto University, Canada, where he taught for twelve years. He also taught at Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta for five years, his last teaching assignment being Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at Oxford and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. He was a Founder Editor of the Journal of Indian Philosophy (D. Reidel Pub. Co.) from the last twenty years. Recipient of Padmabhusana, he authored or edited such books as *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis* (Mouton), *Logic, Language and Reality : An Introduction to Indian Philosophical Studies, Navya-nyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Harvard), *Perception : An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge* (Oxford), *The Central Philosophy o Jainism* (LDI, Ahmedabad), *Moral Dilemmas in the Mahābhārata* (Delhi) etc, and contributed number of papers to journals and conferences. He not only contributed himself to the investigation into various trends of Indian philosophical origin but also encouraged young scholars from India and abroad to do so. In his passing away we have unfortunately and untimely lost a sustained researcher, a dedicated teacher and a well–known editor.

EDITORS

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 4,
October, 1991

TESTING ANTI-PATERNALISM : SOME MEDICAL CASES

I

In talking of paternalism we are referring to the treatment of adults or near adults as parents treat their children. Construed more narrowly, as it typically is in ethical discussions, to speak of paternalism is to speak of the restriction of the liberty of individuals without their consent, where the rationale or justification for so acting is either the prevention of some harm they might do to themselves or the production of some benefit for them they might not otherwise secure. Paternalists hold we can interfere in a person's life to, on the one hand, prevent that person from seriously harming himself or, on the other, to aid in his doing what really answers to his interests in a way that may be quite independent of his own view of the matter.

II

Moral reflection, I believe, creates a presumption against paternalism, though this presumption, like any presumption, might be defeated. Depending on exactly how paternalism is charcterized it may create a presumption so strong that we should say, where adults or near adults, who are mentally non–incapacitated, are concerned, paternalism is never, or at least almost never, justified. What I shall characterize in a moment as 'strong paternalism' is, I shall argue, never, justified while 'weak paternalism' may be. It might, in turn, be said that 'weak paternalism' is not really paternalism. Be that as it may, there is a

Received : 10–8–90

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

presumption against paternalism in any recognizable form. But many believe that under certain circumstances that presumption is defeated. I want to examine whether this is so. I want to ascertain, if I can, just when, if ever, paternalism is justified promoting the interests of particular persons who by the intervention are prevented from harming themselves. I am not assuming what is surely false, namely that individuals always understand best what is in their own interests. What is at issue is not that sometimes others know better than the individual conerned what is in her or his own interests but, even when this is so, whether others are sometimes justified in intervening in certain specific ways in the life of mentally competent adults or near adults to insure a protection or promotion of their interests : interests of which they may not be aware. Are we ever justified in violating their autonomy, usurping their decision–making, either by preventing them from doing what they have decided or interfering with the ways in which they come to make their decisions. Paternalism, recall, is the coercive interference with a human being's liberty of action (life more generally) which is justified, if paternalists are right, by protective or beneficient reasons which in such situations refer exclusively to the interests, needs, welfare, good, happiness of the human being who is being coerced or in some other way interfered with. Put more exactly, paternalism can be formulated in the following two conceptions which I shall call *formulation A* and *formulation* B Formulation A is a slightly more standard formulation, but formulation B, I am inclined to believe, has the advantage of setting out somewhat more perspiciously what is involved in paternalism and why it is so frequently objected to. But it is also a conception under which the possibility of justified paternalism is considerably lessened. In both formulations we have an attempt at a substitution of one person's judgment for another's to promote the latter's good.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Formulation A Paternalism is interference with a person's freedom of action or freedom of information, or the deliberate dissemination of misinformation, where the alleged justification for interfering or misinforming is that it is for the good of the person who is interfered with or misinformed.[1]

Formulation B Paternalism is the belief that a person or group of persons can, and indeed sometimes should, determine (indeed even coercively determine), for mentally competent adult, or near adult, where only that person's interests are affected, what she ought to do or how she ought to live her life, even when that goes against what she on reflection would desire or choose, were she fully informed and firmly in control of herself. (Recall that what we desire or take an interest in, may not be in our own interest.) Such interference with such people for their own good is thought by the paternalist to be justiefid in certain circumstances. (This is a very strong form of paternalism.) Later I shall take note of the way these formulations differ but for now I shall consider whether, on either or both formulations, we can make a good case for there being instances of justified medical paternalism. In attempting to do this, we should keep in mind that whether a doctor or other health professional is acting paternalistically depends upon whether she will proceed with what she thinks is best for the patient regardless of the patient's expressed wishes on the matter.

III

Extreme mental retardation or extreme senility will render a person mentally non–competent and will justify some acts of what is sometimes called paternalism toward that individual. (It would certainly be paternalism under formulation A) Suppose that such a person makes it as clear as he can that he wants to go on living and suppose further that a certain operati-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

on is necessary for that and he, to some degree, understands that and assents to the operation but still he stubbornly refuses to take a medication that is really necessary for him to take prior to the operation. In such a situation the nurse or doctor is justified in tricking him into taking the medicine or even forcing him, if necessary, to do so. Here, paradoxically, while the act is arguably a paternalistic act, it still, on formulation B, is not paternalism, for the individual in question is not mentally competent. But it clearly and unequivocally is on formulation A, for there no qualification about mental competence is made and a person's freedom of action is interfered with for his own good. In the above case there is evidence of an end he clearly wants, namely his continued life, defective though it be, end the medication is a necessary means to that. To will the end is to will the necessary means to the end. There is no lack of respect here for his person or any treating him as a means. There is rather a concern for his good and there is respect for him as a person. His autonomy, of course, is extremely limited but that is not the result of any act or any attitude of the person acting paternalistically, though he is tricked into something he does not want to happen to him. It is, that notwithstanding misleading to say that what little autonomy he has is violated.

Consider now the case of a very disturbed person who comes to a psychiatrist and who says he knows he is in a bad way and asks the psychiatrist's advice about being hospitalized. Suppose the psychiatrist recognizes that he is indeed in a bad way, that he is very self–destructive and that he might commit suicide or badly harm himself (say gouge out an eye or something like that.) The psychiatrist urges him to have himself hospitalized and the patient consents to the hospitalization. No paternalistic act has yet occurred. But suppose further that later the patient wishes to be discharged from the hospital and the doctor refuses

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

permission because he believes (and believes on good grounds) that the patient may do himself serious harm if he leaves. Here, depending on what else the doctor believes, we do have a paternalistic act on the doctor's part. For it to be paternalistic the doctor must believe that discharging him from the hospital will cause the patient harm. However, if he also thinks he is a threat to others or in some other way may harm others and acts on that belief then the act is not paternalistic. Hence my above qualifying phrase. But if he acts simply to protect the patient then he acts paternalistically

Whether it is justified paternalism turns on whether the patient is mentally competent This in some circumstances is very hard to decide Resaonable persons will disagree and in such circumstances, given the value we place on human autonomy, it would be better to err on the side of leniency. But there will be clear cases where a person is so mentally incompetent, so out of control, so incapable of acting in his own interests, or even recognizing them, that such paternalistic acts are justified. Suppose, for example, that he is very likely, if discharged, to mutilate himself: lacerate himself with a razor, cut off his tongue, toes or gouge out an eye. Such a person in such a state is mentally incompetent. The very craziness of any such act, under normal circumstances, shows that the person is plainly mentally incompetent.[2] To say we respect his person, respect his autonomy, by letting him do such things makes no sense at all.

However, by contrast, the very fact that he wants to commit suicide is not at all enough to justify a refusal to discharge him or to justify any other sort of paternalistic tratment of him. Whether suicide attempts can rightly be paternalistically interferred with depends very much on the circumstances. If his suicidal intent was a result of a temporary depression or other mental agitation and there is good reason to believe that in time

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

he would come to react to things differently and that then he would be grateful to the doctor for not providing him with the wherewithal to commit suicide then such a paternalistic act would be justified. But it is also the case that he would not be acting against what he would choose in a rational frame of mind. But there are other circumstances in which it would be wrong to prevent someone from commiting suicide. Suppose the man-like some of the characters out of Eugene O'Neill-knew himself very well indeed and knew how self-destructive he was and how destructive to others he was and suppose he also knew that there was very little that he or other could do to alter that behaviour in any relatively permanent way. Suppose while hospitalized he thought about it carefully and rationally and, with a clear understanding of his alternatives, decided in a cool hour to end it all. That could very well be the rational act of a mentally competent person and I do not see how acting paternalistically toward such a person in such circumstances could be justified. So acting would not be to respect his person or his autonomy. Suicide is not always an irrational act or an unjustified act as can be seen from the following even clearer instance. A well-known Danish philosopher late in life had a plainly terminal cancer which in its later stages would be utterly debilitating and very painful. He would become a burden to himself and to others. He, with a good medical understanding of his condition, worked and lived his life fully until the time his debilitating condition started to set in and then in as painless and non-fussy way as possible committed suicide. This indeed seems to me to be a rational act on his part, indeed an admirable act showing considerable integrity and self-control. It is certainly not something that could justify paternalistic intervention.

Consider another case of a putatively justified paternalistic act. Envisage a member of a religious group that believes blood

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

transfusions are so sinful that they will not be able to go to heaven if they have one. Suppose such a religious person is involved in a serious automobile accident and loses a large amount of blood. On arriving at the hospital, he is still conscious and informs the doctor of his views on blood transfusions. Shortly thereafter he faints from loss of blood. The doctor believes that if he is not given a transfusion he will die. Thereupon, while the patient is still uncoscious, the physician orders and carries out the blood transfusion [3] This is plainly a bit of paternalism on the first formulation of paternalism (formulation A) and probably on the second formulation as well. It is also plainly a difficult case concerning which reasonable, morally concerned people will disagree I think here the disagreement is not rooted in deeply conflicting considered moral convictions but in disagreements about the facts, including facts about human nature If you believe that when push comes to shove that the patient, very near death, will very likely abandon or rationalize his religious convictions, and ask for the blood transfusion, then the right thing to do is to act as the doctor did and carry out the transfusion. You will believe that when the person regains consciousness and indeed thereafter (or at least until his religious ideology sets in full force) he will be grateful to you for ordering the transfusion and saving his life. On the other hand, if you believe that he will probably stick by his convictions through thick and thin, then you will not be justified in ordering the transfusion. To order the transfusion, if that is the case, would be to show a lack of respect for persons and for their autonomy. It would, that is, be to show a lack of respect for what they, as rational, morally competent individuaus, on reflection and with deliberation, would choose. I think that such religious beliefs are about as wrong-headed as can be, but to run rough shod over a person's firm convictions, shows a very deep lack of respect for him as a human being and that is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

something which is very wrong indeed. But, if *au contrare*, it is not very likely the accident victim would really stick with his religious beliefs when death really deeply threatens, then such a weak paternalism is justified. That is to say, the religious sectarian's settled convictions are not to be run over because the doctor judges that the patient's own good is thereby served.

Consider now the case of a doctor lying to a woman on her deathbed when she asks about her son. The doctor tells her that her son is fine when he knows that he has been killed trying to escape from prison after having been indicted for multiple rape and murder. The act is paternalistic at least on formulation A and the motivation is to relieve distress and suffering But does it show a lack of respect for persons, a lack of respect for the woman's autonomy and integrity ? It is not clear to me that it shows disrespect. To lie to someone is in most circumstances to show disrespect for that person. To assume that there is a truth which you can stand but he cannot is in most circumstances not to treat the other person as your moral equal. (Normally to substitute your judgement for his is not to treat that other person as your moral equal.) But not in all circumstances. In certain very special circumstances, such as the above, most people, when they look carefully at it prospectively or retrospectively, would not, where they could distance themselves and universalize, want to be told the truth. Suppose the woman in the above case was just hours from her death. What would be the point of knowing the truth about her son ? It is at least plausibly arguable that showing respect for her would in such a circumstance not be to inflict such pointless suffering on her. There is no way, as it is the case in more usual circumstances, where she could face it and with integrity come to grips with it. In the usual circumstance, we cannot, out of respect for their autonomy, play God with people and hide facts from them

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that are vital to their lives. We have no right to do this and indeed to so act reflects a considerable moral failure. But in the circumstances of the above case there is no one playing God with the woman. If their roles were reversed the doctor would no doubt want the same treatmet. At least many reflective people would and it is not unreasonable for the doctor to believe that the woman would also withhold the information from him if their roles are reversed. Here we have the reciprocity required by morality. The idea of undermining her autonomy here is ridiculous.

Consider now a rather different case. Suppose a woman must undergo surgery in a few days for a malignant tumor in her breast. She intellectually understands her situation perfectly well but appears rather unconcerned about it, curiously minimizing the emotional gravity of her situatiion. Her doctor is well aware of the fact that women in such a situation, who before mastectomy do not experience some grief and some concern about their operation and its implications, often have very severe and depressive post operative reactions. Because of that, and against her patient's insistence that she does not want to talk about it, her doctor talks about it anyway for her own good in order emotionally to prepare her for her post-operative situation.

That is plainly a paternalistic act. Is it justified paternalism? It all depends on an important psychological fact about the patient. If subsequently, after she has gone through the emotional stress of the effects of the operation, and comes to terms with it, she realizes she was hiding things from herself and comes to feel grateful for the doctor's talk, then, if this really happens, his paternalism (if that is the right word for it) was justified. If not, not. If her more normal reaction–that is, how she would react in less stressful situations–is such that she would be glad that the doctor forced that talk on her, then we have, in terms

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of her own normal reaction, evidence that at the time the doctor forced that conversation on her, she was in the relevant respect in an important way mentally incapacitated. However, if she would not so react and if later she would still resent the doctor's forcing that conversation on her, then it would be the case that the doctor would be violating her autonomy and by ignoring her deliberate and considered choice her physician would not be showing respect for her as an adult person capable of organizing and running her own life. The doctor has to make a possibly risky psychological bet on how his patient will react rooted in his knowledge of human nature. (There may be very little here his professional training prepares him for.) Whether his paternalistic act was justified depends on the doctor's beliefs about some facts about human nature and on how reasonable it is for him to have these beliefs. He could be justified in so acitng, even if it turns out that in fact the doctor was mistaken about this particular patient. If he had acted on the best information reasonably available to him at the time and if that information was that it was far more probable than not that she would subsequently be grateful for the conversation, then he would be justified in acting as he did. He was acting correctly on the best evidence available to him at the time.

Let us move on to a psychiatric case. Suppose an outpatient of a psychiatrist during the last few minutes of one of his first sessions with her insistently requests some medicine for his nerves and for vague poorly localized pains which he describes. She believes that there is no medical reason for giving him medication but she is also of the opinion that if she refuses his request a productive therapeutic session will end on a sour note that might very well ruin or at least retard further therapeutic progress. But the psychiatrist also does not believe in administering active drugs for no medical reason. So she resolves the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

situation by prescribing for him a week's supply of placebos and makes a note on her chart to discuss the issue of medication with him in detail during their next session.[4] This is plainly at least weak paternalism But is it justified ? What is at issue here is something like the previous case. But there are also differences. One difference is that atypically in the previous example the doctor forces a recognition and a taking-to-heart of the facts on the patient while in this example she, more typically, conceals something from the patient. But in both instances the doctor acts in the interests of the patient knowing that this is *not* how the patient will construe his or her interests *at the time* the paternalistic action is taken. If in this last case the psychiatrist can reasonably assume that as the therapy progresses and the patient sees his situation more clearly that he will then come to approve of the earlier deception as being in his own interests, and indeed as enabling him to attain a fuller autonomy, then the paternalistic act (putatively paternalistic act) was jutified. If in retrospect that is not how the patient sees it, particularly when he attains a rather fuller mental competence, then the paternalistic act is not justified, though if the doctor had very good reason to believe the patient would retrospectively approve then he was justified in so acting. What *a person* is justified in doing at a given time might not turn out to be the right thing to do, the thing we would be justified in doing *if* we had fuller information. What if the patient does not retrospectively recognize what in fact is in his interest or, even if he does, objects to the means taken to realize what in fact is in his best interests ? Would the 'paternalistic act' in such a circumstance be justified? The patient was disturbed, but if any psychological disturbance is going to count as mental incapacitation then all of us are going to turn out to be mentally incapacitated. There are degrees here of mental incapacitation. Is it possible for paternalistic acts which override a patient's wishes to be justified ? Where the mental

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

incapacitation is such that the patient is no longer even remotely in control of his or her own life can we not rightly speak of a mental incapacitation that would justify paternalism? It would be justified in a situation where the patient was not capable of making anything even remotely like a reflective and informed choice.[8] It would be justified if his mental incapacitation was such that he had very little understanding indeed of what he was doing and why he was doing it. But this is not the situation of the patient in this case, so if the patient does not retrospectively approve of the deception then that paternalistic act was not justified. In real life situations it is often very difficult to ascertain what the relevant facts are. We need to ascertain what degree of mental incapacitation exists and how badly the therapy would be effected if the deception were not carried out. But the principle we are acting on is reasonably clear. Moreover, given the *prima facie* wrongness—the presumptive wrongness—of the paternalistic acts, it would be better here to develop a conservative policy and require very good evidence indeed that the refusal to practice such deception would undermine the therapy. It is doubtful that the psychiatrist has any hard informntion and this makes paternalistic act even more questionable.

Let us consider another psychiatric case. A psychiatric is leading a group therapy session where the patients all claim they have difficulties in relating to other people. One of the patients, a single successful professional man of around thirty, complains that he is unable to maintain lasting friendships with either men or women. The doctor notes in the group therapy sessions that this individual is self-centered, critical of others and smugly certain about his own opinions. Moreover, he has no insight into his having these characteristics. To help him gain insight into his having these characteristics, characteristics which he will try to change once he has gained insight into them, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

psychiatrist encourages the other members of the group to confront this man with their feelings about him despite what he predicts will be his anger and considerable discomfort when they begin to do so. When they do so he does indeed become angry and upset and denies their accusations and feels ill done by.

Again we have what appears at least to be a paternalistic act, albeit of a rather unusal sort. The question is to determine whether it is justified. Here the man enters into the therapy because he knows though he does not clearly understand the specific ways in which this works, that there is something amiss with his personality. He in effect makes a contract with the psychiatrist to ascertain and correct, if he can, this behaviour and in this instance the psychiatrist is using reasonably standard means to make this correcion Subsequently, when the man's therapy has progressed further, and he has some reasonable insight into his situation, he will be grateful for that therapeutic tactic, anxiety-arousing though it was at the time. He, as a rational being with a conception of his own good, wills it, so the psychiatrist is not violating his autonomy and treating him as a means only in using that therapeutic tactic, On formulation A, it is clearly paternalism, though not so clearly on formulation B. But in any event, whether it is paternalism or not it is something the psychiatrist is justified in doing.

Consider now what was once, and perhaps still is, a widespread practice among physicians of not telling patients in a far-advanced stage of cancer, where the prognosis is very bleak, that they have cancer... The doctors who do this believe that if they tell the patient he has cancer and indeed such a far advanced cancer, that they would be depriving him of all hope and that the loss of hope would result in suicidal

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

depression or at least a serious worsening of the patient's condition. This is often thought to be a justifiable paternalism, but it seems to me it almost never is. Here the doctor is indeed playing God. A person in control of his faculties has a right to know what his condition is and to decide in the light of as adequate information as there is available what to do with what remains of his life. Any other treatment is incompatible with treating him as a person, the moral equal of the doctor. Most people have things they want to do with their lives; they have life plans they want to carry out. Having what is very likely a terminal cancer will typically deeply effect those plans and the patient has a right to information so vital to his life, to his whole conception of who he is and what he wants to do. If there is little in the way of hope for recovery then all the more reason for the patient to know just that. The claim that people generally cannot stand such evidence rests on no sound psychological foundation[6] It is perfectly true that such knowledge would be depressing and might very well drive some people to despair and even to suicide. But, as we have seen, suicide is not always either irrational or immoral. The depression and the possibility of despair are indeed bad things, but in moral deliberation they must be weighed against the violation of one's person through lack of respect for one's moral autonomy. When the depression and possible or even likely despair is very overwhelming the case is very difficult indeed, particularly when an awareness of the truth is very likely to worsen the patient's condition. Rather than play God, the physician should candidly, carefully and humanely discuss all these matters with the patient doing his utmost to help the patient come to grips with his life in this terrible situation.

Consider now a moral situation that arises in neonate intensive care units. There we have very difficult cases requiring

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

decisions about whether to initiate or not to initiate or to discontinue life-sustaining therapy for infants. We have, for example, infants with Downe's syndrome with potentially fatal but surgically correctable congenital cardiovascular or gastrointestinal defects. There are surgical techniques to correct this but a large percentage of the infants so treated suffer varying degrees of permanent brain damage and paralysis. The paternalistic problem here is between the doctor and the afflicted children's parents. There are physicians who take the position that they should undertake the responsibllity for making decisions about the life and death of such defective newborns in order to relieve parents of the trauma and guilt of making the decision. It is just too cruel, some paternalistic physicians reason, to ask the parents to decide whether their child shall live or die. This is plainly paternalism. Is it justified ?

If the parents are at all normal, I do not think they can justifiably be excluded from the decision process. It, after all, is a moral decision and not merely a technical, medical decision. Moreover, the doctor has no more moral expertise than do the parents. Once the relevant factual informtion is clearly set out, and it is plain the issue is moral, the doctor has no more expertise than anyone else. The parents have an intimate interest in their children's lives. Such life and death decisions are horrible for anyone but it is not treating the parents as moral equals to exclude them from the decision making process. What the physician must do, rather than paternalistically making the decision for them, is to develop techniques for as fully and clearly explaining to them the condition of their child and the various options and the probable effects of taking those options. He must never hide in jargonese. The real functional decision should in most circumstances not be made by the doctor or by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a team of doctors alone. Under normal circumstances the parents must be fully involved. Anything else is unjustified paternalism.

Let us now consider the case of the paternalistic implications of the ban on Laetrile. Laetrile (Vitamin B–17) is a substance long noted in certain circles as a cure for cancer. However, scientific studies suggest that Laetrile is not effective in the treatment of cancer. The FDA in the United States defends its somewhat paternalistic ban on the use of Laetrile on the grounds that the cancer victim's choice between Laetrile and other therapies cannot be free, for the cancer victim decides in a climate of fear and anxiety created by the especially morbid nature of the disease and exacerbated by pecuniary and political pressures that the pro–Laetrile movement itself has produced. Labelling Laetrile as ineffective is not sufficient because many people are aware that this is the considered scientific assessment but they are so desperate that they will grab at any straw. They are, that is, incapable here of making a rational decision. They are in reality over these matters mentally incapacitated and the FDA, it is argued, must act in these matters paternalistically to protect them from themselves. Hence the FDA ban on Laetirle.

Again is this a justified paternalism ? Where the decision to use the drug rather than use other therapies is substantially impaired so that there is really mental incompetency then the paternalistic prohibition of the drug is justified along the lines we have taken concerning previous cases. But this would hardly be the typical case. To overrule autonomous decision making where only one's own good is at issue cannot be justified. Such paternalism is never justified. This is the heart of the anti–paternalist case. However, where the mental incapacitation is very deep there can be no autonomous choice but mental impairment admits of degrees and it is *not* very likely that most people seeking to use Laetrile are so incapacitated that they

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cannot make choices with any degree of autonomy, so while the ban on Laetrile may be justified on some other grounds it is not justified on paternalistic grounds. After all, desperate people wishing to try Laetrile are not like deranged persons seeking to cut out their tongues, particularly where they will try other more standard therapies as well, the banning of Laetrile is grossly unjustified.[7] I shall give three more cases. The first two seem to me plainly cases of unjustified paternalism, though they are all cases of medical paternalism that have been practiced by the medical or legal profession. The last case, however, seems to be about as strong a case as can be made for medical paternalism.

The first case is that of a magistrate ordering involuntary psychosurgery for a compulsive gambler and psychopath charged with larceny and misrepresentation. The argument for this was not, as one might expect, a utilitarian one that it was in the best interest of the public, i. e. for their protection but the paternalistic one that it was in the best interests of the criminal patient. It would remove otherwise irreversible health deficiencies, remove extreme risks to him and enhance his range of freedom. But here we have a case of a person's personality being so altered that there is no question of his coming to accept later the paternalist action of the doctor. No doubt he would accept it, after psycho-surgery, but the person accepting it is then such a different person that it no longer makes sense to speak of the criminal/patient's consequent consent. Such deep personality alterations through surgical intervention are, to put it conservatively, deeply suspect morally; the are a very deep assault on the person's autonomy and indeed on his very person. Our sense of the importance of respect for persons forbids it. Keep him in jail for our common protection; employ, if it will do any good, more conventional psychotherapy that will not so deeply alter

...2

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

who he is and will work in such a way that what alterations there are will be rooted in his understanding of himself and in that fundamental way will be cognitive. But do not use such psycho-surgery for his own good—a surgery which would radically alter who he is.

To this it might be replied : ' When you really consider *who* he is, concretely and non-evasively, you will sing another song. After all he is a compulsive gambler and psychopath who has engaged in larceny and misrepresentation.' Those are indeed bad things that the public must be protected from and it would be good if we can, by legitimate means, correct his behaviour. But there are other ways of protecting the public and no such deep assault on his very person is justified for his own good. Such paternalism, though in fact practiced, is not morally acceptable.

The second example of what is sometimes taken to be justified paternalism is the modifying of chidren's behaviour by the use of amphetamines for hyperkinetic children. This will indeed quiet them down at home and in school. But it is, I think, just a considerably less drastic assault on their person than the assault we had in the previous case. For convenience at home or in school, or even for their own good, such interventions are not justified.

Now, as my last case, I want to consider, what seems to me, the strongest kind of case for a justified paternalism, namely a drug control case. I have in mind here the preventing of someone under the influence of LSD from self-inflicted death. Here such paternalistic intervention is justified. But it is important to see what the justification would consist in. If under the influence of LSD someone suddenly wanted to kill himself, particularly if he had exhibited no suicidal tendencies before, then that would be very good evidence indeed that he was temporarily mentally

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

incapacitated, indeed severely incapcitated. The reasonable assumption would be that when he came out of the influence of LSD he would be grateful for the paternalistic intervention, It would be something he would choose to have done to him under such circumstances when a cool hour returned and he could rationally deliberate. It is not even remotely a question of overriding his rational autonomy. By contrast with the compulsive gambler–psychopath case, the person wanting to kill himself under the influence of LSD does not have his person assaulted for his own good. Rather than being like the gambler–psychopath case, it is more like the taking of the automobile keys of a very drunk person who wants to drive. On formulation B it is not even paternalism, but, paternalism or not, it is something we are justified in doing.

IV

Reflecting back on all these cases together, I want now to make some generalizations about paternalism. I think these cases provide us with at least the beginning of a justification for believing that paternalism, where adult persons or near adult persons are involved, is only justified when such a person is so deeply mentally incapacitated that he no longer has any control over his life and any conception of how he should live his life. This has two forms, temporary incapacitation and life long incapacitation. (There are, of course, all sorts of in between cases.) Where the incapacitation is life–long, and severe, paternalism is justified. It is analogous to the treatment of a child or perhaps even an infant or an animal. (Consider, for example, how you might correctly and humanely train a German Shepherd. Permissiveness will hardly do the dog a service.) People so severely incapacitated are not capable of acting autouomously, so no question arises of overriding their autonomy. Someone has to act for them and so paternalism is justified. The other form is where a person, capable of some autonomy at least, is

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

temporarily incapacitated as a drunken person or a person under the influence of LSD. Where that is the case, there again can be a presumption in favour of paternalism, but it is only a presumption. The presumption is this. When the person temporarily incapacitated regains control of himself, overcomes his mental incapacity, he will approve of the paternalistic control for his own good during those times when he was incapacitaed. What is done for him is what he would do for himself if at the time he would have acted as an autonomous agent. The thing is we are never justified in overriding the autonomous choices of a person *for her own good.* There may be other reasons for overriding them but never, in such circumstances, *paternalistic* reasons. So paternalistic acts are only justified if the person to whom they are directed is deeply mentally incapacitated throughout her life or for a considerable section of her life or where she is temporarily incapacitated and there is a reasonable presumption that when she recovers from that incapacitation she will approve of the paternalistic act.

That I use phrases like '*deeply* mentally in capacitated' indicates that there is a certain indeterminacy in application here. How deeply must a person be incapacitated before we should say that he has no reasonable control over his life and someone must act for him? There will be no agreement about the boundaries here and reasonable people will continue to disagree about difficult cases even after philosophical clarification. Conceptual analysis can only carry us so far. But there will also be wide agreement about clear cases and, working from these clear cases we can refine somewhat our criteria, though we should not be self-congratulatory about how far this will carry us.

Let us finally look at how the formulations differ. Formulation A clearly is the more neutral formulation. It leaves more space for justified paternalism. If, however, I have been near to the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mark in my arguments, we are only justified in restricting a person's freedom for his own good or not informing him, where it normally would be our business to do so, for his own good or misinforming him for his own good, when he is mentally incapacitated in the several ways we have described. Formulation A makes no such limitation about 'mental incapacitation' and so would allow a lot of paternalism which is not justified but it will also allow some which is justified. It would, that is, allow as justified paternalism, in the sense of 'paternalism' specified by formulation A, paternalistic acts done even when the conditions for justification specified above obtain.

Formulation B, if my arguments have been correct, does not allow of any instances of justified paternalism. For it talks of coercing the behaviour for their own good of mentally competent adults even when paternalists act for them in ways that they, even when were fully informed and in control of themselves, would *not* have approved. If my arguments have been correct, we are never justified in acting paternalistically in this strong sense, though we can, of course, act coercively against such individuals to prevent harm to others. But so acting has nothing to do with paternalism. (If in formulation B I had added 'even' before for a mentally competent adult, there could be justified cases of paternalism, namely paternalistic acts toward children and the mentally incompetent. Clearly those acts in certain circumstances are justified. On formulation B they would not count as paternalistic. If that is deemed too paradoxical, add 'even' to the formulation. This will rid the formulation of paradox and allow that there are some justified paternalistic acts, though they will never be to mentally competent adults or near adults.)

Nothing of substance turns on whether we adopt formulation A or formulation B. The same acts remain unjustified and the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

same acts justified no matter which formulation we adopt. The only question that remains is whether certain justified acts should be called paternalistic acts. The issue here is the issue of which is the least misleading nomenclature. Once we are aware of that, we will see that nothing subtantial turns on which characterization of paternalism we use. Formulation A leaves room for justified paternalism and formulation B does not, but formulation B, as I have remarked, brings out clearly, in a phrase or so, what is so objectionable about paternalism. What is so objectionable is the determining for a mentally competent adult or near adult what she should do or how she should act or should live her life, quite against her reflective and informed choices, where only her life is effected. If we have respect for persons–something essential for moral agency–we will not so relate to others.[8] No such persons should have what is only their own good determined by others. That there is so very seldom *only* their own good involved attests to the limited scope of liberalism without denying the moral insight underlying liberalism. Moreover, this has nothing at all to do with bourgeois individualism.

KAI NIELSEN
Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities
University of Calgary
2500, University Drive N. W.
Calgary, Alberta
CANADA T2N 1N4

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

1. Allen Buchanan, "Medical Paternalism", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Fall 1978), p. 372.

2. That even such acts can have, under very special circumstances, an intelligible rationale is well exemplified in the Argentinian film *Time for Revenge*.

3. Charles M. Calver and Bernard Gert, "Paternalistic Behavior" *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 6, (Fall 1976), p. 46.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

5. We need to be careful of the application of this. They must really be severely mentally retarded. If our criteria for being able to make reflective and informed choices is too high, we will paternalistically act against many people who should not be so treated.

6. Daniel Wikler, 'Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. (Summer 1979), pp. 377-89.

7. The more dicey circumstance is the situation where they will not try the other therapies at all but go straight for the Laetrile. Were it only an individual's own fate that was involved we should, after remonstrating with him, let him go his own way, but if that very likely would not be the case and it might spur many others to similar behavior and people would die of cancer where they could be cured, then the situation is rather different. If anything like that is the case, we have good grounds for banning Laetrile of the standard harm to others sort. The justification for banning, however, would not be paternalistic. I do not want to say that the FDA has such a justification here but only that if they do that still the justification would not be a paternalistic one and it would be a justification that a consistent anti-paternalist could readily accept.

8. This is vividly illustrated in Nils Malmros's film *Beauty and the Beast*.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

Proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, the book contains a critical appraisal of various aspects of the late **Kalidas Bhattacharyya's** philosophical thought, and includes his own final formulation of his philosophical position.

Edited by **Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastava**

The book includes contributions from **K. L. Sharma** (A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharyya), **Daya Krishna** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation), **S. K. Chattopadhyaya** (Professor Bhattacharyya's "Alternative Standpoints" of Philosophy), **K. Bagchi** (Subjective and Objective Attitudes as Alternatives : A study of Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Knowledge-Object Unity), **N. K. Sharma** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Philosophy : Alternative Absolutes), **R. S. Bhatnagar** (Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy : Study of a Fundamental Dichotomy in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Thought), **Mrs. Yogesh Gupta** (Pre-suppositions of Science and Philosophy : A Critical Study) **Mrinal Kanti Bhadra** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Freedom and Existentialist Thought), **Rajendra Prasad** (Freedom and Existential Thought), **Rajendra Prasad Pandey** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya on the Indian Concept of Man), **K. J. Shah** (Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated), **J. N. Mohanty** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician).

1/8 Demy, Pages 239. Price Rs. 60/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
Poona University, PUNE 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 4,
October, 1991

INNER SELF LOCATED

Sufficient is now known from neurophysiology and electroencephalography to pinpoint the part of the brain that operates in our sleep. It is the purpose of this articie to review Hindu philosophy (as expounded in the *Upaniṣads*) on the subject of sleep and to enquire whether the part of the brain that operates during sleep is the part of the brain where the Self resides. It will be shown that scriptures abound with clues as to the precise location of the Self and just a basic knowledge of neurophysiology and electroencephalography is sufficient to interpret these clues, at which stage they become veritable signposts pointing in the right direction.

It can be no exaggeration to say that the state of sleep is the very cornerstone of Hinduism. According to the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad, Puruṣa*, who keeps awake and goes on creating desirable things even when the senses fall asleep, is pure; and He is *Brahman* and he is called the Immortal. All the worlds are fixed on Him; none can transcend Him (II. ii. 8).[1] This *Puruṣa* is called thus, because he sleeps in all bodies *(Puriśaya) (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.5. 18).[2] On an individual plane this *Puruṣa* or *Brahman* is known as *Ātman* or the Self.

Two states of sleep are distinguished. There is firstly the dream consciousness which is evoked and sustained by the Self. 'The blissful Self, revived by the impression of joy etc. is perceived in dream...' (Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary on the *Taittirīya*

Received : 25-4-90

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Upaniṣad p. 323)[1] 'That radiant infinite Being...puts the body aside in the dream state.' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV. 3. 11)[2] This one who, being adored, moves about in dream, is the Self... (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII. 10. 1)[3] *Puruṣa* is the supreme person, who Himself becomes manifest as the persons in the eye and in dream...' (Śaṅkarācāraya's Commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* p. 658)[3].

'When the Self thus stays in the dream state, these are the results of its past work.' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2 1. 18)[4]. 'Dreams generally correspond to experiences of the waking state. But sometimes one dreams things neither experienced nor to be experienced in this life. And since dreams are not original experiences, the above must be attributed to experiences of another life...' (Commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, p. 319)[4]. 'When it dreams, it takes away a little of this all-sustaining body, itself makes (the body) insensible and itself creates (a dream body) and dreams through its own radiance (illumined) by its own light. In this state this entity (the Self) itself becomes the light. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4. 3. 9)[4] The *Praśna Upaniṣad* states, 'there, in dreaming state, that God experiences His own greatness. He sees all, Himself being all.' (IV. 5)

There is secondly the state of deep sleep. "...then the sleeper becomes merged in Existence. He attains his own Self. Therefore, they speak of him as, "he sleeps" for he attains his own Self." (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI. 8. 1)[3]. '...they reach daily (during sleep) this *Brahman* which is the goal.' (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII. 3. 2)[3]. 'In deep sleep *Puruṣa* remains unmanifest and His organs fully withdrawn.' (Śaṅkarācārya p. 660). Krishnananda says, 'It is only in the state of deep sleep that the self goes back to its own pristine purity. The energy is withdrawn; consciousness is withdrawn; the ability to perceive is withdrawn. It appears as if life itself has gone. There is a practical non-exist-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ence of the individual for all conceivable purposes. What happens is that the central consciousness, which is the Self, draws forth into itself all the energies of the external vestures, viz. the body, the *Prāṇa*, the senses, the mind, etc. and rests in itself without having the need to communicate with anything else outside.' (p. 855) [5]

The Self is consistently stated to be the agent that brings about the transition from the sleeping state to the waking state. '...it hastens back in a reverse way just to its previous state, that of waking ..' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4. 3. 15)[4] 'As a large fish swims alternately to both the banks (of a river) eastern and western even so does this infinite entity move alternately to both these states–those of dream and waking.' (*Bṛhadāraṇyka Upaniṣad* 4. 3. 18) [4]. 'while the Self withdraws itself from all manifestations when it is in sleep, it projects itself in waking through the very channels through which it withdrew itself in sleep. (p. 865) [5]

The *Kaivalyopaniṣad* states that 'The being who sports in the three cities (viz the states of wakefulness, dream and profound sleep) from Him has sprung up all diversity. He is the substratum, the bliss, the indivisible consciousness, in whom the three cities dissolve themselves.' (14) [6] 'Verily the *Ātman* (Self) should be known as being the same in its states of wakefulness, dreaming and dreamless sleep.' (*Amṛtabindūpaniṣad* 11) [6]. It should be noted, however, that when the Self has totally withdrawn, It is no longer considered to be contained within the state of deep sleep and the *Upaniṣads* speak of a fourth state Then It is 'devoid of states, positive or negative, and remains in a state of non–separation and oneness, that It is spoken of as *Turīya*, the fourth.' (*Sarvopaniṣad* 2) [6]. The Self or *Ātman* is the *Linga-Śarīra* (subtle body) and the "heart's knot". In the fourth

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

state the Self transcends the individual altogether and merges with the macrocosmic *Brahman*. "That very mind becomes the fearless *Brahman* possessed of the light of Consciousness all around." (*Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* III. 34).[7]

Right from the time of the *Ṛg Veda* the divine texts have consistently maintained that the Self is located in the heart (*hṛdaya*). 'Because this Resplendent God who is the nourisher of all by His might knows fully the hidden soul or *Ātman* dwelling in the cave of the heart or intellect doing many noble deeds, He is Omnipotent.' (1. 23 14) Śaṅkarācārya explains the meaning of the word *aṇguṣṭhamātraḥ*—of the size of a thumb, the lotus of the heart is of the size of thumb; (and) as conditioned by the internal organ existing in the space within the lotus of the heart (the Self) has the size of a thumb.' (p. 181)[1]. The *Chāndogya, Upaniṣad* states : 'This Self of mine within the heart, is smaller than paddy or barley or mustard or a Shyamaka seed, or the kernel of Shyamaka seed. This Self of mine within the heart is greater than the earth, greater than the intermediate space, greater than the heaven, greater than the worlds.' (III 14 3)[3]. In particular the location of the Self in deep sleep is given as the heart. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, for example, states : 'When this Self that is associated with the intellect is thus asleep, it withdraws by its specialised knowledge the functions of the organs, and lies in the Supreme Self that is within the heart. (2. 1. 17)[4]. 'In the ether of the heart situated in the interior of the sheath, the divine soul attains the state of sleep. Then by resorting to the same course he leaps into the waking state.' (*Subāla Upaniṣad* IV 1)[8]

The Sanskrit word '*hṛdaya*' (heart) is composed of three letters '*Hṛ*' '*Da*' and 'Ya'. Krishananda explains, *Hṛ* means to draw. That is the grammatical root meaning of the word *Hṛ*. Drawing, to attract, to pull towards oneself, to compel everything

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

to gravitate towards oneself, to bring everything under one's control, to subjugate everything, to superintend over all things and to be overlord of everything—all these meanings are comprehended in the root meaning of the letter *Hṛ*...that which draws everything towards itself.' (p. 682)[5] ' The other letter is *Da*. In the word *Hṛ-da-ya*, *Da* is the second letter. *Da* connotes the meaning, ' to give ' in Sanskrit (p. 683)[5]. ' The third letter is *Ya* of *Hṛ-da-ya*. In Sanskrit *Ya* means, " to go " (p. 684)[5]. The obvious etymological significance, then, of the word " *Hṛdaya* " is that it goes by drawing and giving. Monier-Williams in his *Sanskrit English Dictionary* confirms Krishnananda's explanation of the three roots ' *Hṛ* ', ' *Da* ' and ' *Ya* '. Monier-Williams lists 'to withdraw' as a specific meaning of the root ' *Hṛ* ' (p. 1302)[9]. He lists ' giving, granting, offering, effecting, producing as meanings of the letter ' *Da* ' (p. 464)[9]. ' Ya ' in the masculine, Monier-Williams says, is a ' goer or mover ' and in the feminine ' *Ya* ' means the act of going. (p. 838)[9].

Given the fundamental precept of Hindu philosophy that the Self is responsible for the three states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep, and the equally fundamental precept that the Self is located in the heart *(hṛdaya)*, the conclusion is inescapable that the heart *(hṛdaya)* is the part of the brain that is responsible for drawing the individual into sleep and for waking him or her up again. The heart *(hṛdaya)* goes by drawing and giving, that is to say withdraws waking consciousness from the individual (draws him or her into sleep) and then it gives consciousness back to the individual at the time that it wakes the individual up (it produces a new waking consciousness). In order to locate the Self it is simply a matter of pinpointing the part of the brain that operates during our sleep.

There are many indications that the embryo in the womb is in state of sleep. The state of ' wakefulness ' comes about after

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the state of sleep and depends upon the fetus being developed to the point where, at the end of the sixth month, its eyelids actually open. The part of the brain that operates during sleep is the embryo brain region. The adult sleeper must therefore be regarded as having reverted to the primary fetal state (the embryonic state). Mentally, the adult sleeper has returned to his mother's womb. This is reinforced by the many physical similarities between an embryo and an adult in the state of sleep that are too obvious to list here.

The specific neurophysiological and electroencephalographical indications that the embryo brain is in a state of sleep are as follows :

a) We know that growth hormone is released from the pituitary gland specifically during the state of ' slow-wave ' sleep. The pituitary gland in the embryo brain develops some thirty days after conception and commences to release growth hormone. In other words, ' slow-wave ' sleep must be occurring for the growth hormone to be released. [10]

b) The electroencephalogram picks up dysrythmic low voltage brain wave activity as early as the second month of gestation.[10] This is consistent with ' slow-wave ' sleep having commenced.

c) Five weeks after conception the embryo will make an ' avoidance ' type movement if the trigeminal nerve in its face is touched or stroked. It will even ' sneer ' eight weeks after conception or ' scowl ' eleven weeks after conception. [11] Such responses are consistent with the embryo being disturbed in its sleep.

d) The part of the brain that is responsible for the transition from ' slow-wave ' (NREM) sleep to dreaming (REM) sleep is located in the embryo brain region. [12]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

e) The neurotransmitter 'noradrenaline' which draws the individual into sleep comes from the embryo brain region. [13]

f) The neurotransmitter 'dopamine' which wakes the brain from sleep comes from the embryo brain region.[13]

g) There may also be a peptide neurotransmitter which is responsible for sleep, and although research data is not clear, larger concentrations of this substance have been located in the embryo brain region.[14]

h) Another neuropeptide 'somatostatin' which releases or inhibits growth hormone, and is therefore very relevant to the sleeping process, has been traced to the embryo brain region. [13]

i) Electroencephalography indicates that the 'synchronizing' and 'desynchronizing' brain waves of the sleep-wakefulness cycle emanate from the embryo brain region.[12]

j) In 1962 Jouvet suggested that the path responsible for sleep desynchronization (dreams) commences in the embryo brain region. Conversely the pathway responsible for the desynchronization observed during waking hours commences in the embryo brain region. [12]

The embryo brain consists of the thalamus, hypothalamus, midbrain and brain–stem. These are the specific areas of the brain that are discernible about five weeks after conception As the brain grows and expands these areas remain the central core and guiding influence. It is mentioned in passing that the thalamus and hypothalamus comprise a part of the brain known as the diencephalon which also contains the pineal body. A special significance for this pineal body is not ruled out although there is little neurophysiological evidence as to its functions.

The hypothalamus is responsible for the states of being awake or asleep which are pivotal in our lives. It is said to organize,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

when electrically stimulated, total acts of aggression, timidity, mating and sexual behavior in animals. As to these last mentioned aspects, compare the content both of our dreams and our thoughts, where themes such as these regularly occur. In terms of human emotion we would talk of hatred, fear, love and desire. The hypothalamus apparently directs our mental processes from the very beginning, and is responsible for all our emotions. The hypothalamus is also considered responsible for the autonomic nervous system which directs all the myriad functions that take place in our body over which we have no conscious control-functions relating to circulation, respiration, digestion, excretion, regulation of body temperature and metabolism, regulation of water content, reproduction. The fact that the hypothalamus remains a relatively small area in the developed adult brain merely attests to its potency and to the fact that it was performing functions just as complex in the embryo period when it was very small indeed. Hence references in the *Upaniṣads* to the Self being of the size of a thumb or less. The entire embryo brain region in the adult brain is indeed about the size of a thumb. The hypothalamus itself has a rostrocaudal extent of about 10 mm. [16]

Compare the fact that the hypothalamus controls respiration with the passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 'That which breathes by the breath is thy soul which is within every being. (3.4.1) [2] It is also known that the fetus in the womb practises breathing movements specifiically during REM sleep. [17] Another factor indicating the workings of the Self in the embryo brain region, the source of respiration and dreams: 'Now he who, without stopping the respiration, goes upwards, moving about yet unmoving, dispels darkness, he is the Self. (*Maitreyi Upaniṣad* II, 2). [3]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The thalamus has extensive connections with the higher regions of the brain and determines what will become conscious to us. Fibres from the thalamus are connected as well to neurones of the central nervous system, gustatory, auditory, visual, and from the skin, the organs of balance, the bladder, the alimentary canal, the muscles and joints. The *Upaniṣads* speak about precisely these nerves emanating from the heart. 'Again when (this person) is fast asleep, when (he) knows nothing whatsoever returning in the body with the seventy–two thousand nerves by name *hita* which proceed from the heart to all parts of the body, he sleeps (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II i 19) [15]

By 5 months of gestation, increased brain wave activity is noted with onset of activity in the area around the thalamus. [10] This is consistent with the thalamus acting as a mediator or 'go–between' between the embryo brain and the higher regions of the fetus's brain that is by now substantially developed. And it is likewise consistent with brain wave activity in the adult where there are 10/sec rhythmical brain waves that are considered to comprise a loop between the cortical regions and the thalamus. [12] There are a number of theories about the precise pathway that the loop takes but the concept of the thalamus as a 'go–between' is reinforced by Baron Adrian's observation that rhythmic thalamic activity persists even if substantial areas of the cortex are removed–indeed even if the whole cortex is removed! Further reinforcement comes from the theory that the thalamus acts as a central 'pacemaker' for cortical rhythmical activity, which implies that command signals from a small thalamic region are distributed to wide areas of the cortical mantle.[12]

The importance of the brain–stem is certainly on a par with the other areas of the embryo brain because a system of pro-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

jections are in place here by the end of the embryo period (8 weeks) which influence the growth and development of the cortical (higher) regions. It is generally concerned with the states of arousal–sleeping, waking, relaxation, alertness, vigilance etc. Sensory input from the receptors does not reach the anatomical substrate of consciousness while we are asleep because of the operation of the brain–stem; if the input is urgent it awakens us.[15] 'The nerve that rises upward from the heart is their passage for moving (from the dream state to the waking state); it is like a hair split into a thousand parts. (Numerous) nerves of this body, called *Hita* are rooted in the heart. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4. 2. 3).[4] This Self (i.e. the subtle body) is surely in the heart. There are a hundred and one of the (chief) nerves. Each of them has a hundred (division). Each branch is divided into seventy–two thousand sub–branches. Among them moves *Vyāna*.' (*Praśna Upaniṣad* III. 6)[7]

Neurones or nerve cells in the brain are a spherical medium enclosed within a surface membrane and containing a salt solution quite different from the surrounding medium. The composition of the external salt medium is similar to that of an ultrafiltrate of blood. Nerve fibres likewise contain an internal aqueous medium and lie in an external aqueous medium which corresponds again to an ultrafiltrate of the blood. (p. 20).[18] As the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says, 'Those that are these nerves of the heart are filled with subtle juices...' (VIII 6.1)[3]

There are many clues in the *Upaniṣads* that the Self is located in the embryo brain region in the centre of the brain. For instance very often the Self is simply described as being located in the middle. 'After meditating on the Self seated in the middle of the heart like a lamp placed inside a vessel of the size of a thumb and of the form of smokeless flame (the Self manifests himself).' (*Paiṅgala Upaniṣad* III. 3).[3] 'All deities worship that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

adorable one, the seated in the middle, who pushes the *prāṇa* upward and impels the *apāna* inward' (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad* II. ii. 3)[1]. '...in the middle (between the two parts) there comes into being the divine person, the person, with a thousand eyes, a thousand feet and a thousands arms ..' (*Subāla Upaniṣad* I. 1)[5] ('between the two parts' – the two hemispheres of the brain). These would all appear to be clear references to the embryo brain region. 'Therein the individual soul who has established himself in the middle of the eyebrows...' (*Paiṅgala Upaniṣad* II. 8)[8] It so happens that the spot in the middle of the eyebrows, the mystical third eye of Shiva, is directly in line with the embryo brain region in the middle of the brain.

We learn from neurophysiologists that when pieces of midbrain are isolated from the brain the cells continue to fire spontaneously and in a sustained manner.[12] By 'firing' is meant 'synapses' -the nerve cells acquire electrical properties. When one considers that by the fifth week after fertilization the embryo cranium is bulging with midbrain, and given the spontaneous nature of midbrainal activity independently of the higher regions, it is apparent that we have a mental life from a very early age. This spontaneous firing of the midbrain is what the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is referring to when it says, 'it thinks as it were and quivers, as it were' 'as in dream the mind vibrates'. (*Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* III. 30)[7] Krishnanada says, 'Even if there is a blazing sun in dream it is the mind shining.' (p. 519)[6] The midbrain 'shines' in the sense of spontaneous firing of nerve cells. 'As from a blazing fire sparks of like form issue forth by the thousands even so many kinds of beings issue forth from the Immutable...' (*Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* III. i. 1)[8]

The fact that the midbrain is directly connected with the eyes is the clue that it is the source of dreams. The *Maitreyī Upaniṣad* tells us that 'The person who is in the eye, who abides in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

right eye, he is Indra and his wife abides in the left eye... There is a channel extending from the heart up to the eye and fairly fixed there. That is the channel which serves both of them, by being divided in two though but one.' (VII. 11) 'That is the eye in a man through which one sees in a dream.' (*Vedic text* p. 52)' The visual pathway runs forward from the midbrain to the eyes and backwards from the midbrain to the visual cortex at the back of the brain. The visual pathway is indeed 'divided in two though but one' as the *Maitreyi Upaniṣad* says in order to serve both eyes. Dreams involve visual image and are therefore inextricably tied in with the visual pathway. Śaṅkarācārya says, 'and then a man whose eyes are plucked out should not perceive blue yellow etc. in dream.' (Commentary on *Aitareya Upaniṣad* p. 52)[7]. This is an allusion to the fact that only the colour cone receptors in the retinae of the eyes can produce a colour image in our dreams. It is apparent then that a dream image originates in the midbrain as an electrical impulse which then travels forwards the eyes where the impulse is converted into a colour image- this is why dreams always involve eye movement either rapid or non-rapid and from the eye back along the visual pathway to the visual cortex where the image is actually registered. It is therefore understandable that brain wave patterns during REM sleep (desynchronized) are practically identical with those recorded during arousal. [12] The visual pathway comes into operation in both cases. Krishnananda says, "As in dream, so in waking, as in waking so in dream." (p. 521) [5] The midbrain 'thinks as it were, and quivers, as it were. For being one with dreams, it goes beyond this (waking) world.' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.3.7)[4].

'This is but the middle-part of the Self.' (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* V. 15 2)[3]; '*Madhye āsīnam*—sitting in the middle—sitting in the space inside the lotus of the heart, shining in the intellect as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

revealed knowledge.' (Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary on the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* p. 187)[1] 'Abiding in the middle place, man sees both places, this and the place of the other world.' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.3 9)[2] It is submitted that in the midbrain is located the cosmic intelligence, *Brahman*, and *Ātman* or the individual Self operates through the hypothalamus and thalamus as well as the brain stem. 'The Supreme dwells in close fellowship with the individual Self in the cave of the human intelligence.' (Rangaramanuja–quoted by Radhakrishnan p. 621)[3]. There are dozens of similar references in the *Upaniṣads* to this '*guhā*', this secret place, this cavity, this cave in the intellect which is the *ākāśa*: space. 'It is used as a name of the Supreme, because like space, *Brahman* has no body and is subtle.' (Radhakrishnan, p. 511) [8] There is literally a cavity or space associated with the midbrain. The fourth ventricle. A broad shallow rhomboid–shaped cavity that extends from the upper cervical spinal cord to the cerebral aqueduct of the midbrain. (p. 35)[16] 'The fourth state, *Turīya?* 'the ether of the heart?' And it does arguably resemble the broad leaf of a lotus plant. 'In addition there is the central grey matter (grey perforating substance) of the midbrain which is also known as perforated space.' (p. 198)[18]

That the embryo brain region is the location of the Self is consistent with the many references in the *Upaniṣads* to the Self being the 'seed', 'the source', 'the creator'. 'In a person, indeed this one first becomes an embryo.' (*Aitareya Upaniṣad* II. i. 1)[5] 'It is the seed of all activity, that is to say, it is the state of deep sleep. That (mental state) is called *jñānam*, knowledge...' (Śaṅkarācārya p. 392)[7] It is repeated that by the fifth week after fertilization the embryo cranium is bulging with midbrain that is firing spontaneously. This is the vital force. 'It is like that which is known as the flash of lightning, and It is also as though the eye winked.' (*Kena Upaniṣad* IV. 4)[1] 'The vital force enters into

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the womb along with the seed and it develops itself into the embryo and all the other limbs such as the eye, the ears and the rest manifest themselves subsequently.' (Sivananda, p 534)[15]

'The desire is for knowing some special director of the mind. (Ananda Giri) 'Who is that effulgent being who is the director of the mind and other organs towards their own objects and how does he direct?' ('Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary on *Iśa Upaniṣad*, p. 39)[1] 'He is all-pervasive, pure, bodiless, without wound, without sinews, taintless, untouched by sin, omniscient, ruler of the mind, transcendent and self-existent.' (*Iśa Upaniṣad* 8)[1] This 'special director', this 'ruler' of the mind has to be the part of the brain that determines the growth and development of the whole brain, ie the embryo brain region.

'As the spider weaves out the web and again withdraws it, so the *Jīva* comes out to and goes back again to the wakeful and dreaming states respectively' (*Brahmopaniṣad* p. 62)[5] This reference to the Self being like a spider that casts out and withdraws its web occurs a number of times in the *Upaniṣads*. It is consistent with the Self being located in the *hṛdaya* (heart) that goes by drawing and giving. It would appear to be an illustration of the way the Self lodged in embryo brain region by means of the neurotransmitter, noradrenaline, draws the individual into sleep, and by means of the neurotransmitter, dopamine, wakes the individual up again. These neurotransmitters emanate from the embryo brain region in spider web pattern through the network of nerve channels in the brain. 'And when a man is about to wake up, they emanate-they proceed to their respective functions-from the mind itself just like the rays radiating from the sun.' (Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary on *Praśna Upaniṣad* p. 452)[7]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

We perceive an external world and function within it by virtue of the outer regions of the brain, and in particular the cerebral cortex. For instance, the visual cortex acting on messages received from the retina of the eye forms an internal map of what is seen. The parietal lobes are responsible for providing us with 'body schema' information about the spatial properties of our own body. It therefore becomes easy to understand references in the *Upaniṣads* to the upside down tree. 'With the root above and branches below (stands) this ancient fig tree. That (indeed) is the pure; that is *Brahman*. That indeed is called immortal. In it all the worlds rest and no one ever goes beyond it.' (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad* II. iii. 1)[8]. The brain truly resembles a tree with the embryo brain region as its root and trunk and the cerebral hemispheres and cortex where the manifested world is registered as the branches. The root is 'above' in the sense that *Brahman* is located in the root. 'It is the Self that is below.' (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VII 25 2)[3] '...that One, the omniscient and transcendent–who is both *para*, high, as the cause and *apara*, low, as the effect...' (Śaṅkarācāray's Commentary on *Mūṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, p. 139)[7]. The tree branches 'downwards' in the sense that the cerebral cortex where the manifested world is located is the effect and is low, for this world is indeed lower (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.18)[4].

'Just as all spokes are fixed in the nave and the felloe of a chariot wheel even so are all beings, all gods, all worlds, all organs and all these (individual) selves fixed in the Self.' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2. 5. 15)[4] It doesn't take much imagination to envisage the brain as a section of a wheel. The embryo brain region in the middle is the hub or nave and the cerebral cortex is the circumference or felloe. 'Within that (heart) in which are fixed the nerves like the spokes on the hub of a chariot wheel moves this aforesaid Self by becoming multiformed,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* II. ii. 5)[7] Note the allusion is simply to the way the spokes are fixed in the hub; not to the Self being the hub of a complete wheel.

There are many references in the *Upaniṣads* to the Self being 'unborn.' 'This great, unborn soul is the same which abides as the intelligent (soul) in all living creatures, the same which abides as ether in the heart; in him it sleeps; it is the subduer of all, the Ruler of all, the sovereign lord of all beings.' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4 22)[8] It is only when one grasps the significance of the sleeping state that the reference to the Self being unborn can be understood. From conception onwards the embryo is asleep and the adult sleeper reverts precisely to that embryonic state of mind. The Self is located in the embryo brain region and preserves its embryonic identity. It is in this sense that the Self is 'unborn'. When an adult goes to sleep he mentally reverts to his mother's womb. 'The talkers vouch indeed for the birth of that very unborn, positive entity. But how can a positive entity that is unborn and immortal undergo mortality?' (*Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* III. 20) [7] '(The Self) without being born (appears to be born in various ways), it follows that He is born on account of *Māyā* alone.' (*Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* III. 24)[7] As *Ṛg Veda* says, 'It is the controller of the body, the unborn part, which survives death.' (X. 16. 4)

Finally, once one understands the significance of *hṛdaya* as the embryonic region of the brain that draws the individual into sleep and wakes the individual up again, it becomes possible to understand the full meaning of the word '*satya*' truth. 'The gods adore even truth. The name of *satya* (truth) consists of three syllables. The first syllable is '*Sa*', the second syllable '*Ti*' and the third syllable '*Ya*' The first and the last syllables (*Sa* and *Ya*) are truth, the middle falsehood *(anṛta)*, falsehood is on

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

either side encompassed by truth.'(*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 5.5.1)' This is an allusion to the sleeping–waking cycle. Truth, the Self, which withdraws into the *hṛdaya* when we are asleep is the reality. When the Sslf gives us a waking consciousness, that is the falsehood, the untruth. In other words, *māyā*, the illusion of the manifested world. On again being drawn into the state of sleep we return to the reality. The truth is that *Brahman* is in the heart *(hṛdaya)* and *Braoman* is the reality.

P. O. Box 327
Potts Point, 2011
(AUSTRALIA)

BRADLEY YORK BARTHOLOMEW

NOTES

1. *Eight Upaniṣads*, Vol. 1, Advaita Ashrama; Calcutta, 1986.
2. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* by Dr. E. Roer; Nag Publishers, Delhi, 1978·
3. *Chandogya Upaniṣad*; Advaita Ashrama; Calcutta, 1983.
4. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, Sri Ramakrishna Math; Madras, 1951.
5. *The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* by Swami Krishnananda; The Divine Life Society, Tehri-Garhwal, 1984.
6. *Minor Upaniṣads*, Advaita Ashrama; Calcutta, 1988.
7. *Eight Upaniṣads*, Vol. 2, Advaita Ashrama; Calcutta, 1986.
8. *The Principal Upaniṣads* by S. Radhakrishnan; Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989.
9. *A Sanskrit – English Dictionary* by Sir Monier-Williams; Motilal Banarsidass; Delhi, 1988.
10. "The Ontogenesis of Hypothalamic-Hypophysiotropic Releasing Factor Regulation of High Secretion" by Selna L. Kaplan and Melvin M. Grumbach; in *International Symposium on Growth Hormone; Proc. of 2nd int. symp. on Growth Hormone;* Milan, 1971, Editor – A. Pecile & E. E. Muller.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

11. "Some Correlations between the Appearance of Human Petal Reflexes and the Development of the Nervous System by T. Humphrey; in *Progress in Brain Research, Vol. 4, Growth and Maturation of the Brain*, Edited by D. P. Purpura & J. P. Schade, 1964.

12. *Handbook of Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology*, Editor-in-Chief-A. Remond, Volume 2A, Section 5, Thalamo-Telencephalic Circuits: A Neuroanatomical Survey, 2A-86, Volume 2C, Section 4, Thalamic Origin of Cortical Rhythmic Activity, 2C-90, Section 5, Reticular Infiuences on Thalamo-Cortical Activity, 2C-119.

13. *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, Edited by Richard L. Gregory; Oxford, 1987-See generally, Brain Development, Catecholamines, Dopamine Neurones in the Brain, Nervous System, Neuroanatomical Techniques, Neuropeptides, Neurotransmitters and Neuromodulators, Visual System : Organization.

14. "The Sleep Factor" by J. R. Pappenheimer; *Scientific American*, 1976, 235, 2V-9.

15. *The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* by Swami Sivananda; The Divine Life Trust Society, Tehri-Garhwal, 1985.

16. *Core Text of Neuroanatomy* by M. B. Carpenter, Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore, 1978.

17. *The Fetus and Birth* by G. C. Liggins, Vol 2 of *Embryonic and Fetal Development*, Editors C. R. Austin and R. V. Short; Cambridge, 1976

18. *Functions of the Nervous System* by M. Monnier, Vol. 1, Elsevier, London, 1968.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 4,
October, 1991

THE GENETIC CODE IN VIEW OF POSTMODERN LINGUISTICS

To be postmodern is quite *de rigueur* among social and literary critics. In fact, reference is made to Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, and Jacques Lacan, for example, in books and articles, in practically every field of study. Nonetheless, postmodernism has been most clearly defined by Jean--Francois Lyotard. In his book *The Postmodern Condition* Lyotard argues that postmodernism represents a movement to undermine " metanarratives "[1] These grand schemes have appeared through Western history, as a means to guarantee a firm foundation for knowledge and order. Without these ultimate principles, the belief is that culture will dissolve into chaos.

In the modern world, one of the most pervasive metanarratives is the genetic code. To some persons, this language embodies both the past and the future of humankind. In the idiom of postmodernists, the genetic code constitutes " arche–writing. " A person's genetic script, in other words, is thought to explain all behaviour, ranging from intelligence to deviance. This fundamantal language is assumed to represent reality and convey the indubitable truth about the human condition. The genetic code embodies a text devoid of interpretation, or any other extenuating factor that may compromise the discovery of unadulterted knowledge.

How does the genetic code work ? In a manner of speaking, an absolute language is represented by genetics, for this code

Received : 13–7–90

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

extends to the very core of existence. Similar to the theory of literature advocated by Frye and responsible for the New Criticism, genetic writing subtends quotidian concerns and differentiates reality from illusion.[2] All the possible permutations of human action, accordingly, are assumed to be an outgrowth of a single language. In short, the genetic text has unquestioned legitimacy and explanatory power. Not very different from the role Levi–Strauss assigns to social structures, the genetic code is a "universal narrative model". The so-called surface phenomena of everyday life are thus easily located within a never questioned framework.

As Barthes might say, a primordial alphabet—the alleged "building blocks" of life—is at work providing continuity to the human diary.[3] For example, sterile symbols such as "X" and "Y" are used to describe sexual identity. In this respect, even inner body is made to conform to a geometric design. Moreover, an almost magical, although some would say miraculous, arrangement of these and other letters is believed to supply sufficient justification for a bevy of social policies, even political programs. The operation of a natural grammar is presupposed, thus giving a *raison d' etre* to actions that would otherwise have none. And consistent with a functionalist rendition of language, internal consistency and rigor are the hallmark of the genetic code. Hence persons are surrounded by a language that is lawful, precise, and omnipresent.

Yet does the genetic code offer a (con–) text, within which behaviour is ensnared ? Postmodernists answer no. The postmodern position on this issue is straightforward : genetic writing is simply another form of language. And like speech in general, the genetic code is not an unmediated form of expression. Hence the language of genetics does not have a pristine center, which

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

serves to anchor firmly this code. Despite the extreme formalization of this language, in the manner advocated by the members of the Vienna Circle, the grammar and syntax adopted by geneticists to describe humans are not ahistorical.

In order to understand the critique of genetics presented in the foregoing paragraphs, the postmodern view of language mus be fully discussed. Stated simply, the genetic code is a remnant of a Newtonian world that has been eclipsed. The 'zero symbols' incorporated into the language of genetics can no longer be used to support this biowriting, [4] Like Newton's *sensorium Dei*, justifying writing by using what Frye calls an "extraliterary schematism is considered to be passé subsequent to the advent of postmodernism. Actually, postmodern writing is centerless and exhibits centrifugal tendencies. Reminiscent of students in Europe during the 1960's, Jean Gebser declares that the "center is every where" in the postmodern world. [5]

With respect to writing, suggested by this call for centerlessness is the idea that signifiers, or symbols, "float". Deleuze summarizes this sentiment nicely when he writes, in his analysis of Proust, that "there is no *logos*, only hieroglyphics" [6] His point is that there is no escape from language, and therefore persons are limited to indirect access to truth. All that can legitimize a particular reading of a text, even the genetic code, is additional language to supplement an already fragile interpretation of reality. Therfore, language use is never final, but provisional.

Discovering a text is an "intertextual" experience, claims Kristeva. [7] She argues, in a postmodern fashion, that the meaning of a passage can be revealed only as a result of shuffling language from one interpretive milieu to another. This *modus operandi* is required for a simple reason: language mediates completely

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

reality. Derrida had this relationship between reality and language in mind when he wrote his now infamous phrase, "nothing exists outside of the text." [8] And the term text, as he explained recently, encompasses far more than books. What Derrida intends to say is that language is not a surrogate for higher reality. As opposed to usual definitions, language does not "point to", "indicate", or "stand for" something non–linguistic. Consequently, speech must be self–clarifying, for all literary and social standards are thoroughly linguistic. Truth, in other words, is the product of "language games", and has "no final legitimacy outside of serving the goals envisioned by the practical subject, the autonomous collectivity." [9]

What is the impact of placing the genetic code in the service of language games? Due to the ubiquity of languge, the genetic code can be entered in a variety of ways. This code can never be "finally broken", thereby exposing its hidden meaning, because language does not correspond in a one–to–one manner to reality. Instead, the orientation indigenous to language use settles any questions about the interplay of truth and error. *Ecriture* is the term employed by French postmodernists to suggest that writing implies a commitment to particular assumptions about nature and social existence.[10] Rather than ahistorical, the genetic code is implicated in a unique style of discourse. As with language generally, this mode of speech has little significance outside of a particular epistemological realm.

Considering the postmodern view of language, the genetic code cannot be approached as if it is a *Ding an sich*. Because no language is innocent, as Barthes and de Man are fond of saying, disentangling genetic effects should be recognized as a political event. At this juncture, politics is defined very broadly as the process of selecting and instituting reality. Typically a person's possibilities are thought to be genetically circumscribed. With

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

regard to postmodernism, however, the genetic text is never simply read, because language use cannot be severed from interpretation. Correspondingly, any genetic analysis must be understood to occur within a limited, linguistically deployed reality. Genetic characteristics, stated differently, have no inherent significance. For even the most natural language, contends Barthes, is nothing but a modality of expression. Even transforming geneties into a science cannot obscure its non–scientific, or linguistic, origin.

Clearly postmodernism radicalizes the traditional nature versus nurture argument. Usually those who disagree with genetic determinism have opted for the position that a person's biological constitution can de altered appreciably by social considerations. Yet is this tactic really liberating, as its exponents claim ? Their rationale, simply stated, is that a multitude of causes influence development of an individual's identity. In fact, however, two causal variables are identified as shaping a self–concept instead of one. Accordingly, the self is still assumed to be the product of natural events. Human agency remains enconced within necessary strictures, as long as psychological stability is maintained.

Striving to locate the null point of a person's being has Cartesian as well as Newtonian overtones. In line with Descartes hope of uncovering " clear and distinct " knowledge, the self provides an indubitable ground for existence. And if the self can be based on something as fundamental as genetic material, the Cartesian anxiety of the West can be calmed. No evil genius will be able to trick persons into pursuing goals that they will never be able to achieve As modern psychologists recommend for healthy living, the so–called ideal and real selves will be reconciled. An individual, therefore, will not have unrealistic expectations and experience the stress that accompanies failure Potentially dangerous flights of fantasy will be precluded, because the self will be grounded firmly in reality.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

As should be noted, however, this sort of dualism is undermined by postmodernism. The notion that the self represents the essence of a person's identity cannot be retained. Similar to every other facet of reality, the self has the status of a linguistic habit. The importance of this theoretical demarche for sustaining an identity is discussed by postmodernists under the rubric of the "author effect."[11]

When Barthes announced the author to be dead, he created quite a stir among litarery critics. In fact, many believed that he was attempting to destroy the origin of literature. Yet is this really the case? Rather than subvert the author, all he wanted to do is remind critics that nothing subtends writing, neither a *psyche* mind, nor soul. Nothing justifies literature other than writing. Indeed, Foucault writes that there is no "deep motive" "creative power" or "design" indigenous to the self.[12] The author, he adds, resides in the "break that founds a certain discursive construct and its very particular mode of being."

Specifically, Barthes contends that authors write themselves into existence, for the "I is nothing more than saying I".[13] In terms of the postmodern rendition of language, he concludes that a writer invents a "linguistic I." For even the self does not escape undefiled by language. There is no Cartesian *cogito*, which can be relied on to explain an author's intentions. Motives and other psychological or sociological elements can be approached only from within the discursive practice that supplies the contours of a text. A writer's identity is indefinite, because the self changes according to shifts in language use. This means that the self is a document rather than a monument, to use the comparison popularized by Foucault.

Various European feminists have expanded on the central theme of the author effect, in order to confront the traditional

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

image of women. While throughout the western intellectual tradition women have been portrayed as deformed men, this viewpoint gained visibility subsequent to Freud's work. In point of fact, the origin of the modern randition of the "anatomy is destiny" thesis is often cited to be an article by Freud, entitled the "Disappearance of the Oedipus Complex". [14] As a result of this publication the female identity came to be defined in absolute terms, as tacking crucial traits. The absence of a penis was believed to stifle the libido and make women inferior to men, with respect to emotional stabilty and mental capability. In short, a women's range of possibilities was presumed to be biologically inscribed.

Early on, Simone de Beauvior challenged this tradition with her quite revolutionary proclamation that women are made, not born. [15] After all, if truth is not a spectacle but a "mise en abime", due to the elusiveness of language, women cannot be approached as if they constitute a class, or genre, of persons. [16] There is no ideal, against which texts or persons can be judged. Both literature and humans must be read in accordance to how they implode reality. The linguistic world that hides between lines, pages, and behaviour is where reality resides. In this regard, Lyotard notes perceptively that "*truth doesn't speak stricto sensu; it works*". [17]

When applied to studying the flesh, Lyotard's dictum has interesting implications. "Writing the body" is the phrase used by Hélene Cixous to describe how a person's biography is articulated [18] Her point is that only the linguistic body exists, thereby, precluding direct access to the genetic biowriting that is assumed to resolve all questions about fate and destiny. Feminity is simply a form or style of signification. Therefore, according to Luce

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Irigaray, the female libido is not a lack, but a mode of sexuality that is other than male. Kristeva, accordingly, charges that there is no such thing as Womanhood. Both male and female identities represent choices about life style, which are linguistically instituted. Under seige at this juncture is Aristotle, who suggested that potential antedates possibility. Postmodernists reject this theory and contend that the self is a "thetic" subject, or an outgrowth of creative *praxis*.

Rosalind Coward summarizes the postmodern view of sexuality when she states that "our subjectivity and identity are formed in the definitions of desire which encircle us."[19] There is no doubt that identities can be imposed on persons by those, for example, who claim to be scientific or represent powerful individuals. Yet even when clients are mauled by the rationality exhibited by psychiatrists, this process is linguistic. "Symbolic violence" is the phrase used by Pierre Bourdieu to describe this rape of language. To postmodernists. a diagnosis is predicated on a discursive practice that can be rejected, if clients recognize the fragile nature of a reality that has a linguistic base. Nonetheless, as a result of the "anatomy is destiny" viewpoint, women have been violated in a variety of ways.

Edward Said illustrates in his book *Orientialism* that the inferiorization of a group involves discrediting the symbolism adopted by its members.[20] The absence of a phallus, however, has dire consequences only within a particular web of social relations. This sort of polity is called a phallocracy by postmodernists. Yet with language placed at the center of reality, women are not natural objects. Instead, the identity of all humans is related to the "*jouissance* of the body", and thus the self is multiva lent and unpredictable.[21] Similar to sexual excitement, the climax of self development cannot be anticipated with certitude.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The language in which the self is written is not unambiguous or final, but incomplete. Using the imagery made famous by Derrida, Lacan writes that only " The Women " exists.[22] Writing " under erasure " in this way indicates that multiplicity-in-unity-is achieved, without *Aufhebung*.

Although the evisceration of symbolism may continue subsequent to the warnings of postmodernists, the source of legitimacy used to sustain this unseemly activity is undermined. The "Father image ", the key to what postmodernists call phallocentrism, is no longer an unrivalled basis of authority. Now authority must be predicated on textual relevance, because writing is not monolithic. Hence, textual reductionism is unjustified. Each text is accompanied by a linguistic world that deserves recognition.

In postmodern parlance, this means that the self is *différance*.[23] Cixous makes this point by suggesting that everyone is bi-sexual. Incidentally, this term is defined as " the non-exclusion of difference ".[24] What Cixous and Clément are trying to accomplish is to radicalize the concept of androgeny. Traditionally androgeny has come to mean that males and females share traits, yet these characteristics are often thought to be naturally disposed. By labelling persons as bi-sexual, these feminist writers aim to demonstrate that Law of Excluded Middle does not hold with respect to categorizing the language of the body. Rather, in a dialectical sense, alleged opposites interpenetrate. Signs, as Deleuze remarks, are " hermaphrodictic ".[25] Thus, the factor that keeps visible an interpretation of the body is the act of choosing, which sustains writing. Language, in other words, must work, if a specific version of reality is to remain credible.

Following the onset of postmodernism, the genetic code is simply one form of writing among many. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari, biowriting is " minor literature ", rather of a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Grand Narrative.[26] Instead of expressing a universal theme, minor literature has temporal relevance. More precisely, revealed by this sort of writing is information that is important, once the genetic arena is entered. Accordingly, minor literature has no intrinsic value. The genetic code, simply put, has little significance outside of the bioworld. Most important, however, is that illustrated by every linguistic world is the desire to write. The intention to create a specific linguistic world is vital to penetrating the word.

The genetic code is therfore " decentered ". Deprived of an inviolable foundation, only a belief in the value of genetics can justify this approach to literature. In more concrete terms, a genetic text must be valued before it can be understood to provide the reader with any appreciable insight. Can a text, therefore, be treated as an explanatory factor ? According to postmodernists the answer is no, for without the undecidable element of interpretation a text does nothing. Stated differently, even if a link could be established between genes and behaviour, the reader mediates this association. Hence the meaning of genetic writing, in the final analysis, is unrelated to biology. *Between* the reader and the genetic code is where the meaning of this text arises.

According Barthes, even so-called evident truths, like those conveyed by the genetic code, are " already interpretations ". With regard to social policy, this finding should not be ignored. Because the genetic code does not represent truth but a text, this style of biowriting has limited explanatory power. When attempting to account for crime, for example, the plot of the genetic text may overlook important aspects of the scenario that accompanies criminal actions. When this occurs postmodernists write that " terrorism " is evident, because the (con-) text of crime is misconstrued.[28] Because society consists of a patchwork of language games, postmodernists argue, each segment of this

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

collage must be allowed to speak for itself. Otherwise the integrity of a specific text is compromised. The genetic code, in short, should not be envisioned to explain every text, because the voice of the genetic code has a limited range.

In sum, the genetic code is comprised of writing and nothing more. Similar to every linguistic expression, this form of writing does not necessarily have universal appeal. Only with respect to certain linguistically substantiated assumptions about existence does the genetic code add anything to social discourse. Moreover if a discussion should stray from these tacitly held beliefs, bio-writing may become sinister. The genetic code, therefore, should not be approached as an explanatory but an interpretive scheme. In this way the genetic text can be read, with no chance of it becoming epic literature. As simply another story, the genetic code is optional reading.

Department of Sociology
University of Miami
P.O. Box 248162
Coral Gables
Florida 33124–2080
U. S. A.)

JOHN W. MURPHY

NOTES

1. Lyotard, Jean-Francois, *The Postmodern Condition : A Report on Knowledge*. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1984, p. xxiv.
2. Lentricchia, Frank, *After the New Criticism*. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 3–26.
3. Barthes, Roland, *The Rustle of Language*. New York : Hill and Wang, 1986, p. 45.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. Barthes, Roland, *Writing Degree Zero*. New York : Hill and Wang, 1968.

5. Gebser, Jean, *The Ever-present Origin*. Athens, OH : Ohio University Press, 1985, p. 544.

6. Deleuze, Gilles, *Proust and Signs*. New York : George Braziller, 1972, p. 167.

7. Kristeva, Julia, *Desire in Language*. New York : Columbia University Press, 1980, pp. 37–38.

8. Derrida, Jacques, *Of Grammatology*. Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, p. 158.

9. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, p. 36.

10. Lentricchia, *After the New Criticism*, pp. 168ff.

11. Barthes, Roland, *Roland Barthes*. New York : Hill and Wang, 1977, p. 56.

12. Foucalt, Michel, "What is an Author". In *Textual Strategies*, edited by Josué V. Harari. Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 1979, p. 150.

13. Barthes, Roland, *Image, Music, Text*, New York : Hill and Wang, 1977, p. 45.

14. Cixous, Hélène and Clement, Catherine, *The Newly Born Woman*. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1986, p. 82.

15. de Beauvoir, Simone, *The Second Sex*. New York : Vintage Books, 1974, pp. 806ff.

16. Miller, J. Hillis, "Stevens' Rock and Criticism as Cure", *Georgia Review* 30 (1), 1976, pp 5–31.

17. Lyotard, Jean-Francois, *Driftworks*. New York : Semiotext(e), 1984, p. 35.

18. Gilbert, Sandra M. "Introduction : A Tarantella of Theory". In *The Newly Born Woman*, p. xvi.

19. Coward, Rosalind, *Female Desire*. New York : Grove Press, 1985, p 16

20. Said, Edward W. *Orientialism*. New York : Pantheon Books, 1978.

21. Lacan, Jacques, *Feminine Sexuality*. New York : W. W. Norton, 1985, p. 142.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 137–148.

23. Derrida, Jacques, *Speech and Phenomena.* Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1973, pp. 129–160.

24. Cixous and Clement, *Newly Born Woman*, p. 85.

25. Deleuze and Guattari, *Proust and Signs, passim.*

26. Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix, *Kafka : Toward a Minor Literature* Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1986, pp. 16–27.

27. Barthes, Roland, *Criticism and Truth.* Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 39.

28. Lyotard, Jean-Francois and Thebaud, Jean-Loup, *Just Gaming*, Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1985, p. 99.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

OUR LATEST PUBLICATION

REGULARITY, NORMATIVITY AND RULES OF LANGUAGE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

Prof. Rajendra Prasad

pp. 310 Rs. 100/-

In this volume twenty essays of Prof. Rajendra Prasad, published earlier in different journals in India and abroad, are collected. In these essays philosophical analysis is brought to bear upon such themes as nature of language, relation between language and philosophy or that between modern logic and philosophy. There are essays in the collection which consider such issues as practical relevance of philosophy, the distinction between apriori and empirical propositions etc. In addition, some essays deal with concepts of substance, mind and religious belief, while some other discuss problems connected with objectivity of historical judgements, relation between man and god, role of reason and sentiment in human life. The last four essays in the collection discuss difficulties connected with philosophical synthesis and consider relation between tradition, progress, freedom, reverence and creativity.

The essays would be immensely helpful to both students and teachers of philosophy.

For further details contact :

The Editor ,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly ,
Philosophy Department ;
University of Poona, Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII. No. 4,
October 1991

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE NYĀYA THEORY OF ACTION

I

The present paper gives an account of the *Nyāya* theory of human action as propounded by the older and Neo-thinkers in the field. The concluding part of the paper contains some critical and evaluative remarks with regard to this theory, An effort has been made to throw some light on phenomenon of *upekṣā* as found in older *Nyāya* system and to consider whether it can be included in action. In this connection some remarks have been made regarding the conditions of being an agent *(Kartā)* of such action, which is consistent with their philosophy of action.

II

When an individual comes to know of the nature of an object he has different attitudes to it.

In the *Prācīna Nyāya* the attitude of an individual towards an object is described as of three types : *Pravṛtti* (inclination), *Nivṛtti* (rejection) and *Upekṣā* (to become indifferent). When someone forsakes some object, it is due to one's notion of rejection (*Hānabuddhi*). In the case of the acceptance of something it is the result of his desire of acceptance (*Upādānabuddhi*). An action existing between acceptance and rejection or an action which is neither acceptance nor rejection arises due to the result of the notion of being indifferent (*Upekṣābuddhi*).[1]

Received : 9-6-90

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Where there is the knowledge of acceptance (*Upādānabuddhi*) there is an action in the form of *Pravṛtti* (inclination). On the other hand, the knowledge of rejection (*hānabuddhi*) gives rise to another type of action called *Nivṛtti* (declination). The *Upādānabuddhi* or *Hānabuddhi* becomes the cause of human action in the form of inclination or declination respectively.[2] ("*Anena Sarvāṇi Karmāṇi Vyāptāni*") From the word '*Karmāni*' it is known that inclination etc. is taken as '*Karma*' or action. Let us try to find out the cause of these human actions.

An individual is desirous of doing those types of actions by which his purpose is served and hence, it can be said that the end-in-view (*Prayojana*) inspires him to do some activity.[3] In order to get or get rid of something an individual engages himself in activity.[4] A man's desire (for action) is related to the result in the form of pleasure or the absence of pain and to the means of it. The longing for the result of some action presupposes the knowledge of it. Hence, the desire for the result is due to the existence of the knowledge of it[5], which can be described as a form of syllogistic argument. The knowledge in the form 'The orange is good for health' is known as the knowledge of the conduciveness to the desired object. If the attainment of the good health is desired, the perception of an orange will give rise to the knowledge in the form : "This is conducive to its being desired" (*Idaṁ madiṣṭasādhanaṁ*). So, the knowledge of the conduciveness to the desired gives rise to the knowledge of acceptance from which the action in the form of *Pravṛtti* comes into being.

It may be argued that the knowledge of the conduciveness of the desired alone cannot be the cause of inclination. For, inclination is *not* possible if one has the knowledge of the conduciveness of the desired alone but does not have the knowledge of the means of attaining the desired result.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In response to the above, the Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that inclination presupposes the desire concerning result (*Phalaviṣayinī*) as well as concerning the means (for the attainment of the result) (*Upāyaviṣayinī*).[6] Hence, the cause of desire for the result is the knowledge of the result and the cause of desire for the means (of the result) is the knowledge of its conduciveness to the desired object. The knowledge of its conduciveness to that which is desirable is considered as *Hetu* to the desire for the means of it.[7] The human action in the form of inclination presupposes both types of desire mentioned above.

It may be objected that the knowledge of the conduciveness to that which is desirable is not always the cause of a man's action in the form of inclination. For, there are many things which, though desirable to us, are not feasible with our efforts. We have nothing to do with the phenomena like rain etc. though they are desirable to us. Hence, the knowledge of the conduciveness of what is desired alone cannote be the cause of our action in the form of inclination.

In response to this, the Naiyāyikas have added another criterion of our inclination. According to them, the notion of its feasibility through one's effort (*Kṛtisādhyatājñāna*) and the knowledge of its conduciveness to that which is desirable (*iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*) are considered as the reasons behind the desire for doing something. Nobody thinks to do an action without having the knowledge of its feasibility through one's effort, the cause of desire. An inclination towards rain etc. is *not* possible due to not having feasibility through effort.[8] Just as the notion of feasibility of an object through one's effort is the cause of inclination, the notion of *not* producing any harm is also a cause of inclination.[9]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The Prabhākara school of the Mīmāṁsakas put forward a different view as to the philosophy of action. According to the followers of Prabhākara, the notion of feasibility is the cause of inclination. That is to say, inclination towards an action is possible due to having the desire to do which is caused by the notion of feasibility through one's effort. Here the said feasibility is accepted as a feature of the desire to do (*Cikīrṣā*). In other words, the notion having such feature is the cause of desire to do through which inclination follows. So the knowledge of the conduciveness to that what is desirable is *not* the cause of inclination. If it were so, there, the Prābhākaras opine, would be an inclination to the action of bringing down the orb of the moon which is not at all feasible through one's effort. [10] But it is an absurd thinking due to *not* having the said feasibility.

The Naiyāyikas have objected to the view mentioned above. According to them, the knowledge of conduciveness to the desired becomes the cause of inclination if there is no obstacle. Here the non-feasibility through one's effort becomes an obstacle to the action and hence, there is no inclination [11] In the case of bringing down the orb of the moon the non-feasibility through one's effort has become obstacle though there may be the knowledge of the conduciveness to the desired. Hence there is no *Pravṛtti.*

The Prābhākaras again argue that the previous view of the Naiyāyikas is *not* tenable. For, if the notion of feasibility through one's effort is accepted, it comes under the 'Law of Parsimony' (*Lāghava*). If both (knowledge of conduciveness to the desired and knowledge of feasibility through effort) are taken as cause, it would lead to the defect called *Gaurava.*"

The Naiyāyikas argue that if the view of the Prābhākaras is taken as accepted (i.e. the notion of such feasibility is taken as a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cause of inclination) there would be possibility of being inclined to the food mixed with honey and poison and to the salulation of road-side tree (*Caitya*) as there is the said feasibility. [13]

The Mīmāṁsakas are of the opinion that the cause of inclination is the notion of feasibility produced by the knowledge of a characteristic of oneself. The characteristic of an individual differs in different activities. The desire may be taken as a characteristic feature of a man in the optional activities like cooking, sacrifice etc. From this desire the notion of feasibility comes into being and this gives rise to the notion of action which becomes the medium for attaining the desired and which is not associated with highly undesirable consequences. This is the cause of inclination. An individual who does not feel hungry does not feel inclined in eating as desire in this case is not the characteristic feature of him. [14] In the case of regular obligatory rites, the purity etc. are the characteristic features of a person. The notion of feasibility which is dependent on the purity etc. is the cause of inclination towards them. [15] The Mīmāṁsakas further argue that the knowledge of the conduciveness to the desired and of the feasibility cannot be attained simultaneously on account of the fact that there is a contradiction between what is being established (*Sādhya*) and what is the means of doing so (*Sādhana*). Here '*Iṣṭasādhanatva*' and '*Kṛtisādhyatva*' are accepted as *Sādhana* and *Sādhya* respectively. The object which is not yet accomplished becomes *Sādhya*, while the object already accomplished becomes the means (*Sādhana*). That is why, as both the *Sādhya* and *Sādhana* cannot be known by a person simultaneously [16], the knowledge of *Iṣṭasādhanatva* and *Kṛtisādhyatva* cannot be the cause of inclination simultaneously.

The above mentioned view of the Mīmāṁsakas is refuted by the Naiyāyikas in the following way. For the sake of simplicity (*Lāghava*) it is better to accept that the notion of feasibility

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(through one's effort) which is associated with being the means of having that what is desirable and which does not give rise to highly undesirable circumstances is the cause of inclination. If different criterion is accepted in different activities, it will lead us to the defect '*Gaurava*' as there would be no common connotation (*anugatadharma*) among the causes. The cause mentioned here contains the common connotation and hence there is *Lāghava*. There is no contradiction in apprehending an object as being end and means. For, the contradiction lies in apprehending the same object as being end and means existing at the same time, but there is no contradiction if an object becomes end and means at different times. Hence, the knowledge of being an end and means existing at different times may be attained simultaneously as mentioned by Dinakara. [17] So, both can be regarded as the causes of inclination.

In the same way, the knowledge of its being productive of what is extremely unpleasant (*dviṣṭasādhanatājñāna* or *Aniṣṭasādhanatājñāna*) is the cause of aversion (*Dveṣa* or *Aniṣṭa*), which is again the cause of declination (*Nivṛtti*). That which does not seem to be conducive to the desired is rejected. [18]

It has already been said that when object is known, the knower thinks the object as acceptable or rejectable or indifferent. If it is rejectable, an individual rejects it, which is a kind of *Nivṛtti*. If acceptable, he accepts it which is a kind of *Pravṛtti*. In the case of *upekṣā* there is neither the desire of acceptance nor rejection. Hence, there is neither *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti*. The older Naiyāyikas think that all human activities centre around the inclination and declination.[19] To remain indifferent (*upekṣā*) is not an action as it is not associated with conduciveness to what is desirable (*iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*) with the knowledge of being productive of what is unpleasent (*Aniṣṭasādhanatājñāna*).

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In other words, that which is neither *Pravṭtti* nor *Nivṭtti* is *upekṣā*, which is not regarded as human action in *Nyāya* system.

III

If the whole theory of action provided by the Naiyāyikas is critically reviewed, the following observations can be made.

The Nyāya theory of *upekṣā* needs some attention in this context In my opinion *upekṣā* is also an action. In this context I have taken *upekṣā* in a slight different way and hence, *upekṣā* can be regarded as a human action in the light of the following arguments.

The sense in which *upeksābuddhi* is admitted by the Naiyāyikas cannot be taken into the account fully and I beg to differ from the Naiyāyikas in this respect. An object, I think, is either accepted or rejected but there is no scope for being indifferent. In my opinion the indifferent attitude towards an object which is described as *upekṣā* would fall under the category of rejection (*hāna*). 'To remain indifferent' is also a kind of rejection on account of the fact that it depends on the knowledge of the non-conduciveness of the desired. When an individual becomes indifferent towards an object, he takes recourse to *Tarka* in hhe form : 'If it would have been conducive to us, it would be accepted'. As it seems to us to be non-conducive to be desired it may be ignored which is also a kind of rejection.

It is true that when food mixed with poison is rejected it is due to having the sense of *Aniṣṭasādhanatā*, which is capable of doing harm This *Aniṣṭasādhanatā jñāna* is of two types : the knowledge of an object capable of doing harm and the knowledge of the absence of the usefulness determined by the non-desiredness of an object, which follow from the literal

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meaning of the term '*Aniṭṣta*'. In the case of the former, the Naiyāyikas have accepted *Hāna* (rejection) but in the latter case they accept *upekṣābuddhi*, as the object neither serves our purpose nor does it do any harm to us.

The *Upekṣā* in the above mentioned sense is not at all *Upekṣā*, as it reveals in our awareness that the object does not serve any purpose in a particular context. That is why, an individual prefers to ignore this. This 'ignorance' in the sense indifference is, I think, not at all *Upekṣā* in the true sense of the term, but is also rejection as it is performed keeping its absence of conduciveness in view. *Upekṣā* towards an object in real sense is possible if there is the absolute negation of the sense of its conduciveness or nonconduciveness. An individual thinks the 'suitability' of an object in a particular time. If the object is not suitable to him, he remains indifferent to it, which is nothing but rejection. The real *Upekṣā* emerges when we have no scope of considering its *iṣṭavta* and *aniṣṭatva* which is determined in terms of attachment. When the nature of an object (i e. *Savikalpaka* nature of an object) is known to us, the question of its usefulnes or otherwise automatically comes to our mind. If indifferent attitude is found in an individual towards something, it is the result of the consideration of its non-usefulness. Hence it is rejection in disguise of *upekṣā*.[20] Actual *Upekṣā* towards an object is possible in the transcendental level (but *not* in phenomenal level), when the real nature of the object gets lost for which the question *Iṣṭatva* or *aniṣṭatva* in the *laukika* sense does not arise at all.

That *Upekṣā* is nothing but a form of rejection is accepted by Dharmottara in the *Nyāyabindutīkā* keeping perhaps this view in mind. According to him, an object may be accepted or rejected but there is no third alternative. That which in described as *Upekṣanīya* is nothing but *Heya* (rejectable) ("*Upekṣanī-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

yohyanupādeya tvāddheya eva"). This same view is also accepted by Prabhācandra, the celebrated Jaina logician in his *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa.*"

The Grammarians also have accepted *Upekṣā* in the sense of *Anīpsita* or *Aniṣṭa.* Pāṇini in the *Sūtra* '*Tathāyuktañcānīpsitam*", has said that *Anīpsita* is of two types: *Dveṣya* (that which is taken through aversion) and *Udāsīna* (indifferent attitude towards an object). 'While going towards village he is touching grass' (*grāmaṁ gacchan tṛṇaṁ spṛśati*) is the example of the *Udāsīna Karma* given by the commentator. This type of *Karma* is included under the category of *Anīpsita* or *Aniṣṭa* there. As it is included under the category of *Aniṣṭa,* it can be described as rejection also by virtue of its producing knowledge of its nonconduciveness of the desired. Keeping this in view, *Bhāṣyakāra* and *Sūtrakāra* have put this type of *Udāsīna* action under the category of *Anīpsita.*

From the foregoing discussions it can be concluded that *Upekṣā* is also a kind of human action as it is nothing but rejection. Where there is rejection, there is the action in the form of *Nivṛtti.* As in *Upekṣā* (in the sense given above) there is also *Nivṛtti,* it can be regarded as human action.

It may be argued that an individual who is inclined to act or rejects to do something is called agent or *Kartā* of these activities. For being a *Kartā* one should possess the direct knowledge of the inherent causes of a particular action, effort for doing an action, and desire for doing so[13], which are also preconditions of an individual's inclination towards an object.

In the context of analysing the cause of man's inclination, all these preconditions, it seems, are not taken into the account by

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the Naiyāyikas. Hence, one may raise the question of inconsistency existing within the system. In other words, there is apparent inconsistency between the conditions of being an agent and those of human action.

The above mentioned view is not tenable. For, the conditions for being a *Kartā* (as given in the definition) are incorporated in the theory of action given by the Naiyāyikas. Having *Cikīrṣā* i.e., the desire to do (an action), one of the preconditions for being a *Kartā*, is accommodated in the theory in the following way. Here also having *Cikīrṣā* is taken as one of the main causes of action, for which they opine, the knowledge of feasibility through one's effort and knowledge of conduciveness to the desired are essential. As it is already said *Cikīrṣā* depends on the knowledge of feasibility through one's effort. So incorporation of 'making an effort' as the cause of inclination is superfluous. Hence the feature 'making an effort' (*Kṛtimattva*) for being an agent is not mentioned here again due to the fear of *Gaurava*. For being *Kartā* the existence of the direct knowledge of the inherent causes of an action is highly essential which is also a pre-condition of an individual's inclination In order to make the theory consistent, the Naiyāyikas have inserted this as the cause for inclination i.e., the perception of the material cause or inherent cause ("*Upādānasya cādhyakṣaṁ pravṛttau janakaṁ bhavet*") as a cause.[24] This criterion of human action is elaborated more clearly in the *Dinakarī*. According to Dinakara, the ordinary perception of the materials in the form of inherent causes is the cause of an individual's inclination.[25] Hence, the charge of inconsistency within the *Nyāya* system in regard to the philosophy of action does not stand.

It has been stated earlier that the knowledge of the result is the cause of the desire for result and the cause of desire for the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

means is the knowledge of its conduciveness to the desired object.[16]

The above mentioned view of the Naiyāyikas is *not* tenable so far as the first part is concerned. I do not think that the knowledge of the result alone is the cause of the desire for result. For, the knowledge of result alone cannot be the cause of our desire unless it is known to us that it is conducive to be desired. When the result of an action is known to us, we can know of its conduciveness to the desired. We may have desire for taking medicine if the result of the medicine is known. The result of taking medicine is the cure of disease, which is nothing but the knowledge of its conduciveness. Hence, the result without the concept of *Iṣṭasādhanatā* cannot be known. In order to avoid logical cumbrousness it is better to accept the knowledge of *Iṣṭasādhanatā* (along with other factors) as cause of both desire for result (*phalecchā*) as well as desire for means (*Upāyecchā*) but *not* for the means only.

Philosophy Department
University of North Bengal
Raja Rammohanpur
Darjeeling—734430 (W. B.)

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

NOTES

1. Yadā jñānaṁ tadā hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalaṁ. *Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya* on Sūtra 1. 1. 3.

2. Yamartham abhisanjihāsan vā karmārabhate tenānena sarve prāṇinaḥ sarvāṇi karmāṇi sarvāśca vyāptāḥ. *Nyāyabhāṣya* on Sūtra 1. 1. 24.

3. Yamartham adhikṛtya pravartate tat prayojanam. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1. 1. 24. Yena prayuktaḥ pravartate tat prayojanam. *Nyāyabhāṣya* on Sūtra 1. 1. 24.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. Yamarthamāptavyaṁ hātavyaṁ vādhyavasāya tadāptihānopāyam anutiṣṭhati tat prayojanam. Tadveditwaṁ pravṛttihetutvāt. *Nyāya-bhāṣya* on Sūtra 1. 1. 24.

5. Icchā hi phalaviṣayiṇī upāyaviṣayinī ca. Phalaṁ tu sukhaṁ duḥkhā-bhāvaśca. Tatra phalecchāṁ prati phalajñānaṁ kāraṇaṁ. *Siddhanta-muktāvalī* on Verse-146.

Nirduḥkhatve sukhe cecchā tajjñānādeva jñāyate. *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Verse no. 146.

6. *Ibid.*

7. Icchā tu tadapāye syādiṣṭasādhyatvadhīryadi. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Verse 146.

Upāyecchāṁ prati iṣṭasādhanatājñānam kāraṇaṁ. *Siddhantamuktāvalī* on Verse 146

8. Cikīrṣā kṛtisādhyatvaprakārecchā ca yā bhavet. Taddhetuḥ kṛtisā-dhyasādhanatvamatirbhavet. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Verse 147.

Cikīrṣā pratiṁ kṛtisādhyatājñānaṁ iṣtasādhanatājñānaṁ ca kāraṇam. Ata eva vṛṣṭyādau kṛtisādhyatājñānābhāvānna cikīrṣā. *Siddhantamuktāvalī* on Verse 147.

9. Tadahetutvabuddhestu hetutvaṁ kasyacinmate. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Verse no. 148.

Balavadaniṣṭājanakajñānaṁ kāraṇamityarthaḥ *Siddhantamuktāvalī* on Verse 148.

10. Kāryatājñānaṁ pravartakamiti guravaḥ. Tathā hi jñānasya pravṛttau jananīyāyāṁ cikirṣātiriktaṁ nāpekṣitamasti. Sā ca kṛtisādhyatājñāna-sādhyā, icchāyāḥ svaprakāratvadhīsādhyatvaniyamāt. Cikīrṣā da kṛtisādhyatvaprakārikecchā. Tatra kṛtisādhyatvaṁ prakārastatprakā-rakaṁ jñānaṁ cikīrṣāyāṁ taddvārā ca pravṛttau hetuḥ. Na tviṣṭasā-dhanatājñānaṁ tatra hetuḥ, kṛtyasādhye'pi candramandalānayanāu pravṛttyāpatteḥ. *Siddhantamuktāvalī* on Verse 147.

11. Nanu kṛtyasādhanatājñānaṁ pratibandhakamiti cenna.

Ibid.

12. Tadabhāvāpekṣayā kṛtisādhyatājñānasya laghutvāt. Na ca dvayo'rapi hetutvaṁ gauravāt.

Ibid.

13. Nanu tvanmate'pi madhuviṣasaṁpṛktānnabhojane caityavandane ca pravṛttyāpattiḥ kāryatājñānasya sattvāditi cenna.

Ibid.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

14. Svaviśeṣaṇavattā-pratisandhānajanya-kāryatājñānasya pravartakatvāt. Kāmye hi pākayāgādau kāmanā svaviśeṣaṇaṁ. Tataśca balavadaniṣṭānubandhikāmyasādhānatājñānena kāryatājñānaṁ, tataśca pravṛttiḥ. Tṛptaśca bhojane na pravartate, tadānīṁ kāmanāyāḥ puruṣaviśeṣaṇatvābhāvāt.

Ibid.

15. Nitye ca śaucādikaṁ puruṣaviśeṣaṇaṁ, tena śaucādijñānādhīnakṛtisādhyatājñānāt tatra pravṛttiḥ.

Ibid.

16. Iṣṭasādhanatva-kṛtisādhyatvayoryugapj jñātumaśakyatvāt, sādhyatvaśadhanatvayorvirodhitvāt. Asiddhasya hi sādhyatvaṁ siddhasya ca sādhanatvaṁ.

Ibid,

17. Maivaṁ. Lāghavena balavadaniṣṭānanubandhīṣṭasādhanatve sati kṛtisādhyatājñānasya tatra hetutvāt Na ca sādhyatva-sādhanatvayorvirodhaḥ, yadā kadācit sādhyatva-sādhanatvayoravirodhādekadā sādhyatvasādhanatvayośca jñānāt.

Ibid.

Yatkiñcitkālinasya sādhyatvasya yatkiñcitkālīnena sadhanena sadhanatvena virodhābhāvādityarthaḥ. Tathā caikakālīna - kṛtisādhyatveṣtasadhanatvayorvirodhe'pi na kṣatiḥ. *Dinakarī* on the same.

18. Dviṣtasadhanatā-buddhirbhaved dveṣasya karaṇaṁ. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Verse no. 140.

Duḥkhopāyaviṣayakaṁ dveṣaṁ prati dviṣtasādhanatājñanaṁ kāraṇamityarthaḥ. *Siddhantamuktāvalī* on Verse 143.

19. Yamarthamabhīpsan jihāsan vā karmārabhate tenānena sarve prāṇinaḥ sarvāṇi karmāṇi sarvāśca vyāptāḥ. *Nyāyabhāṣya* on Sūtra ol. 1' 24.

20. See My paper: "A Problem Concerning *Nyāya* Theory of *Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa*"; *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, University of Poona, pp. 210–213.

21. Pandit Phanibhūṣan Tarkavāgīśa; *Nyāyadarśana*, Vol. I, p. 90, W. B. Govt.

22. Pāṇini, Sūtra no. 1. 4. 50 Also Bhaṣya on this.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

23. Upādānagocarāparokṣajñānacikīrṣā-kṛtimattvaṁ kartṛtvam. Upādānaṁ samavāyikāraṇaṁ.
Dīpikā on *Tarkasaṁgraha*, p. XII, Progressive, 1983.

24. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Verse no. 151.

25. Tatsādhyakapravṛttiṁ prati tatsamavāyikāraṇātmakatadupādānagocara-laukikapratyakṣasya hetutvaṁ.
Dinakarī on Siddhāntamuktāvali under Verse 161.

26. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under Verse–146, which is mentioned under note no. 7 above.

* The paper was presented in the Seminar on "Human Relation" organised by the I. C. P. R. at Lucknow in March, 1990.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 4,
October, 1991

THE CONCEPT OF TĀTAPARYA IN INDIAN THEORY OF MEANING

'*Tātparya*' is a technical term in Indian philosophy of language. It does not have any English equivalent. Keeping in mind the distinctive character of the Indian theories of meaning, it is useful to look at its etymological meaning. The word *tātparya* is a noun and has its source in the adjective *tatpara*. *Tatpara* means dependent on that. The meaning of *tātparya* is dependent on the meaning of *tat* to mean a string of words (*Padasamūhaḥ* or *vākya*). It would mean (a) a mode or power (*vṛtti* or *śakti*) which synthesises the isolated words of the string (b) the fitness of the words to convey a particular meaning. If we take *tat* in the sense of the utterer of the words concerned, *tātparya* would mean (c) an intention of the speaker. These three alternatives viz., (a) synthesising mode or power, (b) fitness of the words to convey a particular meaning and (c) an intention of the speaker suggest two notions of *tātparya*.

i) *Tātparya* is a *vṛtti* or *śakti* that synthesises the constituent words of a sentence (*anvayabodhikā śakti*).

ii) *Tātparya* is not self-dependent (i.e. *Svarūpa-sat*), but is knowledge arising out of either the fitness of words to express a particular meaning (*tat pratīti-jananayogyatva*) or a relevant intention of the speaker (*Vakturicchā*).

The first notion of them implies that *tātparya* is a *padavṛtti* like *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*. It is different from them only in its

Received : 28-11-89

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

function. The second notion tells us that *tātparya* is knowledge. It is *Vākyārtha-jñānahetuḥ*. It is knowledge arising out of the fitness of words to express a particular meaning, or, it is knowledge of a relevant intention of the speaker.

Let us explain and examine these two notions. For our present purpose, we shall follow the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. In fact, while discussing, *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhidhānavāda*, the opposing views of the two schools of *Mīmāṁsaka*, *Jayanta*, the author of *Nyāyamañjarī* has introduced the concept of *tātparya*.

The *Bhāṭṭa* School of *Mīmāṁsā* holds that the words of a sentence first convey their primary meaning (*abhihita*) one by one. Then these meanings are combined (*anvaya*) through *ākāṁkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *āsatti* for the expression of the meaning of a sentence. This is *abhihitānvayavāda*. According to this view, the isolated word-meanings (*śūddha padārtha*) determine the meaning of a sentence (*Vākyārtha*).

The *Prābhākara* school, on the other hand, opines that the words as constructed in a sentence (*anvita*) having necessarily a verb give rise to the meaning of them (*abhidhāna*). This is *anvitābhidhānavāda*. According to this theory, the total meaning of a sentence (*Vākyārtha*) determines the meaning of its constituent words (*padārtha*).

On the first view, Jayanta observes, the words of a sentence have no function after conveying their isolated meanings, which are mere universals. As the words only represent their isolated meanings, there remains no possibility of construction (*anvaya*) of them. They stand independently like the iron-stakes.[1] On the second view, the isolated objects (*padārthas*) cannot be the meanings of words; words as constructed in the sentence-form express their meanings.[2] On this view, construction (*anvaya*) of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the words appears first and as a result the constructed meaning of the words are represented. This construction is made possible through *abhidhāśākti* (primary meaning) of the words.

According to Jayanta, both the views, disregard any constructive mode (*anvayabodhinī śakti*). So both of them are weak. If we take into account the *abhihitānvayavāda* for the understanding of *Vākyārtha*, we are to accept such a mode for construction (*anvaya*) of the word–meanings. Again, if we accept *anvitābhidhānavāda*, we are to recognise such a mode for construction other than *abhidhāna*, because of the fact that construction is not cognisable through *abhidhāvṛtti*. Such a mode, Jayanta says, is *tātparyavṛtti*, which has been ignored by the adherents of both the views. So according to him, both the views are unsatisfactory.[3] Jayanta suggests that the *abhihitānvayavāda* may be accepted, if there remains any scope for the recognition of *tātparyavṛtti* of the words for the synthesis of isolated word–meanings. The *anvitābhidhānavāda* may also be acceptable, if it permits the presenee of such a *vṛtti* for the combination of words. *Abhidhā* can give us certainty only about the primary meaning; for the construed meaning, it has no utility. *Abhidhā* of a word only conveys the isolated meaning (*Śuddha padārtha viṣayini*). It is *tātparya* which expresses the related meaning (*Saṁsarga-viṣayinī*).[4]

Abhinavagupta, Dhanarāja and Dhanika, the rhetoricians, have accepted *tātparya* as a *Vṛtti*. Abhinavagupta is the famous author of *Locanaṭīkā* of Anandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*. He upholds that for the understanding of *Vākyārtha*, construction of words is necessary; and for this purpose *tātparyaśakti* is to be granted.[5] Dhanarāja in his *Daśarūpaka* and Dhanika in his *Kāvyanirṇaya* have accepted *tātparyvṛtti* for the realisation of *rasa* or aesthetic enjoyment of the poetical sentences. Generally, the rhetoricians recognise a *vṛtti* called *vyañjanā* (suggested

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

meaning), besides *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā* for the realisation of *rasa*. According to them, *Vyañjanā* expresses *rasa* through *dhvani* or letter–sounds of the words. Dhanaraja and Dhanika do not accept *dhvani* and so they discard *Vyañjanāvṛtti*. To them, what others call *dhvani* is the *tātparya*. *Rasa* is realised through *tātparyavṛtti*. A poetical sentence is composed (*anvita*) to express a particular implied meaning, which is not obtained through *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā*. This peculiar composition (*anvaya*) is made possible through *tātparyaśakti*. Dhanika says that *tātparya* has no limit; it can express any kind of meaning, as neecssary for the expression of poetical thoughts.[6]

It is not clear, whether Viśwanātha the author of *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* has accepted the above point of view of Dhanarāja and Dhanika. Viśwanātha has explained *tātparya* with reference to the view of *abhihitānvayavādin* He, however, explains that *abhidhā* and the other *vṛttis* cease from their function just after conveying the isolated meaning of the words in a sentence. Then the *tātparya–vṛtti* appears to construct the isolated meaning and express the total meaning of the sentence (*tātparyārtha*).[7]

Inspite of the best efforts of Jayanta and the recognition of some celebrated rhetoricians, *tātparya* has generally been treated not as *vṛtti*, but as knowledge that produces the understanding of *Vākyārtha*. In this connection, we may briefly discuss the views of the *Nyāya* and the *Advaita Vedānta*.

Ancient *Naiyāyikas* did not specifically mention *tātparyajñāna* as a condition for understanding *Vākyārtha*. They were only in favour of *ākāṁkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *āsatti*. Gaṅgeśa, the founder of New *Nyāya*, added *tātparya* as the fourth condition of *Vākyārthajñāna*. According to him, *tātparya* is not a *padavṛtti*; rather *tātparya* determines the role of the recognised *padavṛttis*, viz.,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

abhidhā and *lakṣṇā* in a sentence (*tātparyānusāriṇīvṛtti*). *Tātparya* is the *prayojaka*, the modes or *vṛttis* are *prayojya*. *Prayojya* and *prayojaka* cannot be regarded as the same thing.[3] Thus, to Gaṅgeśa the knowledge of *tātparya*, on the one hand, determines the meaning of words and causes the knowledge of *vākyārtha*, on the other.

Following the *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, Viśwanātha, the author of *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* upholds that *tātparya* is the intention of the speaker (*vakturicchā*). It is the meaning intended to be conveyed by a sentence. A word in a sentence may mean different things in different contexts. The difference of meaning depends on the intention of the speaker. According to Viśwanātha, we must take into account the knowledge of *tātparya* (*tātparyajñāna*) or intended meaning for understanding the meaning of a sentence. He cites the stock example of the sentence containing equivocal words, i.e., "*saindhavamānaya*". This may mean either "Bring the salt" or "Bring the horse". The word *saindhava* means both the salt and the horse. Knowledge of the intention of the speaker of "*saindhavamānaya*" is essential for correct understanding of the sentence. Of course, this knowledge of intention depends on the context (*prakaraṇa*). In the context of dining, '*saindhava*' would be understood as salt; in the context of going out, the same word would mean horse. Thus, the intended meaning of the word or words in a sentence uttered by a speaker should be taken into account for the understanding of *vākyārtha*. And this knowledge of the intention of the speaker is what is called *tātparya*. Now, the knowledge of *tātparya* or the intention of the speaker is caused by the context of the speech, motive of the speaker, conjunction, disjunction, concomitance, contradiction, proximity of other words, space, time etc. Bhartṛhari, the author of *Vākyapadīya* has advocated this view. From this consideration, it may be

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

said that it is not *tatparyanjñāna*, but the context of the speech etc. are the conditions for *vākyārthajñāna*. *Viśwanātha* refutes this by saying that the context of the speech, motive of the speaker, conjunction, disjunction, concomitance, contradiction etc., have no self-same character (*anugata dharma*). There must remain some self-same character in that which has the character of being a cause (*kāraṇatā*) It may be argued that their character of being the cause of *tātparyajñāna* (*tātparyajñāna-janakatva*) is this self-same character. In reply to this *Viśwanātha* says that in order to maintain the comparative simplicity (*lāghava*), *tātparyajñāna* should be granted as the condition for *vākyarthajñāna*. Knowledge of the speaker's intention is a necessary condition, according to him. In the case of the vedic sentences, the intention of God is to be granted. Words of the irrational beings, like a parrot, when informative, are preceded by God, and when non-informative, are preceded by its tutor.

The *Advaita Vedāna* does not accept *tātparya* as the intention of the speaker, because of the fact that the speaker's intention pre-supposes the knowledge of the spoken sentence. There is accepted a principle that knowledge produces intention and intention produces action. But the words of an imitative parrot, though convey some meaning to the hearer, have no intended meaning. Or, when a person, ignorant of the Vedic Texts, reads out the sentences, he has no intention. Yet the read texts express some meaning. In these cases, the intention of God cannot be granted, because, then to the atheists like the philosophers of *Mīmāṁsā* and *Sāṁkhya*, these sentences should not be understandable.

So Dharmarāja, the author of the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, has defined *tātparya* as fitness of the words to convey a particular meaning, while there is no utterance intending to convey a different meaning (*tatpratītijanana-yogyatvaṁ*, with the *viśeṣana*,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'*taditara-pratītīcchaya-anuccāritatvam*'). *Tātparya* is *tat-pratītījanana-yogyatvaṁ*; or *tadarthapratītijanānayogyatvaṁ*; but to cover the sentences with equivocal words and so also the words having some intended meaning the adjective, '*tatpratītīcchayā-anuccaritatvam*' is to be added. If only *tatpratītijanānayogyatvam* were the definition of *tātparya*, then in the case of utterance like '*saindhavamānaya*', both the meanings—'Bring the salt' and 'Bring the horse' may be understood, in as much as the sentence has fitness (*yogyatva*) to express both 'Bring the salt' and 'Bring the horse'. When one utters '*saindhavamānaya*' to mean 'Bring the salt', then he has no intention to convey the meaning 'Bring the horse' in his utterance. Thus, alongwith the sentences having equivocal words, all the informative sentences are to be understood with the help of the knowledge of *tātparya*, because in all such sentences, there is fitness of the words to convey a particular meaning. *Tātparyajñāna* is an essential condition for *vākyārthajñāna*. In fact, according to the *Advaita Vedānta*, if *tātparyajñāna* were not the essential condition for verbal knowledge, then contemplation over the *Upaniṣadic* sentences would be fruitless, as it is a fact that such contemplation results into the knowledge of *tātparya*, i.e. *Advaya Brahma*.

The above gives us a picture of the two notions of *tātparya*, i.e., tātpary as *vṛtti* (mode or power) and *tātparya* as *jñāna* (knowledge). Let us see which of the two notions is acceptable.

While explaining the view of Jayanta, we have seen that the acceptance of *tātparya* as a *vṛtti* is essential for both the theories of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* in order to understand *vākyārtha*. But the scholar–theoreticians do not recognise it. In fact, in respect of the theory of *abhihitānvaya* it may be said that *ākāṁkṣā* or mutual expectancy of words, *yogyatā* or fitness

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the words and *āśātti* or the proximity of words can easily serve the function of *anvaya*, which is said to be the function of *tātparya*. In respect of the theory of *anvitābhidhāna* it may be argued that *śabda* which produces *śābdabodha* is not isolated words, but speech or sentence. A sentence as a speech is itself a construction of words. Words, isolated from the sentence-form, are only abstract universals. Such words can never be treated as *śabda*, the source of verbal cognition. Frege, the father of contemporary western philosophy of language, has suggested a principle. The principle is 'never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition.' The same view has been established by the advocates of *anvitābhidhānavāda*. According to them, the words themselves are constructed (*anvita*) in a sentenee to express some meaning. So the acceptance of *tātparyavṛtti* for the knowledge of *anvaya* of the words is unnceessary. Jayanta has suggested two *vṛttis-abhidhā* and *tātparya* for the theory of *anvitābhidhāna*. But we cannot think how the two modes perform their function simultaneously. Knowledge of *anvaya* or *śābdabodha* will require of the simultaneous function of both the *vṛttis*. In the explanation of Jayanta, there is no scope for simultaneous function of them.

According to the rhetoricians, the expression of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*) from poetical sentences supersedes the meaning of words conveyed through *abhidhā*. Some rhetoricians hold that such an expression is possible not through *dhvani* (letter-sounds) but through the *tātparyaśakti*. By this *śakti* (mode or power) only the synthetic relation of *vibhāva* (emotional state of long duration), *anubhāva* (production of *vibhāva*) etc. are apprehended from the reading or hearing of the poetical words. That is to say, the realisation of *vibhāva* etc. and the enjoyment of *rasa* arise simultaneously from *tātparyaśakti*. But how is it possible ? Realisation of *rasa* etc. cause the feeling of *rasa*. There

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is a before–after sense between the cause *vibhāva* etc. and the effect *rasa* (*kriyā paurvāparyam*). So the position of those rhetoricians, who reject the *tātparyaśakti*, is not to be underestimated.

Moreover, there is a rule which is followed by all the *vṛttis*. When one *vṛtti* ceases after trying to express the meaning only then another *vṛtti* appears. When by *abhidā* the meaning of some word is not satisfactorily conveyed, then *lakṣanā* appears to express the same Each *vṛtti* can convey one meaning, or try to convey one meaning only. *Tātparya* does not follow this rule. According to some rhetoricians, it has no limit; it can express any meaning whatsoever. But then to a hearer, a sentence, having the words of infinite and unrestricted meaning, would certainly be unintelligible. In fact, each and every sentence must have its *tātparya*. In that case it does not matter whether any *vṛtti* ceases from its function or not. So it may rightly be said that *tātparya* is not a *vṛtti*, it is a condition, a necessary condition so to speak for understanding *Vākyārtha* That is to say, it is better to accept *tātparya*, not as *padavṛtti* but as a species of knowledge for the understanding of *Vākyārtha*.

But in regard to *tātparyajñāna* as the *vakyārthajñānahetū*, the question arises : in what sense, then, *tātparya* is to be recognised ? Is it intention of the speaker (*vakturicchā*), or fitness of the words to convey a particular meaning (*tatpratītijananayogyatva*) ?

Consideration shows that *tātparya* is not always *vakturicchā* ; but it is necessarily *tatpratītijananyogyatva*, as the *Advaita Vedānta* contends.

When in dream, some one shouts '*taskaraḥ praveśaṁ karoti*' ('A thief has entered'), those, who are not yet slept or just

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

awakened have the knowledge by *śabda* (words). This knowledge is preceded by *tātparya*, not as the intention of the speaker but as the fitness of the words to convey some particular meaning.

Again, when some child imitates some slang–words and utters these in the presence of the parents, there is no *vakturicchā* (intention of the speaker). Still, there is *tatpratītijananayogyatva* (fitness of the words to convey some particular meaning).

Further, the poetical words, generally have no intended meaning. That is why poetries are interpreted differently by different readers.

Moreover, even if we take *tātparya* as the intention of the speaker, we cannot say that sentence is possessed of *tātparya* A sentence is a collection of letter–sounds. Sound, according to the *Naiyāyika* himself, is a physical phenomenon So a sentence is also a physical phenomenon. How can a sentence possess intention of the speaker, which is not physical at all. But if we accept *tātparya* as fitness of the words to express some particular meaning, then it may essentially be possessed by a sentence.

So by *tātparya*, we should understand *tatpratītijananayogyatva*, and not *vakturicchā*.

Some, however, accept this *tātparyajñāna* in the restricted sense. They opine that *tātparyajñāna* is the condition for understanding the meaning of only those sentences, which have equivocal words. But this is wrong. Even to understand the meaning of sentences without having equivocal words, this condition is necessary. As for example, there is no equivocal word in the sentence — '*ayam eti putraḥ rājñaḥ puruṣa apasaryatām*'. This sentence can express either 'The son is coming, remove the king's men' or 'The prince is coming, remove the man'. With-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

out the knowledge of *tātparya* or *tadarthapratīti janana-yogyatva*, these two types of constructive understanding (*anvaya-bodha*) is impossible.

In fact, in every informative sentence, there is fitness of the words to convey a particular meaning, because of the fact that every sentence is uttered under a particular context, in a particular time, space and form. *Tātparya* differs according to the different forms of the same sentence. For example, the sentence, '*sa āgacchati*' — 'He is coming' may be assertive (He is coming.), may be interrogative (Is he coming?), or may be exclamatory (He is coming!). The *tātparya* or, to say, the knowledge of *tātparya* of each of the forms is not the same.

Besides *tātparya*, there are other three conditions for *vākyārthajñāna*, viz., *ākāṁkṣā* (expectancy) *yogyatā* (compatibility) and *āsatti* (proximity). According to some, *tātparya* is not a separate condition; it may be included in *ākaṁkṣā*. By *ākāṁkṣā* in a sentence, one word expects another mutually in order to convey the intended meaning of the speaker. So, *tātparya*, which is, to some, merely the intended meaning of the speaker is a part of *ākāṁkṣā* Again some think that *tātparya* may be included in *yogyatā*, since *yogyatā* or mutual compatibility of a meaning is always determined with eference to the particular context or the probable intention of the speaker.

But we have seen that *tātparya* should not mean the intention of the speaker, but should mean fitness of the words to convey a particular meaning And in this sense, it may be justified to hold that *tātparya* is the primary condition and the other three, secondary for the knowledge of *vākyārtha*, because of the fact that *ākāṁkṣā* or mutual expectancy of words, *yog-*

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

yatā or compatibility of words for non-contradiction in sense and *āsatti* or proximity of words are the conditions for the production of understanding some particular meaning (*tadartha-pratītijanana*) and *tātparya* is fitness of the words to convey a particular meaning (*tadartha-pratītijanana-yogyatva*).

Department of Philosophy
Vidyasagar University
MIDNAPORE, W. B.

PRABHAT MISRA

NOTES

1. *Nirapekṣaprayogeḥ ayaṁ salākākalpanā bhavet.* — *Nyāyamañjarī*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1936, p. 372.

2. *Tadanvitābhidhāne tu padāntaramarthakam.* — *ibid.*, p. 372.

3. *Matadvayamapīdaṁ tu nāsmabhyoḥ rocatetaram, kuto anvitābhidhānaṁ vā kutovābhihitānvayam.* — *ibid.*, p. 370.

4. *Abhidhātṛmatā-śakti padānāṁ svārthaniṣṭhatā, teṣāṁ tātparya śaktistu saṁsargamavadhi.* — *ibid.*, p. 372.

5. *Vākyārthe tātparyaśakti parasparānvite. tātparyaśaktaiva anvayapratipatti.* — *Locanaṭīkā*, pp. 16-17, quoted from J. N. Bagchi's *Vākyārtha-nirūpaṇer Dārśanik Paddhati.*

6. *Yāvatkāryaprasāritvāt tātparyam na tulādhṛtam* — *Kavyanirṇaya*, ref., *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, ch. v by *Viśwanātha.*

7. *Abhidhāyā ekaikapadārtha-bodhana virāmād vākyārtharūpasya padārthānvayasya bodhinī tāttparyaṁ nāma. Tadarthasya tātparyārthaḥ. Tadbodhakaṁ ca vākyamityabhihitānvayavādīnāṁ matam.* — *Sāhityadarpaṇa by Viśwauātha*, ch. II.

8. Ref., by J. N. Bagchi, *Vākyārtha-nirūpaṇer Dārśanik Paddhati.*

9. quoted from the Foundation of Arithmetic, translated by J. L. Austin, in the article Bolzano and Frege by D. P. Chattopadhyaya in *Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy* — I.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. *Nyāyamañjarī*, *Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*, ed. by Pt. S. N. Shukla, Chowkhamba, 1936, pp. 364-372.

2. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, *V. N. Kavirāja*, ed by K. M. Sastri, Chowkhamda, 1967.

3. *Bhāṣapariccheda* with *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, Viswanatha Nyayapanca-nana, ed. by P. Sastri, Contai, Midnapore, 1374 (Beng.) (*śabdakhaṇda*).

4. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Dharmarājādhvarīndra, ed. by P. Sastri, Contai, Midnapore, 1377 (Beng.) (agamapariccheda).

5. *Vākyārtha-nirūpaṇer Dārśanik Paddhati*. J. N. Bagchi Sanskrit Book Depo, 1981, pp, 7-44.

6. *Sabdārthatattva*, R. K. Bhattacharya Siddhanta Sastri, Pravartak Publishers, 1364 (Beng.).

7. *Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy* — I, MacMillan, 1979.

8. *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, S. C. Chatterjee, C. U., 1965.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-**

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs. 25/-**

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-**

Ramchandra Gandhi (ed) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs. 50/-**

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs. 70/-**

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs. 60/-**

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism, Rs. 50/-**

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-**

S. S. Barlingay (ed), **A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs. 50/-**

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs. 25/-**

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs. 30/-**

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs. 100/-**

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Pune–411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII. No. 4,
October 1991

SHOULD THE CROSS-CULTURAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION BE NORMATIVE?

I

Before one could turn to a discussion of what the cross-cultural philosophy of religion should be like, one needs to know what it is like as it is practised today. And in order to determine that one needs to ask : what is cross-cultural philosophy of religion? Indeed what is philosophy of religion? To one inclined to ask the prior question : what is religion? I would simply say : it is used here in the conventional sense, as those clearly demarcated entities which are so listed in a text book or an encyclopedia dealing with religion. This approach to the definition of religion itself reflects the cross-cultural nature of our intellectual enterprise. For, we have really only defined *a* religion and not religion; and indeed we have not even defined a religion, only identified it. Talk of religion *per se* would lead to a discussion of what it is in the abstract which we wish to avoid; while the discussion of the definition of *a* religion (not to say of the definition of religion) will also sidetrack us at this point.

II

Just as we had to distinguish our concerns from religion as such, we now need to distinguish our concerns from those of the philosophy of religion, which has been defined as "*philosophical thinking about religion*". Here the distinction drawn earlier between religion and *a* religion again comes into play, but not

Received : 17-7-89

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in the singular but the plural. For if there is to be a *cross* cultural philosophy of religion, then a plurality of cultures is implied. Thus, it follows that if the philosophy of religion " studies the concepts and belief systems of religion as well as the prior phenomena of religious experience and the activities of worship and contemplation on which these belief systems rest and out of which they have arisen " then the cross-cultural philosophy of religion pursues such a study on a comparative basis. The cross-cultural philosophy of religion could as well have been called the comparative philosophy of religion, to be distinguished from the philosophy of comparative religion, the word comparative religion itself being a misnomer for the comparative study of religion.

The question then, what is cross-cultural philosophy of religion may be answered as follows. There are bodies of beliefs, practises etc. identified as particular religions. The particular religions have philosophical systems associated with them. The comparative study of these philosophical systems is the domain of the cross-cultral philosophy of religion.

Two residual questions need to be answered : (1) How is this study different from the philosophy of religion ? and (2) Why is the study called a cross-cultural philosophy of religion and not a philosophy of comparative religion ? With respect to (1) it may be noted that there is some overlap between the two fields-philosophy of religion and the cross-cultural philosophy of religion inasmuch as the philosophy of religion tries either to (a) extend its scope beyond that of Western Christian culture and/or (b) base its conclusions about religious experience on data covering more than one culture. The difference between the two lies in this, that while the philosophy of religion may

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

philosophize about religion itself, the cross-cultural philosophy of religion keeps its sights focused on the religions and such conclusions as their comparison may yield, even when it pertains to the nature of religion.

With respect to the second question, the use of culture over religion needs to be justified. It is clear that some religions may possess a feature so specific to it that it may be of either little or no use in comparing it with other religions. What is being suggested is that some aspects of the philosophies of these various religions may be so highly specific as to render comparison difficult if not barren. Examples : the debate in Hinduism whether Śūdras can have access to revelation or whether Brahmins alone can be temple priests; the significance of the mystical letters with which some of the Surahs of the Qur'ān commence or the issue whether Pīrs are worshipped *or* venerated; the pre-millenialism and post-millenialism or pre-lapsarian and post-lapsarian debate in Christianity. They could perhaps still be brought within the ken of comparison but only as peculiarities related to larger issues rather than in their own right. By contrast with these, a comparison which can be extended beyond the sphere of one religion is by convention now called 'cultural' as distinguished from the one barely amenable to comparison, because of its peculiarly 'religious' character (on account of being specific to a religion). Thus, for instance, the debate over the access of the Śūdras to Vedic lore must be viewed as a special case of the question whether some forms of knowledge must necessarily be esoteric. The fact that the question whether one is saved by faith alone or must also exert cuts across religions entitles it to be called cultural, whereas the question of the role of the Gandharva is so peculiarly Buddhist that it must be regarded, and thereby disregarded, as 'religious'.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

III

Thus, the cross-cultural philosophy of religion must be comparative; but now the question arises: should it be descriptive or normative? Or, more generally, is there room in the study of religion for a normative approach or should it confine itself to description?

Hitherto the cross-cultural philosophy of religion has been descriptive. That is to say, it makes comparative statements but does not evaluate these statements for their truth-value. This state of affairs needs to be both explained and justified.

The explanation lies in the fact that the cross-cultural philosophy of religion has emerged as a branch of study *not* under the aegis of philosophy but rather of religious studies. Its ptactitioners assemble at the annual meetings of the American Academy of Religion and not that of the American Philosophical Association. Now the primary method in the study of religion, known as the phenomenology of religion, is built around the assumption of bracketing one's value judgements before embarking on the study of a religious tradition. What Husserl recommended as the hallmark of a philosophical method in *general* has been applied to a particular religious tradition in the study of religion. This has had the following consequences. Firstly, while in the study of natural science the objects themselves are inanimate and do not possess beliefs of their own, and therefore a meaning has to be *imposed* on them, in the study of religion the object of study, namely, a religion, that is, its followers, themselves possess faith, beliefs and a universe of meaning which are being studied and therefore have to be *disclosed* by them. This means that the student of religion must show a special respect for the believer's point of view, a position which finds its most extreme formulation in the statement that the believer

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is always right. Such scrupulous solicitude for the insider is shown not only at the stage of the collection of data but also at the stage when conclusions are drawn based on this data which are not merely factual but also interpretive. A follower of the phenomenological method in the study of religion is required not to violate the self–understanding of the believers. Such self–understanding can be violated perhaps by philosophers of religion but not by the phenomenologists of religion. Thus, inasmuch as the cross–cultural philosophy of religion is to be genetically located in the study of religion in general, it has come to share these assumptions. The truth question has been bracketed out. The phenomenology of religion sharply contrasts with the objective procedures of science and the veridical procedures of philosophy.

The justification of this state of affairs will be subjected to criticism later. But inasmuch as this justification is justifiable, two points may be said in its favour. When an approach rooted in the empirical sciences is applied to the study of religion, it runs the risk of becoming reductionistic. This being so, the phenomenological method in the study of religion may have saved the day for religious studies against 'scientism' (though I imagine I would be saying something quite different if 'scientism' had prevailed!). Secondly, a philosophical approach to the study of religion, when philosophy of religion was heavily shaped by the Judeo–Christian religious tradition in its attitudes and norms, ran the risk of becoming judgemental, in the sense of passing adverse judgement on non-Christian religions. It was easy to dismiss Hindu polytheism, Buddhist atheism etc, without arriving at a proper understanding of them. Thus, the appearance of the phenomenological method in the study of religion may have been a godsent; what is now being questioned is its dominance to the exclusion of all evaluation.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

IV

It will now be argued that the philosophy of religion should be normative. I would like to distinguish here between an *evaluative* and a *normative* approach to the study of religion. An evaluative approach assesses the various religious traditions in the light of a criterion supplied, e g. attitude to birth-control or position of woman or human rights etc., receptivity to democracy, technology, progress etc. or any other criterion supplied to the student of religion. The evaluative approach does *not* evaluate the criteria, only the various religious traditions in the light of the specified criteria. In that sense the evaluative approach is open-ended Moreover, there is no reason *per se* why such an evaluation may not be carried out in relation to less liberal criteria such as those of militancy, regimentality etc., The evaluation is itself value-free here. Such, however, is not the case with the normative approach wherein the criteria are also evaluated and a special value attached to the criterion of truth. There are no doubt, philosophical problems associated with the issue of criteria. If we are to evaluate criteria the question arises: by what criteria are they to be evaluated and then by what criteria are the criteria of criteria to be adjudicated? Similarly, if we offer a reason for a criterion of truth " then reason, and not the criterion proposed, becomes the true criterion ". Notwithstanding these dangers, it is clear that what is being proposed is a move away from the current moratorium on value-judgements and an emergence from the state of axiological retreat the study of religion is in. The assessment of the " truth " of certain philosophical claims made by various religions is a task, one can immediately sense, of a somewhat different order than evaluating each religious tradition for its receptivity or otherwise to, say, family planning.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It is now claimed that the cross–cultural philosophy of religion should be *normative* for the following reasons. (1) Philosophy *per se*, if it is to continue to claim to be a rational inquiry into the nature of reality, cannot abandon its function of distinguishing between the true and the false when it becomes cross–cultural without endangering its claim to be philosophy. (2) It could be urged in the past that sufficient and sound data were not available regarding the philosophical traditions of other cultures for them to be assessed. This is no longer true (3) It could also be urged in the past that such an exercise could degenerate into a form of intellectual imperialism. This danger is not denied but there is sufficient contemporary awareness of it to hold it in check. (4) Phenomenology of religion advocates the bracketing of value–judgements when encountering data form religious traditions other than our own. Should this not mean that "bracketing" be *confined* to the process of collecting data so that such collection is not distorted by the philosophical position of the scholar ? Why should one be debarred by this method from evaluating such data after they have been collected ? (5) The believer is not always right. Not only do other believers sometimes contend that he is not right, he can sometimes be shown to be acting in a way contrary to the "great tradition" within his own religion, as well as believing in facts demonstrably false historically. Thus, undue solicitude for the believers' views should not come in the way of developing a normative approach to the cross–cultural philosophy of religion. (6) It could be argued that such an attempt is likely to be inconclusive. It could be urged against this point that the inquiry may not be final in the sense that no model or paradigm even in science is final, but it need not be inconclusive, in the sense that, given the state of the art at any moment, it cannot allow us to draw meaningful conclusions. (7) It could be urged that the philosophical component of the religious traditions is too culture–bound and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

constitutes such an independent integral system as cannot be evaluated. The fact of philosophical acculturation is no doubt true, but is it such as to prevent cross-cultural comparison and subsequent evaluation ? The parallel found in South Indian Vaiṣṇavism to the Augustinian/Pelagian controversy and the common axiological component in the Hindu and Confucian reactions to Buddhist Monasticism are instructive here. (8) Human beings belong to particular culture but they also share a common humanity. While it is granted that particular and universal loyalties may cause tension and even confiict, the universal dimension of each philosophical system coupled with an open claim to universality on the part of some needs to be examined and not ignored.

V

If the aforesaid arguments are accepted then the question naturally arises : how should such a normative cross-cultural philosophy of religion proceed ? The norms of truth and morality immediately suggest themselves.

For openers, let us consider the application of the norm of truth in the cross-cultural philosophy of religion. Now truth cannot be divorced from the issues of what is truth, what are the criteria of truth, etc. In other words, the discussion of the norm of truth must yield ground to a discussion of the theories for truth.

Three theories for truth have often been discussed in the literature on the subject. These are (1) the correspondence theory of truth; (2) the coherence theory of truth, and (3) the pragmatic theory of truth. Acccording to the correspondence view of truth, " truth is some kind of correspondence of belief to facts. " According to the coherence view, " truth is the agree-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ment or coherence of beliefs ". According to the pragmatic view, truth is " the felt relation of consistency of our theoretical and practical consciousness as experienced in the successful working of our ideas in life ".

The problem with the correspondence view is that while it can show that belief corresponds to cognition, it cannot establish that cognition corresponds to reality, for we " cannot get outside ourselves; and so there can be no direct evidence of correspondence between mind and reality ". It cannot prove itself. The main advantage of this view is that it provides a test of truth which is objecively verifiable.

The problem with the coherence view is that although the harmony of experience may hold up to a point of time, it by itself does not guarantee that future experience will not falsify present knowledge. Its merit lies in the fact that it emphasizes the internal consistency and harmony of experience.

The problem with the pragmatic criterion is that even false cognition may result in successful activity as in the case of the flatness of the earth. Its merit consists in emphasizing the practical dimension of truth.

VI

How then can we use truth as a norm in the cross-cultural philosophy of religion ? One may do so by applying the theories of truth in the cross-cultural philosophy of religion. How could this be done ?

The correspondence view could be employed in evaluating the *presuppositions* of a philosophical system. Even though the criterion cannot prove itself, it at least suggests an objective referent which may provide some check on the truth-claim. Thus

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

if Hindu philosophy pre–supposes reincarnation one could set out to examine the evidence for and against it. If the divine audition of the Qur'ān is central to Islam, then the manner in which such experiences occur should be explored. Such issues are typically dealt with in journals on parapsychology.

The coherence view could be applied to a philosophical system to examine its degree of internal consistency and doctrinal harmony *given its presuppositions*. Thus, one may examine the extent to which the various doctrines and practises of a religion are internally consistent. How does the idea of the Qur'ān being in Arabic, for instance, square with the Islamic claim that God is lord of all the worlds ? How is Brahman without distinctions to be reconciled with a Hindu social system in which castes proliferate ? How does one reconcile Christian charity with the theology of missions ? Inasmuch as the traditions themselves recognize and rationalize these apparent inconsistencies, how good a job have they done ?

The pragmatic criterion could be applied to test the practical efficacy of the techniques for spiritual development elaborated in a philosophical system. Do these techniques work ? Are some more effective than others ? Thus, one could *experimentally* compare Hindu, Zen, Theravāda and Islamic techniques of meditation represented by focusing on say, AUM, KOAN, SATI AND SAMÃ with the help of biofeedback equipment for their effectiveness. Such issues are typically dealt with in journals of transpersonal psychology.

VII

This would, however, require a fundamental change in the orientation of the philosophy of religion. The application of the correspondence theory seemed to extend the cross–cultural philosophy of religion in the direction of parapsychology, the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

coherence theory into that of logic, and the pragmatic criterion into transpersonal psychology. Out of these only logic belongs to the orthodox heart of the philosophy of religion. The cross-cultural philosophy of religion stands at this cross road : will it study religion cross-culturally only to the extent that it can be done from within the *existing* domain of the philosophy of religion or is it prepared to extend that domain ? In other words : will it let existing study of philosophy define its issues or will the issues determine what it studies ? Will it confine itself to the existing wardrobe or will it add to it ? I now leave you to reflect on the sartorial metaphor.

3520 University Street
Montreal, PQ H 3 A 2 A 7
(CANADA)

ARVIND SHARMA

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

OUR LATEST PUBLICATION

REGULARITY, NORMATIVITY AND RULES OF LANGUAGE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

Prof. Rajendra Prasad

pp. 310 Rs. 100/-

In this volume twenty essays of Prof. Rajendra Prasad, published earlier in different journals in India and abroad, are collected. In these essays philosophical analysis is brought to bear upon such themes as nature of language, relation between language and philosophy or that between modern logic and philosophy. There are essays in the collection which consider such issues as practical relevance of philosophy, the distinction between apriori and empirical propositions etc. In addition, some essays deal with concepts of substance, mind and religious belief, while some other discuss problems connected with objectivity of historical judgements, relation between man and god, role of reason and sentiment in human life. The last four essays in the collection discuss difficulties connected with philosophical synthesis and consider relation between tradition, progress, freedom, reverence and creativity.

The essays would be immensely helpful to both students and teachers of philosophy.

For further details contact :

The Editor ,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly ,
Philosophy Department ,
University of Poona, Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 4,
October, 1991

THE INDIAN CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY

The purpose of the present article is to determine what is the Indian conception of philosophy. In earlier times two collections of Philosophies were written in India, namely *Sarva Dasśana Siddhānta Saṅgraha* and *Sarva Darśana* Saṅgraha. The author of the latter was Madhavācārya and that of the former was Śankarācārya. But there is some controversy as to who was the author of the former In these two collections there is no chapter on the *Vedas, Upaniṣads* or the *Gītā*. This shows that these two authors distinguished between *Darśana* (Philosophy) and *śruti* (scripture). "*Sarva*" means all. It is the first word in the captions of both the collections Therefore, they excluded *prasthāna trayī* (*Vedas, Udaniṣadas* and the *Gītā*) from what they took to be *all* the systems of *Darśana*.

If we want to discover the Indian conception of *Darśana* we have to consider how we use the word *Darśana*. The word occurs in expressions such as "*Cārvāka* or *Lokāyata Darśana*", "*Nyāya Darśana*", "*Vaibhāsika Darśana*", "*Mādhyamika Darśana*", "*Vedānta* Darsana" and so on. This raises the question what is common to all of them, or what constitutes a family resemblance between them, because of which all of them are identified as philosophical systems No *Dārśanic* (Philosophical) theory is accepted by all of them, and hence none is common to all of them. Therefore, *Darśana* is not to be defined in terms of theories or answers to *Dārśanic* questions. It is to be defined in terms of problems and questions. It is questions and problems that are common to them; hence *Darśana* is to be defined in

...7

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

terms of them. Ancient Indians discuss problems such as whether matter is ultimately real, whether there is God, whether there is soul as distinguished from body, what is knowledge, what is inference and so on. These are discussed by ancient Indian philosophers. Hence *Darśana* is to be defined in terms of such problems. Problems give us the subject matter. And, in a general way, this is a sound policy on definition. A branch of study should be defined in terms of problems. Theories in a branch of study keep changing, but the concept and definition of that branch remains unchanged. But this can be so if the branch is defined in terms of problems. For example, Newtonian Physics and Einsteinian Physics are systems of Physics in the same sense of " Physics ". If Physics is defined in terms of theories and answers, then the very concept of Physics will change whenever theories in it change.

If *Darśana* is defined in terms of problems, then the Indian conception of *Darśana* is the same as the Western conception of Philosophy. There is no *distinctive* Indian conception of *Darśana* (Philosophy). The same problems were discussed in the west as in ancient India.

But philosophical theories are of interest in themselves, and may be considered here briefly. Most of the philosophical theories discussed in the West were discussed in ancient India also, and the theories discussed in ancient India were discussed in the West. Sometimes it is said that the theory of transmigration of soul is distinctive of Indian philosophy. But this is false. Transmigration was accepted in the West by Plato, and was considered to be plausible by Hume and Kant.

Department of Philosophy SRI CHANDRA
Lucknow University
Lucknow (U. P.)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XVIII, No. 4,
October, 1991

DISCUSSION

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SO-CALLED 'BUDDHIST PROCESS-ETHICS'

In his long and rambling article [1] of the above title Peerenboom has attempted to show that all the problems in Indian philosophy engendered by the essentialist views regarding the nature of self and moral responsibility can be 'dissolved' by Buddhism if it is taken to favour what Peerenboom calls 'the process-ethics'. The problems arise according to Peerenboom as he says in more than one place in his artilcle, (see for example the remark on p. 261, I. P, Q. Vol. XVII July '89, 'Only they could be worried about stringent identity requirements... because they alone, by construing the flow of experience in terms of discrete ontological particulars, sabotage continuity') because the flow of experience is construed by essentialists in terms of dis-continuous and discrete ontological particulars; and such a construal makes it very difficult to give a satisfactory account of the ethical and spiritual phenomena like moral responsibility, transmigration of self, etc. One may ask here, 'what is essentialist (or based on essentialist metaphysics) in such a momentarist construal of experience? Is it not diametrically opposed to the essentialist viewpoint to hold that flux of experience is composed of utterly discrete, self-defined (*svalakṣṇa*) momentary units?' All the philosophies like those of *Nyāya, Vedānta*, etc., which advocate the substantialist view of reality have strongly criticised the momentarist doctrine in no uncertain terms. It is Buddhism and Buddhism alone which has very vehemently maintained the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

momentarist doctrine (otherwise known as the no-self or '*Pudgala-Nairātmya*' view in regard to the subjective sphere, and no-substance or '*Dharma-Nairātmya*' view in regard to the objective sphere) commonly known in Indian philosophical literature as '*Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga vāda*' If Peerenboom needs any proof of this he may refer to the monograph of Ratnakīrti on *Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga* which is full of subtle polemics against the substantialist view of reality. This monograph is included in the collection of Ratnakīrti's works known as '*Ratnakīrtī Nibaṇdhāvali*'. A similar polemical work on *Kṣaṇabhaṅga* by another redoubtable champion of the momentarist doctrine, the great Buddhist scholar Jnānasrīmitra, is available in a collection known as *Jñānasrī-mitra-Nibandhāvali*. The great eleventh-century logician Udayana had to compose his well known treatise *Ātmatattvaviveka* mainly with the avowed purpose of demolishing the Buddhist doctrine of universal momentariness. A noted modern scholar of Buddhism, Theodore Stcherbatsky used in his *Buddhist Logic* the significant term 'staccato' for aptly charactarising the Buddhist conception of the discontinuosly-and-discreetly-flowing nature of the real. For the *Sāmkhyan* conception of the real as contrasted with that of Buddhism, Stcherbatsky has used the term 'leggato'. Against all this evidence it may not be open to Peerenboom to argue that only a section of Buddhist philosophy adheres to the momentarist doctrine. It is wellknown that every school of Buddhism excluding that of the *Mādhyamika*-which does not advocate any view of its own-upholds the doctrine of momentariness. Not only the *Vaibhāṣika* and the *Sautrāntika*, even the *Yogācāra*, whose main thrust is towards idealism, has maintained that the flow of consciousness which is the only real that is there, is composed only of momentary ideational units. From all this it is as clear as day light that the doctrine of momentariness is a pivotal doctrine for all Buddhist philosophy. It is therefore simply astounding that Peerenboom should blame the ethical difficulties of Buddhism on

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'essentialist metaphysics'. The difficulties of Buddhism are self-created and it stands to the great credit of traditional Buddhist scholars that they have grappled with these difficulties without compromising their basic doctrine of universal momentariness. Peerenboom in his misplaced enthusiasm to defend Buddhist ethics has doubly falsified it, first by disowning on behalf of Buddhism the very doctrine that is a central feature of it and next by foisting upon it the process view of reality which is totally alien to its basic outlook. But, as the following discussion will show, even with his distorted view of Buddhist ethics Peerenboom does not succeed in the least in 'dissolving' what he regards as 'essentialist dilemmas' about moral responsibility. If Peerenboom had taken the trouble to analyse carefully the concept of 'process', it would have been evident to him that under its usual interpretation the process-conception fares no better than the momentarist conception in giving a satisfactory account of the 'phenomenological self'. We shall however explain towards the end of this short paper how the 'process' view of reality can be so interpreted as to make it compatible with all common ethical notions. But by this we would not like to suggest that the process view is acceptable to any school of Buddhism.

What is then a 'process' which Peerenboom makes so much of? The common view of the nature of a process as well as the view that philosophers like Bertrand Russel have taken of it is, that a process is a continuous and uninterrupted succession of terms which is so compact that between any two terms of it a third term can always be conceived to be interpolatable. This means that in the strict sense there is no term which can be conceived to be immediately next to any term in the continuum (of the process). However, the fact that the continuum is constiuted by terms *different* from and in uninterrupted succession to each other, (of which there may be any number conceivable) will not

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

be denied by any one who admits the reality of the continuum. The terms of the continuum cannot be exactly alike, for then any kind of experiential change occurring in the self–in–process cannot be accounted for. Change must be gradual and equally distributed over the successive terms in the continuum. But it should be noted here that strictly speaking 'change' cannot *happen* to the terms or take place in them, as each of them is an integral entity not split up into two or more connected entities, as substance and attribute are (so that the substantive locus of the attributes could be described as the entity undergoing change or as that to which change happens when any one of its attributes fades away and is replaced by another). So the continual total supersession of one term in the succession by another following it is the only kind of change that may be supposed to take place in the process–self. Could such a changing entity, which cannot remain the same even for two moments (a moment here is to be understood as the smallest possible unit of time); sustain the weight of moral responsibility for actions which is sought to be imposed upon it? However dense and compact the series of selves constituting the process may be, the self which initiated an action cannot be identical with the self, coming long after its cessation and reaping the result of its action. There may be some connecting thread (if at all) running through all the selves (in the continuum) but it cannot be supposed to cause the merger of the separate identities of the different selves into each other. The erroneous notion that continuity and change could be combined in the concept of the 'process' (whose precise nature as explained above is not taken into account seems to have misled Peerenboom into the wrong belief that a changing self is a continuing self and therefore it is this self that retains its identity unaffected from moment throughout its career or phenomenological existence. Radical change in being and identity cannot go together.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

There is however another interpretation of the concept of continuity or process which may enable us to explain moral phenomena quite satisfactorily. This interpretation results from a slight modification of the Whiteheadian concept of 'ingression'. In a slightly modified view of 'ingression', the *essences* of the different unit–selves of each moment may be supposed to be carried over into the selves of the immediately–next moment so that the thread of identity is retained by all the selves in the series from moment to moment. There is no need to admit the ingression of the whole antecedent self into the consequent self in the continuum.

Another version of this 'ingression' is that each self in the series, while disappearing, leaves behind its impress on the immediately–next self and this process continues till the self–series becomes totally extinct. Any self in the series would carry within its being the accumulated impressions of all the previous selves A slight variation of this very view would be to say that every succeeding self in the self–series emerges into being as an entity incorporating all the effects that the previous selves appear to have caused, but in reality the effects are intrinsic to the emergent self itself and not caused by anything outside preceding it. The mere prior and necessary occurrence of the earlier selves could however be equated with their causality in relation to the latter transformed self.

These accounts of the continuous self are only intended to show that it is possible to explain ethical phenomena quite satisfactorily on the process–view of self, provided the view is properly interpreted. But in no case should these accounts be taken as representative of the Buddhist standpoint. Buddhism as a whole is inalienably associated with the doctrine of momentarism.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It is not quite clear whether Peerenboom is aware of this patent fact or not. But what comes out very clearly from various remarks of his is the confusion he has made between the momentarist–view and the process–view which are poles apart from each other. If he had recognised the incompatibility of these views he would never have regarded momentarism interpretable as the process–view.

But conceding for argument's sake the validity of the process–view in Buddhism, one is simply astounded to see Peerenboom carrying the process–view of self to its absured illogical extreme and maintaining that a self–in–process is continuous with its environment, and so it is also continuous with other selves constituing the environment. Why stop then with the environment? The self–in–process could as well be regarded as continuous with the whole universe. There would then be no need to admit more than one self in the universe to explain all moral and spritual phenomena.

Instead of decrying the doctrine of momentarism and regarding it as the source of all problems for Buddhist ethics, Peerenboom should have carefully considered the account of moral and spiritual phenomena given by the Buddhist authors advocating momentarism. We may present briefly this account (with slight modification) in some such way. The phenomenological self called *jīva* is an illusory identity or a transcendental construct sustained by the flow of discrete momentary and self–contained experiential units. These units are held together, so to say, in their necessarily–sequential relationship (or existence) by the law of dependent origination. The law is not some controlling agency or principle but is just the nature of the necessary succession of the discrete experiential units, each of which emerges into being out of its own natural necessity. We have

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

thus a three-tier structure constituted by the phenomenological self at the top level and the discrete momentary experiences and the law of their necessarily-successive emergence into being at the middle and the lowest levels respectively. The changing mental states do not disrupt the identity of the self either at the phenomenological or at the transcendental level of the law of dependent origination. The former type of identity is an illusion pure and simple, as the experience of this identity incorportes diversity from moment to moment as part and parcel of itself. We are to ourselves both identical and different from moment to moment. Moral phenomena are not explicable at this level of (our illusory) identity. Only the underlying transcendental identity based upon the law of dependent origination can explain moral phenomena satisfactorilly. No doubt there is no identity here in the strict sense of the word, but the necessity of the succession of the experiential units can do the duty for identity by holding together in a rigorous concatenated chain all the elements that go to make up a man's moral life. If it is felt that in this account the fact of the evolution of the self, through its past history influencing its present being is left out, as there is only succession but no connection whatsoever between the successive selves (or the experiences), we may slightly modify this account to provide for the phenomenon of evolution. This may, however, be done without importing the idea of continuity into the account. Since every moment a new self emerges into being, we may suppose that the self emerging at each moment is such that it embodies all the changes that the occurrence of the earlier selves would have wrought upon it. Not that the earlier selves influence the latter or that this influence, if it is produced, is carried over to the later selves. What may be supposed to be the case (according to the theory) is that the emergent self turns out to be, by its own nature, the evolved

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

 Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

self. Thus, every moment newer and more and more evolved selves come into being of themselves, not being influenced in the least by the selves preceding them in the series.

Indian Institute of Advanced Study
SIMLA–171005 (H.P.)

N. S. DRAVID

NOTE

1. See "Buddhist Process Ethics", *IPQ* Vol. *XV*, No. 3, pp. 248–268.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
VOLUME XVIII

No. 1, January, 1991

Ashok Gangadean	:	Predication and Logic of Language (I)	1
R. Sundara Rajan	:	Aspects of the Problem of Reference (II)	53
Jagat Pal	:	G E. Moore on the Values of Whole and Parts : A Critique	73
Daniel Holbrook	:	The Ontology of Mental Images	87
K. Srinivas	:	Analysis as a Method in Philosophy with Special Reference to A. J. Ayer	111

No. 2, April, 1991

R. Sundara Rajan	:	Aspects of the Problem of Reference (III)	153
Ashok Gangadean	:	Predication and Logic of Language (II)	199
Mangala R. Chinchore	:	Kṛtapraṇāśa and Akṛtābhyāgama : An Analysis, Defence and Rationale of the Buddhist Theory of Action	23

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Philippe H. Fluri : Thomas S. Kuhn and Fleck : Two Sociologists of Science 271

P. R. Bhat : Pragmatic Principles of Language 285

V. Ananda Reddy : Sri Aurobindo and the Process of Physical Transformation 315

Jyotsna Bapat : A Candidate Paradigm for Human Ecology 335

No. 3, July, 1991

Ashok Gangadean : Predication and Logic of Language (III) 363

R. Sundara Rajan : Aspects of the Problem of Reference (IV) 431

A. Kanthamani : L. J. Cohen's Metaphilosophical Relativism 461

P. B. Johnie : Social Constructionist and Positivist Approaches to Social Enquiry : Some Comments 479

R. P. Singh : Contradiction and Sublation : Hegel on Dialectic 503

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

No. 4, October, 1991

Kai Nielsen	:	Testing Anti–Paternalism : Some Medical Cases	525
Bradley York Bartholomew	:	Inner Self Located	549
John W. Murphy	:	The Genetic Code in View of Postmodern Linguistics	567
Raghunath Ghosh	:	Some Reflections on the Nyāya Theory of Action	581
Prabhat Misra	:	The Concept of Tātaparya in Indian Theory of Meaning	595
Arvind Sharma	:	Should the Cross–Cultural Philosophy of Religion be Normative ?	609
Sri Chandra	:	The Indian Conception of Philosophy	621
N. S. Dravid	:	Some Observations on the So–called 'Buddhist Process–Ethics'	623

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

LIFE MEMBERS (INDIVIDUALS)

307. Dr. J. Ouseparampil
Plot No. 96
S. No. 34/2
Vidyanagar
PUNE-411 032

308. Dr. B. C Goswami
Philosophy Department
Pragjyotish College
Guwahati–781 369
(Assam)

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

(Formerly 'The Philosophical Quarterly')

Students' Supplement

Journal of the Pratap Centre
of Philosophy, Amalner
AND
Department of Philosophy
Poona University, Pune

New Series

Volume XVIII
No. 1
January 1991

24/12/91

Editors :

S. S. Barlingay
R. Sundara Rajan
Rajendra Prasad
Mrinal Miri
M. P. Marathe
S. S. Deshpande

University of Poona

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
ISSN 0376-415X

Editors

S. S. Barlingay, (Professor Emeritus, Poona University), Rajendra Prasad, (Rtd. Professor, Patna), M. P. Marathe (Poona University), R. Sundara Rajan (Poona University), Mrinal Miri (NEHU, Shillong), S. S. Deshpande (Poona University)

Board of Consulting Editors :

G. N. Mathrani (Bombay), Daya Krishna (Jaipur), Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta), K. J Shah (Dharwad), R. C. Pandeya (Delhi University), D. P. Chattopadhyaya (Jadavpur University), G. N. Joshi (Poona). D. Y. Deshpande (Nagpur), J. de Marneffe (Poona), Dharmendra Kumar (Delhi University), R. C Gandhi (Delhi), J. Khwaja (Aligarh Muslim University), S. A. Shaida (I. I. T., Kanpur), Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow University), S. K. Saxena (Delhi University), S. V. Bokil (Poona University), R. A. Sinari (Goa University), R. K. Gupta (Delhi University), R. Balasubramanian (Pondicherry University), Ranveer Singh (Imphal), V. K. Bharadwaja (Delhi University), Ashok Gangadean (Haverford College, USA).

Articles in this Journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index, U. S. A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium, and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).

Articles for publication, Books for Review, and other communications pertaining to publications, Book-reviews, subscriptions, I. P. Q. Publications, etc. may be sent to :

The Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Department of Philosophy, Poona University, Pune 411 007, India.

Subscription to be sent to :

The Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly (by Cash or by Cheque)

- Change of Address and/or non-receipt of an issue of the Journal may be intimated within a month of the date of publication

- **Life Membership :**

Individuals	:	Rs. 400/-(in India)	US $ 100/-(outside India)
Institutions	:	Rs. 1500/-(in India)	US $ 200/-(outside India)

- **Annual Subscriptions :**

Individuals	:	Rs. 60 (Rs. 45/- by cheque)	US $ 35.00
Institutions	:	Rs. 100 (Rs. 80/- by cheque)	US $ 50.00
Single copy	:	Rs. 20/-	US $ 5.00

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regn. No. 24248/73

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
STUDENTS' SUPPLEMENT

ARUNDHATI MUKHERJI : Three Models of Competence : A Critical Evaluation of Chomsky ...1

SATRUGHNA BEHERA : Rule–Scepticism : Kripkean Understanding in Wittgenstein's Perspective ...17

KAMATA PRASAD : The Problem of Moral Freedom and Nicolai Hartmann ...31

BENULAL DHAR : Some Reflections on Husserl's Aproach to the Problem of Transcendence ...47

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

* Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I. P. Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
* The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
* **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
* The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
* Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
* Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining, bold face by wavy underlining.
* The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
* Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
* The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations.

Edited and Published by S. S. Barlingay, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune 411 007.
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, Pune 411 016.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THREE MODELS OF COMPETENCE : A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF CHOMSKY

The notion of competence is central and very much crucial in the theory of Noam Chomsky. But in spite of the frequent occurrence of the term *competence* in his writings, the term is not sufficiently illuminating. I have tried to give a critical assessment of some of the interpretations of Chomsky regarding the relation between competence and performance.

Transformational grammar, as formulated by Noam Chomsky, "purports to be a description of the ideal speaker–hearer's intrinsic competence." [1] Chomsky in his book *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax,* observes that competence is "the speaker–hearer's knowledge of his language" as distinct from performance which is "actual use of language in concrete situations." [2] Thus a speaker–hearer is linguistically competent in the sense that he has knowledge of language or in other words, has mastery of a system of rules. Further, this knowledge has mental reality and the rules that the speaker–hearer know are the rules as represented by transformational grammar.

Actually Chomsky's interest lies not in the actual utterances made by the people but in what is linguistically possible. In other words, he is concerned not with the actual utterances of the native speaker of a language, but with what he *can* say. And this leads to a study of his competence or the knowlege that he has of the language and not to a study of what he actually does, the sentences he actually produces.

Now we shall try to understand critically how Chomsky's theory of competence can act as the model of explaining linguistic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

behaviour. It must be mentioned in this connection that by linguistic behaviour Chomsky does not mean the behaviour where different psychological or sociological factors come into play. More clearly, by linguistic behaviour Chomsky means the behaviour that is produced by the native speakers only under ideal conditions when they are not swayed away by any extraneous factors. In short, by linguistic behaviour he means the ability of the native speakers to produce grammatical sentences. And Chomsky also claims that this production of infinite grammatical sentences can be understood not by reference to any mechanical stimulus–response mechanism but by a theory of competence as formulated by transformational grammar. Of course, when we try to explore how competence can serve to explain linguistic behaviour, we do not find any uniform and consistent answer from Chomsky.

Sometimes, Chomsky holds that we can produce and understand sentences not encountered before, because we have a mastery of rules. And in this sense *competence is an idealized model of linguistic performance*. Obviously, the linguistic behaviour that Chomsky's competence–model seeks to explain is one which is detached from the contingencies of any performance factors– 'linguistic theory', as Chomsky put it, " is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker–listener, in a completely homogeneous speech–community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random and characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance."[3] By talking about idealization Chomsky intends to exclude false starts, memory limitations from rules and all those psychological factors or grammatically irrelevant conditions from a study of language, for all these conditions, which he calls performance conditions, cannot hope to reveal the structure of our linguistic behaviour.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Thus, transformational grammar, according to Chomsky, is an account of competence, i.e , a model of what the speaker–hearer can do or actually does when he produces and understands utterances provided certain extraneous factors as distractions, shifts of attention etc are not present. To give some examples from Chomsky :

> " By a ' generative grammar ' I mean a description of the tacit competence of the speaker–hearer that underlies his actual performance in production and perception (understanding) of speech. A generative grammar, ideally, specifies a pairing of phonetic and semantic representations over an infinite range; it thus constitutes a hypothesis as to how the speaker–hearer interprets utterances, abstracting away from many factors that interweave with tacit competence to determine actual performance. "[4]

Again ;

> " A grammar, in the traditional view, is an account of competence. It describes and attempts to account for the ability of a speaker to understand an arbitrary sentence of his language and to produce an appropriate sentence on a given occasion. If it is a pedagogic grammar, it attempts to provide the student with this ability; if a linguistic grammar, it aims to discover and exhibit the mechanisms that make this achievement possible. "[5]

Thus, transformational grammar is an account of competence which is a matter of knowing how to produce grammatical sentences. And in this sense, linguistic performance is a direct reflection of competence. Just as a symphony is a set of instructions for playing a particular music, similarly competence refers to a set of rules for performing speech–acts.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But still this account of Chomsky's competence is not without serious difficulties. For one who looks at our linguistic behaviour reasonably feels with Campbell and Wales that this competence model is not an ideal model of our speech behaviour. It cannot be an adequate account of our linguistic behaviour since it is only a set of recursive rules which ignores our ability to use language on the appropriate situation. As Campbell and Wales observe:

> " Although generative grammarians, in particular Chomsky, claim that their work is an attempt to characterize the nature of competence$_2$ (that is, the nature of those human abilities that are specific to language), their main effort has in fact been directed towards a more restricted sort of competence, which we will call campetence$_3$, from which by far the most important linguistic ability has been omitted- the ability to produce or understand utterances which are not so much *grammatical* but, more important, appropriate to the context in which they are made." [6]

And incidentally, since Chomsky failed to give sufficient attention to the environmental factors or to the 'appropriateness to the situation' as an important property of our normal use of language, a very peculiar consequence would follow from his theory of competence by which one would be able to say, *I am linguistically competent even if I talk silly,* provided that is grammatical.

Accordingly, Chomsky makes a new shift in the following way :

Competence is a central component of an idealized performance model. This shift represents that although an adequate explanation of language is not given by a competence model, yet a performance model incorporates generative grammar (which expresses the speaker's competence or knowledge of language) as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a fundamental component. It is for this reason that Chomsky says :

> " To study actual linguistic performance, we must consider the interaction of a variety of factors, of which the underlying competence of the speaker–hearer is only one." [7]

Hence, to Chomsky any theory of language use or performance must include competence model as a basic component.

Now, from the changed interpretation concerning the distinction between competence and performance certain things would follow. (A) First, the notion of linguistic competence is now differently interpreted. (B) Secondly, competence is placed prior to performance

(A) It is clear that Chomsky now has changed the meaning of the term competence. In his early views Chomsky has treated the term competence as a matter of *knowing how* to produce and understand grammatical sentences But now in the modified view competence does not stand in that sense; rather it has been taken as a matter of *knowing that*. For now the notion of competence has been explained by Chomsky as *unconscious* or *tacit* :

> " Obviously, every sdeaker of a language has mastered and internalized a generative grammar that expresses his knowledge of his language. This is not to say that he is aware of the rules of the grammar as even that he can become aware of them, or that his statements about his intuitive knowledge of the language are necessarily accurate. Any interesting generative grammar will be dealing, for the most part, with mental processes that are far beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness." [8]

Hence as soon as Chon sky tries to explain the notion of competence as tacit or unconscious his earlier view changes

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

drastically. Since knowledge of language is now tacit or unconscious it cannot therefore be in the realm of *know how* which is neither conscious. nor unconscious Tacit knowledge is the knowledge that something is the case. Thus, speakers know language not in the sense that they speak grammatically under ideal conditions; knowledge of language is now taken as a necessary component for explaining our linguistic behaviour. Now a statement of knowledge is not a statement about ability which is conditional in form but a statement about knowledge in a non-trivial sense, a statement of *knowledge that* there are rules or that rules or categories are. . . .[9]

(B) Secondly, competence is prior to performance; i.e., Chomsky's view presupposes that there can be a performance model dealing with actual linguistic behaviour only after the formulation of a competence model of language. But this claim of priority of the one over the other is not made in any other field. Actually what we observe is not *priority* but *interrelation*. In fact theorists of two related fields e. g. economics and decision making are interrelated. Economic theory provides valuable insight into regularities in decision-making, and decision theory in its turn contributes to economic theory. This is the exact story of how the related deciplines develop. Priority hypothesis ignores just this well known fact.

Again, Chomsky must have to deal with the important question : how to prove that people have unconscious knowledge of language or competence ? Transformational grammarians and thus Chomsky regard the native speaker's intuition as part of the evidence for his unconscious knowledge of rules or competence.

Now let us try to understand how the word " intuition " has been taken by Chomsky. According to him intuition is a complex of rule and structure; it is not an unanalysable property as Moore thought. It is because of our rational reflection that we

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

can intuit the difference between 'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please.' Hence, by saying that 'speakers have intuition,' Chomsky does not mean that the speakers have something which transcends rational reflection. Intuition is not equated with what is self–evident on immediate inspection either. An ambiguous sentence like 'I have a book stolen' is not self–evident on immediate inspection. Rather the detection of the ambiguity would be possible after a certain mental effort. Hence, Chomsky would prefer to say that intuitions refer to the judgements the native speakers because of being native speakers, can make about the sentences of their language.

Thus, the speaker–hearer has intuition about language, i.e., he can judge that (1) some sentences are well-formed while others are not. E g 'Ann has two brothers' is a well-formed sentence and 'Ann brothers too has' is an ill–formed sentence.

(2) The native speakers can judge that certain sentences, despite their apparent similarities, are really different from one another. So, if the two sentences, 'Mira is easy to please' and 'Mira is eager to please' are given to native speakers, they will be able to judge that these sentencas are different, though they look similar,

(3) Again the native speakers can judge that two sentences, though they look different, are really similar. Thus, if the two sentences like 'Ann closed the door' and 'The door is closed by Ann' are given to native speakers, they will be able to judge or identify that they are synonymous, although they have different *surface structures.*

(4) They also can judge that certain sentences are ambiguous. If a sentence like 'I like her cooking' is presented to native speakers they will be able to identify by their intuition that this sentence is plainly ambiguous and so it can

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

either refer to ' I like what she cooks ' or ' I like the way she cooks ' etc.

These are the judgements that a native speaker can make about the sentences of language. And his ability to make judgements about this language proves that he has unconscious knowledge of grammar as specified by transformational grammar. A grammar actually explicates a native speaker's intuition. Now let us see how transformational grammar formalizes this intuition. Underlying ' Mira is eager to please, there is a string which represents ' Mira ' as the subject of the verb ' please. ' And underlying ' Mira is easy to please ' there is a string in which ' Mira ' is represented as the object of ' please '. By different types of transformational rules the two underlying strings are then transformed into the above two sentences which are similar in their surface structure.

The two sentences ' Ann closed the door ' and ' The door is closed by Ann ' have the same deep underlying structure inspite of their difference in surface structure. A transformational rule has been applied in the first sentence which can be converted into the second sentence which is its passive form by adding some elements like ' is ', ' by '. That is, from the same underlying string another type of transformational rule will derive the second sentence. The rule is ' transformation by addition '.

Grammar can also explicate the ambiguity in a sentence. When a sentence is ambiguous, the speaker also can judge that the sentence has two underlying structures. The ambiguity is not, however revealed in the surface structure of the sentence. We can reveal the ambiguity at a deeper level. So, there are two different underlying strings from which the sentence ' I like her cooking ' can be derived by different transformational rules. This is the way how grammar actually explicates our intuition. The

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

work of transformational grammar, therefore, is to formalize and specify our intuition. A transformational grammarian makes explicit the speaker's intuition and finally the implicit rules which, he believes, enables a native speaker to make judgements and produce and understand infinite number of sentences.

But the above modified version of competence does not seem satisfactory on several counts.

First, intuition as evidence in favour of our unconscious knowledge of rules or competence fails. For, even if we suppose that our ability to make judgements about language is due to the generative rules which we have internalized, yet a question remains : Is there any guarantee that our linguistic intuitions or judgements we make about language are occassioned just by the unique system of rules as given by transformational grammar ? Frankly speaking, it may not be fair to say that we have a unique system of rules for we can work out more than one system of rules to which our linguistic performance can conform. For instance, one grammar may have the following rules :

1. $A \rightarrow B$
2. $C \rightarrow B$

while another grammar may have the following rule :

3. $\begin{matrix} A \\ C \end{matrix} \rightarrow B$

And any linguistic behaviour that is in harmony with 1 and 2 will also be in harmony with 3.[10] Now, if linguistic performance is the only clue wherefrom we can jump to generative rules, how then to determine what system of rules are working actually and whether the system of rules that operates is of the type that Chomsky has formulated ? Secondly, there may be certain rules

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

in performing our speech acts–the rules which are not known by us, but at any rate they are not also very relevant to our actual verbal behaviour. This point has been beautifully made by Harman in the following way :

> " The cyclist must keep balanced on the bicycle. Exactly what he needs to do in order to retain his balance will be dictated by certain principles of mechanics that he himself is unaware of... ... ...following Chomsky's model, we might say that the cyclist has an internal representation of the principles of mechanics. Should we go on to say that every cyclist has an intuitive or tacit knowledge of the principles of mechanics ? This does not seem an illuminating way of talking about cyclists; and Chomsky's remarks about " tacit competence " do not seem to provide an illuminating way of talking about speakers of a language." [11]

Again that we can identify the sameness of two different sentences or the difference between two apparently similar sentences is no evidence in favour of our knowledge of rules or competence. There is no reason why we should run after a special kind of knowledge of language in order to identify the difference between the two sentences ' Mira is easy to please ', and ' Mira is eager to please. ' It is just our look at the words *easy* and *eager* which will suffice our purpose. If my butler brings my mail and breakfast in the same tray, I don't require a special kind of knowledge to identify the difference between my mail and my breakfast.[12]

In the foregoing we have tried to show how futile it is to make sense of unconscious knowledge of language. But still there is hope for Chomsky if we can exploit the idea of functional equivalence as suggested by Fodor. Fodor's argument runs

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

somewhat like this : the native speaker appropriately speaks, understands, identifies and makes judgements about language exactly in the same way as the linguists do (who all are consciously aware of the particular rules in performing those linguistic acts). Therefore, the difference between a native speaker and a linguist is that the former can perform the behaviour without knowing the rules, whereas the latter can perform the very same behaviour by knowing the rules. In other words a native speaker without being aware of the rules (as proposed by transformational grammar) can generate and identify well-formed sentence. He does this behaviour exactly like the linguist who knows that behind the well-formed sentence like "The man hit the ball" there lies the rule of English which is $NP\,(D + N) + V + NP\,(D + N)$. Hence, it follows that although the native speaker cannot state the rules like the linguists yet he knows them implicitly. Just as the child or an adult is not consciously aware of the principles which govern his gastric secretions unless he mastered physiology, so a child or an adult is also not

> "Consciously aware either of the grammatical rules of his language or of the principles by which he arrives at the ability to speak the language governed by those rules," [18]

unless he mastered generative Transformational Grammar. An important fact to be noted is that "stating the rules" is not necessary. A person may, in a sense, know the rule of language though he is not able to state it. It is only the professional grammarians who state those rules and feel necessary to state them.

Thus, one can say that the functional equivalence between the linguistic behaviour of a native speaker and that of a linguist proves that it is possible to infer knowledge via behaviour. But it can be argued now that any sort of behaviour may not be an identifying criterion of knowledge. The fact that one behaves in a particular way does not always mean that he has a particular

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

knowledge or belief behind it. The fact that the child behaves just like his father, i.e., sits on the armchair and opens a book of philosophy does not mean that he has the knowledge of philosophy like his father. So, we must have to specify the identifying conditions for endowing native speakers with knowledge of rules they are not explicitly aware of. And in this connection we may utilize the significant point made by Thomas Nagel.[14] Thus I may be said to have unconscious knowledge of rules if, when they are formulated explicitly before me, I immediately recognize that these rules were what I had been following all the time. But when the rules as proposed by Chomsky are presented before native speakers they do not have this kind of immediate and spontaneous assent for them.

Actually, we need not and should not agree with "inner process." In fact, it does not seem necessary to postulate any implicit knowledge of langage or inner process. The obvious danger of talking about mental structure is the temptation to think of the mind as a mysterious, imperfectly understood, medium. If our overt linguistic behaviour is mere empirical evidence for as yet inaccessible and unknown mental mechanism we can naturally wonder what the latter is. It is better that we should leave off any concept of internal representation to explain our linguistic behaviour and concentrate more on linguistic behaviour itself.

Further, even if a performance model contains an internal representation of a system of rules, we must have to show the relation between competence and performance. And Chomsky himself admits that the deep structure or the intrinsic competence is so abstract that

> "it may have no close point–by-point correlation to the phonetic realization." [16]

So, actually Chomsky has not provided any connection between

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the system of rules of transformational grammar and the actual linguistic behaviour of the native speaker. What justification can, therefore be in favour of the claim that a competence model must represent the knowledge of the language that provides the basis for the actual use of language? We don't find any conclusive arguments from Chomsky to justify his claim. Actually we don't understand the possible utility of a competence model standing apart from any performance model.

Again, if competence or knowledge of rules is a distinct abstract entity, a mystery, then how to relate this unhistorical core with social, historical conventions ? Chomsky did not illuminate this crucial point anywhere. And this perhaps leads to the third interpretation of Chomsky that *competence is an independent abstract entity remote from linguistic performance.* As he puts it :

> " (Transformational Grammar) is not a model for a speaker or a hearer." [16]

Thus, Chomsky has given such an abstractionist interpretation of transformational grammar (a grammar that is neutral to any performance model dealing with actual linguistic behaviour) that we don't understand why linguists and psychologists should devote so much time to transformational grammar that has no bearing on linguistic performance. Practically Chomsky is indifferent to this matter and he is occupied only with mere formalism. Arbitrary formalization of rules, in spite of their formal subtlety and elegance, cannot attract our interest unless they are related in some way with performance model. It is this vital fact that we miss in Chomsky. His generative grammar is merely an axiomatized system for sentences and their structural descriptions – it is only a *formal and frozen abstraction* useless for the purpose of constructing any performance model. And if a grammar cannot

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

illuminate anything about, or has no connection with, our actual linguistic behaviour it should be abandoned.

108, Lake Terrance
Calcutta – 7000 29
(W. B.)

ARUNDHATI MUKHERJI

NOTES

1. Chomsky, N., *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, Mass., The M. I. T. Press, 1965, p. 4.
2. *Ibid*, p. 4.
3. *Ibid*, 1965, p. 3.
4. Chomsky, N., *Cartesian Linguistics*, New York, Harper and Row, 1966, p. 75, n. 2.
5. Chomsky, N., *Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar*, The Hague, Mouton, 1975, p. 10.
6. Campbell, R. and R. Wales, 'The Study of Language Acquisition' in J. Lyons (ed), *New Horizons in Linguistics* London, Penguin Books, 1975, p. 247.
7. Chomsky, N., *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, Mass., The M. I. T. Press, 1965, p. 4.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
9. Cooper, D. E. (cf. *Knowledge of Language*. New York, Humanities Press, 1975, Chapter – 3) has given us three excellent reasons in favour of the contention that knowledge of language is not a matter of *knowing how* but *knowing that*. First, knowledge as competence is now supposed to explain language behaviour, and that it cannot do if equated with linguistic behaviour. Secondly, knowledge is now tacit, but *know how* is neither tacit nor explicit either. Thirdly, rules and categories of grammar are now mentally represented. Thus, knowledge of rules is now knowledge that the rules or structures are.....
10. Cf. Cooper, D. E., *Knowledge of Language*, New York, Humanities Press, 1975.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

11. Harman, G., "Psychological Aspects of the Theory of Syntax" in J. F. Rosenberg and C. Travis (eds), *Readings in the Philosophy of Language.* Englewood-Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1971, pp. 383-84.

12. Cf. Cooper, D. E., *Knowledge of Language*, New York, Humanities Press, 1975.

13. Nagel, T., 'Linguistics and Epistemology' in G. Harman (ed), *On Noam Chomsky : Critical Essays*, New York, Anchor Books, 1975, p. 221.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

15. Chomsky, N., *Language and Mind*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968, p. 27.

16. Chomsky, N., *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, Mass., The M. I. T. Press, 1965, p. 9.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

PROF. G. R. MALKANI ESSAY COMPETITION

Essays are invited for the Prof. G. R. Malkani Essay Competition **either in English or Hindi** from undergraduate or post-graduate students below the age of 25 years studying in any Indian educational institution on the theme "**Dr. Ambedkar's Contribution to Buddhism**" for the First and Second prizes to be awarded respectively of Rs. 200/– and Rs. 100/– to the essays adjudicated to be so by a panel of referees appointed for the purpose. The prize-winning essays would be published in course of time either in Studens' Supplement of the **Indian Philosophical Quarterly** or **Paramasa (Hindi)**, quarterly journals published by the Department. The conditions governing submission of essays for the competition are as follows :

1. The essay typed in double space on one side of the paper must be submitted in duplicate.
2. The essay must not be longer than 2500 words.
3. The essay must be accompanied by a certificate signed by the Head of the Institution/Department where the student is studying to the effect that
   (a) the student is studying in that institution and is below the age of 25 years, and
   (b) the essay is written by him/her.
4. The essays should reach Dr. Mangala R Chinchore, Philosophy Department, Poona University, Ganeshkhind, Pune 411 007 not later than 31–5–1991.
5. The decision of the panel of referees shall be binding on all the competitors and no correspondence of any kind would be entertained on that count.

The Head,
Philosophy Department,
University of Poona, Ganeshkhind,
Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

RULE-SCEPTICISM : KRIPKEAN UNDERSTANDING IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PERSPECTIVE

The sceptical interpretation of Wittgenstein's concept of rule and rule-following is quite apparent in Saul Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private-Language : An Elementary Exposition*[1] (hereafter K). According to Kripke rule-scepticism follows from the fact that in following a rule any rule could be followed since there is no objective ground of knowing which is the correct rule to be followed Interpreting *Philosophical Investigations's*[2] (hereafter, PI) sect. 201 he contends that a 'sceptical paradox' underlies Wittgenstein's contention that "no course of action could be determined, because every course of action can be made to accord with the rule". This, he thinks, undermines the very foundations of following a rule and hence language-use. Further, he maintains that Wittgenstein gives a 'sceptical solution' to this sceptical paradox by committing himself to a communitarian view of language and rules. This brings, as he intends to say, Wittgenstein closer to the Humean tradition which leads our concept of rules and following a rule to a virtual collapse. This paper is an attempt to give a critical account of Kripke's sceptical interpretation of following a rule in the later philosophy of Wittgenstein.

1. Rule-Scepticism : The Paradox

Kripke observes that the sceptical problem arises from the fact that one's previous knowledge of the application of a rule gives us no absolute guarantee about how in future we will apply the same rule. One's past history (past applications of the rule) and present intentions never tell us that one is following the same rule or something other than that. For example, in an

...2

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

arithematical continuation such as " 1002, 1004, 1006, 1008..." if one follows a rule like ' + 2 ', there is scope for doubt as to whether this is the continuation of series. One can ask : How do we know that one is following the particular rule ' + 2'? Nothing in any instruction given to one (or which one gives himself) justifies him to write ' 1002, 1004, 1006, 1008...' rather than ' 1004, 1008...'. The instructions one gave, the examples one produced, can be made out to be consistent with both ways of proceeding. Equally, nothing in one's mind constitutes the fact of his meaning to go on in this way or otherwise.

Kripke puts the question sharply by asking '...if God looked into our mind at some such moment what fact would God have observed in our mind ?' (K. p 14). What happened in our mind that was our meaning ' plus ' retherthan ' quus ' or some other function by ' + '? What is the mental state at that moment in the past which makes it correct for us to give ' 125 ' rather '5' as the answer to the question " 57 + 68 " ? (K. p. 21).

What follows, as Kripke contends, is Wittgenstein 's paradox. That is, as answer to the problem ' 57 + 68 ' can be determined by an act of ' meaning ' addition by ' + ' because any answer can be made out to accord with the act i. e. addition function. The Paradox about being able to know whether I am using a word (i.e., following a rule) in accord with what I meant by it (the rule) leads to the scepticism (PI, sect. 201). Kripke insists that what is true of ' + ' is true of every other meaningful expression and language–use i. e. any kind of linguistic rules that govern our use of language.

Though the sceptical problem has wide ramifications and implications fundamentally it involves two questions such as :

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(i) What is the fact that constitutes the meaning of plus by '+'?

(ii) What is the fact that forces me to follow a particular rule in a new instance ?

Keeping these questions in mind, Kripke demolishes the idea that the paradox can be solved by appeal to the notion of "disposition". In fact, as Kripke points out, no one is disposed to give correct answer to all addition questions. Most of us are disposed to give mistaken answers to some questions. Most of us are disposed to die of old age before getting to the end of some very big addition questions (K. p. 28). A disposition to make a mistake, for Kripke, is simply a disposition to give the answer other than the one that accords with the function one meant (K. p. 3). He argues that a dispositionalistic stance to the sceptical problem confuses a factual question i.e., "what answer would one give?" With a normative one i.e. "what answer should one give ?" It is not the case that "whatever is going to seem right to me is right" (PI, Sect. 258). For him, "the relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive" (K. p. 37). Consequently, language rules are communal norms for how one should go on rather than merely descriptive of communal dispositions.

Kripke's account thus allows for there to be a difference between what one *does* is allegedly following a rule as opposed to what one *should* do. This enables us to distinguish between thinking we are following a rule and actually doing so. The former occurs when one intends to follow a rule and the latter is confirmed when one's rule–following activities conform to communal norms.

Kripke also refutes the suggestion that meaning addition by '+' should be analysed by appeal to some special introspectible

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

experience. Meaning addition by ' + ' cannot be a certain feeling, like a special sort of headache or toothache. Finally, Kripke briefly discusses and rejects Platonism i.e. the realist position which he characterizes as ' largely as unhelpful evasion of the problem of how our finite minds can give rules that are supposed to apply to an infinity of cases ' (K. 54). On this account he argues that no past fact about one's mind (a finite set of applications of a rule) or his behaviour (external manifestation of dispositions) constitute his meaning plus by ' + ' So nothing in one's present use of ' + ' can constitute accord or conflict with what he meant by ' + '.

There are, according to him, no facts (or substantial contents) with which meaning of a certain word in a certain way (i.e. the possibility of a rule) can be identified So, one cannot know that in the current application he is still following the same addition rule. His application of a rule, for Kripke, is 'an unjustified stab in the dark he applies the rule blindly' (K. p. 17). So, for Kripke scepticism about following a rule virtually leads to the conclusion that language use as a rule-governed activity is impossible.

2. *The Sceptical Solution*

Wittgenstein, according to Kripe, gives a ' Sceptical Solution ' of a Humean form to this sceptical problem. This strategy consists in accepting sceptic's premises but denying that sceptical conclusion follows from them (K. p 86) Wittgenstein's solution is a sceptical one because he concedes that the sceptic's negative assertions are not answerable.

Kripke makes a distinction between a ' sceptical solution ' and ' straight solution ' in this connexion. According to him, a sceptical solution is a solution to a sceptical philosophical problem of which the negative assertions are unanswerable. That is, as A. J.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Ayers has put it, " a solution that admits the cogency of the sceptic's argument but denies that this invalidates the beliefs which the sceptic has set out to demolish ". According to Hume, for example, one cannot provide a necessary evidence which can tell us that the sun will rise in the east tomorrow. One may very well doubt claiming that the sun will not rise in the east tomorrow, which seems equally irrefutable. Hume admits the fact that not *apriori* argument, but custom is the source of our inductive inferences. This solution, for Kripke, is the sceptical solution to Hume's problem of induction or causation. So is Wittgenstein's solution to the problem of rule-following according to Kripke. In a mathematical calculation such as ' 57 + 68 ' one follows the rule of addition (the meaning given to ' + ') and gets ' 125 '. But no apriori argument is possible against someone who claims to follow the rule of quaddition (i.e. $+$)[4] and gets ' 5 '. Wittgenstein also says, according to Kripke, following a particular rule is a custom, a communal usage ' based upon a communal agreement ' This solution that Wittgenstein seems to offer is sceptieal because the sceptic's counter arguments still remain irrefutable though his conclusions are invalid.

On the contrary, a straight solution, for Kripke, is a solution to a sceptical philosophical problem according to which ' the scepticism proves to be unwarrented ! Descrates' ' cogito-ergo-sum ' argument makes him sure about the existence of everything (external and internal) and consequently proves his ' universal doubt ' unjustified.

According to Kripke, Wittgenstein's solution to the scepticism of rule-following is formed solely in terms of the community of language-users. Kripke, in general, formulates Wittgenstein's arguments as follows : firstly, how can one tell whether I am following rule ' plus ' or ' quus ' ? Secondly, what are the circumstances under which one can meaningfully ascribe rule-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

following to me ? And thirdly, when can one claim that this particular application of rule is justified ? These questions cannot he answered, as Kripke claims, if we consider rule–following in isolation. On the contrary, if we take the rule–follower as a member of community there should not be any problem to tell whether he is following the particular rule correctly or incorrectly.

The point is this It is only when we consider the rule-follower as the member of the community of language–users that the notion of following a rule and thus understanding of the rule get significance. As a result, Kripke contends that one will be in a position to say that I am following a rule if he finds, firstly, that the response which I give i.e. the way I use the sign agrees to his response. Secondly, if I interact with other fellow members of the community to which he belongs. And thirdly, if the rules which he ascribes to me have a rule in our shared communal iife. On the basis of these considerations he may take me into his community as a language–user. Moreover, a person is said to follow a rule when his/her behaviour conforms to the behaviour of other members of the community, its 'form of life'. Thus following a rule and making an application of it in actual cases is constitutive of the custom or practice of the community. Following a rule, in this sense, is a communal practice and therefore to say that a person is following a rule–privately does not make any sense.

Kripke finds that Wittgenstein makes it consistently clear that 'rule–following in isolation' is an unintelligible concept. According to Kripke, this institution of rule–following does not have any "substantive content" (K. p 89). But the circumstance (s) radically changes if we regard the rule–follower not in isolation but as a member of a wider community interacting with others. In this solution " others will have justification conditions

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

for attributing correct or incorrect rule–following to the subject" (K p. 89). This means the rule–follower's responses agree with others. In this sense, the statement "Jones is following rule R" does not satisfy any truth conditions because there is no fact in the matter. But, on the contrary, it satisfies justification or assertion–conditions. The justification conditions are the circumstances under which we are allowed to make a given assertion. The justification conditions, for Kripke, consists of communal circumstances under which we are licensed to follow a rule (s) using language. These conditions, as Ayer[5] puts it, consists of 'communal agreements' which justify our attribution of meaning to assertions with reference to our forms of life. As Kripke says "the game of asserting them under such conditions has a rule in our lives. No supposition that 'facts correspond' to those assertions is needed" (K. p. 78). This is a departure from the earlier *Tractatus* approach which proposes the "view that the general form of explanation of meaning is a statement of the truth–conditions"[6]. Thus, according to the justification conditions, Jones is entitled to say 'I mean addition by 'plus'' whenever he has the feeling of confidence that he can give correct responses in new cases (K. p. 90). Similarily, Smith is entitled to say that Jones means addition by plus if he judges that the responses which Jones gives is similar to that of Smith. One's rule–following will be judged by the community; if his responses agree with that of the community's then he passes the tests of rule–following. The way they check this is, in general, a primitive part of the language–game (K. p. 101). This means that he is accepted as the normal speaker of the language. This is in accordance with what we have said earlier, namely, that following a rule is a communal practice.

3. *Rule–Scepticism and the Private Language–Argument*

Kripke extends the sceptical argument to the notion of a private–language For Wittgenstein a case of private rule–follo-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

wing is ruled out because there is no criterion by which one can distinguish between one's thinking of following a rule and actually following it (PI, Sect. 202). Following a rule is a practice, a social institution. Therefore, it is open to public check. But a private language rules out the possibility of public check. A private language, according to Wittgenstein, is a language that definitionally is incomprehensible to any one but its inventor-user. In such a language, our concept of rule–following is not available.

Kripke has defined a private language as primarily a language developed by only one person in social or linguistic isolation. Because language and justification of word usage depends on rules, which result out of communal agreements and which make no sense except as part of the interactions within a community. So, for Kripke, the notion of a private rule (i e. to say a private use of a sign) used by a single person in isolation "can have no substantive content" (K. p 89). A person in linguistic isolation has no criteria to justify his present and future applications of what he thinks are rules. Kripke argues, as we have discussed earlier, that there is no 'corresponding facts' to verify that his present application of the rule in a new instance is justified. What he can appeal to is his own intentions and fallible memories of past intentions. For him, therefore 'what seems to be right is right'. Thus, in refuting a private language Kripke intends to say that "what is really denied is what might be called the 'private model' of rule–following, that the notion of a person following a given rule is to be analysed simply in terms of facts about the rule-follower and the rule–follower alone, without reference to his membership in a wider community" (K. 109).

In view of the above, Kripke interpretes Wittgenstein's exhortation such as 'obeying a rule is a practice' to mean that one

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

cannot be said to obey a rule in isolation because the criteria for correct and incorrect application of a rule are missing. Further, Kripke says that " the falsify of the private–model need not mean that a *physically isolated* individual cannot be said to follow rules; rather that an individual *considered in isolation* (whether or not he is physically isolated) cannot be said to do so" (K. p. 110). What this suggests is that a person in physical isolation e.g. an exile, may develop and follow rules. But an individual considered in linguistic isolation (as opposed to a physically isolated individual) is a person who is not merely out of contact with a community but is a person with whom one cannot communicate. For, our notion of a rule simply cannot apply to whatever this person does or utters.

Kripke's point is this. One cannot establish truth conditions for one's intention because one has no independent criteria to establish whether one's past use of a rule such as plus (or to say a rule to use word ' red ') is the same as his present one. So a person in social isolation cannot justify his uses of rules. One needs a community to have agreement about the use of rules. Kripke insists that as a community in which we live, we can agree on what we take to be correct uses of rules. A person in linguistic isolation or social isolation, whether or not in physical isolation, cannot follow rules, since there is nothing that he can call the correct use of words. So, according to Kripke, language is community–based, which makes a private–language in the sense of a language developed by a person in isolation or in the sense of a language that is unintelligible to person's other than its inventor-user impossible.

Further, Kripke enquires whether Wittgenstein's private language argument entails that Robinson Crusoe, isolated on an

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

island, cannot be said to follow any rules (K p 110). Kripke suggests that one can still attribute rule-following to Robinson Crusoe. That is to say, we regard him as a person who must have followed certain rules or must have participated in some community life. Nevertheless, these rules are different from ours since our experience is different from his experience Hence, we take him into our community of language-users. " Our community can assert of any individual that he follows a rule if he passes the tests for rule-following applied to any member of the community (K. p. 110) ". This suggests that Crusoe acts in the same way in which a rule-follower like any of us acts except with a difference that his responses do not agree with ours The view that Robinson Cruosoe follows rules is a consequence of community-interpretation of rule-following.[7] Crusoe's physical isolation does not stand in the way of his being called a member of our community.

Thus, according to community-interpretation, following a rule is a social practice. The concept of following a rule can be applied to an individual only to the extent he belongs to some community. This communitarian view of the concept of following a rule implies that there must be public criteria for whether there is a rule that an individual is following. Thus, this view implies the impossibility of a language which contains names of sensations where these names are used quite independently of the public criteria associated with rule-following. So there is a simple transition from the conclusion of Wittgenstein's analysis of rule-following ' it is not possible to obey a rule privately' (PI, sect. 202) to the conclusion of his analysis of words of sensation that it is not possible to have a private-language for one's inner sensations.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. Something Lacking

Kripke's interpretation is not free from certain pitfalls that are implicitly occupied in his position. A little reflection on it can show this. A Wittgensteinian reasonably may argue that there is crucial mistake that is derived from his analysis of the beginning line of the paragraph of sect. 201. His argument that there is nothing that could constitute one's understanding of a rule in a determinate way is solely based on the assumption that understanding always involves interpretation. He confuses between understanding of a rule with its interpretation. The sceptical paradox, based on the above confusion, is dispelled by the continuation of *PI*, sect. 201, that is; " It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding from the mere fact that in course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us atleast for a moment, untill we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call " obeyeing the rule " and " going against it " in actual cases. Hence, there is an inclination to say : every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term " interpretation " to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another ".

The " misunderstanding " which Wittgenstein refers to here is the idea that interpretation must alwas be involved in grasping a rule. This idea is confused because it coflates two distinct but related notions. First, interpreting a rule consists in substituting one expression of the rule for another. Second, understanding or grasping a rule involves interpretation, which is considered as a mental process. We give interpretation for something for the purpose of making it either easier to understand or more precise. An interpretation, then, may be seen as a rule which one employs to enable one to follow the original rule. But

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

an interpretation itself is not a rule. Rather a rule is exhibited through interpretations. For example, seeing a sign post i.e. an arrow mark, one may interpret that " The Administrative Building is to right, another may interpret that it is opposite direction, and yet another may interpret that it is standing nearby. But these possible interpretations are not rules themselves i.e., the signpost. As Wittgenstein very well suggests that understanding or grasping a rule is ' to be able to do ' which is exhibited in one's application of the rule. My understanding of signpost is manifested in how I respond to it on the various occasions I encounter it. I understand a word if I can make use of it in a certain way in an appropriate context; if I can be the master of a technique (PI sect. 199). Understanding is not a mental state or process. Understanding is the mastering of a technique, and how one understands a rule is manifested in the exercise of that technique in practice. But a practice is not mere action, it is a regular action in accord with a rule. Once this distinction has been clarified the temptation to think that understanding a rule must involve interpretation is removed.

The point is like this. Even if every application of a rule is an interpretation there is a way of ' grasping a rule ' which is not an interpretation. So, there is a way of ' grasping a rule ' such that the source of application of that rule itself is not an interpretation. This idea, however, does not induce us to think that Wittgenstein commits himself to a Platonic or Fregean kind of realism since for him there is no gap between a rule and its application.[8] Besides, he rejects Frege's type of grammatical from which exists eternally and immutably.[9] According to him all grammatical rules, which include rules of logic and mathematics, are the rules which are involved in our thinking and saying. They are laid down in the very use of language i.e. in the way we follow them. Wittgenstein shows that ' a paradox ' is a para-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

dox only in defective surroundings. If this is overcome the appearance of paradox will disappear.[10] We would now definitely suggest that as every paradox is a disguised non-sense, it must be solved by the 'clarification of concepts'.

Conclusion :

From the above considerations what follows is : according to Kripke following a rule amounts to conforming to the rules resulting out of social agreement appropriate to that particular use of language. In the absence of socially agreed rules, communication and interactions amongst the members of the speech community will not be possible. If all our rules change and new rules come into being without our acceptance we will fail to understand one another. If, as Kripke intends, the 'plus' means 'quus' and the 'red' means 'blue', our social behaviour will be thrown into disarry. So to ascertain the meaning of the expression i.e., a rule for its use is not to consider the expression in isolation deprived of communal circumstances. Rather, it is to find out the way it functions in the language–game that 'sustains itself only because of the brute fact that we generally agree.' That is, the foundation for language proposed by Kripke, to get over the rule–scepticism, is agreement in responses. Even though there is no 'fact of the matter' which justifies one response over another (to follow a 'quus' like rule rather than 'plus'), the mere fact that we agree in our responses is sufficient to make language possible. A wrong response would be one that does not agree with those of the community, a correct response would be one that does agree. If there would be no common agreement there could be no rules and no language as a rule–governed activity which enmeshes with our form of life.

Kripke suggests a unified and coherent interpretation of some of the most enigmatic and intractable Wittgensteinian pronouncements. He presents and discusses a genuinely puzzling paradox

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

which leads to the so-called 'rule-scepticism', that is worthy of careful thought whether Wittgenstein invented it or not. Nonetheless, Kripke's consideration is thought-provoking and reactive to recent language-thinkers, especially to Wittgensteinians.*

Department of Philosophy
University of Hyderabad
Hyderabad – 500 134.

SATRUGHNA BEHERA

NOTES

1. Kripke, Saul A. *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition;* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982)
2. Wittgenssein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations.* Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953)
3. See, Ayer, A. J. *Ludwig Wittgenstein* (Penguin Book, 1985), p. 72.
4. Kripke (1982) introduces a new sign i. e. '$+$' which stands for the concept 'Quus' and claims that there is not any philosophical justification to mean 'quus' as 'Plus' in a mathematical computation (following additional rule) p. 21.
5. See, Ayer, *Ludwig Wittgenstein* p. 73.
6. See, Dummett, Michael. "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics" in *Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations* ed. George Pitcher (Mcmillan & Co. Ltd. London, 1966) p. 421.
7. See, Christopher Peacocke "Rule-Following: The Nature of Wittgenstein's Argument" in *Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule* (ed) Holtzman and Leich (1980) pp. 63-80.
8. See, Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Book* (Basil Balckwell, Oxford, 1958) p. 98
9. See, Wittgenstein, *Remarks On The Foundations of Mathematics.* (RFM) ed. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1956) p. 96.
10. See, Wittgenstein, R. F. M. p. 410.

* I am thankful to the authorities of ICPR for providing me with General Fellowship that enabled me to carry on research in this connection. And I am thankful to my teacher Dr. R. C. Pradhan for his valuable suggestions and comments on this paper.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE PROBLEM OF MORAL FREEDOM AND NICOLAI HARTMANN

It is a fact of moral experience that human beings, when faced with a moral law, a moral value or an ought, have the power to decide for or against it, and to actualize or reject. This capacity of the person to decide for or against a moral value or an Ought and to actualize it or reject it is known as moral freedom.[1] In other words, moral freedom of the person consists in his ability to choose between alternatives and to actualize or to reject it. Hartmann's conception of moral freedom may be accurately described in the words of Martin Luther King (Jr.) as ' the act of deliberating, deciding and responding within our destined nature. '[2]

It is obvious that moral freedom includes both, i.e, freedom of decision and freedom of action. Nicolai Hartmann distinguishes between the two constituents of moral freedom, i.e., freedom of decision or will and freedom of action. The freedom of action refers only to the carrying out of the decision, it refers only to the actualization of the decision. It does not refer to the decision or will itself or the setting of its direction.[3] But the voluntary actions of human beings presuppose the decision of the will which is manifested in the voluntary actions of human beings.

The real appreciation of the relevance of moral freedom depends upon the realization that there are certain moral phenomena which would remain unexplained without the hypothesis of personal freedom. The consciousness of self–determination, the fact of moral responsibility and accountability and the consciousness of guilt are instances of such moral phenomena. The consciousness of self–determination felt to be present among human beings indicates the presence of such a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

self-determination among them. A man is held to be morally responsible only for an action which he is supposed to performed at his own free will. The same is true of accountability too. The consciousness of guilt prevails over a person only when he feels that he has done a misdeed at his own free will. After analysing these moral phenomena, Hartmann cocludes that they lead us only upto the level of a high degree of hypothetical certainty, not absolute certainty.[4] They do not provide a proof of moral freedom. But this is so only because of the metaphysical nature of the problem itself.[5]

The relevance of the issue is further illustrated by the fact that moral judgments become meaningless without the presupposition of the freedom of action of the person concerned. Moral judgements are passed only over such conducts of the persons which are considered to be voluntary in the sense that such acts are supposed to be performed at their own free will. Moreover, ethics itself is rendered to be a pseudo–study without such a presupposition because it is concerned with the study of voluntary conduct of human beings. Hartmann concludes that 'freedom of the moral person is ethically necessary'.[6] In fact, the denial of freedom of decision and action implies the denial of all creativity to human beings.

It is only because of its vital implications for human beings and human society that the issue of personal freedom has received such a widespread attention of the philosophers and ethical thinking itself. Prominent ancient Greek thinkers, e.g, Plato and Aristotle, considered the freedom of personal will to be something self–evident needing no proof to establish itself.[7] In fact, belief in pesonal freedom constitutes a dominent element of western culture.[8] The same holds true in the context of Eastern culture, especially Indian culture.[9]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But after all, philosophers have expressed difference of opinion over the issue. The belief in personal freedom seems to be undermined by the philosophical belief in determinism. 'Determinism is the doctrine that what happens must happen '.[10] Although different varieties of determinism have been put forward in the history of philosophy, in the present age it is only the causal variety of it that is supposed to create a real challenge to the issue of moral freedom. It is only because of its widespread acceptance in the present day society that Paul Edwards felt compelled to identify determinism exclusively with its causal variety when he says : 'Determinism is the theory that everything in the universe is entirely governed by the causal laws, '[11]

The causal laws state that each and every event of nature, including human decisions and actions, is determined by the causes or conditions antecedent to it. It states that the present is always an outcome of the past. The determinist claims that he is right in holding such a view because it is supported by scientific evidence.[12]

An objection is raised against determinism that it cannot be taken as true simply because the scientists have not succeeded in discovering causal laws governing all events. The determinist replies that the continued success of science provides some ground for believing that all events are governed by causal laws, even if a shortage of time, intelligence or effort results in ultimate failure of the attempt to discover all those causal laws.[13] In fact, the failure of the scientists to discover laws governing all events does not imply a denial of the existence of such laws.

In opposition to the advocates of moral freedom, the determinist believes that there is no such a thing as free will. He argues : If each and every decision is determined by the causes

...3

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

or conditions antecedent to it, then it is a necessary product of certain forces antecedent to it. Bvt it implies the falsity of the belief that one could have decided otherwise. To put it another way, ' If every decision is determined, then free will is an illusion. '[14]

This gives rise to the problem of personal freedom. It presents itself in the form of a dilemma : either men are capable of deciding and acting freely and therefore nature is not dererministic, or nature is deterministic and therefore men are not capable of deciding and acting freely. But men are inclined to believe, on the one hand, that nature is deterministic, and, on the other hand, they suppose themselves to be free in the sense that is required to make them morally responsible. In fact, the apparent conflict between these two assumptions constitutes the philosophical problem of personal freedom.[15]

There are three ways of dealing with a dilemma : to accept one horn, to accept the other horn, or to attempt a reconciliation of the two horns of the dilemma. The task of reconciliation of the two horns of this dilemma consists in illustrating the compatibility of freedom, in the sense required by moral responsibility, with natural determinism.[16]

During the most recent times those who embrace natural determinism at the cost of denying freedom have received little favour among philosophers and ethical thinkers. Therefore, the field has been left open for the other two : those who embrace freedom at the cost of denying natural determinism, and those who attempt to reconcile the two. These are known as libertarians or indeterminists and compatibilists respectively [17]

The libertarians reject natural determinism in order to defend personal freedom. They hold the view that natural indeterminism is a necessary condition of freedom. In other words, they hold

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the view that there are at least some human decisions and actions not governed by causal laws.[18] The most common defence of this position is based on the immediate experience of freedom. The libertarians argue that nothing can be more certain than what is given in immediate experience. Hence, our experience of freedom, being a fact of immediate experience, is more certain than the complicated theory of determinism.[19]

In fact, libertarians agree with the determinists that physical objects and animal organisms are subject to the laws of cause and effect. They further agree with the determinists that our bodies and bodily functions, too, are largely determined by the laws of cause and effect. But they disagree with the determinist's view that even man's moral and volitional nature is subject to the laws of cause and effect. Libertarians argue that man's moral and volitional nature cannot be explained in terms of cause and effect. These are free and undertermined.[20]

Libertarians are also known as inderminists only because they hold the view that natural indeterminism is a necessary condition of freedom. They cannot believe that they are wrong in holding this view because they consider it as self evident truth.[21]

The indeterminist believes that it is impossible to predict human decisions and actions. It is so not because of the ignorance of the causes governing them but rather because they are not governed by the laws of cause and effect. The indeterminist holds that the individual not only can make uncaused decisions but also can initiate courses of action that represent genuine novelty.[22]

Libertarians appear to go to pieces over the questions: What are the sufficient conditions of freedom. It becomes difficult for libertarians to say that the sufficient conditions of freedom may be simply absent, because they hold that a necessary condition of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

freedom is its natural indeterminism. But freedom is something more than mere randomness. When libertarians try to speak about what this something more is, their talk becomes obscure and incoherent. Indeed, the best argument for compatibilism is still that libertarianism soon falls into obscurity and incoherence.[23]

Hartmann rejects indeterminism as an explanation of personal freedom on the ground that it advocates a break, a gap or an interruption in the causal nexus, in opposition to his belief that there is no break, no gap or no interruption in the thorough-going determination of causal nexus. But once the theory of uninterrupted all pervading determination of causal nexus is accepted as ture, then the theory which advocates a break, an interruption in the causal nexus stands refuted of itself. In fact, indeterminism, at least within certain limits, was postulated as an explanation of personal freedom by those thinkers who held the incompatibility of freedom and determinism.[24]

In opposition to the indeterminists or Libertarians, the compatibilists maintain that there is no conflict between freedom and determinism. And the appearance of any conflict between the two is deceptive. They consider that a free action does not mean an 'uncaused' action. They hold the view that it is not causality that freedom is to be contrasted with, but necessity, constraint or compulsion. An action is considered to be unfree not because it has a cause but because it has a special sort of cause. In fact, most of the compatibilists explain the appearance of incompatibility as the result of a confusion of the meaning of 'compelled' and 'caused'.[25]

Nicolai Hartmann is a compatibilist. He believes that freedom and determinism are not opposed to each other. They are not incompatible. Far from there being a conflict between the two,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the moral freedom of the person consists in having a determinant of his own and the capacity of the person to add this peculiar determinant as a Plus not only over and above the determination of causal nexus but also over and above the determination of the Ought in deciding for or against an Ought.[66] This is what Hartmann calls 'freedom in the positive sense'.

Hartmann accepts a thoroughgoing causal determination of nature, including hamn beings. He goes to the extent of saying that personal freedom is possible only in a world determined thoroughly by the law of cause and effect, not otherwise. The causal nexus of nature does not resist the addition to such a heterogeneous determinant because it is not a closed totality. It always stands open to the determinants from other quarters, provided the availability of such a determinant. The effect of adding such a peculiar determinant results in the diversion of the process itself from its original direction, because it modified the determinational complex and thereby all the ensuing stages of the process. The causal nexus does not resist such a diversion of the process because it is determined in a forward direction, not in a backward direction.[67]

Hartmann realizes that personal freedom is not possible in a world determined finalistically because the finalistic nexus cannot incorporate a new determinant from another quarter. It is a closed totality consisting of the backward running determination of the means, starting with the end. At every stage it resists the addition of a new determinant.[28] If the new determinant is stronger than the finalistic nexus, then the process is diverted and the nexus itself is broken. But if the finalistic nexus is stronger than the new determinant, then it overcomes the disturbance and cancels the diversion and leads the process back again to the end. In both cases the possibility of incorporating a new determinant to the undamaged nexus is excluded. This

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

implies impossibility of personal freedom, i.e, 'freedom in the positive sense', in a world determined by the finalistic nexus.[29]

Hartmann criticizes ethical naturalism and psychlogism on the ground that both these theories set up a monism of causal determination. It is this determinational monism which excludes freedom. Freedom is never possible in a world where a single type of determination reigns throughout all its strata. It is possible only in a world where at least two types of determinations are superimposed one over the other. It is only in such a world that a higher determination can adjust its determinant to a lower one and an actual Plus of determination comes into existence over and above the lower one. Therefore, the mistake of ethical naturalism and psychologism does not consist in accepting a determinism of the causal type, but in adhering to determinational monism. In such a case there remains nothing which can be added as a Plus of determination over and above the causal nexus, and hence no freedom.[30]

Hartmann is confident regarding the presence of determinational types other than the causal one. In this connection he analyses the situation of human beings. As a matter of fact man is not only a natural being but also a moral being. Of course, as a natural being man is determined by the causal nexus of nature. But as a moral being he also feels the determination of moral law or moral values.[31] This implies the fact that there are at least two types of determinations superimposed one over the other, so far as the case of man is concerned. In other words, man is also determinined by the moral law or moral values over and above the determination of causal nexus. The causal nexus of nature does not resist such a superimposition because it is not a closed totality. It always stands open for a higher type of determination, the determination of moral law or moral values can be added as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

a Plus over and above the determination of causal nexus. And on that account it is 'free in the positive sense' as compared with the lower one. This is what the third law, i.e. 'the law of freedom' of 'the law of categorical dependence' states.[32]

Hartmann makes it clear that the determination of moral law or moral values is finalistic in nature because it has a goal, a purpose or a teleology of its own. It leads to a goal or an aim which it tries to attain This implies the fact that the finalistic determination, being a higher type of determination, can be superimposed over the causal nexus. It can be added as a Plus over and above the determination of causal nexus. 'This means that the causal nexus always stands open to the introduction of a purpose and attaches itself to that purpose unresistingly, so far as the purpose knows how to make use of the given causal complex as a means.',[33]

Hartmann proceeds further by pointing out the fact that the determination of moral law or moral values over and above the causal nexus demonstrates only the categorical freedom of the moral law or values over and above the causal nexus. It does not imply a demonstration of personal or moral freedom of the person because the latter requires a freedom over and above the determination of moral values too, because moral freedom of the person subsists in his power or ability to decide for or against a moral value.[34]

Hartmann realizes that a demonstration of moral freedom is possible, only if the person contains in himself a determinant of his own which can be added as a Plus, not only over and above the causal nexus but also over and above the determination of moral values. The personal determinant can be added as a Plus, only if it is a higher type of determinant, as compared not only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with the causal determination, but also with the determination of the Ought. But once the presence of such a personal determinant is accepted as true, then the personal freedom or moral freedom 'follows simply from the categorical laws of dependence, according to which the lower determination is always the 'stronger', but the higher is none the less 'free' as compared with it[35] But the total structure is thereby changed, because there are no longer only two but three types of determination, super-imposed one over the other in one and the same ethical actuality, in the actual will, in every actual deed of a person[36]

Although the determination of the Ought is finalistic in nature, it does not resist the addition of personal determinant. In fact, the teleology of the values takes place only through the addition of a personal determinant. It is so because the Ought as a determinant is not ontologically universal. It determines the actual will only when the will itself decides to be determined by it. This capacity of the person to decide for or against a value, to commit or not to commit himself to it, is what Hartmann calls moral or personal freedom. But the actualization of this capacity is made possible only through the addition of a personal determinant. [37]

In fact, moral freedom, according to Hartmann, is only a special case of categorical freedom.[38] The categorical freedom denotes the fact that every higher type of being in the levels of stratification is 'categorically free' over and above the lower level of beings because it has its own novelty, it has a determinant of its own which can be added as a Plus of determination over and above the lower level of beings.[39] Ontologically it is possible that the human beings, being at the highest level of stratification, may have a categorical novelty, a determinant of their own which can be added as a Plus of determination over and above the lower level of beings. Moral freedom of the person,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

his capacity to decide for or against a value or an Ought is made possible only through the addition of his own personal determinant. In case he decides to be determined by an Ought or a value then the extra-causal determinant that is added over and above the causal nexus consists of a peculiar supplementation of the moral determinant and the personal determinant. Even when the will decides against a value or an Ought, it does so only through the addition of its own determinant against it.[40] Such a positive interpenetration of the extra-causal determinant is made possible only because the determination of the Ought is not ontologically Universal. It does not determine the actual will unless the individual will itself decides to be determined by the Ought.

It is evident from the above that the free will is 'free in the positive sense' not only over and above the causal nexus but also over and above the determination of the Ought. Even if the will decides against a value, it must be positive self-determination; otherwise it would be an undetermined will. If fact free will is not an undetermined will but it is precisely the decided will, the determined will which must be free. But this does not prevent it from confronting precisely the same values which leave an open alternative before it. This implies that the will is connected with an axiologically typical situation, a partial indeterminism of the values which can only be described as 'freedom in the negative sense'.[41]

This leads Hartmann to the conclusion that the will and with it the person are free in two senses. They are free 'positively' over and above the ontological and axiological principles, but at the same time they are also free negatively from the side of values. In fact, 'on the higher plane, a reciprocal conditioning relation subsists between the two kinds of freedom in one and the same personal volition.'[42]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

As to the nature of the personal determinant, Hartmann holds that nothing more can be known about it than the mere fact that its mode of determination is finalistic in nature. In other words personal teleology is the determinational mode of personal determinant which constitutes personal freedom of the individual.[43] The peculiarity of the determinational mode of personal determinant lies in its 'power to commit itself to definite ends'. In other words, its peculiarity lies in its capacity to actualize its own teleology. On the contrary, the teleological determination of the Ought lacks this capacity.[44]

The most powerful argument used by the critics against compatiblists is based on the view that they do not pursue the subject far enough. It is said that the reconcilers stop arbitrarily at the volitions or desires as the causes of our voluntary actions. But if determinism is true then the search for the causes must be pursued further. Ultimately it leads us to the inherited equipment and environmental influences over which we have no control. Hence, it is said, we cannot be held responsible for our actions because they are not really free. In the words of Schopenhauer 'a man can surely do what he wills to do, but he cannot determine what he wills'.[45]

But this criticism does not apply particularly in the case of Nicolai Hartmann. It is so because Hartmann's view is not based on the insufficient analysis of causes but it is based on the categorical novelty of the human beings. Because of their categorical novelty human beings have a determinant of their own which can be added as a Plus of determination not only over and above the causal nexus but also over and above the determination of the Ought in deciding for or against an Ought. Here lies the personal freedom or moral freedom of human beings.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Nicolai Hartmann's contribution to the issue of moral freedom consists in his effort to provide a critical analysis of the issue in a proper perspective from a realistic point of view.

He is perfectly justified in holding that moral freedom of a person consists in his capacity to decide for or against a moral value or an Ought, and to actualize it or to reject it.

Hartmann's views over the celebrated controversy of 'freedom versus determinism' appear to be the most rational even today. Although indeterminism continues to receive the support of some eminent thinkers even today, the compatibilist approach adopted by Hartmann appears to me to be the most rational.

He is justified also in upholding the view that the facts of moral phenomena, i e. the consciousness of self-determination, the fact of moral responsibility and accountability, and the consciousness of guilt led us only upto the level of hypothetical certainty, not the absolute certainty, about the reality of moral freedom.

But Hartmann's most original contribution to the issue lies in his attempt to trace out an ontological possibility of moral freedom. He does so with admirable success. In this regard he is led to the conclusion that moral freedom is only a special case of the categorical freedom. The categorical freedom denotes the fact that every higher type of being in the levels of stratification is 'categorically free' over and above the lower level of beings because it has its own novelty, it has a determinant of its own which can be added as a Plus of determination over and above the lower level of beings. Ontologically it is possible that human beings, being at the highest level of stratification, may have a categorical novelty, a determinant of their own which can be added as a Plus of determination over and above the lower level of beings. Moral freedom of the person, his capacity to decide for or against a value or an Ought is made possible only

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

through the addition of his own personal determinant. In case he decides to be determined by an Ought or a value, the extra-causal determinant that is added over and above the causal nexus consists of a peculiar supplementation of the moral determinant and the personal determinant. Even when the will decides against a value or an Ought, it does so only through the addition of its own determinant against it. Such a positive interpenetration of the extra-causal determinant is made possible only because the determination of the Ought is not ontologically universal. It does not determine the actual will unless the individual will itself decides to be determined by the Ought.

The relevance of Hartmann's effort in this regard may be appreciated only if we realize the fact that 'by the opening of the twentieth century it (determinism) was so aggressive as to put the orthodox view on the defensive'.[46] Hartmann's Ethik appeared in 1926. The limits of his work extend only upto a demonstration of ethical necessity and ontological possibility of moral freedom.[47]

118/A, Birla Hostel
Banaras Hindu Univerisity
Varanasi–221 005
(U. P.)

KAMATA PRASAD YADAV

NOTES

1. See Hartmann, Nicolai: *Ethics* (trs.) Stanton Colt (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1951), Vol. III, pp. 21–22.
2. King (Jr.), Martin Luther: *Strength to Love* (Harper Row, New York, 1951) p. 81.
3. See Hartmann, Nicolai: *Ethics* (trs.) Stanton Colt (Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1951), p. 41.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 153, 170 and 176.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 137–38.
6. *Ibid*, p. 246.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
8. Clark, Mary T., *The Problem of Freedom* (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey, 1973), p. 3.
9. Potter, Karl H.: 'Freedom and Determinism from an Indian Perspective,' in *Philosophy East and West*, 1967, Vol. 17, p. 113.
10. Throp. John. *Free Will* (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, p. 10.
11. Edwards Paul: 'Introduction' of 'Determinism, Freedom and Moral Responsibility,' in *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, (eds). Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London 1957), p. 310.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
13. See Tillman, Frank, Berofsty, and O'Conner, John (eds.): *Introductory Philosophy* (Harper and Row, New York, London, 1967), p. 128.
14. *Ibid*, p. 130.
15. See Ayer, A. J.: "Freedom and Necessity" in *Philosophical Essays* (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., New York, London, 1963), p. 271.
16. Thorp, John. *op cit*, p. 1–2.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
18. Tillman, Frank; *op cit*, p. 129.
19. Edwards Paul; *op cit*, p. 313.
20. Mead Hunter: 'Determinism Vs. Indeterminism,' in *Types and Problems of Philosophy* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, London, 1965), p. 311.
21. Thorp John; *op cit*, p. 2.
22. Mead, Hunter; *op cit*, p. 311.
23. Thorp. John; *op cit*, p. 2.
24. Hartmann, Nicolai; *op cit*, p. 65.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

25. Pap, Arthur; 'Determinism, Freedom, Moral Responsibility, and Causal Talk,' in *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science*, (ed.) Sidney Hook (Collier Books, New York, 1961), p. 212.

26. Hartmann, Nicolai; *op cit*, p. 208.

27. *Ibid*, p. 69.

28. *Ibid*, p. 70.

29. *Ibid*, p. 71.

30. *Ibid*, p. 64.

31. *Ibid*, p. 80.

32. *Ibid*, p. 76.

33. *Ibid*, p. 79.

34. *Ibid*, p. 11

35. *Ibid*, p. 208

36 *Ibid*, p. 208

37. *Ibid*, p. 210–11.

38. *Ibid*, p. 245

39. *Ibid*. p. 76

40. *Ibid*, 22[illegible]

41. *Ibid*, p. 228.

42. *Ibid*, p. 230.

43. *Ibid*, p. 237.

44. *Ibid*, p. 238.

45. Edwards, Paul; *op cit*, p. 316.

46. Mead, Hunter; *op cit*, p. 308.

47. Hartmann, Nicolai; *op cit*. p. 246.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

SOME REFLECTIONS ON HUSSERL'S APROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE

Husserl's phenomenology makes a radical attempt to liberate itself from the problem of transcendence. *This* has been the chief concern of this paper. To analyse the topic, a modest attempt has been made to review (i) how Husserl's predecessors have dealt with the problem of transcendence and Husserl's attitude to their solution to the problem, (ii) Husserl's own methodology and basic apporoach to the problem of transcendence. And (iii) lastly, a few points, which occur in mind by way of strong doubt, have been brought out in favour of the view that Husserl's phenomenology does not fully succed in keeping itself free from the problem of transcendence.

It may be worthwhile to make clear the senses of transcendence which we wish to deal with here. The first transcendence is found in traditional European epistemology where it is meant– " being essentially (in itself) different from pure consciousness ".[1] The problem arises when we direct our attention on the nature of genuine cognition. In the case of genuine knowledge, there is a subject possessed of some idea, on the one hand, and the object as such, on the other. Consider the simple case of perception for example, when we see a " chair ". The " chair " we see, is taken to be an idea in the subject's mind which is said to be cansed by the chair that exists outside the mind. In the case of true cognition, the idea corresponds with the object of what it is the idea. Here, " the object is not immanent in the act of cognition; rather it is transcendent to this act ".[2] Correspondence of the idea with its respective transcendeut object gives rise to a piece of true knowledge But the problem arises : what guarantees that

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the idea which we possess is corresponding to its transcendent object ? How do we make sure of it ? This question has been formulated slightly differently by Ulrich Glaesges as follows: " How can an experience immanent to a subject correlate to an object not contained in this experience ? " [3] There remains the possibility of illusions and error.

Here another sense of transcendence, which has taken its root from Husserl's own epistemology, is to be dealt with. The word, " transcendence " in this sense does not mean beyond the region of transcendental consciousness but *within* pure consciousness which Husserl calls " transcendence in immanence ". More explicitly, it is meant–being different from or beyond the *act* of pure consciousness. What remains beyond the act of pure consciousness is, in Husserl's term, " immediate givenness ".

I

Let us begin by pointing out that Husserl, like many other thinkers, " is historically conditioned in important respects." [4] He is more or less influenced by his predecessors, particularly, by Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and Kant. Firstly, Husserl's emphasis on a systematic starting–point and a definite method in philosophy is clearly a Cartesian echo. Husserl also welcomes the Cartesian ideal of grounding philosophy on mathematical certitude, and accordingly, he takes the Cartesian attention to the primacy of first–person experience as his *modus operandi*. Secondly, Berkeley's endeavour to show that the existence of the external world is mind–dependent in respect of knowledge, and his anti–metaphysical attitude seems to have influenced Husserl to a great degree. Thirdly, it is perhaps due to Hume's sceptical attitude, which shakes off the foundation of the objective world, that Husserl seeks to remain neutral to it. Lastly, Husserl, like

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Kant, has taken transcendental approach to the problem of knowledge i e., to find out the logical presuppositions of knowledge.

As Husserl is influenced by these classical thinkers, it is quite obvious that he is aware of the problem of transcendence and the difficulties it posed for these thinkers. Here it may be worthwhile to consider briefly how the problem of transcendence is approached by these philosophers and what is Husserl's reaction in this regard.

Firstly, Descartes, at the outset of his philosophical thought, feels the difficulties of taking the transcendent world as the object of knowledge. He raises the question, namely, what is the guarantee that we are not dreaming always? He begins to doubt the existence of everything and finds that this world of tables and chairs, trees and mountains can be doubted *in principle*.[5] But gradually, he becomes convinced that everything can be doubted except the doubting experience itself. For doubting is a kind of thinking, and thinking presupposes a thinker. Hense the self-evident principle "I think, therefore, I am." But in order to escape solipsism, Descartes brings the idea of a veraeious God as innate idea. It is to be noted here that God, of which Descartes talks, is *transcendent* one. Thus Descartes, at the end of his philosophic journey, is back with all that he set out to doubt. What is more, now he is able to affim truth on what he thinks such firmer ground

From this short survey of cartesian solution to the problem, it appears that the idea of a transcendent God plays an important role here. Descartes' starting point is no doubt praiseworthy, but his acceptance of transcendent world depending on the veracity of God is not a sound solution. For, he may be said to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

have solved the one instance of the problem of transcendence by creating another problem of transcendence, namely God.

Secondly, turning to Berkeley we see that he is greatly influenced by the Lockean thesis that our knowledge extends no further than ideas. But he is well-aware of the problem that arises out of the Lockean position which takes the transcendent world for granted. As Berkeley thinks that nothing exists except the ideas, his theory is generally known as "Subjective idealism" or more appopriately "idealsm". According to this theory, the term, "existence" as being related with perception is always given in the mind. That is to say, "we cannot meaningfully assert the existence of anything without relating it to the existence of a perceiving mind"[6] Hence, the dictum, "Esseest percipii". In order to escape solipsism and to account for *continuity* of the existence of things, Berkeley attributes perceptions to God who cannot claim of such perceptions. Here it is to be noted, again, that the Berkeleyan God is *transcendent*, and certainly not immanent.

It may be said with regard to Berkeleyan solution to the problem that he partially succeeds in solving the problem of transcendence taking the external world as immanent to human mind, but *in order* to establish the *continued* existence of the things, he has to bring the idea of a *transcendent* God and thereby he immediately becomes involved in the riddle of transcendence.

Thirdly, Hume, as a thorough-going empiricist, tries to carry the basic standpoint of empiricism to its logical conclusion. He reduces transcendent world to impressions and ideas from which all our knowledge is derived For him, we know nothing about what is transcendent to "impressions" and "ideas". Though he agrees with Descartes that genuine knowledge must be self-evident, he finds no such knowledge anywhere except in mathe-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

matics. Accordingly, he denies the universal law of causality and substance–both material and spiritual. Hume, thus, adopts a sceptical attitude towards the problem of external world.

Now, it may be remarked that his distinction between the impressions and ideas leaves much to be desired. For, the examples he cites in order to make clear as to what he meant by impressions refer to, even though *indirectly,* a transcendent world. Yet on strict ground of empiricism, Hume is not able to maintain that such a world exists beyond all doubts. It is perhaps in Hume that we find the philosophical problem of transcendence assuming a status of importance.

Lastly, Kant, in order to synthesize the empiricism and the rationalism, takes " experience " as a *chronological* presupposition of knowledge when he says that knowledge begins with experience but does not originate from it. Here " experience " refers to transcendent world. Further, he makes a distinction between the object of knowledge and the object as such i.e, between " phenomenon " and " noumenon ". He recognises the possibility of the knowldge of what " appears " to consciousness and *not* of what lies behind " appearance ". But a question arises : how does Kant predict the existence of " noumenon " which can *never* be the object of knowledge ? The postulation of " things–in–themselves " or " noumena " seems to be unjustified. Though philosophically inadequate, it bears a significance in his system. For if he drops it, it becomes difficult for him to talk of things when they are not the object of knowing consciousness of any individual.

From this brief survey of Kant's confrontation with the problem of transcendence, it may be concluded that Kant's use of the term " phenomenon " is to be understood only in contradistinction from what he calls " noumenon " but for Husserl,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

" phenomenon " does not posit a transcendent reality. However, what " appears " to consciousness is presented to sensibility and there remains the possibility of illusion or error when the object as such appears. Besides this, Kant's recognition of " noumenon" means transcendent reality. Kant, thus, fails to offer a proper solution to the problem of transcendence.

In fine, from Husserl's point of view, it may be observed that all his predecessors have failed to offer a proper solution to the problem of transcendence, though they have contributed much to Husserl's thinking on the subject. For him, " Descartes did not determine this field of consciousness purely ".[7] Both Cartesian and Berkeleyan solution to the problem of transcendence by bringing the idea of God is not a reasonable solution. Besides this, he also cannot embrace scepticism of Hume, or any other form of scepticism. Moreover, Kantian way of tackling the problem of transcendence by making a contradistincsion between " phenomenon " and " noumenon " also is not acceptable to him For, this contradistinction directly points to transcendence.

II

Having observed the predecessors' solution the problem of transcendence seems to Husserl to be an unresolved one and consequently, he seeks to neutralise ' transcendence " by his distinctive methodology. As a result, he launches on his own plan and methodology for pure phenomenology. For our purposes, we will briefly explain his phenomenological method of " bracketing " or reduction and draw the basic features of intentionality in what follows

It may be quite relevant to present here, as Husserl does, the Brentanian interpretation of intentionality and see how he approaches to it. Brentano's chief concern is to demarcate the boundary of mental phenomena by distinguishing it from physical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ones According to Brentano, the distinction between psychological phenomena and physical phenomena lies in the fact that the former. unlike the latter, are characterised by " intentional relation " or what he calls " intentional inexistence " of the intended object

" Every mental phenomena ", says Brentano, " is characterised by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or sometimes the mental) inexistence of an object, and what we should like to call, although not quite unambiguously, the reference to a content the directedness toward object (which in this context is not to be understood as something real) or the immanent-object-quality ".[8]

In order to characterise the psychological phenomena, Brentano, as we see in the above passage, makes use of two phrases (i "intentional inexistence of an object", (ii) "reference to a content " In the first, " object " means factual object. The ' intentional inexistence " implies the existence of the intended object *inside* the intending subject and not outside. The intended object may or may not have the existence independent of intended mind. When, for example, one thinks of a " pen ", the object of thought is the pen which exists outside, independent of the intending mind, but it need not be existent, E. g. an " unicorn " which has no extra mental existence. Thus, the two objects, namely, " pen " and " unicorn " make no difference to Brentano's conception of intentionality. So Brentano calls these objects like " pen " or " unicorn " " immanent objects ".

The second characterisation of the psychic phenomena, namely, the intentional relation or " reference to a content " is a *psychological* relation which holds between the subject, on the one hand and the object, on the other. As the relation does not necessarily require the condition that the two relata must be existent, Brentano

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

hesitates to call it a *relation,* but it is a relation in a special sense. Further, Brentano makes the distinction between the mental phenomena e g, *seeing* a colour or *hearing* a tone and physical phenomena e.g. colour or tone.

As we turn to Husserl, we see that he vehemently critisizes and consequently rejects the psychological interpretation of intentionality. Though he gives full credit to his teacher for reviving the Scholastic term and for having called the attention to this excellent phenomanon, Husserl is not at all interested in such distinction that has been made by Brentano. For, being a strong critic of both psychologism and naturalism, he wants to keep the psycho-emperical considerations into *brackets* His objective, it seems to us, is to avoid the problem of transcendence or relativism. Having clearly stated his position aginst naturalistic standpoint and that of psychologism, he seems under an obligation to refute any attempt at establishing the dichotomy between the mental and the physical phenomena. If this distinction is accepted by him, it would be quite inconsistent with his basic standpoint. Viewed in this perspective it is quite understandable that he is not prepared to indentify intentionality with all mental phenomena. If it be shown that at least some phenomenon is characterised by intentionality then it would constitute the refutation of Brentano's criteria with regard to mental phenomena. Similarly, if it be shown that besides mental phenomena, some physical actions are also characterised by intentionality, then also it will take away the weight of Brentano's argument. As has been pointed out by Mohanty, Husserl shifts between this position at different times, sometimes taking one and another on other occasions in order to meet the requirement of his methodology by proving Brentano to be wrong. This is the form of the argument which Husserl seems to adopt: in general, in order to

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

salvage the concept of intentionality from the cesspool of psychologism

Rejecting Brentano's interpretation, Husserl embraces the transcendental approach in explaining the intentionality of consciousness. It must be pointed out that Husserl's concept of intentionality can be understood only within the framework of his method of reduction The method of " bracketing " or reduction as it is designed by Husserl is the tool of escaping the problem of transcendence i.e. of suspending the judgements concerning the spatio-temporal world. " Therewith all the *sciences, natural and mental,* with the entire knowledge they have accumulated undergo disconnexion as sciences which require for their development the natural standpoint. "[9] We have to bracket out another transcendence which " comes to knowledge in a highly mediated from ".[10] namely God. Thus, all forms of transcendence must be kept under suspension, " till we reach the stream of consciousness. "[11] It is only transcendental consciousness, remaining permanently and necessarily above the empirical considerations, unites the intentional acts. In the language of Kant quoted by Husserl : " The ' I think ' must be able to accompany all my representations. "[12]

The peculiar nature of consciousness has been indicated by Husserl in the expression : " consciousness of something ". The element " consciousness " in the expression is clearly meant, *transcendental* consciousness. Now, this " pure " consciousness can be understood only in terms of its intentional acts which is finally termed as " noetic act " or " noesis ". But the " act " is not to be understood as it is used in ordinary language where it is ment as activity or process involving the concept of space-time. Hence, the act, of which Husserl talks, is to be treated as fact-neutral transcendental act having no referent in physical or

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mental world. The act of pure consciousness is called by Husserl " noesis ", or " noetic act. "

Husserl's notion of " noesis " which is the " proper component " of intentional experience is said to be subjective side in a sense. And this side contains another " reel component " namely, " hyle ". Husserl is reluctant to confuse it with " noetic act " itself, because the latter is characterised as possessed of " directedness " where the former is not. As Husserl puts it: " For it is easily seen that *not every real phase* of the concrete unity of an intentional experience has itself the *basic character of intentionality,* the property of being a " consciousness of something. " This is the case, for instance, with all sensory data, which play so great a part in the perceptive intentions of things. '[13] He gives the following example–in perceiving a piece of white paper, the glance of consciousness is directed towards the papers's quality of " whiteness " where lies the sensory datum " white ". As the content, the " whiteness " is the essential or real component of perception, and hence it is the *" bearer of an intentionality "*, but it is itself not a consciousness of something. Hyle is regarded by Husserl as sensorial, yet it is the component of " pure " consciousness. Husserl very cautiously distinguishes his concept of sensation from that of the empiricists by saying (i) that the former, though possessed of the nature of sensation, is a component of consciousness, and does not reside in the " sector of Nature " like the latter, (ii) that his concept of hyle is not formed out of the sensory data, that is to say, consciousness is not the consciousness of the hyletic data.

The Nature of hyletic component is that it is passive and material component of act consciousness or in the words of A. Lingis : " The ' sensations ', the hyletic date are mental ' material ' ". [14] It is the integral part of consciousness through which the intentional objects are " given ". The intentional flash of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

consciousness has to pass through the hyletic portion to react the transcendent objects meant. Thus, the importance of hyle in Husserl's notion of interntionality is that the consciounsess comes into contact with the transcendent things *through* it. But it must be noted here that consciousness does not actively produce it, or receive it passively from outside. Rather it remains permanently in consciousness as the component having no referential character.

Looking at the objective side i.e. the element "of something", we see that there is another element namely, "noema" or "noematic content". In so far as intentional experience is consciousness of something, it is said to be "intentionally related" to something; it is "noema". The element, "noema", the "intentional correlate", needless to say, is *not* transcendent to consciousness; rather it is immanent to it. A noema is immediate object of perception of partial or one–sided presentation, It is the ray of intentionality of consciousness which is directed towards it, and thereby the meaning of a real object is grasped in its essence Even the simple perception, according to Husserl, has its "noema", that is, the *perceived as such,* in an act of judging the *judged as such.* Here "as such" indicates that noema is "reduced" to *essence* of transcendent things.

Let us now focus our attention on an important aspect of intentionality thesis, namely, "noetic–noematic correlation". Husserl very precisely presents this correlation in a single sentence in his book, *Ideas* : "No noetic phase is without a noematic phase that belongs specifically to it."[15] We shall explain this significant correlation theory with the help of an illustration.

Suppose that Mr. A is perceiving a book on his table. For the first time, he parceives the book from one perspective, there he performs one perceptual act. This particular perceptunl act has

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

its noema i.e., the "perceived as such". Again, Mr. A performs another perceptual act to perceive the same book from *another* standpoint. His second perception has its perceptual noema. In this way, he may perceive the intended object from different perspectives and obviously, there must be different noemata corresponding to each perceptual act. In each perspectival perception, Mr. A may perceive the colour, shape or length etc. Thus, it is clear that corresponding to multiple perceptual acts, there may be multiple noemata. But the intended transcendent object remains the same.

Again, when Mr. A perceives the same book from the *same* perspective, over and again, then he performs different acts. This performance of perceptual acts from one level, unlike the former case, has the same noema. Thus, different acts performed at different points of time from the same perspective have the same noema.

In short, (1) the acts performed from different perspectives have their corresponding different *noema*, (2) Different acts performed from one perspective may have the same noema. (3) Multiple noemata have the same intending referent object i.e., noematic intentionality. (4) "Each act–phase has its noematic-phase."[15]

Let us now understand these four-fold relationships more vividly : *Firstly*, Husserl warns us "that the parallelism between the unity of the noematically "intended" object, of the object we have in mind, should not be confused with the parallelism between noesis and noema."[17] *Secondly*, the noetic–noematic correlation at one level is one-to-one, but in another level many-one. *Thirdly*, perceptual acts involve temporality and particularity, but the noema remains over and above temporality Hence, Husserl calls it "irreal". *Fourthly*, when different acts are per-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

formed from *one* single perspective, then "noema" may be said to be an identity of different acts, and again different noemata have their identity in their same *transcendent* object. Thus, "noema" may be said to function as a *mediator* between the noetic act, on the one hand, and the intentional transcendent object on the other.

Now, looking at the whole scheme of intentionality thesis, we see that there are noetic acts on one side, and there is the transcendent object on the other, and in between these two, there remain noemata Now "The reference of consciousness to its object", in Mohanty's language "is made possible through (a) the correlation (b) the noematic "nucleus" by virtue of which the noema also refer to the object, and (c) the consequently noematic intentionality" [18]

III

It is evident from the forgoing that Husserl is quite responsive to the need for getting around the problem of transcendence through his distinctive methodology. But his "phenomenology found the problem in the problem. [19] Marvin Farber quotes a sentence from Husserl's writings which reveals his own view of transcendence : "the transcendence of a thing requires that we place it question, we do not understand how perception can meet something transcendent; but we understand how perception can meet something immanent; in the form of reflective and pure immanent perception, of the reduced type." [20] Thus, Husserl is avowed in establishing a "rigorous science" by suspending universally all forms of so-called transcendence in order to achieve certainty in the field of knowledge. If we look at the history of philosophy, we see that the philosophies from ancient time to the modern age feel the problem of transcendence as an obstacle which hinders certainty in knowledge but no significant

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

attempt has been made to eradicate the problem. In this respect, Husserl's attempt is undoubtedly revolutionary in the history of modern philosophy. Still, the question arises : Does he fully succeed in accomplishing this task ? Or does Husserl really get rid of the problem of transcendence ? Little reflection would reveal his failure. In what follows, we would argue in support of this view.

Firstly, Husserl's concept of "hyle" in his own formulation of intentionality thesis is in the nature of sensation, and he distinguishes it from the empiricist concept of sensation. But the question arises : How does hyle, being sensory in nature, exist in intentional consciousness as a component ? Does it not involve contradiction ? In order to find out the answer, let us first see the implication of incorporating the hyletic date in his concept of intentionality.

It is pointed out by Husserl that intentionality is not a property or a distinguishing feature of a substance, namely, consciousness, but it is the "very *essence* of consciousness."[21] But we might ask : If consciousness is essentially intentional in character, then how can a sensory component exist in it ? It stands to reason that pure consciousness, being *essentially* intentional, cannot include anything possessed of different nature. Obviously, the nature of pure consciousness is opposed to the nature of hyle. Still, if Husserl seeks forcibly to place hyle in pure consciousness, then he cannot assert (i) that consciousness is "pure" or wholly transcendental i.e, free from transcendence; (ii) that consciousness can be understood *wholly* in terms of acts, (iii) that it is essentially intentional. It follows that he has to assert that consciousness is partially non-intentional which will go against his basic standpoint. For, the hyletic component is passive, having no referential character. If this is so, then he has to say consequently that consciousness is both intentional

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

and non–intentional at the same time which would lead to contradiction.

Although Husserl is strongly opposed to its identification with the empiricist concept of sensation, yet " many have found in the latter (hyletic data) a trace of uncritical sensualistic empiricism." [22] It must be remembered that consciousness, for Sartre, is transparent i.e., contentless. Moreover, Hyle, being of the nature of the nature of sensation, cannot reside as immanent to consciousness. Rather it is, being closely connected with body, transcendent to it. Further, it is also pointed out that sensations have the properties like spatial properties which disqualify them to be component part of pure consciousness. Only transcendent objects have spatial properties. Hence, hyle or sensation is transcendent to pure consciousness. Morleau–Ponty also would agree with Sartre in this regard. In this context, Mohanty remarks : " The notion of hyle I believe has a certain relevance and need, but it cannot be retained in the form in which Husserl formulates it." The question is : Does Husserl succeed in dealing satisfactorily with the problem of transcendence ?

Secondly, there is another important point to show that the epistemological problem of transcendence persists in his phenomenology. In order to clarify this point, we have to understand how consciousness refers to an object. The intentional act of consciousness has its intended object; it is noema. E. g., in perception, after reduction, we find *perceived as such,* in memory, *the remembered as such* etc. In every case, the object may be the same table which appears but the noematic correlates are essentially *different* for perception, fancy, and memory. " At one time that which appears is characterised as " corporeal reality, at another as fiction." [23] Now, the noematic content refers to the same object which is transcendent to it. Hence, Husserl seeks to assert that noema possess a kind of directedness.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In his own words : " It is, as it were, *a noematic intentionality over against noetic.* The latter carries the former in itself as a correlate of consciousness, and its intentionality passess in a certain way through the noematic and beyond it."[26] Hence, the noematic intentionality is directed to what is *transcendent* to it and certainly not toward itself. In our view, Husserl seems to have failed to free his phenomenology from transcendence.

We would now suggest another sense of transcendence in two points which seems to persist in Husserl's phenomenology. (a) Husserl's well-known phrase, namely, " consciousness of something," as we have pointed out, has two sides–(1) Subjective side or act-side having referential character and a component namely, hyletic data, (2) objective side, or the element " of something " refers to the intended object of the act which is termed as " noema." Pure consciousness has these two aspects. From this, it is quite clear that the intended object or " noema " is *not* contained in the intentional act; that is to say, the objective side is transcendent to the subjective side. As Ulrich Claeges puts it : " The intended is not contained as an immanent aspect of the intentional act; rather it is transcendent to this act." [27] We would view this transcendence in a new sense of transcendence.

(b) Let us elucidate another point. We may begin by making a preliminary remark about what Husserl means by perception. The intentional ray of consciousness is directed to what is " given " to consciousness. The " given " is identical with the intended object. This identity between the two is called by Husserl, " Self-givenness " which is held to be free from doubt. For Husserl, this is what is perception. Obviously, this view of perception is different from ordinary perception where " perceiver " and the " perceived " are conditioned by natural laws. Husserl calls this perception, " transcendent perception " as

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

opposed to his own sense of peception, namely, " immanent perception ". However, " Self–containedness is a distinctive characteristic of immanent perception. " [28] In immanent perception, the " perceiver " and " perceived " are both immanent to pure ego.

Again, as we have pointed out, what is " immediately given " in the implied object is identical in meaning with noema. The noema means something more than this. " This excess of meaning beyond the individual self–given is referred to by Husserl as apperception." [29]

Now, when the intentional ray of act-consciousness is directed towards noema, there is content or knowledge. Again, when consciousness reflects or apperceives this very " act of perception " the latter becomes *noema in relation to the appercevted act.* Hence, we can say that in relation to apperceived act or apperception the " noema " (i.e., the act of perception) stands as transcendent. Husserl's phenomenology, therefore, involves these two senses of transcendence in its epistemology. *

Department of Philosophy
North Bengal University
Darjeeling–734430 (W. B.)

BENULAL DHAR

NOTES

1. Andtrig Pottawski; " Constitutive Phenomenology and Intentional Objects " *Analecta Husserliana* Vol. II, D. Reidel Publishing Co Dordrecht Holland, 1984.
2. Ulrich Claeges; " Intentionality and Transcendence " *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. II.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Marvin Farber; *The Aims of Phenomenology.* 1st edition, 1966, Herper Torchbooks, The Academy Library, Herper & Row Pub. New York.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

5. It is to be noted here that the method of doubt which Descartes develops, clearly distinguishes his approach from that of a philosophical sceptic. He doubts in order to arrive at some certain *truth*, or, in other words, in order to be able to get rid of the doubt.
6. Edo Pivcevic; *Husserl and Phenomenology*, pp. 15-16, Hutchinson & Co (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1970.
7. Marvin Farber; *op. cit.*, p. 64
8. F. Brentano; *Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint*. This passage is translated and quoted by H. Spiegelberg in his book: *The Phenomenological Movement*, Vol. I, 2nd Edition, Martinus Nijhoff/The Hague,
9. Edmund Husserl; *Ideas*, p. 171. Trans by W. R. Boyce Gibson, 5th impression, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1969.
10. *Ibid*, p. 171.
11. *Ibid*, p. 172.
12. *Ibid*, p. 173.
13. *Ibia*, p. 120.
14. A. Lingis; "Intentionality and Corporeity", *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. I, op. cit.
15. E. Husserl; *op. cit*, p. 271.
16. J. N. Mohanty; "A Note on Noetic-noematic Correlation" *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. II, *op. cit*,
17. E. Husserl; *op. cit*. p. 290.
18. J. N. Mohanty; "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality" *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. I, *op. cit*.
19. U. Claeges; *op. cit*.
20. M. Faber; *op. cit*, p. 68
21. A. Lingis; "Hyletic data", *Analecta Husserliana*, op. cit, Vol. II.
22. J. N. Mohanty; "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality" *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. I. *op, cit*.
23. J. P. Sartre; *Being and Nothingness*, p. ixi, Trans by Hazel E. Barnes. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1957-66
24. J. N. Mohanty; "A Note on Noetic-noematic Correlation" *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. II, op. cit.
25. E. Husserl; *op. cit*, p. 266.
26. *Ibid*, p. 294.
27. U. Claeges, *op. cit*.
28. E. Husserl, *op. cit*, p. 125.
29. U. Claeges, *op. cit*.

* This work is based on the Dissertation submitted in 1987 as part of M. A. course to the University of North Bengal. I am very much grateful to my teacher Dr. Ranjan K. Ghosh, Department of Philosophy, North Bengal University, for his encouraging guidance and supervision. I am also thankful to the authorities of the university to allow me to make use of it.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

(Formerly 'The Philosophical Quarterly')

Students' Supplement

Journal of the Pratap Centre
of Philosophy, Amalner
AND
Department of Philosophy
Poona University, Pune

New Series

Volume XVIII
No. 2
April 1991

Editors :

S. S. Barlingay
R. Sundara Rajan
Rajendra Prasad
Mrinal Miri
M. P. Marathe
S. S. Deshpande

University of Poona

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
ISSN 0376-415X

Editors

S. S. Barlingay, (Professor Emeritus, Poona University), Rajendra Prasad, (Rtd. Professor, Patna), M. P. Marathe (Poona University), R. Sundara Rajan (Poona University), Mrinal Miri (NEHU, Shillong), S. S. Deshpande (Poona University)

Board of Consulting Editors :

G. N. Mathrani (Bombay), Daya Krishna (Jaipur), Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta), K. J. Shah (Dharwad), R. C. Pandeya (Delhi University), D. P. Chattopadhyaya (Jadavpur University), G. N. Joshi (Poona). D. Y. Deshpande (Nagpur), J. de Marneffe (Poona), Dharmendra Kumar (Delhi University), R. C. Gandhi (Delhi), J. Khwaja (Aligarh Muslim University), S. A. Shaida (I. I. T., Kanpur), Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow University), S. K. Saxena (Delhi University), S. V. Bokil (Poona University), R. A. Sinari (Goa University), R. K. Gupta (Delhi University), R. Balasubramanian (Pondicherry University), Ranveer Singh (Imphal), V. K. Bharadwaja (Delhi University), Ashok Gangadean (Haverford College, USA).

Articles in this Journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium, and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).

Articles for publication, Books for Review, and other communications pertaining to publications, Book-reviews, subscriptions, I. P. Q. Publications, etc. may be sent to :

The Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Department of Philosophy, Poona University, Pune 411 007, India.

Subscription to be sent to :

The Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly by Cash or by Cheque)

- Change of Address and/or non-receipt of an issue of the Journal may be intimated within a month of the date of publication

- **Life Membership :**

Individuals	:	Rs. 400/-(in India) US $ 100/-(outside India)
Institutions	:	Rs. 1500/-(in India) US $ 200/-(outside India)

- **Annual Subscriptions :**

Individuals	:	Rs. 60 (Rs. 65/- by cheque) US $ 35.00
Institutions	:	Rs. 100 (Rs. 110/- by cheque) US $ 50.00
Single copy	:	Rs. 2 /- US $ 5.00

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regn. No. 24248/37

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
STUDENTS' SUPPLEMENT

ATHRUGHNA BEHERA : Later Wittgenstein on Objectivity of Rules ...1

ARITOSH KUMAR DAS : The Concept of Ego in Husserl's Philosophy ...13

V. ALTEKAR : Quantum Gravity : Some Philosophical Reflections ...27

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

* Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I. P. Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
* The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
* **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
* The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
* Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
* Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining, bold face by wavy underlining.
* The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
* Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
* The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations

---

Edited and Published by G. S. Bhange, Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona Pune 411 007.
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, Pune 411016.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

LATER WITTGENSTEIN ON OBJECTIVITY OF RULES

In Wittgenstein's philosophy of language,[1] the concept of rules and rule-following occupies a central place. Both in early and later philosophy, Wittgenstein's effort has been to understand language, its rule-structure and application. However, whereas in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein viewed language as having a formalized and explicitly given rule-structure, in the later philosophy he has come to question the idea of the formal compactness and explicitness of the rule-structure. The transition from the *Tractatus* to later philosophy is not a transition from language with rules to language without rules. It is basically a change of the method of treatment of the rules of language. The objective of this paper is to show the objectivity of rules that has been a matter of recent discussion on the understanding of language in Wittgenstein's game-model grammar. The central theme of Wittgenstein's game-model grammar is that rules *(regel)* govern the language games and the possibility of language-games presupposes the possibility of the rules. In other words, rules constitute a language system. However, one may show that (notably Dr. Rajendra Prasad)[2] linguistic rules are not constitutive in the sense rules of game are. That, however, I shall not discuss here. I shall attempt to show, so far as Wittgenstein's notion of rules is concerned, that rules that govern our language-use are constitutive to that system and the very constitutive character of rules ascertains their objectivity in various language-games through grammar. Grammar pertaining to rules displays their necessity, thus bringing rules back into the language games.

I

Wittgenstein contends that 'we are interested in language as a procedure according to explicit rules, because philosophical

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

problems are misunderstandings which must be removed by clarification of the rules according to which we are inclined to use words' (*PG*, I Sect. 32). It suggests that language is a rule-governed activity, and that we can describe its systematic nature by giving sets of rules which explain the meanings of the expressions. He repeatedly emphasises that a language-game is so called because of the set of rules which are underlying it. The rules are rules of use regulating all possible moves in language. Since we use language in different ways for various purposes in varying situations rules are possible to the extent the uses of language are possible. Wittgenstein does not abolish the rules and thus does not abolish grammar (*PI*, Sect. 108, 292). He only brings the rules back into the language-use itself In the absence of the rules, which constitute the structure of language-games, we feel not only being without a standard, a paradigm but also being without any fixed guidance except by a fortuitous Deity (*PI*, Sect. 234). Rules are part of the framework on which the working of our language is based (*PI* sect. 240). The rule-structure is built into the language we use and the forms of life we have (*PI*, sect. 241). From this point of view, language may be construed as 'a process involving a rule' as contrasted with 'a process in accordance with a rule' (*BB*, P. 13).

For Wittgenstein a process means an activity or a series of activities which is not something queer (*PG*, I, sect. 60). According to him, 'a process being in accordance with a rule' means that in which an action is done according to a rule. Squaring cardinal numbers like 1, 2, 3, 4, for example if one writes 1, 4, 9, 16 respectively, he/she does it according to a general rule of squaring. But one may do it by other rules as well (*BB*. p. 13). Therefore, the rule is not *involved* in the process of playing such a language-game i.e., squaring the numbers. Rather, it is played according to a general rule of Arith-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

metic i.e., the rule of squaring, that is already laid down. On the other hand, 'a process involving a rule' suggests that a rule is embedded in the very process of the action done. It is revealed in its expeession, that is, in the way one does something. If one puts down the expressions like '1×1', '2×2', '3×3', '4×4', for squaring the cardinal numbers like 1, 2, 3, 4 respectively, the rule that he follows is shown in the very process of the game, i.e. multiplying each number itself. Here, 'the expression of the rule' forms part of the process. Wittgenstein remarks : 'A rule, so far as it interests us, does not act at a distance'. The expressions 'involving' and 'does not act at a distance' here obviously suggest that rule is not a metaphysical entity existing outside our use of it. Rather, it has significance only in being involved in the process in which we play a language–game i.e,, operate a system. For Wittgenstein, rules are always expressions of rules and they can be illustrated through various examples like 'a schema of arrows', 'a sign–post'. 'a rule line' etc., instead of giving any defiinition to it. In this respect Wittgenstein says 'we are not saying 'what a rule is' but just giving applications of word "rule". We certainly do this by giving applications of the words 'expression of a rule' (*BB*, p, 98). That is to say, according to Wittgenstein rules are not like abstract entities. Rules are those which are expressed in their illustrations. Wittgenstein, as a matter of fact, does not commit himself to a Platonic or Fregean kind of realism, since for him there is no gap between a rule and its application (*BB*, p. 98). He rejects Frege's type of grammatical form which exists eternally and immutably (*RFM*, p. 96). According to him, all grammatical rules, which include rules of logic and mathematics, are the rules which are involved in our thinking and saying. That is, they are laid down in the very use of language i.e., are being followed in doing something with language.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The point is that so far as the notion of rules is concerned, whether it is 'a process involving a rule' or 'a process being in accordance with a rule' rules are always system-bounded.

Another argument follows from the paradigmatic use of the rules. Wittgenstein discusses the standard metre in paris and refers to the possibility of setting up samples of colour such as 'sepia' as paradigms (*PI*, sec. 50–53). He takes such paradigms as objects of comparison. Since paradigms furnish standards of comparison he regards them as quite primitive and fundamental in any language-game in which they are employed. Indeed, many of the metaphors he uses drive home this point. That is, paradigms serve as 'roads' along which language use can move; they are 'measures' or 'Yardstics', are 'bed-rock' or 'fossilized', are elements in one's 'frame of reference' and act as 'foundations', 'fundamental walls' or 'hinges'. Wittgenstein consistently suggests that these are forms of representation which underline our language use.

Grammatically rules as paradigms are themselves neither true nor false, and hence cannot be characterized as neither right or wrong, correct or incorrect. Just as the standard metre cannot be said to be a metre long, so too it is false to say that it is not a metre long. Wittgenstein contends : 'The rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement. But that means no more than that the choice is independent of the length of the objects to be measured and that the choice of one unit is not 'true' and of another 'false' in the way that a statement of length is true or false. Of course that is only a remark on the grammar of the word 'unit of length' (*PG*, I, sect. 133). Further he says : To accept a proposition as unshakably certain, I want to say—means to use it as a gramatical rule : this removes uncertainty from it

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(*RFM*, III, sect. 39). It follows that unlike an empirical proposition, rules of grammar are 'unshakable truths'. Acceptance of rules of grammar entails the acceptance of grammatical propositions or as some would like to put 'as grammatical remarks'.[3] A grammatical proposition like 'Every rod has a length' states an 'unshakable truth' because of the fact that we cannot imagine the opposite of what this proposition expresses. It does not make any sense to assert the opposite of 'Every rod has length' (*PI*, sect. 251). We cannot conceive of a possible 'rod' which has no length at all. Similarly, 'I cannot have your toothache' (*BB*, p. 49) is a grammatical remark which excludes from intelligible discourse the attribution of one person's sensation to another. It makes no more sense to solve a chess problem by jumping a pawn wirh a rook. 'The rook cannot jump over pieces' excludes a move from chess. 'I cannot have your toothache' excludes a form of words from use. There is no such a thing in chess as 'jumping a pawn with a rook', and there is no such a thing as having another's pain. These grammatical propositions, as Backer and Hacker[4] suggest, being used as rules are 'forms of representation' constituting the bounds of sense, delimiting what it makes sense to say.

Rules expressed in the form of grammatical propositions are 'unshakable truths' of grammar which have no foundation in any objective reality outside language itself. They, as constituting our 'frame of reference' justify the use of language but are themselves not justifiable. The frame of reference is thus embedded in grammar which constitutes the 'account books of language' according to Wittgenstein (*PG* I, sect. 44). Grammar determines the logical conditions of what we can think and speak and thus it determines the normative grounds of all language and thought. The normative 'must' here is the grammatical 'must'. The grammar of language show itself in the practice

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

i.e., playing language-game. Rules of grammar thus constitute the language use and broadly delimit our form of life. The rule of grammar, however, exemplify certain grammatical connections rather than state any empirical state of affairs. Non-sense results when we regard grammatical propositions as expressing metaphysical truths,

Moreover, for Wittgenstein, grammtical rules as norms function as critieria of the use of language. The concept of criterion introduces a new aspect of semantical analysis by determinig the justificatory grounds of all our cognitive statements through grammar. According to Wittgenstein, the criteria represent rules of grammar which justify the use of our linguistic expressions. The criteria are the defining grounds of a linguistic expression because they mention the *grammatical conditions* of the expression (*BB* p. 25). In supplying the criteria of a given assertion we come ultimately to the limits of our language-games. Thus, in this sense, criteria do not provide causes of our cognitive statements but their logical grounds which justify them (*Z*, sect. 437). The sense or meaning of these statements is defined by these criteria which constitute the only semantical grounds of any knowledge claim. That is, they are so constitutive to our thought and action that without them we cannot think anything, and tnereby say anything. For thought is expressed in language and language is a rule-governed activity. Thus, the objectivity of rules that govern our linguistic activities as criteria or paradigm remain 'unshakably certain.'

In this connection the problem of objectivity of the mathematical propositions as paradigm is a fundamental issue for Wittgenstein. According to him, mathematical propositions as grammatical rules (paradigms or proofs) are necessary for us. They are necessary because we cannot but accept them. If we

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

are to speak and think meaningfully, we cannot dispense with them. For example, if we have to remain normal human beings at all, our forms of calculating, inferring etc., are inexorable for us. We cannot calculate or infer in any way we like. If anybody calculates or infers in any way he likes then we shall not call him normal human being. Therefore "if it should happen, then we should declare him abnormal and take no further account of his calculation" (*RFM*, p. 79). For Wittgenstein our forms of calculating and inferring are inexorable for us, not because they are imposed on us from outside but because it is just this that is called 'thinking', 'speaking', 'inferring', 'arguing', etc. (*RFM*, p. 96) Each of these activities as linguistic activities represent a form of life (*PI*, sect. 23). That is to say, our forms of life provide the frame of reference in which our ways of doing mathematics are necessary for us.

Contrary to the above view, there is an alleged belief that Wittgenstein's ideas of 'concept-formation' makes him a radical conventionalist. According to the conventionalistic view, following Dummett, our acceptance of all mathematical proofs and mathematical propositions is a matter of arbitrary decision. Formation or accptance of mathematical proof is solely based on human choice. As Dummett unhappily suggests, 'Wittgenstein goes in for a full–blooded conventionalism; for him the logical necessity of any statement is always the direct expression of a linguistic convention'.[5] For Dummett' accepting a proof is our choice because "at each step we are free to choose to accept or reject the proof; there is nothing in our formulation of the axioms and of the rules of inference, and nothing in our minds we accept before the proof was given, which of itself shows whether he shall accept the proof or not; and hence there is nothing which forces us to accept the proof."[6] Dummett,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

thus, seems to mean that Wittgenstein has reduced all mathematical proofs to human convention and decision.

Wittgenstein, however, does not seem to have such a full blooded conventionalism. For him by emphasising that mathematics creates concepts one does not mean that concept formation (i.e., initiation of a new proof) is based on arbitrary decision. Concept-formation or acceptance of any proof, according to Wittgenstein, is essentially involved in our mathematical thinking i.e., in calculating and inferring and in proofs in general. Thus, for Wittgenstein, acceptance of mathematical proof is not a matter of decision. On the contrary, we accept them because they show the 'ways in which we make comparisons and in which we act' (*RFM*, p. 387).

II

The above discussion now obviously leads us to the problem how are rules, whether considered as paradigms or mathematical proofs, to be justified? As we have pointed out earlier since rules of grammar as criteria or paradigms justify our linguistic activities and provide justificatory grounds to all our language use, Wittgenstein adopts the non-justification approach to the rules which are involved in our language-use. Every philosophical justification can be made either by appeal to reason or to experience. According to Wittgenstein, rules of grammar and language-games they define cannot be justified by any appeal to experience or to reason. He maintains that our experiences i.e., facts in the world presuppose the rules of grammar and therefore cannot provide any justification for the latter. It is true that the rules of grammar do correspond to facts of nature but that is no reason to suppose that our rules of grammar are justified by the latter (*PI*, II, Xii). They lay down the conditions of intelligibility of language and also facts which language describes.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Rules of grammar cannot be justified even by appeal to reason, since rules as paradigms provide normative grounds for all our linguistic activities and since the notion of reason itself is a normative concept it cannot be taken to account for the former. Asserting autonomy of rules of grammar he metaphorically suggests, rules are like the channels through which we are permitted to move, they are like rails on which our language moves (*Z*, sect. 375) and they are like the 'gardenpaths' in which we have to learn how to walk following them.[7]

For Wittgenstein, the rules of grammar are arbitrary in the way the rules of cookery or washing are not. For rules of cookery or washing are to be justified by their respective ends or consequences, while rules governing language use have no specific end and they are not defined or justified by their consequences. That is, if you follow grammatical rules other than such and such ones that does not mean you say something wrong, so you are speaking of something else (*Z* sect, 20). And 'the rules of grammar may be called "arbitrary" if that is to mean that the aim of the grammar is nothing but that of the language (*PI*. sect. 497). This arbitrariness of the rules follows from ther being non-justified in an ultimate sense because they constitute 'the frame of reference' in which all justification takes place. That is, for Wittgenstein, whatever justification seems possible is expressed in language which itself cannot be justified. Language has no other purpose than what it does. To that extent rules of grammar are arbitrary. We may explain a rule by another rule in the way we use it in a language. But we cannot justify rules of grammar by any higher order i.e., to say meta-rules. In this sense, rules governing language-uses are grammatical not only in origin but also in expression. The only ground which lays them down is the form of life itself in which they are articulated.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

According to Wittgenstein, the fundamental thing is that rules that govern linguistic activities are paradigms and that mathematical proofs have a grammatical origin as well as grammatical significance. For every possibility of a new rule or mathematical proof is not the result of arbitrary human decision but the consequence of a spontaneous emergence of a form of linguistic activity i.e., of a language–game. Rules of grammar constitute the necessary presuppositions of our language–use. The possibility of such rules cannot be just due to human decision or convention because these rules constitute the very frame–work is presupposed by all our decisions and conventions in language. These are represented by our way of using them i.e. by language-games. That is, they are made conspicuous in language-games and thus in our forms of life.

From the above consideration of rules of grammar as criteria or paradigms we arrive at the following conclusions regarding the rules :—

(i) Rules of grammar function as standard or paradigm by which particular cases are judged.

(ii) Since they constitute 'the account book of language' agreement in them is necessary for engaging in any practice i.e. playing language-games which employ them.

(iii) They cannot be justified since they represent what can be said and thus nothing can be said about them. The objectivity of rules is displayed through grammar that makes our linguistic activities possible.

Rules, in the above sense, would not be contingent on lanuage–use but rather that rules would make what–a–language use is. In this sense language–use cannot accord with any rule but must accord with the rule that makes it possible. Thus it explains the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

right of our language use not by deriving it from what we agree to call a rule but by deriving it from what is a rule in the language-games and the form of life in which it is embedded. If this analysis is correct and is accepted many problems concerning understanding of language can be resolved.*

Deptt. of Philosophy
University of Hyderabad.
Gachi Bowli
Hyderabad–500134.

SATHRUGHNA BEHERA

NOTES

1. All Wittgenstein's textual reference would be made in this paper according to the following abbreviations :

   BB : *The Blue and Brown Book* (Oxford, 1960)

   PI : *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford, 1958)

   PG : *Philosophical Grammar* (Oxford, 1974)

   RFM : *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (Oxford, 1978)

   Z : *Zettel* (Oxford, 1967).

2. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, "Regularity, Normativity and Rules of Language", in the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. 1-1, 1983, pp. 39-62.

3. See, John V. Canfield ; *Wittgenstein : Language and World*, U-mass Press, 1981, chapt. 9.

4. See, G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein : Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Vol. 2, Basil Blackwell*, 1985, p. 271.

5. See, Michael Dummett, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics" in *Wittgenstein : The Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G. Pitcher, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1966, pp. 425–426.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 427.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

7. Alice Amborse, *Wittgenstein Lectures, Cambridge, 1932–1935*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979, p. 155.

* This paper is a modified version of my paper 'Later Wittgenstein on Objectivity of Rules' which was presented in National Seminar on '*On certainty*' organised in the Dept., of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, 21st Feb., 1990. In this connection I owe my gratitude to Prof. Suresh Chandra, Prof K. P. Mishra and Dr. R. C. Pradhan for their valuable comments and suggestions. My thanks are also due to Authorities of ICPR for providing me Financial Assistance for this research activity.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE CONCEPT OF EGO IN HUSSERL'S PHILOSOPHY

Husserl explicitly upholds an egological conception of consciousness. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of his conception of the Ego appears to be a big step towards understanding his philosophy of consciousness.

Husserl's conception of the Ego undergoes a long development. At first, Husserl admitted only one Ego–the empirical, psychological Ego, which is nothing other than a complex of real conscious events. At that time, he rejected Natorp's conception of consciousness.[1] Later on, he changed his mind, and in the *Ideas–I,* he introduced the 'pure Ego' as the Ego–pole of all conscious acts of an individual stream of experience.[2] The epithet 'pure' is used in order to indicate that phenomenological reduction has already been performed and the Ego sustains reduction. At the same time, the phenomenologically pure Ego is distinguished from the empirical psychological one—the 'I' as the human person living in the natural world. The pure Ego is the 'center of reference' and the 'source' of all conscious acts belonging to the stream of experience. Each pure Ego is individual, and it remains identical with itself amidst a changing series of acts. In the *Ideas–II,* Husserl brought about a variation in this earlier conception of the pure Ego. The pure Ego, even though non–real (meaning that the pure Ego does not form part of the real world), is still a subjective life, a living (erlebnis).[3] The pure Ego is further said to have its 'habitualities.' "Habitualities indicate the inclination from being to having (*Ideas–II,* p. 119), from the me to the mine, through a sort of inertia in duratio..."[4] The real importance of the notion of 'habitus' is seen in the *Cartesian Meditations.* The habitualities of the pure Ego play an important role in the fourth Meditation which is mainly concerned with the constitutional problems

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

pertaining to the pure or transcendental Ego. In the *Cartesian Meditations,* Husserl also changed the mode of speaking, from 'pure Ego' to 'transcendental Ego.' The centering Ego is no more taken to be an empty pole of identity, the Ego shows throughout an abiding style: a 'personal character.'[5] In the same work, Husserl even went forward and characterised the transcendental Ego as 'monad'. The monadic Ego, by unfolding its subjective life, unfolds the whole world. In this conception of the Ego, phenomenology is identified as egology.

We shall now study in detail some of the important developments of Husserl's conception of the Ego.

In the first edition of the *Logical Investigations,* Husserl admitted the existence of only the empirical Ego and explained its composition very much in the fashion of Hume. In that work, he mainly confined his attention to a class of conscious facts-the intentional acts. The act is experienced as 'directed towards the objects.' But the act is not found to be emerging from a 'source' or 'center of reference–the 'I' or the 'Ego.' Therefore, relatedness to the Ego is not regarded as the essential feature of the act. The Ego appears when an attitude of reflexion is adopted with regard to the act. But the Ego that thus appears is not understood as an agent, in the sense of the cause of the act; rather it is understood as the complex of real conscious acts, their organised totality.

In the *Ideas-I* Husserl upheld to notion of pure Ego as distinguished from the psychological Ego or the Ego of the human person. The Ego was specifically admitted as the 'ego-subject'. In the *Logical Investigations* the Ego was regarded as the complex of real conscious events or acts, but not as the subject of those acts. In the *Ideas-I,* however, there has been a real shifting of attitude with regard to the Ego. The Ego is the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

subject, and not a bundle of perceptions. Apperceived in the 'natural' manner, the 'Ego is the Ego-subject in me', which is the same as my psychological subjectivity. It is real in a body and, therefore, a part of the real world. As distinguished from the psychological Ego, the pure Ego is 'pure subjectivity', which has no body, and which does not form any part of the world. It is the Ego of the endless stream of pure and disembodied consciousness which sustains reduction.[6]

The quality of the empirical psychological self and the transcendental self goes back to Kant's conceptions of the self. Aroused by Hume's scepticism, Kant produced a synthesis of the Cartesian Ego and the Humean self. The Cartesian 'I am' became for Kant 'the supreme principle of all employment of the understanding', which he characterised further as 'the transcendental unity of self-consciousness', in order to indicate the possibility of *a priori* knowledge arising from it. Kant also acknowledged Hume's self as an object of introspection. It was, therefore, a subject matter fit for empirical science, though the Cartesian Ego could not be : 'I know my soul as an object of inner sense, by appearances which constitute an inner state, and essence of it in itself which lies at the ground of these appearances is unknown to me". And he reiterated : "...the I in the proposition *I am* means not merely the object of inner intuition (in time) but also the subject of consciousness".[7]

Kant's epistemology required the conception of a dual self, for there was empirical evidence for the one and a cogent transcendental argument for the other. Futher, Kant's theory of the autonomous will in morality required the conception of an autonomous self. Philosophical analysis shows moral will to be duty-bound and principled, constrained only by the requirements of the Categorical Imperative which it itself rationally establishes. The autonomy and freedom of will belongs to the transcendental

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

self or 'the ego of the understanding' which is free from the natural causality. Thus, the transcendental self or Fgo is for Kant the ground of the empirical Ego and the epistemological correlate of all human acts of knowing and doing including those which involve the empirical Ego. In synthesizing, understandingly, sensible appearances into objects of knowledge, and in conforming, ideally, to the Moral Law's requirements, it is, therefore, an active Ego. But in other ways it remains oddly uninvolved with its manifestations in the empirical Ego.

Husserl draws light from Kant's essential insight that the empirical Ego necessarily presupposes the transcendental Ego as its foundation. But Husserl does not regard the psychological Ego as the phenomenal manifestation (appearance) of the transcendental Ego which in itself is unknown and unknowable. For Husserl, the difference between psychological Ego and pure or transcendental Ego is one of meaning. Apperceived in the natural manner, the Ego is the psychological Ego, but when grasped in the attitude of reduction the Ego appears to be the transcendental one. The Ego is always open to self-observation and is never presupposed. In the natural attitude of mind the Ego is observed as a natural reality, as a worldly being, but in the phenomenological attitude it is observed as the ultimate ground in and for which the 'world' including me as a psychological subject is constituted. As Husserl writes : "Therefore I, the constituting Ego, am not identical with the Ego who is already worldly. not identical with myself as a psychophysical reality; and my psychic life, the psycho-physical and worldly life of consciousness, is not identical with my transcendental ego, in which the world, with everything physical and psychic that belongs to it, is constituted for me".[8] That means. the essential Ego is the transcendental or pure Ego, and the psychological

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Ego is a limitation put to it and falsely regarded as the real nature of the Ego in the natural attitude of mind.

Obviously, the pure or transcendental Ego of Husserl's phenomonolgy is not the same as the transcendental Ego or the transcendental self-activity of Kant's philosophy. The latter ego has no contents of its own and is not amenable to observation. But the pure Ego of which Husserl speaks is open to observations (immanent perceptions), though of course under the attitude of *epoche*. Husserl claims to have made a number of observations on the pure Ego situated as it is within the realm of pure consciousness, and in the *Ideas-I*, he puts down those observations as follows :

(1) The pure Ego is not a general Ego—the ' self function in general ', or anything like that. It is the personal Ego of the individual concerned, the philosophising self that performs reduction, and is a separate one in each separate field of experience.[9] On the basis of the concept of the plurality of pure Egos, Husserl, in his latter works, developed the concept of the 'community of monads' or the ' community of pure Egos '. The concept of the community of pure Egos became a celebraled theme in Husserl's constitutive phenomenology. This concept gave Husserl an adequate instrument for fighting what he regarded as the ' spectres of solipsim ' (transcendental solipsism).

(2) The pure Ego is the source in which the acts of experience originate. It is the permanent feature or form of the cogito that it is necessarily related to the Ego as its subject and as its source. " The ' being directed towards ', ' the being busied with ', ' adopting an attitude ', ' undergoing or suffering from ', has this of *necessity* wrapped in its very essence, that it is just something ' from the Ego ', or in the reverse direction ' to the

...2

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Ego'; and this Ego is the *pure* Ego, and no reduction can get any grip on it."[10]

Therefore, the Ego is not a real part or constitutive element of experience. "In principle, at any rate, every *cogitatio* can change, can come and go,... But in contrast the pure Ego appears to be *necessary* in principle, and as that which remains absolutely self-identical in all real and possible changes of experience, it can *in no snese* be reckoned *as a real part or phase* of the experiences themselves."[11]

(3) The field of pure consciousness comprises a series of acts-actual and potential. An act becomes actual when it receives attention from the Ego, and the Ego enjoys the consciousness of it. But all other acts are also acts of the Ego, though the Ego does not live in them actually. The Ego participates in these acts ideally. The acts which ideally belong to the field of the Ego constitute the field of Ego's freedom.[12] Thus while no one act is absolutely necessaey for the being of the Ego, the Ego is absolutely necessary for the being of any and every act, even when the act is a mere potential act. Considering the position of the Ego in relation to the acts, Husserl ascribes a peculiar kind of transcendence to the pure Ego itself; the pure Ego is "a non-constituted transcendence—a transcendence in immanance".[13]

(4) Though the pure Ego transcends any particular act to be the Ego of all other acts and is not a real part or phase of the experiences, yet, "Apart from its 'ways of being related' or 'ways of behaving', it is completely empty of essential components, it has no content that could be unravelled, it is in and for itself indescribable : Pure Ego and nothing further".[14] The pure Ego can be grasped only in the actual moment of its living in the act.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

(5) When the Ego lives in the act actually, it manifestly exhibits that special property of consciousness, namely, intentionality—the 'consciousness of something'. In the 'experience of something' we can distinguish the pure Ego of the experiencing process, the experience itself, and the Ego-diverted content of that experience. The latter two aspects are technically called 'noesis' and 'noema'. The experiencing process takes place by virtue of a sort of 'mental gaze', a 'glancing towards', the object, perceptively in perception, fancifully in fancy, and so forth.[15] However, the glancing of the Ego is not a separate act, and the 'object' towards which the glance of the Ego is directed is not necessarily an apprehended object; it is the 'object' intended by the Ego in the act.

(6) The pure Ego is identical with itself in all real and possible changes of experience. However, the *identity of the pure Ego* is not experienced in the normal flow of experience. "Only through acts of experiencing as reflected on do we know anything of the stream of experience and of its necessary relationship to the pure Ego; e.g., that it is a field for the free consummation of the conscious process of one and the same pure Ego; and that all the experiences of the stream are its own just in so far as it can glance at them or 'through them' at what is other than and foreign to the Ego."[16]

Husserl's conception of self-knowledge as reflective awareness involves a genuine difficulty. It require at least three Egos to account for phenomenological or transcendental reflection. Reduction consists in a splitting of the Ego in which the Ego establishes itself as the 'disinterested onlooker' above the 'interested Ego' of the natural attitude. That this takes place demands the same attitude of looking on 'disinterestedly,' which obviously implies the existenee of another 'disinterested onlooker

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of the disinterested onlooker '.[17] Eugen Fink identified it as the third Ego–the 'Ego spectator' that performs reduction and carries on phenomenological reflection.[18]

(7) The pure Ego, as Husserl observes, is the original source of all 'theses.'[19] The pure Ego lives in the acts which constitute its mental life. While the pure Ego lives in the act it is actively engaged in it. Engaging in a mental life, the pure Ego busies itself with 'something' intended to in that mental life. That 'something' with which the Ego is actively engaged is thus objectivated, a basic way of thematizing on which all other thematizings are founded. The object with its objective sense is the theme of the act. The manner in which the Ego is directed toward the theme–believingly, disbelievingly, liking it, disliking it, loving it, hating it, shaping it, using it, etc.–is the 'thesis' in an extended sense of the term.[20]

(8) The pure Ego, Husserl further observes, covers a region of being which is essentially temporal. The time, which Husserl here speaks of, is phenomenological or pure time. In the *Ideas–I*, Husserl dropped a hint that this pure time is 'ultimately and truly absolute.'[21] However, the problem of the relation of the pure Ego with original, pure, or phenome nological, time is not fully worked out in the *Ideas–I*. The problem has been taken up in the *Ideas–II*. There the pure Ego is said to be autoconstituted in time, though the pure Ego is still regarded as identical with the original time.

Husserl's doctrine of pure Ego in the *Ideas–I*, as far as we see, brings about a tension between opposite manners of being of the Ego. On the one hand, the pure Ego is not a real part or phase of any experience. It is 'something' that transcends the acts. But the 'something' is indescribable. On the other hand, the acts of consciousness are necessarily related to the Ego. The

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

pure Ego lives in them and operates them. It behaves in definite ways in so far as it relates itself to the acts, and thereby, to the objects of reference. The pure Ego is variously describable only when we see it living in the acts. But is the pure Ego something over and beyond the stream of pure consciousness? Husserl would not admit such a pure Ego. What he wants to assert is that consciousness consists of plurality of acts. The plural acts stand related to a single Ego which is their agent. In this conception, the pure Ego is held to be polarised. But more and more Husserl comes to regard the pure Ego as a concrete life having its habitual properties and bearing the sense of the whole world in that concrete life. The *Ideas–II* and the *Cartesian Meditations* are expressions of this new and the extended conception of the pure Ego.

The recognition of the pure Ego as the Ego of the 'habitus' (in the *Ideas–II*) is a significant addition to the concept of the Ego as 'Ichpol' already recognised in the *Ideas–I*. It gives the pure Ego more of a concrete status and is a step towards the development of the concept of the Ego as monad. At the same time, Husserl is opposed to the notion of pure Ego as substance. The identity of the pure Ego is not the identity of a permanent substance. The pure Ego has no content and no hidden domain. "It is absolutely simple and lies entirely open. All domains lie within the cogito and in the adequately apprehended manner of its functioning."[22] Even though the Ego is not a substance it shows throughout an abiding 'personal character' with its habitualities. The habitualities of the pure Ego are not real psychological dispositions. They emerge from the self–constitution of the Ego in original time. It is a structural necessity of immanent time that the pure Ego should be able to recognise itself as the same Ego living in its passing acts. The pure Ego, as has been pointed out in the *Ideas–I*, is not recognisable apart from

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

its 'ways of being related' to the actual acts. But the past acts are past, and the Ego has no control over them. It can stop or initiate reflection, but cannot radiate its acts.[23] That means, the freedom of Ego with regard to the acts that occur in original time is a compromised freedom. Then, how does the Ego recognise its identity across time ? This is made possible by the 'habitualities' of the pure Ego. Habitualities of the pure Ego indicate the retention of the themes of the intending processes. It is a kind of, what we may call, 'transcendental memory' through which the past is made present before the Ego.

The notion of the 'habitus' serves in an important way towards the development of the concept of the Ego as monad. The monad is the Ego taken in full concreteness.[24] It includes the Ego as the identical subject-pole, the habitualities of the Ego and 'world'. The habitualities of the Ego mediate the 'Ego-subject' and the 'world', and connect the world in an organic manner with the life of the pure Ego. The pure Ego posits the 'world' in its acts as transcendent and existent, and as something other than those acts. The intended world is an 'alien world'. The habitus of the pure Ego cuts across the 'alien world' and regards its familiar world as the world possessed by the Ego. By the 'alien world' we mean the 'world for consciousness'. The 'world' which was treated as the 'world *for* consciousness' in the *Ideas-I* turns out to be the 'world *in* consciousness', and the habitus of the pure Ego makes possible this conversion. The pure Ego in its conscious life becomes lodged with the 'world', thanks to the habitual retentions of the themes of the intending processes. The pure Ego that 'inhabits' and 'inherits' the 'world' is a concrete monad (the term taken over from Leibnitz). The monadic Ego by explicating or unfoulding its own life unfolds the sense of the whole world.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It appears that there is a further development in Husserl's conception of the Ego as observed by Prof. Kockelmans.[11] Prof. Kockelmans' observations are based on Husserl's *Erste Philosophie* Vol. II, and on Iso Kern's study of the original manuscripts of Husserl, *AVI* 30. Prof. Kockelmans points out that Husserl gradually developed in the direction of Kant's conception of the Ego. Husserl, thinks Prof. Koekelmans, finally came to the conclusion that the Ego and particularly its identity are not so much connected with the Ego's habitual convictions concercing concrete contents of consciousness, but are the consequences of the positing of the world as universal horizon. The Ego constitues the world by means of its harmonizing and continuously maintained position in regard to the world. The conviction of the Ego in regard to concrete mundane objects may obviously change, but the identity of the Ego requires that in all these changes it is determined by the idea of the world as an harmonious Cosmos, which is thus a necessary condition for the unity and the identity of the Ego. However, Prof. Kockelmans also observes that there are certain basic differences between Kant's conception of the Ego and Husserl's conception of the same. According to Husserl, the constitution of the unity and the identtty of the Ego through the constitution of the harmonious world is no more than a mere factum from the point of view of absolute consciousness. "It is and remains always possible that the world becomes dissolved in a mere 'gewuhl', which obviously entails a dissolution of the Ego."[12]

But, if phenomonology visualises the ideal possibility of a dissolution of the world (of which Husserl speaks in the *Ideas-I* and elsewhere), and if the dissolution of the world entails a dissolution of the Ego, then, does phenomology arrive at a consciousness or a being which is 'behind' or 'beyond' the transcendental Ego-consciousness, and which is the 'truly abso-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

lute'? In this connection, certain peculiarities of the constitution of the world in the performance of the Ego do not escape our notice. First, Husserl speaks of the auto-constitution of the Ego in time. The 'time' in question here is the 'absolute time'. Transcendantal consciousness is in identity with the absolute time. While Husserl speaks of a plularity of transcendental Egos, he never conceives of the possibility of a plularity of absolute times. Secondly, Husserl speaks of 'full freedom' and 'perfect freedom' which ensure *epoche*'.[27] But the constitution of the world does not appear to be an expression of Ego's freedom. Neither does the deal possibility of a nullification of the world reveal Ego's freedom. What phenomenology shows is that the Ego can and does constitute such a world as it in fact constitutes. That means, the transcendental Ego is the ground of the being of world. But it is not clear whether the transcendental Ego is also the sufficient ground of the being of the world. On the contrary, it appears that the transcendental Ego is obliged to constitute the inter-subjective world. However, none of these considerations should mislead us, since Husserl strongly condemns any talk of a being which is 'outside' or 'beyond' the transcendental Ego. In Husserl's own words : "Once one reaches the Ego, one becomes aware that one is standing within a sphere of evidence of such a nature that any attempt to inquire behind it would be non-sensical".[28] Certainly, Husserl's conception of the Ego runs into difficulties; and Husserl himself admits that the Ego has got many dark corners. In all probability, he could not fill all the dark corners of the Ego with light.

Department of Philosophy
University of Budwan
Burdwan–713104
(W. Bengal)

PARITOSH KUMAR DAS

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

1. In the first edition of the *Logical Investigations* (1901) Husserl joined issue with Paul Natorp and made the following remark; Now I must confess that I am utterly unable ro find the ego (asserted by Paul Natorp) as a necessary center of conscious reference' (Quoted by Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, The Hague, Mertinus Nijhoff, 1971, Vol. 1, p. 140).

2. Correcting his earlier stand on the pure Ego, Husserl, in a foot note in the *Ideas I*, adds the following statement: "In the *Logical Studies* I took up on the question of the pure Ego a sceptical position which I have not been able to maintain as my studies progressed. The criticism which I directed against Natorp's stimulating *Introduction to Psychology* (Vol. II, pp. 340 ff) ceases therefore to be relevant on one of the main issues". (Edmund Husserl, *Ideas : General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York; Macmillan Co., 1958), p. 173 (hereafter referred to as *Ideas-I*). In the revised edition of the *Logical Investigations* (1913) also Husserl made similar corrections, Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N, Findlay (London : Routlege and Kegen Paul, 1970), Note to § 4, Investigation V, Vol. II, p. 542.

3. Paul Ricoeur; *Husserl : An Analysis of his Phenomenology* trans. G. Ballard and E. Embree (Evanston, North Western University Press, 1967), p. 54.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

5. Edmund Husserl; *Cartesian Meditations : An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trons. Dorion Cairns (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 66-67 (hereafter referred to as *CM*).

6. *Ideas-I*, p. 150.

7. Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena*, Trans. P. G. Lucas (Manchester University Press, 1953), p. 49.

8. Edmund Husserl; *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 238 (hereafter referred to as *FTL*).

9. *Ideas-I*, p. 173.

10. *Ideas-I*, p. 233.

11. *Ideas-I*, p. 172

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

12. *Ideas-I*, p. 233.

13. *Ideas-I*, p. 173.

14. *Ideas-I*, p. 233.

15. *Ideas-I*, p. 121.

16. *Ideas-I*, p. 222.

17. *CM*, p. 35.

18. Eugen Fink; 'Die Phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserl in der gegenwärtigen Kritik' *Kant-Studien*, Vol. 38, (1933), p. 356.

19. *Ideas-I*, p. 342.

20. *Ideas-I*, p. 329.

21. *Ideas-I*, p. 236.

22. Ideas-II, p. 105, Quoted by Paul Ricoeur, *op. cit.*, Note 17, p. 54.

23. Paul Ricoeur, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

24. *CM*, p. 67.

25. Joseph J. Kockelmans; 'World-Constitution : Reflection on Husserl's Transcendental Idealism' *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. 1, pp. 29-31.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

27. *Ideas-I*, § 31.

28. *FTL*, p. 237.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

QUANTUM GRAVITY : SOME PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS

The very name " Quantum Gravity " suggests the integration of two diametrically opposite theories: the quantum mechanics and the (general) relativity. The quantum world is a micro-structural phenomenon whereas general relativity (i.e., gravity) refers to macro-structural phenomenon. Thus, quantum gravity is an attempt to explain and describe all phenomena—micro as well as macro—in terms of a single paradigm.

The previous attempts to synthesize both (special) relativity and quantum mechanics have had a limited success. The union of special relativity with the quantum mechanics has led to some spectacular successes both at quantitative as well as qualitative stages, the examples of which could be cited in the form of Dirac equations, the existence of anti-particles, the connection between spin and statistics, the TCP theorem and so on and so forth. (Isham, Penrose and Sciama, 1974).

But the main lacuna, in this adventure is that it cannot explain simultaneously the entire universe which is macro as well as micro. It is also too divergent to form any uniform pattern with which an adequate description of the reality can be made. Moreover, some of the cosmological problems have remained unsolved with such a formalism. Hence, a new leap is required to integrate both relativity and quantum mechanics. In fact, combination of quantum theory with the general theory of relativity has been tried out for the purpose of the solutions of some of the cosmological problems (Alexander Rüger, 1989).

But when we try to integrate both general theory of relativity (GTR) and quantum mechanics (QM) within quantum gravity (QG), the difficulties are more serious (For the convenience I

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

will talk about quantum mechanics (QM) in terms of quantum field theory (QFT). Even some physicists raised doubts about the compatibility of such an unification and they argued further whether such a reconciliation is fruitful and at all needed, since both the theories are conceptually and structurally entirely different. Obviously, then, the question would be : why should one make such an attempt to unite QFT and the GTR ? To answer this question is a very delicate and difficult task because inspite of the great attempts to unite these, still they have not yet genuinely been integrated.

But before we embark upon to study the hard-core of QG, it is fruitful to put down some of the concrete reasons which are mainly instrumental in stimulating research in this new area. Generally it has been maintained that advances in theoretical physics have mainly been responsible in doing research in quantum gravity (Isham, 1981). More specifically, there are subtle reasons for doing research in quantum gravity which are as follow :

1) There is a rapid evolution in quantum field theory following t' Hooft's discovery-that-Yang-Mills-Kibble theory could be successfully renormalized.

2) Also, there are unfied theories which have stimulated research activities. There is the successful Salam/Weinberg unification of weak and electromagnetic interactions and much effort is being expended in the development of a grand unified theory (GUT) incorporating strong interactions. It has also led to explore the possibility as to what extent quantum chromodynamics and gravity could be merged in the true unified grand theory.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

3) Supergravity has also been evolved in 1974, as the bose–fermion supersymmetry and it has attracted considerable attention.

4) Finally, Hawking's thermal radiation of black-holes led to an explosion of interest in quantum theory in various types of gravitational background and heralded the dawn of a new and exciting era in quantum gravity research.

My purpose in this paper is to examine quantum gravity in two stages : one is purely at the scientific stage and the other one is at the philosophical stage.

1. *Scientific Stage*

What is Quantum Gravity ? Or in other words, what is to be extracted from the QG ? (Isham, 1981). Beforel answering this question, there are certain other relevant questions which are to be at least known if not answered.

1. How much of the technical and conceptual structure of classical general relativity do we expect to retain ?

2. How much of the technical and conceptual structure of conventional quantum field theory do we expect to retain ?

From the view–point of conceptual consideration, the conceptual structure of the *Copenhagen* interpretation of quantum mechanics is quite inappropriate when gravity is involved. Basically, this is because the supposed 'classical background' has itself become part of the dynamical system

3. Do we expect to be able to quantize general relativity plus any collection of matter fields or must some special selection be made ?

This question is more important than it looks at first sight and again its answer sharply distinguishes different approaches. In

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the early work on quantum gravity most attempts were concerned with the gravitational field alone. On the other hand, modern ideas on supergravity and unification suggest that only a special mixture of gravity and matter will work.

4. Whether quantum gravity is a purely formal exercise or whether it has any testable supports ? Whether it is purely mathematics or a theoretical physics ? This is a problem. What sort of physical predictions do we expect from quantum gravity?

5. What is the significance of the Plank length which must presumably arise in any theory which unifies gravity (G) with quantum mechanics (h)?

In the light of the above questions, I will proceed further.

The general theory of relativity (GTR) is a theory about gravity, about the study of space–time curvature. According to GTR, gravity is a continuous process; it cannot be haulted. It is simply unstoppable. Inside a back–hole or a collapsing universe the contents will tend to collapse nothing to a geometric point, a singularity in spacetime where a vast mass occupies a zero space. (Nigel Calder, 1985).

In the case of quantum mechanics (QM) the process is reverse. QM is a powerful agent for preventing collapse. It explains why ordinary atoms occupy a substantial volume of space, instead of collapsing to a dot under the influence of the electric force. Sub–atomic particles occupy space by virtue of their motion. Because of a deep rooted uncertainty about their positions the sub–atomic particles are, in effect, smeared through space. The extent of the uncertainty is, not itself, at all uncertain; it is precisely defined (Calder, 1958).

So, ultimately we come to the back–holes or singularities. If you imagine smaller and smaller black–holes you can come

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

down ultimately to the Planck's mass. The diameter of a black-hole of the Planck mass is equal to the uncertainty about its position. As a result, black hole can no longer he pinned down in space. The black hole of that mass corresponds with a certain very high density of matter, such as would exist during the collapse to a singularity or at a very early stage of the Big-Bang. At this juncture, both relativity and quantum mechanics completely break-down (Calder, 1905).

It is the principal aim of physics to explore simple laws which govern the physical reality. In other words, the purpose is to device such a single theoretical construction by which an entire universe would be explained. Thus, twentieth century physicists are trying to understand all matter in terms of atoms and these in turn could be described with sub–atomic particles, The entire cosmos could be understood by four basic cosmic forces which are : (1) gravity, (2) electric force including magnetism, (3) strong nuclear force which binds the pieces of the atomic nucleus together, (4) the weak nuclear force which plays a key part in changing one kind of sub-atomic particles into another. Given these constituents and forces, you could explain everything.

But the major issue is : why nature had adopted only these forces and constituents ? And how are these related with each other and in turn their relationship with space, time and the cosmic world ? These questions are really unanswerable either with the quantum theory without or with the relativity.

A first major step towards merging quantum theory with the relativity theory came with the theoretical discovery of exploding black–holes by Stephen Hawking in 1974. According to this, very strong gravity could in effect squeeze particles of matter out of empty space in accordance with the quantum theory. Here Einstein's notions of space were inadequate for the forth-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

coming reconcilliation of gravity with the quantum theory, because the laws of geometry itself must fail at very short ranges. Here, rather than unquantized gravity, a quantized gravity is appropriate in describing the black–hole radiation. In other words, non-Minkowskian space–time geometry is very useful.

Roger Penrose of the Oxford University also developed his " twistor " project to understand the process of quantum gravitation. He has looked at different ways to paint a geometric description of the vaccuum and of particles in the vaccuum, a geometry involving destrorted space–time and twisted pieces of space–time that we perceive as particles. But most of the people were not ready to accept his " twistor–programme ". But the concept is important–using one theory. Penrose is trying to explain both the tiny particles and the vast reaches of empty space within a solid object.

The notion of supergravity[2] is also analogous to the quantum theory of gravitation. Supergravity starts with a hypothctical particle, called graviton, which carries the gravitational field. Also, there are other types of particles called as gravitinos which cannot be detected either because they might be elusive with a verty little mass or these particles might be so massive that we do not have any machines to create them and observe them. Cosmos is the big machine and we can observe and test these particles. So, the quantum gravitational study is being carried out with the supergravity. The problems with the supergravity are immense; but to a great extent its argument seems to be consistent, finite and not in need of renormalization (John Gribbin, 1984).

So far we saw the problems faced by the quantum gravity purely at the physical or scientific level. But the problems at the philosophical level are still serious and complicated. Nontheless, philosophical enquiry makes the scientific understanding more

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

comprehensive and deep. Then the question would be : is it due to philosophical problems that the unity between GTR and QFT and the quantum gravitational level becomes highly controvertial and problematic ? Hence, I will now try to document such deeper philosophical issues that makes the unification problematic.

2. *Some Philosophical Problems of Quantum Gravity*

There are numerous philosophical problems within the way of constructing a sound theory of quantum gravity.

There are at least three central issues faced by quantum gravity in making the unification of QFT and GTR impossible. In the first context, the difficulty is about the character of physical laws and quantities that could be constructed and understood. In the second context the basic difference concerns to status of space–time. In the third context, there is a measurement problem.

1. *Local Non-Local Problem*[3] :

In the GTR the character of physical quantities and laws are considered to be Local, whereas, in the QFT the character of physical quantities and laws are to be considered as Non-Local. In GTR the quantities are defined at space–time points, whereas in QFT particles or objects are defined over the whole of space.

From this it can be deduced that the scientists and philosophers both believe strongly that QFT and GTR, are both distinct and separate theories and there is no interconnection and interaction among them. Hence, their unification is an impossibility. Some of the theoreticians viewed that GTR is irrelevant for describing the micro-structure. They argue that since the very nsbjet-matter is utterly different for two theories, there is no question of their unification. Therefore, the very conceptual fabric

...3

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

makes a deep impression on the construction of formalism of a grand unified theory of quantum gravity problematic. Quantum gravity has to consider this problem and try to construct such a model so that the above stated difficulty might be surmounted.

2. *The Status of Spacetime in Both*[4] :

The other difference that concerns is the very status of space-time itself.

QFT (which is an improved version of classical quantum mechanics) describes the dynamics of quantum fields on a fixed flat spacetime background, i.e., Minkowski space. In Minkowski space gravitational effects are not taken into account.

In GTR spacetime is itself a dynamical object modified and partly generated by the matter-energy distribution. Here space-time is non-Minkowskian in character. That is, spacetime has a curvature and it is effected by gravity.

3. Measurement Problem

Apart from these two fundamental problems, there is another problem which is connected with the precise measurement and the apparent paradoxicality of the behaviour of the micro-structural world. In quantum theory a precise measurement of the behaviour of quantum particles is the most principal difficulty scientists are facing. For example, the simultaneous measurement of momentum and location of a particle (i e. electron) is impossible. So, the same measurement problem puts hurdles in uniting both quantum theory and the relativity. In addition, sub–atomic particles exhibit the peculiar paradoxicality of their behaviour; for example, light behaves sometimes as a particle and sometimes as a wave. Due to these problems unification is not favoured. In QFT the problem is just shifted to consider dualism between field and particle.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

From the foregoing enquiry one can tentatively say that quantum gravity faces fundamental philosophical problems at two levels. First, at the epistemological level of understanding of quantum gravitational world. In other words, by which method or manner quantum gravitational structure of the world is understood ? Secondly, at the ontological level; where does actual quantum gravitational world exist ? Thus, one is concerned with the process of knowing the reality, while the other with the actual existence of that reality.

The main epistemological question is how can we know reliably the real structure of the world ? That is, by which method can we know the world ? This epistemological problem has arisen due mainly to a measurement problem. Due to it we cannot know reliably the quantum gravitational world.

Not only is there a difficulty at the epistemological stage of the quantum gravity due to measurement problem; but due to this problem there is also a difficulty at the ontological stage. Due to this problem ontological picture of the quantum gravity gets distorted. Here, in ontology, the question is which component is basic : whether a field or a particle (in QFT)? This problem of duality was underdetermined in Niels Bohr's Complementaristic Structure of quantum mechanics; the same is also not resolved at quantum gravitational level either (Alexander Ruger, 1989), because the main ontological problem here is whether ontology is continuous or discontinuous and discrete entity.

So, due to such philosophical problems both at the epistemological and ontological levels, the unification of QFT and the GTR within QG is still not accomplished satisfactorily. So far as epistemology and ontology are not properly unified, discrepancy remains between the two theoretical positions, and here the real

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

theoretical structure of quantum gravity may not emerge. Although it is a fact that other lot of empirical or observational and technological information is needed, yet what is ultimately demanded for the theory construction is the complete agreement between the method of knowing (i. e. epistemology) and the real existence of the world, (i. e. ontology).

On this background I shall now proceed to consider some of the implications of Quantum Gravity.

Quantum Gravity

In and around 1970s the scenario has completely changed. There are hardly any theoreticians who oppose the synthesis of the diametrically opposite theories like QFT and the GTR. For the first time they are ready to give up their steadfastly held old beliefs which they embraced since long. They are thinking now that both theories should not be treated as distinct. Instead, these should be thought of in terms of unification and integration. The macro and the micro are thought to be a single reality and that there are no two distinct–realities. Only the problem is how to construct a formalism which describes properly both the micro–structures and the macro–structures. One should not disregard ths quantum effects while considering the astronomical objects. And conversely, that astronomical objects have a quantum structure and its effects cannot be ruled out, is the theoreticians' basic idea now. Scientists are currently engaged in constructing conceptual model with which effectively one can study the problem both below and above the level of Planck's constant. The theoreticians like Isham, Sciama, Ashtekar, Geroch, Penrose, and others constructed variously the model of 'Quantum Gravity'.

I have chosen the arguments of Ashtekar and Geroch here, for the sake of convenience, as a specific case study of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

quantum theory of gravitation which is described briefly as under :

Ashtekar-Geroch Thesis

According to this thesis the language of quantum mechanics is appropriate for the description of all physical phenomena. In particular one expects that the correct description of the phenomena of gravitation will be within such a framework. (Ashtekar-Geroch, 1974).

Even though quantum mechanics provides an appropriate language, that does not mean there are no difficulties at all while constructing the new theoretical model, i.e., quantum theory of gravitation. So also is the case with general relativity. Moreover QTG will not be of immediate help to the experimental or observational areas in laboratory experiments or astrophysical observations. (Ashtekar–Geroch, 1974). The immediate question arises : Why should one be after quantum gravity when it has no immediate help in the above stated sense ? The answer Ashtekar–Geroch thesis gives is : " In the broadest sense, a quantum theory of gravitation would represent an extension of our conceptual framework for the description of nature : any such extension would be of interest in itself. More specifically, one hopes that a search for such a theory will contribute to a deeper undrstanding of the structure of gravitation——or even of quantum mechanics itself ". (Ashtekar–Geroch, p. 1213).

The above quoted remarks show deeper philosophical connections with the epistemological enquiry. In other words. epistemological dynamism is involved here in our understanding of nature since the essence of science lies in its growth (See Karl Popper, 1985). By adopting such a conceptual fabric, our understanding of nature becomes more comprehensive and also deeper. The best analogy is the work of Niels Bohr in classical quantum mechanics.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

With the concept of 'Complementarity', he could resolve one of the intricate paradoxes of nature. As everybody knows, light manifests the dual characteristic features of waves and particles which are irreducible to each other. This paradox could not be resolved at the purely scientific level but only at the higher philosophical or epistemological level (Rosenfeld, 1961). According to complementaristic notion waves and particles should not be treated as opposite or paradoxical but essentially as complementary to each other. With the complementaristic approach, the very notion of understanding the nature of light itself and the quantum mechanics in general, becomes more comprehensive and profound, since the inquiry here is carried out not merely on the contingent plane of observation and ratiocination but also on the thematic (or imaginative) plane as well (Gerald Holton 1974).

The other features of Ashtekar-Geroch thesis is that the quantum gravitation is charged with some of the metaphysical components. Here the argument is constructed for its sake only (i.e., for the sake of knowledge or for gaining intellectual satisfaction) and not for immediate gains. According to this the very purpose is to understand entire nature or entire universe which gives the indication of some sort of metaphysical undercurrent.

Now coming back to the problems faced by the general theory of relativity and the quantum mechanics. The main difficulty is that though both make universal claims, yet both of them are diametrically opposed to each other. General relativity is a certain body of rules which are to be universal in the following sense: they are to govern the forms in which every acceptable theory of physics is to be expressed. These rules include, for example, introduction of a four dimensional space-time manifold, the use of tensor fields and tensor equations for the descrip-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

tion of physical phenomena, the introduction of a certain fundamental metric etc. (Ashtekar–Geroch, 1974).

Quantum mechanics is also a body of universal rules : the use of non-commuting operators, perhaps on a Hilbert–space of states, to describe physical phenomena, the introduction of a probability distribution for the results of measurements etc.

So, the main problem here is how to construct the new body of rules which are appropriate to the features of quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity.[5]

Now under such situation, Ashtekar–Geroch argue that it is natural to begin with by ignoring these issues of interpretation completely (i.e., for the time-being we must ignore quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity completely). Instead, let us simply write–down formulae which incorporate the appropriate features of general relativity and quantum mechanics. After that, attempt should be made to deduce some of the consequences which may perhaps in the end exhibit the true nature of reality. In other words, such a formalism ma well, in the end, suggest its own interpretation (Ashtekar-Geroch 1974).

The new theory of quantum gravitation could be constructed tentatively. First, the new theory of quantum gravitation contains the three constants : the speed of light "c", the gravitational constant " G " and Planck's constant " h ". From these one can cony struct unique quantities of mass ($c^{1/2}G^{-1/2}h \simeq 10^{-5}$ g), length ($c^{-3/2}$ $G^{1/2}$ h $\simeq 10^{-33}$ cm) and time ($c^{-5/2}$ $G^{1/2}$ h $\simeq 10^{-43}$ S). These dimensions would probably characterize the regimes in which quantum effects of the gravitational field will become important.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

The present status of the problem of obtaining quantum description of gravitation is two–fold : one is based on the techniques of canonical quantization and the other is based on the techniques of the quantum field theory. I need not go into the details of these problems. But from the above argument one can understand or at least sense that slowly the process of building the grand new synthesis is within the sight in the near future.

The above the procedure suggested by Ashtekar and Geroch is to construct a formal structure without immediately attempting to apprehend a physical interpretation to the formalism. The paper clearly brings out the problems and paradoxes if we immediately ask for an interpretation of the features of Quantum Theory of Gravitation (QTG). Hence, temporary suspension of interpretation is advised. This suspending of an interpretation in terms of particular type of physical model has some analogies with the phenomenological epoché. Before I proceed further, I think, it is necessary to give a very short account of phenomenology.

According to Husserl, phenomenology is a science of phenomena, that is, of all the data of consciousness. In other words, it is a method which consists of examining whatever is found in consciousness. Its primary concern is not the act of conciousness, but the object of consciousness. Descrates also used the method of doubting in order to make the truth claim as genuine and as presuppositionless as possible.

The phenomenological method is very significant since its aim is to free oneself from any preconceptions or presuppositions. It is imperative that in the exploration of consciousness all biases, theories, beliefs and habitual models of thinking be suspended or " bracketed " as Husserl described this process, using an expression familiar in algebra. This suspension of all judgements

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Husseel called epoché, a Greek word meaning abstention. Only when epoché a Greek word meaning abstention only when epoché is accomplished can fruitful exploration of phenomena be expected, becuuse only then are they not obscured or distorted by a person's individual idiosyncracies. (Misiak and Sexton, 1972, pp. 409–10).

In his major work *Ideas*[6] Husserl claims that suspending or attempting to doubt a thing or object does not mean denying or avoiding the existence of that object. The attempt does not affect the form of Being itself. What is or should be doubted is our way of attempting to understand the way it is constituted. In this way, our attitude towards looking at object is to be held in abeyance or suspended temporarily and not the existence of that object.

So, adoption of epoché is the suspension of an immediate commitment of certain physical objectification.

In the " Crisis ", again Husserl how shown has the theoretical constructions of physical theory are based on certain pre-theoretical structures of the life–world. As far as physical theory is concerned, in the life–world itself there is a certain mode of givenness of physical reality. A scientific theory is founded on this pre-theoretical experience of nature and builds its own constructions on its basis. In the light of this, generality of scientific theory, as suggested by Husserl, becomes available if we look at the situation in QG described by Ashtekar and Geroch. We may interpret it saying that different physical interpretations raised conflicting and contrasting situations and hence there is a need to suspend these constructions. The formalisation of theory is relatively independent of its interpretation. The echnique by which physical objectification could be accomplished may by suspended : but the fact that a certain physical cons-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

truction is kept in abeyance does not mean, however, that our thinking loses contact with objective reality. In terms of the phenomenological principle of intentionality, consciousness is always consciousness of something. Hence, when we formalise our thinking in physical theory, it means that we suspend particular physical constructions for the sake of re-establishing a presuppositionless and original contact with physical reality in life-world. This sort of renewed contact with nature, as presented in the life-world, may ultimately suggest more complex interpretations which could unify the quantum field theory and the general theory of relativity. The technique of formalisation suggted by Ashtekar and Geroch is a temporary device to keep that possibility open.

The above stated argument of Ashtekar and Geroch appears to be suggested by phenomenological inquiry. But the main aspect of the Ashtekar-Geroch thesis would be that perhaps the method may be known to us as has been displayed above, perhaps an epistemological stage might have been reached. However, the real question is : can this epistemological enquiry take us into the realm of structures of the nature ? Can we reach an ontological state with the epistemic enquiry ? Is ontological structure ultimately determined or is it still underdetermined ? As in complementaristic structure within the classical quantum mecbanics, so too here the status of ontology seems to be undertermined. Thus the issue continues to haunt us : which one is basic—whether a particle or a wave ? Since in the new research also there is a symmetry between gravitation, geometry, and quantum field (or particle ?), the problem has emerged once again in a new form about the status of ontology : which one is basic, whether gravity, quantum field (or particle) or geometry ? Again, we cannot decide and the problem of under-determination remains unsolved.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I think unless and until epistemology is coupled with ontology and the two are united fruitfully together the theory of QG may not emerge as a well established theory. That does not mean one should underrate recent researches and new developments in physical science. Nor does one need to uderestimate the results of new empirical and observational data. It may, nonetheless, also be kept in mind that one should not adopt the "wait and see" policy.

But then the real question would be : can phenomenology itself exhibit the two fundamental features of philosophy (or knowledge) one, epistemological and the other ontological [7]

Philosophy Department
Poona University
Pune-411007.

E. V. ALTEKAR

NOTES

1. There is infact integration between general theory of relativity and quantum field theory (QFT). QFT is actually an improved version of Q. M. since here the duality is not between particle and wave but between particle and field. More importantly, QFT treats particle as belonging to the observer and hence particle is necessary to interpret the quantum field. So, the problem of integration between GTR and QFT has been minimized. So, here we have to integrate quantum field and the gravity. Of course, this is again a debatable issue, whether particle-wave duality has been really solved in this new attempt.

2. John Gribbin ; *In search of Shrodinger's Cat*, p. 270.

3. In this context please see the views of Ashtekar and Geroch 1975, pp. 1214-16, also Wald, 1986, and Alexander Rüger, 1989.

4. Alexander Rüger, 1989, p. 561.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

5. For the construction of a genuine theory of quantum gravity, theoreticians face enormous problems. For the details please see Ashtekar-Geroch, "Quantum Theory of Gravitation", *Report on the Progress in Physics*, 1974, 37, 4, 1211 – 1256.

6. Edmund Husserl; *Ideas : General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*: p. 108, Similar ideas are also developed and used by Husserl in *Crisis*.

7. I am very much indebted to Professor R. Sundara Rajan, University of Poona, for his fruitful suggestions and his invaluable comments to develop the present idea into its presentable form.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ashtekar Abhay and Geroch Robert (1974) "Quantum Theory of Gravitation", *Reports on the Progress in Physics*, Vol. 37, Part 4, 1211-1256

Barrow, J. and Silk J. (April, 1980) "The Structure of the Early Universe" *Scientific American*, Vol. 242, No. 4, 98–108.

Bohr, Niels, (1858). *Atomic Physics and Humun Knowledge*, John Wiley & Sons., Inc. New York.

Bohr, Niels, (1934, Reprinted, 1961). *Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U. K.

Boslough, John, (1984). *Beyond the Black Hole : Stephen Hawking's Universe*, Fontana/Collins, U. K.

Calder, Nigels (1985). *Einstein's Universe*, Penguin Books, U. K.

Greenberger Daniel and Overhouser A. (May, 1980) "The Role of Gravity in Quantum Theory", *Scientific American*, Vol. 242, No. 5, 54–64.

Gribbin, John (1984). *In Search of Schrodinger's Cat*, Corgi Books, U.K.

Holton, Gerald (1973). *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought*, Harvard University Press. Mass., U. S. A.

Holton, Gerald (1978, Reprinted, 1988). *Scientific Imagination*, Harvard University Press, Mass., U. S. A.

Isham, Penrose and Sciama (Eds.) (1974, 1981 and 1986). *Quuntum Gravity : An Oxford Symposium*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Husserl, Edmund (1969). *Ideas : Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.* (Tr. by W. R. Boyce, Gibson) Fifth Impression, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.

Husserl, Edmund (1965). *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (Tr. by Quentin Lauer) Harper Torchbook, New York.

Misiak and Sexton (1972) *History of Psychology*, Grune and Stratton, New York and London.

Marlow, A. R (Ed.), (1980) *Quantum Theory and Gravitation*, Academic Press, New York.

Popper, Karl (1985). *Conjectures and Refutations*, Routledge and Kegan Paul London.

Peterson, Aage (1963, II Printing). *Quantum Physics and the Philosophical Tradition*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, U. S. A.

Pagels, Heinz (1982) *The Cosmic Code*, Penguin Books, U. K.

Pagels, Heinz (1985) *Perfect Symmetry*, Simon and Schuster Ltd., New York.

Rüger, Alexander (1989) "Complementarity Meets General Relativity : A study in Ontological Commitments and Theory Unification", *Synthese* Vol. 79, No. 3, 559–580.

Rosenfeld, L. (April, 1961). "Foundations of Quantum Theory and Complementarity", *Nature*, Vol. 190, Nos. 4770–76. pp. 384–388.

't Hooft, Gerard (June, 1980). "Gauge Theories of the Forces between Elementary Particles", *Scientific American*, Vol. 242, No. 6, 90–116.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

OUR LATEST PUBLICATION

REGULARITY, NORMATIVITY AND RULES OF LANGUAGE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

Prof. Rajendra Prasad

pp. 310

Rs. 100/-

In this volume twenty essays of Prof. Rajendra Prasad, published earlier in different journals in India and abroad, are collected. In these essays philosophical analysis is brought to bear upon such themes as nature of language, relation between language and philosophy or that between modern logic and philosophy. There are essays in the collection which consider such issues as practical relevance of philosophy, the distinction between apriori and empirical propositions etc. In addition, some essays deal with concepts of substance, mind and religious belief, while some other discuss problems connected with objectivity of historical judgements, relation between man and god, role of reason and sentiment in human life. The last four essays in the collection discuss difficulties connected with philosophical synthesis and consider relation between tradition, progress, freedom, reverence and creativity

The essays would be immensely helpful to both students and teachers of philosophy.

For further details contact :

The Editor ,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly ,
Philosophy Department ,
University of Poona, Pune 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

(Formerly 'The Philosophical Quarterly')

Students' Supplement

Journal of the Pratap Centre
of Philosophy, Amalner
AND
Department of Philosophy
Poona University, Pune

New Series

Volume XVIII
No. 3
July 1991

17191

Editors :

S. S. Barlingay | Rajendra Prasad | M. P. Marathe
R. Sundara Rajan | Mrinal Miri | S. S. Deshpande

University of Poona

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
ISSN 0376-415X

Editors

S. S. Barlingay, (Professor Emeritus, Poona University), Rajendra Prasad, (Rtd. Professor, Patna), M. P. Marathe (Poona University), R. Sundara Rajan (Poona University), Mrinal Miri (NEHU, Shillong), S. S. Deshpande (Poona University)

Board of Consulting Editors :

G. N. Mathrani (Bombay), Daya Krishna (Jaipur), Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta), K. J. Shah (Dharwad), R. C. Pandeya (Delhi University), D. P. Chattopadhyaya (Jadavpur University), G. N. Joshi (Poona). D. Y. Deshpande (Nagpur), J. de Marneffe (Poona), Dharmendra Kumar (Delhi University), R. C. Gandhi (Delhi), J. Khwaja (Aligarh Muslim University), S. A. Shaida (I. I. T., Kanpur), Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow University), S. K. Saxena (Delhi University), S. V. Bokil (Poona University), R. A. Sinari (Goa University), R. K. Gupta (Delhi University), R. Balasubramanian (Pondicherry University), Ranveer Singh (Imphal), V. K. Bharadwaja (Delhi University), Ashok Gangadean (Haverford College, USA).

Articles in this Journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium, and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).

Articles for publication, Books for Review, and other communications pertaining to publications, Book-reviews, subscriptions, I. P. Q. Publications, etc. may be sent to :

The Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Department of Philosophy, Poona University, Pune 411 007, India.

Subscription to be sent to :

The Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly (by Cash or by Cheque)

• Change of Address and/or non-receipt of an issue of the Journal may be intimated within a month of the date of publication

• **Life Membership :**

Individuals : Rs. 400/-(in India) US $ 100/-(outside India)
Institutions : Rs. 1500/-(in India) US $ 200/-(outside India)

• **Annual Subscriptions :**

Individuals : Rs. 60 (Rs. 65/- by cheque) US $ 35.00
Institutions : Rs. 100 (Rs. 110/- by cheque) US $ 50.00
Single copy : Rs. 20/- US $ 5.00

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regn. No. 24248/37

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
STUDENTS' SUPPLEMENT

SUNIL BARAN MONDAL	:	Development of Epistemology	...1
S. K. PAL	:	Significance of the Theory of Life–World in Husserl's Phenomenology	...9
MAHADEV DEWASHI	:	Mackie on Causal Priority : A Critical Study	...19

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

* Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I. P. Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
* The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
* **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
* The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
* Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
* Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining, bold face by wavy underlining.
* The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
* Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
* The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations.

Edited and Published by S. S. Barlingay, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune 411 007.
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, Pune 411 016.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMOLOGY

Epistemology or theory of knowledge is one of the three core areas of philosophy–the other two being Metaphysics and Ethics. Throughout the history of philosophy Epistemology has been ranked next only to Metaphysics. The fundamental problem of Epistemology concerns the nature and limits of human knowledge. It is obvious that the question " What is the nature of knowledge and what are its limits ?" is organically related to the question of the relation between knowing and being--the fountain head of the all philosophical reflections. The various schools of Epistemology constitute various answers to fundamental epistemological question concerning the nature and limits of human knowledge. In the history of Epistemology one not only finds a variety of different and even conflicting views advanced as solutions to the central problems of Epistemology, but also different styles of epistemological practice. These different styles constitute different approaches to the central questions of epistemology. The differences between styles and approaches are so radical that not only the solutions but also the very construal and articulation of the problem exhibit fundamental disagreements. In other words, two philosophers adopting two different styles of practice in the Epistemology or approaches towards the problem of the nature and the limits of knowledge differ not only with regard to what an adequate solution to the problem is but also what exactly the problem itself is and how it can be tackled. It is this lack of consensus over even the fundamentals concerning the exact nature of the problems and the mode of their solutions, that compels some thinkers to characterize the discipline of epistemology as highly ' indisciplined'. [1]

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, in what follows we briefly attempt to provide a birds–eye–view of the main styles of epistemological practice or chief epistemological traditions.

Since the beginning of its history till recently epistemology was dominated by what may be called the grand–tradition or the classical style. The functions of epistemology, according to the grand–tradition, was to work out an adequate solution to the problem of the nature and limits of knowledge in accordance with an adequate metaphysical theory. The classical philosophical tradition of the west begins with Plato and ends with the rise of Modern Philosophy. The function of epistemologists was to work out a theory of knowledge which logically followed from a theory of reality that was propounded or expounded or accepted by the Epistemologists This is evident from the fact that, for example, in Plato and Aristotle the respective theories of knowledge, on the one hand, follow from the theory of reality and, on the other, provide them a justifications. This is also so in a classical Indian thinker like Śaṁkara. In other words, in classical philosophical thought, whether Western or Indian, epistemology subserved the purposes of Metaphysics in the sense that epistemological practice was a means to metaphysical end, With the rise of modern philosophy epistemology undoubtedly ceased to play a secondary subservient role *vis–a–vis* metaphysics due to the fact that the primary concerns of the modern philosophers like Descartes and Locke ere epistemological, though they were not, except for Hume and possibly Kant, antimetaphysical. Even though the modern epistemologists did not consider epistemology to be subservient to metaphysics and epistemological practice to be the means for achieving certain metaphysical ends they took scrupulous care to see that their epistemological theories are consistent with their avowed metaphysical conviction. Two points are to be noted in connetion

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with the grand tradition of epistemology. Firstly, Epistemology was closely associated with metaphysics even though this association was too strong in the case of classical philosophical tradition and relatively tenacious in the case of modern philosophical tradition. Secondly, in the grand tradition the orientation of epistemology was absolutely normative in the sense that every epistemologist in the grand tradition believed that there exists a norm/norms which is/are abiding, absolute and a–historical, which ought to be satisfied by our claims in ordr to be ratified as knowledge. The traditional epistemological thought, Indian or Western, sought to solve the problems of the nature of knowledge by addressing itself to the question, " what is/are the source/s of valid knowledge".

This question brings to surface the normative character of epistemology as it was practiced under the grand tradition. The contemporary epistemological traditions which radically departed from the grand tradition, did so by undoing either of the two or both the central features of the grand tradition in Epistemology, viz; 1. The association of epistemology with metaphysics, and 2. The normative feature of epistemology.

The analytical tradition in epistemology rejected wholly the contention that epistemology must be closely associated with metaphysics. This is natural because the analytical movement was essentially an anti–metaphysical movement. The different streams of analytical philosophy in different ways purported to show that metaphysical questions were not genuine questions. After dissociating epistemology from metaphysics the analytical tradition in epistemology seeks to answer the question, ' What is knowledge ? ' by understanding the nature of the concept of knowledge as it figures in our discourse. Though there are differences among analytical philosophers with regard to exact nature of analytical philosophy, they all share the idea of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

antonomy of epistemology and accept that the analysis of the concept of knowledge and related concepts will throw decisive light on the nature of knowledge.

The question is whether in the analytical tradition epistemology is a normative enquiry or a descriptive one. The analytical epistemologist does not adopt the normativist position, so strongly championed by the eipstemologists of the grand tradition according to whom an epistemologist must aim at setting or fixing the norms that ought to be satisfied by our knowledge claims. What gave the right to epistemologists to do so was the veracity of his metaphysical position. Thus, the normative character of traditional epistemology has to be traced to its link with metaphysics The analytical epistemologists, who believe that they successfully snapped this link, cannot share the idea of normativity of epistemology entertained by the grand tradition. However, this does not mean that analytical epistemologists are anti–normativists and descriptivists. Many analytical epistemologists do believe in the existence of certain abiding, culturally neutral and a–historical norms which ought to be satisfied in order that our claims can be considered to be genuine knowledge, though unlike epistemologists in grand tradition they do not look upon them as tollwing from metaphysical truth but only as following from the logic of our language. Of course, even this much of normativity is absent in later Wittgenstein who rejects the very idea of the logic of our knowledge. Thus, the orientation of epistemology in the analytical tradition is normative; it is not normative in the same sense in which the grand tradition construes the orientation of epistemology. However, it should be noted that most of the analytical philosophers consider epistemology to be a normative enquiry, even though the description of the concept of knowledge and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

other cognate concepts is the only adequate method in epistemology.

In his *Analytic Philosophy of Knowledge* written in the typically analytical style, Arthur Dante, one of the main figures of the analytical tradition of epistemology, draws a fundamental distinction between the world and our knowledge of the world. This distinction is drawn in terms of two levels, such that what holds good in the case of one does not hold good in the case of the other By drawing this distinction and contending its unquestionable centrality, Dante implies that the study of knowledge has to be qualitatively different from the study of the objects of the world. If the discourse about the world and its objects is descriptive, the discourse about knowledge of the world and its object has to be non-descriptive i e. normative. This point is important because it is precisely this distinction which was rejected by what is called Naturalistic epistemology. Naturalistic epistemology could adopt a totally descriptivist stance on the question of the orientation of epistemology precisely because it rejected the distinction Naturalistic epistemology considers our knowledge of the world to be part of the world such that our discourse about knowledge need not be and should not be qualitatively different from that of natural entities which are the objects of our knowledge, in so far as the terms and the idioms of the latter are descriptive.

Thus, one can say that whereas analytical tradition in epistemology totally rejected the contention of the grand tradition in connection with the close association of epistemology with metaphysics and partly rejected the latter's normativist contention, the naturalistic tradition rejects both the contentions of the grand theory with equal vehemence Hence, the naturalistic tradition in epistemology is a more radical departure from the grand-tradition than analytical epistemology. Naturalistic

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

epistemology is gaining ground though it is still in a nascent stage. Analytical tradition is loosing its way in favour of naturalistic epistemology which has among its follower such eminent philosophers like Quine.[2] The naturlistic epistemology has three versions : biological, psychological and sociological. The biological version considers knowledge to be basically a biological phenomenon, such that its description must take recourse to the terms whose efficiency has been proved in our study of biological phenomena. Since it is admitted today that the theory of evolution by natural selection has been proved to be extremely successful, there is a growing tendency to provide a theory of knowledge in terms of the theory of biological evolution.

Naturalistic epistemology practiced on the lines of the theory of organic evolution is called evolutionary epistemology. Epistemologists like Stephen Toulmin[3] belong to this tradition of epistemology. They seek to understand the nature of knowledge and rationality on the analogy or in terms of biological evolution. Locutions like selection and adaptation figure heavily in the writings of these epistemologists.

The psychological version of Naturalistic epistemology has found its best expression in Jean Piaget. In working out this theory which he calls genetic Epistemology Piaget attempts to bring to bear the facts of child's psychology on the development of human knowledge. According to Piaget the ways by which the child-constructs the concepts of space, time, physical object, number, motion, causation etc, provide keys to our understanding of the phenomenon of human knowledge. Of course, genetic Epistemologists are quite often sensitive to the possibility of our biological nature in knowledge, especially of morphology and organic evolution sheding light on the nature of knowledge. This has very well been brought out in the words of Piaget him

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

self when he says " There is a chapter of the history of science, however, which for long time now should have served as an as an analogy to facilitate the rapproachment we recommend, namely, that of relations which embryology has been gradually asked to maintain first with comparative anatomy, then with the evolutionary theory as a whole Such comparison deserves attention, for there is no doubt that child psychology constitutes a kind of mental embryology not only as a description of the individual's stages of development but chiefly as the study of the very machanisms of this develodment...to consider epistemology a comparative anatomy of thought operations and a theory of intellectual evolution or of adaptation of mind to mind and to reality by no means reduces the extent of its tasks... once this kind of comparison is admitted, the history of relations between embryology and other biological branches shed much light on possible relations and those already present between child psychology and epistemology " [4] *

SUNIL BARAN MONDAL

Philosophy Department
Visva-bharati
Santiniketan 731 235
BIRBHUM (W. B.)

NOTES

1. Bunge Mario. (1967) *Foundations of Physics*, Springer-Verlag, New York, inc. p. 4.

2. " Epistemology Naturalised " In Royce, J. R. and Rizebvin (ed) *The Psychology of Knowledge.*

3. *Human Understanding*, Vol. 1.

4. *Psychology and Epistemology : Towards a Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 23-25.

* I am deeply indebted to my teacher Dr. S. G. Kulkarni for making valuable suggestions in writing this paper.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-**

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs. 25/-**

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-**

Ramchandra Gandhi (ed) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs. 50/-**

S S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs. 70/-**

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs. 60/-**

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism, Rs. 50/-**

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-**

S. S. Barlingay (ed), **A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs. 50/-**

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs. 25/-**

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs. 30/-**

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Pune–411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THEORY OF LIFE–WORLD IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Preliminary study of Husserl's manuscripts, and the post-humous publication of the previously unpublished part of his last work, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, have revealed many fertile ideas. Among these the idea of 'life–world' (lebenswelt) is the most important one. During Husserl's life–time only a few of his friends and followers were acquainted with his investigations of life–world, and actually Husserl did not carefully formulate these ideas until he was preparing the final draft of the second part of the *Crisis*, the book he was working out at the time of his death. Nevertheless, that the concept of the life–world must have preoccupied him for at least the last fifteen years of his life becomes apparent, e g, in his post–humously published *Phenomenological Psychology*, which was written before 1925 and 1928, contains penetrating analyses of the 'world of immediate experience' as we 'live' before every theoretical and in particular, every scientific reflection. Husserl's ideas along these lines were first made known by Ludwig Landgrebe in an article published in 1940. Then, in 1945 Merleau Ponty used these ideas with which he had become acquainted while studying Husserl's manuscripts in Louvain, as one of the central issues for *Phenomenology of Perception*. Following the publication in 1950 of the relevant Husserlian manuscripts on this subject, the life–world concept became and remains the subject of drawing intensive attention.

In investigating the real significance of this theory of life–world we would divide the discussion in some such four parts : (1) a survey of the earlier development of Husserl's philosophy

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

on the perspective of which this theory of life–world comes to the fore, (ii) an understanding of the ontology of life–world, (iii) a critique of some misrepresentations of Husserl, and, finally, (iv) a conclusion.

I

In the earlier development of his phenomenology Husserl thought that the realm of pure consciousness made available by phenomenological reduction constitutes the area in which every process, every movement, and every objective relation holding between things–in short, every theoretical and practical truth–has its origin, its ultimate foundation. Everything is explained there with reference to the meaning constitution of the pure and transcendental subjectivity. But the contention that everything gets constituted in my transcendental consciousness leads to the problem of transcendental solipsism. If every objectivity and transcendence are explained in terms of subjective constitution, there arise some problems and difficulties. Husserl, however, was aware of these difficulties, and we find him trying to discover a radical solution to these problems, e. g, of the objectivity of the world, of the 'other,' the universality of human standpoint. In his enquiries of the *Ideas, Cartesian Meditations, Formal and Transcenaental Logic,* etc. Husserl reiterated that the transcendental ego works upon the phenomena to derive the meaning of the world. In *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl introduced the concept of *appresentation,* and the process of *pairing* to account for the experience of someone else. Though the 'other in person' is never given in my experience originally, it is given *appresentatively* in a semi–originally manner. Thus the other, on Husserl's account, means the *alter ego.* Myself and other thereby make the ground for intersubjectivity which is said to be another name for objectivity and the world. In the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* Husserl brought to light the ultimate

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

roots of general theory of science by referring to this transcendental subjectivity. In this book Husserl explained the unity of the life of consciousness determined by a universal constitutive *apriori* of intersubjectivity. [1]

Thus, we find Husserl to solve the problem of objectivity of the world on the basis of intersubjectivity for which he wanted to establish the independent existence of the other But the independence is proved to be a contribution of the transcendental subjectivity. If the other is a product of the subjectivity, the world owing its origin to intersubjectivity becomes problematical Again, in *Formal and Transcendental Logic,* the explanation of the Sciences in terms of the constituting activity of the transcendental ego does not give the sciences an independent foundation. The world thus explained is creation of the subjectivity.

Husserl wanted to escape from this unhappy situation. He thought that the life-world would give him an opportunity to found the independent existence of the world and establish the genuine character of the sciences. And in the *Crisis* the theme of lifeworld is placed on his philosophical map and is made the core issue of phenomenology. There are, however, equivocations' of this thesis of life-world. There is not one homogeneous concept, but a whole spectrum of concepts which lead to shade off into one another. Husserl's primary motive, however, is to return to the world of pre-scientific, pre-logical and pre-predicative experience which is to be the ground of all theoretical and practical activities. All this means that Husserl introduces this new idea of lifeworld in order to find a woy out from transcendental solipsism. However, let us now enquire more extensively what Husserl means by ' life-world '.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

II

Under the influence of science since Galileo, the world of our common lived experience has been replaced by the objectively true world of science,[3] what, accoring to modern science, is accepted as reality in the strict sense of the word. But such a view of the world, Husserl contends, in not acceptable. We can not have a direct and immediate experience of the objective entities of science whereas the life–world itself, either actually or vitually, is available in our immediate experience. Moreover, the universe of science is found to be a net work of ideal constructs. Its conceptions are of the same nature as those of the mathematical sciences. The construction of the world of science implies certain definite procedures in which idealization plays an integral role. But the world of science must have a firm basis upon which it can rest. It is idealiation and abstractions of the foundation which builds up the scientific frame–work. This foundational basis cannot be anything other than the life–world and the immediate evidence of our lived experience underlying the mental activities, the constructs of objective world of sciences are the acts through which the life–world appears to us as always present, as pre–given, as prior to and independent of any scientific theory. Husserl calls the totality of all these acts immediately referring to the life–world, 'our world–experiencing–life.'[4] Thus, Husserl shows that all theoretical and practical truths whether mathematical, logical or scientific have their final justification and roots in the events and happenings of the life–world. For a really fundamental understanding of the world of science we have to return to the life–world and elucidate the role it plays in the constitution or the development of science.[5]

This life–world is the world presented in our immediate 'lived' experience in which determinate distinctions of the subject and the object have not yet developed, in which experiences mingle

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with one another indicating an invarient structure. It is a common world in which we come in contact with each other as individual humanbeings. However, to gain the life world we need a first reduction in which the abstracts of the theoretical sciences, the ideas which are responsible for the dichotomy between the individual and the world, are bracketed. The invariant structures of life–world show how the so–called objec tivity of the sciences is constructed on the basis of reflection. The crisis of the sciences develops while the roots of objectivity are forgotten. But Husserl speaks of a further reduction is which the life–world is bracketed and an attempt is made to see how the invariant structures of the life world are constituted in transcendental subjectivity. It is said that the life–world is constituted by the ' functioning intentionality '.[6] This intentionality is not the intentionality of pure and static consciousness, but is the participating, growing intentionality intermixed with the world.

III

But husserl is not very explicit here. There are ambiguities in his texts, which, however, leave the scope for different misconceptions. Some scholars, who are staunch supporters of the idealistic interpretation of Husserl, see nothing new or radical in this thesis of life–world of the *Crisis* and the later manuscripts. They hold that Husserl introduced the concept of life–world only to show and sharpen the contrast between the world of our immediate experience and the objectified world of sciences. They opine that Husserl's investigations of the life–world is but one of the four approaches that Husserl uses to reveal the constitutive activity of transcendental subjectivity. They say that the life–world is not the deepest layer to which phenomenology can genetrate. On the contrary they reiterate that this life–world (which can even be equated

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

with the natural world) is constituted by the transcendental ego. Kockelmans, a scholar on Husserl, supports this contention. These interpreters refer to the second reduction, in which the life–world is bracketed, and thereby opine that the concept of functional intentionality is nothing else than the unknown principles of transcendental subjectivity which has the characteristic of intentionality. And the principles of constitution are, perhaps, the *apriori* structures of subjectivity. The intended object of the life–world is constituted in the heart of transcendental subjectivity.

But this was not Husserl's intention. This interpretation of Husserl is over–simplification and fails to represent later Husserl duly. On the contrary, Husserl's introducing of functioning intentionality, and 'anonymous intentionality'[8] means a radical break of Husserl's transcendentalism. Several authorities on Husserl, like Merleau Ponty, A. De Waelhens, G Brand, etc, strongly uphold the view that the thesis of life–world is altogether a new and revolutionary discovery of Husserl through which he tries to get nearer to the 'human' world. Moreover, if it were not his intention, why does he need this thesis, and elucidate it so urgently ?

If we take a serious look at the *Crisis* and the later manuscripts, we would see that in all these Husserl finds an existential basis of life and culture. In each experience, husserl says,[9] intentionality functions simultaneously as an implicit project (Vor Wurf) and as retrospect (Ruch–Schan). "At the starting point" Husserl says, "the first ray originates and darts out as having the character of a beginning, and processes a pre–horizon, which refers to things to be achieved later..."[10] But the projected intentionality is none–the–less already saturated with legacies from earlier perceptions, which are, as it were, 'sedimented' in the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

actual perception. Consciousness is not a *tabula rasa* on which time and again new sings manifest themselves; on the contrary, while consciousness forges ahead continually transcending the horizons, it already has consciousness behind it as well. The object is grasped in the project of its possible explanation together with the history sedimented in it.[11]

Paul Ricouer in his book *Husserl : An Analysis of His Phenomenology* has indicated the existentialistic tendency of Husserl's phenomenology. He says that Husserlian phenomenology becomes more and more existential to the extent that the problem of perception becomes the most dominant. In Husserl's works from *Logical Investigations* to *Cartesian Meditations* consciousness is defined not by perception, i.e., by its very presence to things, but rather by its distance and absence. This distance and this absence are the powers of signifying, of menaing, but such signifying can be empty. Perception has the priviledge of fulfilment by intuition. Thus, according to Ricouer, consciousness is doubly intentional. In the first by the characteristic of being a significance and in the second, by virtue of being an intuitive fulfilling.

Indeed, it can be seen that in the last ten years of Husserl's writings perception is regarded as the fundamental basis and origin of all operations of consciousness. It is in perception that the existence of things and that of the subject are simultaneously revealed. The Platonic and Galilean traditions suppose that the true reality is not what one perceives, but what one conceives and measures. In this way the things acquire transcendence in relation to consciousness. But in reality it is the relative transcendence of an object into which consciousness comes to transcend itself.[12] Consciousness defined by intentionality is out side and beyond itself. It connects its perspective of things to which it

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

can apply its consideration, its desire, its actions, and thus the world is 'world-for-my life'; environment of the 'living ego'[13] where "the pact between daily living and every revealed presence is continually renewed".[14] The phenomenology of later Husser becomes more and more empirical and existential. This progress towards an ever more original consciousness destroys every claim of 'constituting the world' in 'consciousness'. The solipsism of transcendental phenomenology is, thus, removed by progressive discovery that one does not constitute the original consciousness, but everything has to be derived from it.[15]

IV

From the above discussion it is quite evident that the idealistic interpretation of the thesis of life-world is mistaken, and further that the life-world is the most important theme of Husserlian phenomenology upon which all theoretical and practical knowledges are sought to be based.

S. K. PAL
Department of Philosophy
Burdwan University
Burdwan-713101
(W. B.)

NOTES

1. J. N. Mohanty; "Life-world and *Apriori* in Husserl's Thought" *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. III, p. 52.

2. D. Carr: "Husserl's Problematic Concept of the Life-world" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1970, p. 331.

3. A. Gurwitsch; "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XI, p. 389.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. J. J. Kockelmans; "Life-world and World Experiencing Life", Introduction, *Phenomenology*, Double-Day & Co., Garden city, New York, p. 196.

5. Edmund Husserl; *Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften and die transcendental Phenomenologie* (edited by Walter Bimel). The Hague, Martinus Nljhoff, 1954, pp. 48-54, 114-116, 130-38.

6. Eugen Fink; "Das problem der Phenomenologie Husserls" *Revue international de Philosophy*, 1, (1936), p. 226.

7. J. J. Kockelmans; *Op. cit.* p. 195.

8. Edmund Husserl; *Manuscripts*, CIIV, pp. 11-15.

9. Edmund Husserl; *Manuscripts*, C3 III, p. 19.

10. *Ibid*, p. 19.

11. Gerd Brand; "Intentionality, Reduction and Intentional Analysis in Husserl's Manuscripts", reprinted in *Phenomenology*, *op. cit.*

12. M. K. Bhadra; *Phenomenology and Existentialism; A Critical Evaluation*, (in Fress) Ch. on Life-word.

13. Paul Ricouer; *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, North Western University Press, Evanston, 1969 p. 204.

14. *Ibid*, p. 204.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

Proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, the book contains a critical appraisal of various aspects of the late **Kalidas Bhattacharyya's** philosophical thought, and includes his own final formulation of his philosophical position.

Edited by **Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastava**

The book includes contributions from **K. L. Sharma** (A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharyya), **Daya Krishna** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya and the Logic of Alternation), **S. K. Chattopadhyaya** (Professor Bhattacharyya's "Alternative Standpoints" of Philosophy), **K. Bagchi** (Subjective and Objective Attitudes as Alternatives : A study of Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Knowledge-Object Unity), **N. K. Sharma** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Philosophy : Alternative Absolutes), **R. S. Bhatnagar** (Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy : Study of a Fundamental Dichotomy in Kalidas Bhattacharyya's Thought), **Mrs. Yogesh Gupta** (Pre-suppositions of Science and Philosophy : A Critical Study) **Mrinal Kanti Bhadra** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya's View of Freedom and Existentialist Thought), **Rajendra Prasad** (Freedom and Existential Thought), **Rajendra Prasad Pandey** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya on the Indian Concept of Man), **K. J. Shah** (Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated), **J. N. Mohanty** (Kalidas Bhattacharyya as a Metaphysician).

1/8 Demy, Pages 239. Price Rs. 60/-

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
Poona University, PUNE 411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

MACKIE ON CAUSAL PRIORITY : A CRITICAL STUDY

The problem of causality and that of causal relation have been intriguing problems through the history of philosophy. A central task confronting any attempt to give a account of the nature of causal relation concerns what may be referred to as the *problem of causal priority*. The problem of understanding the differences between causes and effects is the problem of causal asymmetry or causal priority. The difference between them seems obvious but it is not easy to state in any general and informative way what this difference is. Philosophers have not agreed, however, on what costitutes this priority, or how it can be detected.

One very well known approach to the problem of causal priority involves the following claim that a state of affairs can be causally prior to another only if it is also temporally prior. This appears to have been Hume's view. According to Hume, the difference between causes and effects lie in their order in time : causes precede their effects. In other words, if *c* causes *e* then *c* is temporally prior to *e*. But there are good reasons for resisting this Humean solution The most important reason is: Humean approach rules out not only the existence of simultaneous and Backward Causation, but also their logical possibility as well. In place of the temporal priority approach a number of possible alternatives have been offered in the last two decades. It is not possible to deal with all of them within the scope of this small article The purpose of this paper * is to present a critical expository survey of Mackie's account of causal priority.

Several recent discussions of causal priority have followed Mackie in regarding the singular statement, " X causes Y " as true just in case X and Y are *causally connected* and H is caus-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ally prior to Y.[1] Mackie has devoted the most sustaincd attention to the problem of causal priority. He first *broached* the question in his influential article "Causes and Conditions",[2] where he considered whether causal priority can be analyzed through the notions of causal necessity and sufficiency. In the above paper, Mackie has analysed the concept of cause in terms of condition concepts. He considers whether an event cited as the cause of another is causally necessary for the effect, causally sufficient for it, or neither. He concludes that it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. According to him a cause is an *insufficient* but *necessary* part of a condition which is itself *unnecessary* but *sufficient* for the result.[3] That is to say, according to Mackie, events cited in singular causal judgements are insufficient but necessary components of a complex of conditions that obtained at the time the cause occurred, where the conditions comprising the complex are not themselves jointly necessary for the occurrance of the effect but are, nevertheless, sufficient for it. This is known as *INUS* condition. The first letters of the above underlined words give rise to his acronym INUS condition as the characteristic of cause. An example of Mackeie's own description will make clear why cause events are the INUS conditions of their effects. He says, the fire is said to have been caused by an electrical short-circuit. A short-circuit is not a necessary condition, since many other condiiions could create a fire. Neither is it sufficient, since this particular short-circuit would not have caused the fire, had there not been combustible material nearby, the absence of a sprinkler, and so on. The short-circuit which is said to have caused the fire is thus, an indispensable part of a complex sufficient (but not necessary) condition of the fire. In this case, then, the so-called cause is, and is known to be, an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

But the major objection against defining cause in terms of INUS condition has been raised by Prof. J. Kim.[4] He says in what sense is the short–circuit said to be the cause of the fire ? Mackie did not give any complete answer to this question.

Dorothy Emmet says that an INUS condition need not be unique. It can be selected according to our interest in what aspect of a situation we want to explain. According to her cause is a selective notion, it can be explanatory within a context, but it does not give a total explanation.[5]

Mackie's analysis of causal priority presupposes the INUS condition analysis While this approach has considerable plausibility as an analysis of singular causal statements, INUS Conditionality cannot alone account for causal asymmetry, as Mackie himself later argues in " The Direction of Causation ".[6]

> To say A was ... an *inus* condition of B is not to say that B was an *inus* condition of A This asymmetry, however, cannot constitute the causal priority ... For if A is an *inus* condition of B, then, provided that there is some necessary and sufficient condition for A itself, B will also be an *inus* condition of A. Since (for instance) the short circuit was, given the circumstance, non–redundant (i e., necessary) and also sufficient for the fire, together with these circumstances, formed a sufficient condition for the short circuit, and of this sufficient condition the fire was a non–redundant part ... Thus although the relation " is an *inus* condition of " is in fact an *inus* condition of its cause ...

Every event's effects, together with the circumstances in which the event takes place, are jointly sufficient for the occurrence of that event, and its effects are necessary for it as well The symmetry of conditionality, and the fact that causes are necessary and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sufficient (in the circumstances of their occurrence) for their effects, guarantee that effects are necessary and sufficient in the circumstances for their causes. These same considerations also imply that the only events without causally sufficient conditions are those having no effects at all. The question of causal directionality does not even arise for events of this kind. Mackie's conclusion is, therefore too weak : an effect is not just usually an *inus* condition of its cause; it is invariably one.

In his " Direction of Causation ", Mackie provides the following two ways of characterization of causal priority :

(I) If A and B are causally connected in a direct line, then B is causally prior to A if there is a time at which B is fixed while A is not fixed otherwise than by its causal connection with B.[7]

In a later account the notion of fixity is characterized as follows:

(II) An event E is fixed at time *t* if, and only if, *either* E has occurred at or before *t*, *or* a sufficient cause of E has occurred at or before t.[8]

Both these accounts have explained causal asymmetry in terms of *fixity*. The notion of " fixing " is, thus, quite fundamental in Mackie's analysis. According to him, two individual events, *A* and *B* are such that the basic requirements for the judgement '*A* caused *B*' is fulfilled. Under the circumstances, Mackie says that *A* would be causally prior to B, if and only if, there is no such time, *t*, when *B* is fixed and *A* is not fixed. This notion of fixity explains that causal relations are asymmetrical, without any explicit reference to time. In other words, he fixes it instead by appeal to the concept of event being 'fixed': causes '*fix* their effects' but not *vice versa*. For example, 'if *A* and *B* are causally connected..., then if *B* is fixed at time

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

when A is not fixed, it must be A which is the effect and B the cause.

There are number of objections against Mackie's analysis of causal priority in terms of fixity. Some of them are as follows :– Firstly, in analysing causal priority in terms of fixity, which in turn involves the notion of temporal priority, Mackie faces the problem that confronts any attempt to relate causal priority to temporal priority, namely, what account can be given of temporal priority ? Can it plausibly be treated as primitive, or is some analysis called for ? And if the concept of temporal priority stands in need of analysis, is there any satisfactory alternative that does not involve causal notions ? If not, then Mackie's account is implicitly circular.

Secondly, Prof. Brown [9] raises an important challenge against Mackie's analysis of causal priority. According to him, there seems to be an ontological difference between cause and effect in the sense that causes smooth the way to the existence of their effects, while effects do not relate in the same manner to their causes. This ontological primacy of cause has to be taken account of, even if it is not possible to match it by an epistemic analysis.

A third objection is arised from a possibility mentioned by Douglas Gasking [10] Let us suppose that iron glows in a certain way only when its tempereture is at least 1000°c. It seems possible that the state of affairs which is the iron's being at that temperature might have precisely the same spatiotemporal location as the state of affairs which is the iron's glowing. But even if that were so, one could, Gasking argues, know that the former was causally prior to the latter, in view of the fact that the heating of substances always makes them hotter but does not in general make them glow in the way that iron glows at 1000°c .

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Someone may question : why does this sort of case constitute a problem for Mackie's analysis ? The reason is this : (i) given that the events occur at the same time, and that each is nomo-logically sufficient for the other, there connot be any time at which one is fixed, and the other not. And (ii) given that they also occur at the same place, there can be no intervening causal process by virtue of which one is causally prior to the other. So if such cases do occur, or if, at least, they are logically possible then Mackie's analysis must be unsound

. Another important difficulty with Mackie's explication of causal priority is that it assumes the falsity of universal causal determinism. He intends to articulate our ordinary way of think-ing about causation, but it is doubtful, at best, that our ordinary way of thinking presupposes the falsity of determinism. Thus, it seems that Mackie's account of causal priority can obtain between events only if there is some time at which the events are not fixed, and in a totally deterministic universe this will not be so. He was not especially troubled by this consequence. But it is rather surprising if our ordinary concept of causation has the consequence that it is logically necessary that some events be causally undetermined.

A final objcetion is that Mackie's analysis, like Humean analysis of temporal priority, has faced difficulty with the possi-bility of a world in which causal or at least proto-causal processes, run in opposite directions. Therefore, on the one hand, if one postulates a single direction for time which deter-mines what events are fixed at a given time on both sides of the wall, it will follow that there are cases in which event e is fixed at time t, and *c* not, even though e is causally, or proto-causally, dependent upon c. On the other hand, if the direction of time is different on opposite sides of the wall, it seems that the direction

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

of temporal priority, and with it what events are fixed at a given time, must rest upon causal or proto–causal relations.[11] For otherwise, what account can possibly be given of the grounds for holding that time has one direction, rather than another, in a given region? There is however, a possibility of a world in which causal or proto causal processes run in different directions. Thus, it seems to show that Mackie's analysis must be either false or circular.

To tackle the above difficulties, Mackie in "Mind, Brain, and Causation"[12] offers a new account of causal priority which differs from his earlier works His new account of causal priority runs as follows :

> "...if on a particular occasion A's doing X is causally related to B's doing Y, and if they had not been so related but things had otherwise been as far as poosible as they were, A would still have been doing X but B would (or might) not have been doing Y, then A's doing Y, than B's doing X is conditionally and causally prior to B's doing Y. And this holds whether A's doing X is necessary for B's doing Y, or sufficient, or both.[13]

This view has been formulated in counterfactual terms. That is : c is causally prior to e if and only if c and e are causally connected on a particular occasion and, if a small change were made such that c and e had not been so connected on particular occasion but things had been as far as possible at they were, c would have occurred but e would have failed to occur. Mackie illustrates this view with an example of two causally related items, the rotation of a drive shaft and the rotation of the rear wheels of a car. When the engine is moving the car along the road, the rotation of the wheel is causally dependent on that of the drive shaft. What does it involve? According to Mackie,

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

'...this means that if the connection between the two rotations had not been there–say, if the differential had failed or had been missing–but things had otherwise been as far as possible the same, the drive shaft would have been rotating but not the wheels.'[14] As Mackie puts it, the directed conditionality is formulated in terms of a counterfactual conditional of which the contrary–to–fact antecedent is that the causal relation between the relevant items is absent. The antecedent also includes the condition that the failure of the causal relation is the result of a 'small change in the circumstances' so that the circumstances are as far as pooible the same. The consequent of the conditional states that the cause–event occurs but the effect–event fails (or might fail) to occur.

This analysis of causal priority is criticized by Douglas Ehring[15] He points out that it is vulnerable to counter examples involving preemption. Suppose, for example, that the "small change" required to eliminate the causal connection between c and e brought into play some otherwise preempted cause d, which, in the absence of this connection, causes e.

In addition, Mackie claims that his analysis is true whether 'A's doing X is necessary, sufficient, or both for B's doing Y. Suppose that c is a sufficient but not a necessary cause of e such that e is causally over determined by c and d. We then introduce a small change in the circumstances which eliminates any causal relation between c and e Since e is causally overdetermined e occurs in the absence of this causal link to c. If we further suppose that the small change made also eliminates a necessary condition of c, then we are required to conclude that e causes c contrary to our assumption Cases of this sort of counter examples show that Mackie's analysis does not provide an adequate reconstruction of our concept of causal priority The above criticism does not pose any serious problem regarding

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Mackie's analysis of causal priority in terms of counterfactual conditional. For, the central point of Mackie's reply is that in cases of the preemption causation " we cannot suppose that in the *nearest* possible world where c fails to cause *e* the alternative cause d is brought into play."[16] And when Mackie claimed that his analysis ' holds whether A's doing X is necessary for B's doing Y, or sufficient, or both ' he was not in fact referring to overdetermination, but to different possible types of causal law.[17] In addition, it is controversial whether pure cases of overdetermination, where exactly the same effect results from causes together as would have resulted from either on its own, ever occur. Thus, we may say that an adequate analysis of causality should not depend on the truth of a controversial philosophical thesis. Indeed, it can be argued that an adequate analysis of causality should not be committed to any philosophical thesis, controversial or not. An analysis is, basically, an explication of meaning, and as such is independent of regulatory principles and philosophical thesis. Finally, we may claim, in favour of Mackie's new account of causal priority that the main suggestion in his article " Mind, Brain and Causation " was that we have a certain notion of a direction of conditionality which contributes to our concept of causal direction and that there are typical procedures and observations which conform such a direction of conditionality in particular cases [18]

MAHADEV DEWASHI

Department of Philosophy
University of Hyderabad
Hyderabad–500 134.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

NOTES

* I am grateful to the I. C. P. R., for Financial Support to prepare this article.

1. Mackie, J. L.; *The Cement of The Universe*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1974), p. 51.
2. Mackie, J. L; "Causes And Conditions", *American Philosophical Quarterly*. Vol. 2, (1965) pp. 245-64 reprinted in SOSA, E. (ed) *Causation and Conditionals*, Oxford University Press, (1975) pp. 15-38.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
4. Kim J.; "Causes and Events : Mackie on Causes", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 68, (1971), pp. 426-41.
5. Emmet, D.; *Effectiveness of Causes*, Macmillan, London (1984), p. 11.
6. Mackie, J. L.; "The Direction of Causation", *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 75, (1965), p. 446.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 457.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 459.
9. Brown, E.; "The Direction of Causation", *Mind*, Vol. 88 (1979) pp. 335-50.
10. Gasking, D.; "Causation and Recipes", *Mind*, Vol. 64, (1955) pp. 479-87.
11. *Proto-Causal Relation* :- It is a kind of relation which need not have necessarily possessed the structural property (whereas causal relation ordinarity conceived is a structural property) but which does have direction associated with it, and which holds between any two states of affairs that are causally related.
12. Mackie, J. L.; "Mind, Brain, and causation", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 4 (1975) pp. 19-29.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
15. Ehring D.; "On Mackie's New Account of Causal Priority", *Analysis*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1981), pp. 82-83.
16. Mackie, J. L.; "Causal Priority and the Direction of Conditionality" *Analysis*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1981), p. 85.
17. Mackie, J. L.; *The Cement of the Univers*, pp. 40-43 and 58.
18. I am indebted to Dr. Chinmoy Goswami for his valuable suggestions, which helped me in writing this paper.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

(Formerly 'The Philosophical Quarterly')

Students' Supplement

Journal of the Pratap Centre
of Philosophy, Amalner
AND
Department of Philosophy
Poona University, Pune

411021

New Series

Volume XVIII
No. 4
October, 1991

Editors :

S. S. Barlingay
R. Sundara Rajan
Rajendra Prasad
Mrinal Miri
M. P. Marathe
S. S. Deshpande

University of Poona

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
ISSN 0376-415X

Editors

S. S. Barlingay, (Professor Emeritus, Poona University), Rajendra Prasad, (Rtd. Professor, Patna), M. P. Marathe (Poona University), R. Sundara Rajan (Poona University), Mrinal Miri (NEHU, Shillong), S. S. Deshpande (Poona University)

Board of Consulting Editors :

G. N. Mathrani (Bombay), Daya Krishna (Jaipur), Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta), K. J Shah (Dharwad), R. C. Pandeya (Delhi University), D. P. Chattopadhyaya (Jadavpur University), G. N. Joshi (Poona). D. Y. Deshpande (Nagpur), J de Marneffe (Poona). Dharmendra Kumar (Delhi University), R. C. Gandhi (Delhi), J. Khwaja (Aligarh Muslim University), S. A Shaida (I. I. T., Kanpur), Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow University), S. K. Saxena (Delhi University), S. V. Bokil (Poona University), R. A Sinari (Goa University), R. K. Gupta (Delhi University), R. Balasubramanian (Pondicherry University), Ranveer Singh (Imphal), V. K. Bharadwaja (Delhi University), Ashok Gangadean (Haverford College, USA).

Articles in this Journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium, and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).

Articles for publication, Books for Review, and other communications pertaining to publications, Book-reviews, subscriptions, I. P. Q. Publications, etc. may be sent to :

The Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Department of Philosophy, Poona University, Pune 411 007, India.

Subscription to be sent to :

The Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly (by Cash or by Cheque)

• Change of Address and/or non-receipt of an issue of the Journal may be intimated within a month of the date of publication

• **Life Membership :**

Individuals	:	Rs. 400/-(in India) US $ 100/-(outside India)
Institutions	:	Rs. 1500/-(in India) US $ 200/-(outside India)

• **Annual Subscriptions :**

Individuals	:	Rs. 60 (Rs. 65/- by cheque) US $ 35.00
Institutions	:	Rs. 100 (Rs. 110/- by cheque) US $ 50.00
Single copy	:	Rs. 20/- US $ 5.00

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Regn. No. 24248/37

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
STUDENTS' SUPPLEMENT

PARAMITA BANERJEE : Technology of the Self : A Preview .. 1

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

* Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for I. P. Q. **Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.** An additional copy should be retained by the author.
* The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
* **A Brief abstract of paper must accompany each MS.**
* The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc., leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
* Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed in double space on a separate sheet. Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
* Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and an alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter *l*, and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining, bold face by wavy underlining.
* The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
* Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within three months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to avoid needless correspondence.
* The author will receive 25 off-prints free of charge.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas of Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Indian Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries into basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations

---

Edited and Published by S. S. Barlingay, Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune 411 007.
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, Pune 411 016

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

TECHNOLOGY OF THE SELF : A PREVIEW

Section I : The Intended Scope of The Article

The scope of the article needs to be marked out at the very outset, and that can be done through explaining the use of the term ' preview ' in the title. Describing anything as a preview normally indicates that there is more to come, and I've used the term precisely with that indication in mind. Advocates of the technology of the self claim that, the concept cannot be understood fully until and unless it is situated in a historical actuality. But in this article, I have *not* placed the concept in any such historically real situation. The present article merely seeks to explain the notion of the technology of the self through conceptual analysis. Hence, it is just a preview.

The problem that primarily needs to be addressed in this context is that of *person,* which for the present—semantical and conceptual debates notwithstanding—I shall use as synonymous with the terms *individual, subject* and *self.* It is perhaps not too presumptuous to say that, ever since Descartes formulated his *cogito ergo sum,* the Western philosophical tradition received a permanent subjectivistic twist (I am deliberately refraining from looking further back.) Leter, Kant spelt it out more clearly and the thinking ego reached its summit through Hegel. The subjectivistic tradition has been dominated by a fixed notion of the subject or the self. Generally speaking, the subject *qua* subject may be said to be constituted by certain epistemological faculties and forms, the metaphysical quality of changelessness, the ethical property of freedom of will and the social attributes of rational dynamism.

Sure enough, apparent crusades against such a fixed idea of the subject have been launched within the Western tradition

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

itself from thinkers who can be generally grouped together under the rubric of empiricist thought. But the very emphasis on the study of the self, and the tendency to always view the person—or the self—or the subject—as an ahistorical, acultural phenomenon is present in both sides. The necessary presupposition has always been that, whichever way the self may be defined or described once is applicable to all times and cultures. I shall argue this point through a brief discussion of the notions of the self so far advocated in Western thought. And, only after that would I attempt to show why or how it is not only possible but also necessary to try and formulate a different technology of the self. It is only in that method that the importance of the concept of the technology of the self can be properly brought out.

Section II : Prevalent Notions of the Self—The Two-Pronged Fork

William James, in his article entitled *The Sentiment of Rationality*,[1] speaks of two rival theoretic positions as the two main trends of all Western philosophers. One of the positions is the philosophic quest for simplicity and unification, which basically aims at reducing the sensible diversity of the world around us to simple, unified concepts. The other position is the search for clarity, which really seeks to recognise particulars in their full completeness This observation of James is directly applicable to the idea of the self as it has been discussed in Western thought. Taking rather a vast span of Western philosophy into consideration, one might possibly group the observations about the self under two basic approaches : the metaphysical and the behavioural. While the first approach represents the passion for unification and simplicity, the second may be said to represent the zeal for clarity and distinction. However, one possible confusion should perhaps be clarified before proceeding further. The term *behavioural* is *not* to be understood here in the same sense as what is known as behaviourism in psychology.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In the present context, it is used rather in the sense of what is known as behaviouralism in the social sciences, indicating the trend of explaining any concept under consideration on the basis of an analysis of actual human behaviour in that regard.

When I talk of the metaphysical approach to the concept of the self, I refer to various Western thinkers who have advocated different shades and patterns of an absolutistic self, which acts as the assumed beginning point of their discussions. This self is an atemporal and aspatial entity, always characterised by the metaphysical quality of changelessness—though its other properties might vary slightly, depending on individual philosophers' own interests and pursuits. It acts as a perfect foil for explaining an underlying unity of the sensible diversity of the facts of the world. It is intersting to note that the method of arriving at the concept is never through an analysis of experience, but through *rational reflection*, as many philosophers are so fond of saying. That is, it is generally a concept assumed first as a necessary axiom and then sought to be established through the QED method. That the concept is a postulate is often directly acknowledged in calling it apriori, the process of knowing it being intuition.

As I have already mentioned, even if we keep ourselves within the limits of 'modern' Western philosophy, or in other words—look back only till the time of Rene Descartes, advocates of this idea of the self have been in plenty. Since it is not possible to go into even a brief discussion of the views of all the thinkers, I have chosen two philosophers as paradigm cases. They are Spinoza and Hegel. Through a very brief discussion of the salient features of their concepts, I would like to explain what I mean by the metaphysical notion of the self.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Standing opposed to the notion of the metaphysical self are a number of philosophers—whom it is possible to group together as already suggested, under the common banner of empiricist thought. This should straightaway imply that these philosophers have rejected the notion of a self given apriori to us. Their starting point is experience. For them, the self is not a pre-requisite axiom, indispensible for reducing the world's sensible diversity into one unity. In fact, this group of philosophers is rather averse to any such reduction at all. Their interest is much more to grasp the diversity of experience with all its particularities and peculiarities. They have sought to analyse the notion of the self from a behaviouralistic point of view, meaning that—their procedure is to try and formulate such a notion of the self as can be gathered from the observation and analysis of actual human behaviour. They start with the question : 'What do people mean when they utter the personal pronoun *I*?' and proceed from there.

David Hume in the context of modern Western philosophy is possibly the first significant thinker to have upheld such a diversified view of the self. He started with and remained within the bounds of human experience and had to conclude that the self is nothing more than our diverse mental states. Since Hume, contributors to this line of thinking have been quite many. For the same reason mentioned earlier, I have chosen two thinkers as paradigm cases here also—William James and Sigmund Freud.

Section III : The Metaphysical Self—Spinoza and Hegel

The zeal for unification reaches a sort of climax in Spinoza insofar as he dissolves not only individual selves, but all diversities in an absolute unity, which he calls God, or Substance, or Nature. He also acknowledges this postulated unity to be the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

necessary beginning point and emphatically declares that any other way of conceiving would only result in miseries and folly. I merely want to point out in this connection that all the other advocates of this unified notion of the self also start from a presupposed concept of it—whether acknowledged or not.

However, to discuss Spinoza's idea of the self, I refer mainly to his *Ethics*, where–I believe–his notion of an ultimate and absolute unity has been discussed most fully. His first step is to impress us with the essentiality of accepting this unity as necessary, which he seeks to achieve by defining freedom of the self for us According to Spinoza, the only way to freedom lies in the discovery of the union of the mind with the whole of nature. He means to tell us that, we are slaves to anxiety and unhappiness only because we fail to understand that, we are what we are because of our place in nature, and freedom lies in the realisation of the absolute necessity of this place. To understad that our place in nature is a necessary one, without which neither nature nor we can get on, is to discover the very essence of everything—without which nothing can be nor be conceived. This essence is always self–sufficient, needing nothing outside itself. It is perfect, complete, infinite attributes. Because of it, whatever is follows. This something that Spinoza often calls Nature is nothing else than what theologians call God or philosophers call Substance.

Spinoza, thus, presents us with a self which is aspatially and atemporally determined by preexisting rules of nature (the word being used in Spinoza's special sense) and whose freedom lies in its dissolution. The steps he takes to prove this axiom are complicated and varied. But the basic scheme is easily understandable. After explaining to us his idea of God, he seeks to demonstrate how our individual selves are nothing outside this ultimate unity.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

I'll merely present a few relevant extracts from the *Ethics* to clarify what I mean. A very important statement is his definition no. VII, offered right at the beginning of part II : ' By individual things I understand things which are finite and which have a determinate existence; and if a number of individuals so unite in one action that they are all simultaneously the cause of one effect, I consider them all, so far, as a one individual thing.[2] Thus, he unites all individual selves into one great existence, which he further proves (or seeks to) to be nothing other than God Himself. To Spinoza, the human self consists of the body and the mind—which themselves are not two different objects, but merely two aspects of God. The body is : ' A mode which expresses in a certain and determinate manner the essence of God insofar as He is considered as the thing extended '.[3] The mind, on the other hand, is nothing but a mode which expresses in a certain and determinate manner the essence of God insofar as He is a thinking thing. Any possible distinction between the two is dissolved through the declaration that—the thing extended and the thinking thing being one and the same expressed in two different ways, a mode of expression (the body) and the idea of the mode (the mind) are also one and the same thing. Eternity, however, is granted to the human mind, though—as mentioned before—that eternity consists in its dissolution in God. It is in its eternity that the human mind is capable of feeling what Spinoza calls ' the intellectual love of God ', which is part of the infinite love with which God loves Himself. The scheme for unification is completed in his assertion that : ' There is nothing in Nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can negate it.[4]

Thus, in Spinoza we are presented with such a picture of a person as is unconditionally determined by his/her place in nature, his/her only way to freedom lying in the realisation of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the necessity of this determinate state of affairs and the consequent dissolution of the self as merely a mode of the infinite God.

Two aspects of Spinoza's thesis need to be especially noted. First, in Spinoza we find a strikingly strange—so far as the ordinary language usage of the two terms is concerned—identification of freedom with an essentially determinate necessity. His scheme for the freedom of the human self is determinate in the ordinary sense of the term, but he defines freedom in terms of this very determinism. His freedom consists in the recognition and realisation of the truth that the self is determined. Secondly, his dissolution of the human self into the absolute unity called God should not be taken to imply that he leaves us with a structureless state of affairs. Rather, the structure he provides us with is pyramidal in form, where the spread out base is finally narrowed down to one single point at the summit.

In Hegel we find a different form of unity. Instead of providing us with a pyramid, we might say that he presents to us a cube into which two sets of triads are solidly united. One of his triads deals with the metaphysical aspect of the self while the other is concerned with the social aspect of the self. Like Spinoza Hegel's self—or Mind as he prefers to call it—is also essentially free, and the process of realisation of this freedom in the metaphysical sphere is rather similar to Spinoza as well. But unlike Spinoza, Hegel has shown a definite concern for the social/sociological aspect of the human mind and has tried to provide us with a scheme for realising social freedom too.

At the very outset, it is to be explained that Hegel's tendency to present his theory in the form of several sets of triads is possibly rooted in his choice of dialectic as the ideal method for 'systematic philosophy', as well as in his very conception of

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

dialectic. To him, dialectic is essentially a triplicity—not in temporal succession on numerical representation—but in terms of linguistic expression. It is a system of the unity of opposites, where the Thesis and the Antithesis are related to each other through a continuous two–way movement between themselves, out of which Synthesis evolves. Dialectic implies the essential simultaneity of so-called contraries, or the co-existence of opposites. Hegel believes that the process of reality can be understood and explained only through the dialectical method. That is why he presents us with several sets of triads to explain his theory of the self or mind.

Now, one of the very commonly held views of Hegel's philosophy is that, he believes only the mind to be real. This is definitely true, but it should be clarified that by such an assertion Hegel has not denied the existence of material things. To Hegel, Mind is not a plurality of immaterial substances; it is a system of individuals actively developing their potentialities by embodying them in increasingly complex forms. A fundamental feature of Mind is its freedom, which can be realised only when it is entirely self–conscious and realises its essential unity with the Absolute or Infinite.

However, Mind is to be understood in three aspects—the Subjective Mind, the Objective Mind and the Absolute mind. This thesis has been developed in Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* (later part of the *Encyclopaedia*). But a complete understanding of it is impossible without references to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind, Lectures on the Philosophy of History* and the *Philosophy of Right*. In Hegel's philosophical scheme, we are presented with the inseparable triad of Being, Nothing and Becoming—all three elements tightly rolled into one unity, or Totality, as Hegel calls it. Reality is nothing but this process of a continuous

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

two–way movement beween Being and Nothing. This inner unrest of self movement is Becoming Thus, reality becomes a process of continual movement towards Totality, used synonymously with the terms Spirit, Subject, Truth and Whole by Hegel. This totality is all–inclusive, a systematic collection of things united with each other through the internal relation of coherence. This relationship constitutes the very nature of the terms related, so that it becomes a process of the whole becoming the parts and the parts becoming the whole. The beginning point of this process or Reality is Idea, which is merely the possibility of Reality. Its end is Spirit, which is the actuality of Reality in all its fullness. Idea presupposes Spirit, without which it is meaningless. In the same sense, Reality is to be understood as a process of mediation between the finite or the incomplete and the Infinite or the complete. Human mind realises its own freedom concretely only through its self–identification in the Absolute. This realisation occurs only through the successful operation of Reason, which is the highest form of human thinking. One reaches the stage of Reason only after being freed from the abstract identifications and dichotomisations of Understanding. In between Understanding and Reason stands dialectical thinking,

It is on this backdrop of Hegel's thesis on reality that his theory of Mind ought to be studied. First of all comes what Hegel calls the Subjective Mind. It has three constitutive levels—anthropology, phenomenology and psychology. In its anthropological aspect, the subjective mind is to be understood as the soul as a natural entity in the world, a sensitive and feeling being capable of internalising the world's effects on it and of acting upon the world through externalisation of its feelings. In its phenomenological aspect, the subjective mind comprises phases of sense–experience, perception, understanding, desire, self–consciousness recognising its own other, and, reason. Within the psychological

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

sphere falls the intellectual activities like intention, representation, recollection, imagination, memory and thought. Practical drives or impulses and seekings after satisfaction are parts of this sphere too. The subjective mind is free only on this dual basis of thought and impulse, that is, on the rationalisation and systematisation of impulses and passions.

However, freedom as the culmination of the subjective mind is merely a concept, which is destined to develop into its objective phase. Thus, we pass on to the Objective Mind, which consists of ways through which human will becomes effective in the social world. Here, human thoughts and deeds become objectified in the form of rules, institutions and organisations. Through exercising the objective mind, men build up different world within the natural world. This transformation is effected through Law, Objective Morality and Social Morality Law stands for legal rights and duties, as exemplified in property, contract and punishment. Objective morality is an ethics of conscience and intention, where the influence of internal decision and action is rather great on the agent. Social morality, on the other hand, is characterised by three different stages—family, civil society and state.

Family is the 'natural and immediate phase' of the objective mind, where the bond that holds individuals together is love. Emotion, rather than rationality, is much more at play here. When individuals mature, they break free of family bonds and tribal allegiances to enter into an economic arna of free competition. Here they are related through the rational coincidence of their wants in a market of great extent. Thus, the civil society evolves as a system of needs, where the common concern of trade and industries also make men unite in various corporations.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

A double necessity for a higher organisation is felt within the civic society–for upholding fair dealings as well as for curbing the selfishness of various corporations. That is how the state evolves as the highest social achievement of man, as the most effective embodiment of social morality. There can be nothing superior to the state in the social sphere, but within the state there should be guarantees against arbitrariness and despotism. When a state reaches this guaranteed stage, it is an incarnation of the Absolute and individual freedom is concretely realised only through complete identification with the state.

Just as the freedom of the subjective mind consists in the final domination of impulses by thought, similarly the freedom of the objective mind consists in the ultimate subjugation of private wills to the state. A freedom that is constituted by respective guaranteed spheres, where the individuals can do what they want to do without interference from others, is negative and abstract according to Hegel. Concrete freedom is realised only when the various orders and groups of civilised life are maintained by the state. Hegel has emphatically stated in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* that, only when individuals submit their own private wills to the state, and its subordinate but free institutions can freedom be enjoyed concretely and fruitfully. This process of self-identification with the state is effected through exercising Reason. Just as the subjective mind achieves freedom by discarding understanding and adopting Reason, through the mediation of dialectic—similarly the play of understanding, dialectic and Reason are manifested in family, civil society and state respectively.

The subjective mind and the objective mind are finally united in the Absolute Mind, which consists of Art, Revealed Religion and Philosophy. In art, the Absolute Mind is embodied in material things fashioned by the artist. Religion as revealed to us is a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

more adequate and rationalised form of art, implying that embodiment in material objects is still present. Philosophy is the highest form where Reason alone functions, so that it is wholly rational and completely freed from picture thinking. The Absolute Mind or God is not something that is fundamentally like the natural world, only grander and more powerful. Neither is He something beyond this world, forever inaccessible to man. God is manifested in this world and the artist's external vision grasps this trnth, just as the mystic's internal vision does. This is the truth revealed most adequately in the Christian doctrine of incarnation. However, the two types of visions about the Absolute are united in Philosophy, where all conflicts are resolved and ultimate freedom achieved through the self–realisation of one's own identification with the Absolute.

This cubic structure presented by Hegel has to be studied with reference to his view of history, for otherwise we miss a very significant point of departure in the Hegelian system. In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History,* Hegel argues that the progression of man in real terms is as important as the advancement of his thought. Human history, according to Hegel, is the depiction of various stages of the development of mind's freedom and individual minds need to be understood with reference to their own historical epochs.

In Hegel's conception of history as progression from lesser to greater freedom, the advent of Christianity is quite a landmark, Hegel believes Christianity to have offered for the first time a scope for all men to be free. Christianity, he claims, views an individual as of infinite value and as a candidate for eternal salvation. Since the beginning of the Christian era, human progression towards greater freedom has always proceeded on a much wider scale than before.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

However, the question that we need to ask is—how is Hegel's thesis of complete identification of the individual with the state compatible with his view of history as a continuous progression towards greater freedom ? Why should this march stop at one point, and what is the guarantee that that stage is the one where greatest freedom has been achieved ? This is definitely a paradox in the Hegelian system, which possibly results from his idealistic emphasis on Reason and the Absolute, rather than on the real nature of human progress. The history he speaks of is not a record of actual happenings in this world. It is a course of history philosophically coceived, aiming at the ultimate dissolution of everything into the Absolute. What Hegel says about history and the importance of viewing individuals with reference to their own epochs might lead us to believe that he is about to give us a genealogy of the development of the human subject. But what he actually does is, evolving a conceptual course of history which serves his purpose of tightly unifying all aspects of the individual subject into intimate dissolution in the Absolute. Through this discussion of Spinoza and Hegel, I hope to have conveyed what I mean by the metaphysical idea of the self. Now I'll pass on to the other approach–the behavioural self.

Section IV : The Behavioural Self–James & Freud

William James starts his discussion of the self with the comment : Let us begin with the Self in its widest acceptation, and follow it up to its most delicate and subtle form, advancing from the study of the empirical ... to that of the pure Ego.[4] Thus beginning with the empirical self, James points out to us that this self is constituted by all that we call *me* and *mine*. Taking this widest sense of the term, James proceeds to highlight three aspects of it—its constituents; the feelings and emotions aroused by these constituents and the actions prompted by them.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

According to James, the empirical self consists of three parts– the material self, the social self and the spiritual self. The material self, in its turn, is constituted by body, clothes, family, home and property. About the social self, James states that it is the recognition that a person gets from his/her fellow human beings. Whatever images a person has in the minds of his/her friends, relatives and acquaintances of any form—all contribute to the formulation of this aspect of the empirical self. That is why, it differs from person to person and it is virtually impossible to locate common standards for the social self. However, James feels that recognition by the person one loves is one of the most important constituents of this aspect.

'By the Spiritual Self, so far as it belongs to the Empirical Me,' writes James, 'I mean a man's inner or subjective being, his psychic faculties and dispositions taken concretely'.[6] Considering the spiritual self is a reflective process, where we think of ourselves as thinkers. The faculties of argumentation, discrimination, willing, moral judgment etc. formulate this inner self. When we look at it abstractly, we see these faculties as different and isolated from one another. But in concrete terms, these faculties are always found simultaneously in our consciousness. Concretely also, we may take a broader view and take the entire consciousness as a stream, or we may view only a segment of it at a time. James believes that we tend to take '*a certain portion of the stream abstracted from the rest*'[7] to be the nucleus of our personal identity. It is normally called the *active* element of consciousness, which is *felt* by all human. Through a discussion of what is felt and how it is felt, James has concluded that, what commonly passes by the name of spiritual activity is really a feeling of bodily activities, which are really our primary reactions.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

After discussing the three aspects of the empirical self, James turns his attention to the feelings and emotions aroused by them which he calls self–feeling. According to him, self–feeling primarily consists of self–complacence and self–dissatisfaction In elaboration he has said : 'Pride, conceit, vanity, self–esteem, arrogance vainglory, on the one hand, and on the other, modesty, humility, confusion, diffidence, shame, mortification, contrition, the sense of obloquy and personal despair. These two opposite classes of affection seem to be direct and elementary endowments of our nature.'[8] James believes these feelings to be normally provoked by one's actual success or failure and states that each of them has its own peculiar physiognomical expression. He has further indicated that the rise and fall of our self–esteem in our own eyes seem to have visceral and organic rather than rational causes and have no correspondence with the esteem of the social self.

Next come the actions prompted by self–preservation. They can be related to the three aspects of the empirical self—physical, social and spiritual. All our ordinary reflex actions, movements of alimentation and defence as well as acts prompted by fear and anger are actions or bodily self–preservation. Whichever means we adopt for the benefit of the social self are actions of social self–seeking. All our acts carried on through friendliness, loving, jealousy, wielding of power etc. fall under this category. Any impulse directed towards intellectual, moral or religious progress falls under spiritual self–seeking.

James goes on to tell us that no account of the empirical self can be complete without throwing some light on the rivalry and conflict of the different selves. He emphasises that from the various possibilities of the empirical self, individuals must choose one to actualise, so that the chosen aspect becomes real to them and the other possibilities are relegated to a kind of unreality

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

insofar as they are not actualised. He has elaborated at length on it to illustrate exactly how much conflict and rivalry of the various aspects of the self are involved in this process, so that this choice is hardly ever an easy one. But individuals do actually make the choice, or so would James have us believe.

James' final discussion on the empirical self is about self-love. He starts with the question--which self do we love in self-love--and comes up with the answer : '*We see no reason to suppose that self-love is primarily or secondarily, or ever, love for one's mere principle of conscious identity.* It is always love for something which, as compared with the principle, is superficial, transient, liable to be taken up or dropped at will.'[9]

Finishing off with the empirical self with this discussion, James proceeds to examine the notion of the so-called pure Ego. He begins his discussion with the sense of personal identity and stresses that : '*The sense of our own personal identity... is exactly like any one of our other perceptions of sameness among phenomena. It is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental respect, or on the continuity before the mind, of the phenomena compared.*'[10] He assures us that no non-experiencial axiom is really necessary to explain our sense of personal identity. To prove his point, he goes into a detailed analysis of the three different theories that postulate the existence of a so-called pure ago--the Spiritualist Theory or the Theory of the Soul, the Associationist Theory and the Transcendentalist Theory. Since our purpose is not to find logical flaw in James' refutation of these theories, we need not bother ourselves with a detailed discussion of that. But the conclusion he reaches needs to be mentioned. While summarising his chapter on the *Consciousness of the Self*, James states that, what we mean by *me* is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known and the *I* that knows them need not itself be an aggregate. It is a

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

continuous process of thought, different every moment, but appropriative of the one preceding it. He concludes with the comment that, since we have a direct knowledge of this thought, there is no reason to presuppose any unperceived metaphysical entity to explain why and how we have that direct knowledge.

Thus, in William James we find a view of the self that is diametrically opposite to the notion of metaphysical self discussed in the previous section. Rather than attempting to unify our diverse experiences about I or Me or the self, James prefers to keep the description of the self limited within the boundaries of what we directly sense and perceive. However, I still think, it is possible to draw a line of similarity between Spinoza and Hegel on the one hand and James on other. Just like these two great advocates of the metaphysical self, James also believes that the way he has described the self is a fitting description of selves of all times. It is true that James has left the formation of the social self as non–standardisable on account of being extremely individualistic. But the assumption that an individual must have some sort of a social self defined in terms of his/her relationship with others, the most important factor of which is one's recognition by the person one loves, is taken absolutistically Though he does allow some individualistic subjective elements in his notion of the self, he allows no room for history and culture. Thus, it can be said that, in none of the three theories discussed so far can we perceive any attempt to view the self as a cultural entity—the very definition of which changes with history. It has to be borne in mind in this connection that, merely allowing temporal elements in the formation of the self is *not* equivalent to recognising the self as historico–culturally determined. Because, by history we do not mean any abstract study of the notion of *Time*, but the actual study of time seg-

...2

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

mented into different epochs through human activity. Similarly, in the real sense of the term, there can be no single *Culture*, but cultures specific to historic periodisations.

Finally we come to the other proponent of the behavioural view of the self—Sigmund Freud. Freud stands apart from all the other thinkers discussed before insofar as he describes the self merely in terms of consciousness—but brings within its fold elements of the unconscious and preconscious as well. In discussing Freud's thesis, I've relied mainly on *An Introduction to Psycho-Analysis*, which contains–as revealed in Freud's own introductory note—a summarised but comprehensive account of his main tenets.

Freud prefers to call the self or the mind the psychical apparatus, which, according to him, has three layers—comparable to one large room dimly lit by one electric lamp in the centre. The portion of the room well-lit by the lamp may be called the conscious zone of the mind; the portion of the room half–lit corresponds to the preconscious, while the area left in the dark is the unconscious zone of the psyche.

The conscious mind consists of ' perceptions, feelings, intellective processes and volitions.'[11] However, it is wrong to suppose that consciousness is strictly a mental process. Freud tells us that : These conscious processes do not form unbroken series which are complete in themselves; ... there are physical or somatic processes which accompany the mental ones and which must admittedly be more complete than the mental series, since some of them have mental processes parallel to them but others have not. It thus seems natural to lay the stress in psychology upon these somatic processes, to see in *them* the true essence of what is mental and to try to arrive at some other assesment of the conscious process.[12] Freud indicates that only if we can

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

comprehend this can we accept the role of the preconscious and the unconscious in the workings of the mind.

Apart from the four major conscious processes already named, all other mental qualities are unconscious. However, some processes of the unconscious can be made conscious easily and they have been called *preonscious* by Freud. Any memory that can be easily recalled falls under this zone.

However, Freud asserts that, ' There are other mental processes or mental material which have no such easy access to consciousness, but which must be inferred, discovered and translated into conscious... It is for such material that we reserve the name of the unconscious proper.'[11]

One thing to be remembered in this connection is that, these layers of the mind are neither absolute nor permanent. The preconscious becomes conscious without much trouble, and often without any deliberation at all. Even unconscious can be made conscious, though resistance here is quite strong.

The psyche that is thus composed of three layers has three constitutive apparatus as well. Freud has named them to be the Id, the Ego and the Super Ego. Freud claims this knowledge of the psychical apparatus has been gained through the study of the development of individual human beings. That is, his method is an inductive one, where he starts with particular cases given through experience and arrives at a general conclusion on the basis of them.

Freud defines the id as follows : 'To the oldest of these mental processes we give the name of *id.* It contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is fixed in the constitution—above all, therefore, the instincts, which originate in the somatic organization and which find their first mental expression

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

n the id in forms unknown to us.'[14] The two basic instincts of the id are Eros and the destructive instinct. Eros may roughly be called the love instinct and includes within itself the instincts of self–preservation, preservation of the species and the contrasts between ego–love and object–love. The energy of the Eros in its entirety is called libido and it serves to neutralise the destructive impulses that are simultaneously present.

The destructive or the death instinct remains silent as long as it operates internally. It works not only against the Eros, but also in combination with it e.g., the act of eating is a destruction of an object which is essential for self–preservation We become conscious of the death instinct only when it manifests itself in outward destruction.

Freud's description of the Ego is as follows : ' Under the influence of the real external world which surrounds us, one portion of the id has undergone a special development. From what was originally a cortical layer, provided with organs for receiving stimuli and with apparatus for protection against excessive stimulation, a special organization has arisen which hence forward acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world. This region of our mental life has been given the name of *ego.* [15]

The principal task of the ego is self–preservation. This function is carried on in two ways in relation to the external and the internal events. With regard to external events, the task of the ego is to receive stimuli from outside, store experiences in memory, avoid excessive stimuli through flight, deal with moderate stimuli through adaptation and modify the external world to its own advantage through activity. With regard to internal events, the principal function of the ego is to control the demands of the instincts, which are either satisfied or repressed in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

consideration of the tensions produced by stimuli present within or introduced into the id. A rise in the tensions is felt as unpleasure and their lowering is felt as pleasure. The ego seeks to pursue pleasure and avoid unpleasure.

About the super-ego, Freud has said : 'A portion of the external world has, at least partially, been given up as an object and instead, by means of identification, taken into the ego—that is, has become an integral part of the internal world .. It observes the ego, gives it orders, corrects it and threatens it with punishments, exactly like the parents whose place it has taken. We call this agency the *super-ego* and are aware of it, in its judicial function, as our *conscience* '.[16] According to Freud, the super-ego contains not only the personalities of the parents themselves, but racial, national and family traditions as well as demands made by one's immediate cultural milieu.

The function of the ego is really to reconcile the demands of the id, the super-ego and reality. As long as the ego works in total agreement with the super-ego, they are not separately distinguishable. Tensions and alienation between the two become apparent only when there is conflict between them.

Freud goes on to discuss in detail the functioning of these three instruments of the psychical apparatus as well as the problems arising from conflicts and collisions among the three. For our present purpose, it is not necessary to get into the details, since Freud's basic structure of the self is already clear in the account so far given. What we ought to note here is that, Freud does allow elements of culture in the formation of the super-ego. But that does not prevent him from taking the mind in itself as a non cultural entity. That is, while he accepts the influence of culture in the shaping of one of the psyche's instruments, he does not accept the very conception of the psyche as something

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

that can and does change with culture. Like other three thinkers already discussed, Freud also believes that the way he has described the self is correct and appropriate for all selves of all times and culture.

Section V : Technology of the Self—Why and How

A careful examination of the approaches discussed so far would reveal to us a general epistemic position, against which it is possible to pose oneself. It is an epistemic structure that proceeds with pre–determined concepts and through essential dichotomies, forever aiming at the reduction of one to the other. E. g , in the discussions of the self, carried on from whichever of the two points of view mentioned, essential postulate is always that some sort of an autonomous entity called the self or the subject can be derived, whether through ' rational reflection ', or through an analysis of actual human experience. The dichotomies involved here are unity/diversity, eternity/change, subject/object etc. Both the approaches discussed can be seen to be catering to either of these polar concepts, attempting to reduce one of the pair to the other. The metaphysical approach to the self aims at achieving unity against diversity, eternity against change, through a subjectivistic (the term being used to imply the emphasis on Reason) account of the self. The behavioural approach, on the other hand, prefers to adopt an objectivistic (i.e., the emphasis here is on actual experience) method to study the self so as to capture its diverse and changing nature, rather than its unified, eternal metaphysical concept.

This epistemic position may be identified as a teleological position, where the topic discussed as well as its method are chosen to suit a discourse whose end is already pre–determined. It is a standpoint that is rationalistic (emphasis on Reason or experience not withstanding), that presupposes a general order-

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

ing of nature and accepts the possibility of an analysis sufficiently radical to discover elements and origins beyond culture. A person here is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, who is a being able to grasp the knowledge of what renders all knowledge possible. In other words, the human subject is projected at a presumed zero–point of culture, through the study of which subjectivity, the essence of homo–sapiens beyond the control of culture, is expected to be understood.

An attempt certainly can be made to deconstruct this telos–oriented epistemy and question the why of any cognitive discourse whatsoever. In fact, such an attempt becomes most significant if we keep in mind that there is really no zero–point of culture, that culture and human subjectivity defined in terms of being the knower are co-extensive. That is why, it becomes important to question the culture–boundedness of various lines of discursiveness. In other words, rather than entering into discourses on various topics presented to us by whatever forces, it is possible to try and understand why such and such a discourse on such and such a topic at all It would be an attempt at setting the various lines of discursiveness within their own cultural contexts, which have moulded these discourses to serves the purpose of their particular historical epochs. However, it is to be borne in mind in this context that, discourses always serve a double purpose of articulating certain practices prevalent at any given historical moment as well as of creating new practices through this very articulation.

It is from this angle that I am interested in approaching the concept of the self. My attempt would be to construct a genealogy of the self, to sketch the history of subjectivity so to say. The basic purpose is to try and analyse the concept of the self as a culture–specific notion, being shaped and reshaped by various historical forces and factors.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

It is perhaps necessary here to underline the difference that exists between my approach and that of Karl Marx as well as quite a few other thinkers, who have emphasised the influence of society on the shaping of individuals. Marx has stated in unequivocal terms that individuals are very much the products of their own historico–cultural epochs, and there are many other thinkers who have expressed the same opinion in a variety of voices. But generally speaking, all these thinkers have laid stress on various techniques of dominance—viewing society as a power that moulds persons to fulfil its own needs. The ideal man is posed beyond this, who is to emerge only when society itself has reached the stage able to provide the ideal conditions. The explanation here is always in terms of individuals standing opposed to society at large. One might refer here to the three types of social techinques spoken of by Habermas : techniques of production, of signification or communication and of domination. These techniques more or less sum up the various means of social dominance spoken of by different thinkers of this genre; these are actually all techniques of dominance that allow human beings to exercise their power over nature as well as over each other. The fundamental trend of thinkers seeking to view Individuals as products of history has been to study them through a powerful/powerless dichotomic paradigm as objects being moulded into particular role–players in and through the domination of historical forces. Power here is viewed as a necessarily negative force outside individuals who stand pitted against it either in obedience or in protest.

One might relevantly refer here to Michel Foucault's *The Order of Things*, where he states that according to this interpretation of individuals, it seems that, 'Man is governed by labour, life and language : his concrete existence finds its determinations in them; it is possible to have access to him only through his

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

words, his organism, the objects he makes–as though it is they who possess the truth in the first place (and they alone perhaps): as soon as he thinks, he merely unveils himelf to his own eyes in the form of a being who is already a living being, an instrument for production, a vehicle for words which exist before him.'[17]

It is possible to view individuals beyond these dominating techniques and that is where the question of the technology of the self comes in. That is, individuals can be studied as products of history not merely as malleable objects at the mercy of socio–cultural forces, but as beings whose very subjectivity is constituted by particular cultural set–ups. It does, of course, involve a different view of power as well. Viewing power as a positive force instead of a negative one, as something immanent in persons rather than something outside them is the basic postulate that needs to be accepted in order to understand the technology of the self. To grasp this concept, we must cease to see individuals as standing opposed to social power/s and begin to understand the entire society as a complex network of various kinds and degrees of power, where individuals are very much within that same power–structure, not outside it. In other words, power must not be viewed as an external force against which persons are compelled to stand either in submission or in defiance. Rather, it ought to be accepted as a force that includes within itself both submission and defiance. wieldable not merely by mysterious outside forces but by individuals themselves as well. It is on the backdrop of such a notion of power that the concept of the technology of the self can be fully comprehended.

Technology of the self is a term I've borrowed from the French thinker, Michel Foucault. He has introduced the term in his *History of Sexuality, Vol. I* and has gone on to elaborate it in

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

the secoud volume of the same book, as well as in other subsequent articles. Foucault claims that, through his studies primarily as historian, he has discovered the existence of a different type of technique over and above the techniques of dominance in all societies. He has indicated that individuals are not merely influenced and moulded through the techinques of dominance. They also feel obligated to see themselves through certain forms and modalities, with the help of which they act on themselves. These forms and modalities are collectively called *technologies of the self.* To explain the concept in Foucault's own words : 'Techniques which permit individuals to affect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own thoughts, their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves and to attain a certain state of perfection, happiness, purity, supernatural power. Let us call these kinds of techniques technologies of the self. [18]

It may still be necessary to elaborate a little more on the use of the term *technology*. By this term, we generally mean the various means adopted and applied by human beings to modify the natural world for their own benefit. We use the term here in the same sense to refer collectively to the various techniques employed by persons upon themselves to modify their own beings for attending a coveted level of something.

It is in describing this something that culture comes back into the discussion. What is this *something* to achieve which the technology of the self is used ? It is the subjectivity of a person or in other words, it is that which allows an individual to view himself/herself as an autonomous subject. What would be the standard for this subjectivity is always culture–specific, essentially related to particular historic periodisations. In order to construct the history of subjectivity, the initial necessity is to break free

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

from the notion of the self conceived as constant. It is essential at the very outset that there is no fixed philosophical subject, but the very subject *qua* subject keeps changing What is my *self* today need not have been my*self* in the 6th century, nor does it have to be my*self* in the 26th century.

Only through our acceptance of the fact that there are various modes of subject production, just as in the production of other commodities, can the study of the technology of the self emerge as a line of fullfledged philosophical research. It is with reference to historico-cultural eras that we can study the reasons behind the growth of the concept of the human subject as a fixed, autonomous entity in Western thought, or in other phliosophical traditions.

Following Foucault again, we can classify the basic areas of focus in this respect as follows: i) the formation of specific disciplines dealing with the problem of the self; ii) the systems of power that regulate the practice of subjectivity in any specific historical period; iii) the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to recognise themselves as subjects.[19] It is with regard to the third question that the technology of the self can be most fully understood. It is here that we need to concentrate most on the culture-specific practices through which 'individuals are led to focus their attention on themselves, to decipher, recognise and acknowledge themselves as subjects.'[20]

The previous two aspects are really tools needed to formulate a genealogy of the subject *qua* subject. It becomes essential to analyse the forms of discursiveness that have acted as articulated manifestations of notions of the self or subject, as well as to examine various strategies and techniques that control the exercise of power-not merely from without but from within individuals themselves. The analysis of discursive practices makes

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

it possible to trace the formation of distinctive disciplines dealing with the notion of the self The analysis of power–relations and their application methods helps us to view these disciplines as open strategies, while escaping the alternative of a power conceived as domination. To use Foucault's words again, power ought to be studied in its manifold relations, open strategies, and the rational techniques that articulate the exercise of power.[21]

In the study of the technology of the self, we are to concentrate on the various standards operating on persons of a specific historico–cutural era, through which they recognise themselves as subjects–ethically, epistemically, sexually etc Every historic period has fixed 'truths' for its subjects, only through which they are obliged to see themselves as individuals capable of functioning with power in a society. In this sense, this entire study can also be called an analysis of the games of truth. Because, to formulate a genealogy of human subjectivity, what we really have to do is to figure out the various definitions of *truth* handed out to persons of different periods. It is through these 'truths' that human beings have always looked for the essence of their existence. 'What are the games of truth by which man proposes to think his own nature when he perceives himself to be mad; when he considers himself to be ill; when he conceives of himself as a living, speaking, labouring being; when he judges and punishes himself as a criminal?'" It is only through a thorough examination of the answers provided to such and other questions at various phases of history that an adequate history of subjectivity can be formulated. It is through this analysis that we can understand how persons are led to practise on themselves and on others different hermeneutics, only through which they formulate a knowledge of their own self, to recognise themselves as subjects.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

To study the theories of the self discussed in the previous sections from this angle would mean : placing these theories in their own historico–cultural contexts and compare them with the practices prevalent then to grasp why and how these lines of discourse could emerge, what have been the exercises of power behind these emergences as well as how the respective forms and modalities did evolve as the truths about the subject or the self. To clarify a little more, studying Spinoza from this point of view would mean an analysis of the social context, and the then social practices that could have led to such a formulation of the self as the *true* self of human beings.

To be able to effectively carry on such a study, it is essential as already suggested–to break free from the notion of an autonomous human subjectivity which has dominated western thought for quite a few centuries. It is to be accepted that there is no such thing as a sovereign human self–whether it be a metaphysically eternal one or an experiencially changing one that aculturally acts as the knower, the moral judge, the willing–feeling–desiring being. Rather, that very subjectivity or the notion of such a fixed self can arise and has actually arisen out of particular cultural contexts, on the backdrop of which these discourses are to be analysed. It is through studying the relevant social practices that the formulation of these notions can be fully comprehended.

This man–centered dogmatism in Western thought has been called 'the anthropological sleep' by Foucault, about which he comments that a study of the formation of the human self is a must 'in order to awaken thought from such a sleep–so deep that thought experiences it paradoxically as vigilance'.[22]

All this discussion, however, remains incomplete–as clarified right at the beginning—until and unless the technology of the

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

self is studied in a particular historical situation. In such a study, one can posit either the develoment of disciplines or an analysis of the power–structure as the basic method of approach. While the former would yield an insight into the role the various lines of discursiveness have played, the latter would illumine the changing roles of subjectivity redefining itself throngh changes in the power network. To clarify the notion of the technology of the self then, it is essential to adopt either of the two basic approaches and apply it to a real historico–cultural situation.

The last but no less important point to be clarified is that—though this discussion has been carried mainly on the backdrop of Western thought, the scope of applying the idea of the technology of the self is definitely not delimited to Western fields only. Any real historico–cultural situation is open to such a treatment.

Department of Philosophy
Jadavpur Univesity
Calcutta–700032
(W. B.)

PARAMITA BANERJEE

NOTES

1. James, William; *Essays in Philosophy* (The works of William James series), Harvard University Press/Article : " The Sentiment of Rationality ", pp. 36–37.
2. Spinoza, Benedict De: *Ethics*, Hafner Press / Part II : Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind, p. 80.
3. *Ibid*, Definition I, p. 79.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

4. *Ibid*, Proposition XXVII, p. 175.
5. James, William : *The Principles of Psychology*, Dover Publishing Inc./ Chapter X : The Consciousness of the Self, p. 291.
6. *Ibid.* p. 296.
7. *Ibid.* p. 297.
8. *Ibid.* p. 306
9. *Ibid*, p. 323.
10. *Ibid*, p. 334.
11. Freud, Sigmund : *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, Translated by James Strachey, The Hogarth Press, London and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis / Chapter IV : Mental Qualities, p. 16.
12. *Ibid*, pp. 16–17.
13. *Ibid*, pp. 19–20.
14. *Ibid*, Chater I : The Psychical Apparatus, p. 2.
15. *Ibid*, p. 2.
16. *Ibid*, Chapter X : The Internal World, p. 77.
17. Foucault, Michel : *The Order of Things*, Vintage Book Edition / Chapter 9 : Man and his Doubles, Section III : The Analytic of Finitude, p. 313.
18. Do : Article "Sexuality and Solitude", included in *On Signs*, Edited by Marshall Blonsky, John Hopkins University Press, p. 367.
19. Do : *The History of Sexuality*, Volume 2 : The Use of Pleasure, translated by Robert Hurley, Vintage Books / Introduction, p. 4.
20. *Ibid.* p. 5.
21. *Ibid.* p. 6.
22. *Ibid.* p. 7
23. Do : *The Order of Things*, Vintage Books Edition / Chapter 9 : Man and his Doubles, Section VIII : The Anthropological Sleep, p. 341.

078678

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-**

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs. 25/-**

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-**

Ramchandra Gandhi (ed) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs. 50/-**

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs. 70/-**

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs. 60/-**

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism, Rs. 50/-**

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-**

S. S. Barlingay (ed), **A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs. 50/-**

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs. 25/-**

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs. 30/-**

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs. 100/-**

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Pune–411 007.

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar